CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050032-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 378
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: February 17, 1967
• Content Type: REGULATION

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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE
SOVIET UNION
HEARINGS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETIETH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
EXECUTIVE D, 88TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-968 WASHINGTON : 1967
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
WAYNE MORSE, Oregon
ALBERT GORE, Tennessee
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, Ohio
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho
STUARM SYMINGTON, Missouri
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut
JOSEPH S.. CLARK, Pennsylvania
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
EUGENE J. MCCARTHY, Minnesota
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
FRANK CARLSON, Kansas
JOHN J. WILLIAMS, Delaware
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk
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CONTENTS
Statements by- pogo
Allen, Richard V., Hoover Institute, Stanford University----------- 206
Dobriansky, Lev E., Chairman National Captive Nations Committee_ 145
Hicks, W. B., executive secretary, Liberty Lobby------------------ 226
Huminik, John, Jr., Camp Springs, Md__________________________ 252
Lay, S. Houston, director, International Law Program, American Bar
Foundation------------------------------------------------- 187
MacDonald, Warren H., director of research, The American Legion-- 78
Rudis, Anthony J., national president, Lithuanian American Council- - 240
Rusk, Hon. Dean, Secretary of State, accompanied by Hon. Nicholas
deB. Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State; Hon. Foy D. Kohler,
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; and Hon.
Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser, Department of State --------- 6
Insertions for the record:
Letter to Hon. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation from Hon. J. W. Fulbright, January 19, 1967-------------- 1
Letter to Senator Fulbright from Mr. Hoover, January 20, 1967 ----- 2
Letter to Mr. Hoover from Secretary Rusk, September 14, 1966 ----- 2
Letter to Secretary Rusk from Mr. Hoover, September 16, 1966___-_ 3
Letter to Senator Fulbright from Hon. Douglas MacArthur II,
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, January
20, 1967, together with information on most-favored-nation clauses
in other consular treaties, and figures on diplomatic immunity---- 3
Table showing U.S. travelers to the U.S.S.R. and Soviet travelers to
the United States__________________________________
7
Table showing "immunity" status of Soviet officials in the United
States on July 1, 1966---------------------------------------- 11
Dates of Soviet consular conventions with Japan and Great Britain__ 15
Liberty Letter, No. 71, January 1967____________________________ 27
State Department memorandum of comment on Liberty Letter- - - 28
Letter to Mr. Hoover from Hon. Karl E. Mundt, January 21, 1967-- 43
Letter to Senator Mundt from Mr. Hoover, January 23, 1967, to-
gether with a list of Soviet officials in the United States who have
been arrested or expelled since January 1, 1957------------------ 44
List of American officials stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow
who have been expelled since January 1, 1946___________________ 54
Table showing tourist and exchange visitors from Eastern European
countries, 1962-66------------------------------------------- -- 62
Violations of diplomatic immunity in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern
Europe---------------- 65
Editorial entitled "Clear It With Hoover" from the New York Times,
January 23, 1967-------------------------------------------- 67
Article entitled, "24 U.S. Executives Visiting Red Bloc," from the
New York Times, October 21, 1966____________________________ 107
Chart showing FBI budget estimates and appropriations--_-__--___ 114
President Johnson's news conference of February 2, 1967, relating
to the consular convention with the U.S.S.R-------------------- 119
Statement by President Eisenhower February 2, 1967------------- 134
Letter to Senator Fulbright from M'r. Hicks, Liberty Lobby, January
.24,1967 ---------------------------------------------------- 135
Letter to Acting Attorney General Ramsey Clark from Senator
Fulbright, January 25, 1967___________________________________ 136
Letter to Senator Fulbright from General Clark January 27, 1967-- 136
Letter to committee members from Ambassador MacArthur, January
27,1967 ---------------------------------------------------- - 137
Letter to Senator Fulbright from Assistant Secretary MacArthur,
February 2, 1967--------------------------- 139
Letter to Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper from Assistant Secretary
MacArthur, February 24, 1967--------------------------------. 139
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rv CONTENTS
Insertions for the record-Continued
Letter to all committee members from Assistant Secretary Mac-
Arthur, February 6, 1967, containing questions and answers on the
proposed treaty___________
Letter to Secretary Rusk from Senator Mundt, January 28, 1967____
Letter to Senator Mundt from Assistant Secretary MacArthur,
February 3, 1967--------------------------------------------
Letter to Secretary Rusk from Senator Mundt, February 7, 1967----
Letter to Senator Mundt from Assistant Secretary MacArthur,
February 15, 1967-------------------------------------------
Letter to Secretary Rusk from Senator Mundt, February 10, 1967---
Letter to Senator Mundt from Assistant Secretary MacArthur,
February 17,1967-------------------------------------------
Correspondence with the State Department on the abrogation of the
Litvinov agreement__________________________________________
Advertisement from the St. Louis Globe-Dispatch, 1967------------
Senator Symington's letter to constitutents on the proposed consular
treaty------------------------------------------------------
Letter to Senator Mundt from Admiral Arleigh Burke, February 13,
1967-------------------------------------------------------
Article 11 of the proposed consular convention____________________
Roosevelt-Litvinov correspondence of 1933 -----------------------
Biographic sketch of Mr. Allen__________________________________
Organization of American States resolution, dated November 28,
1966 -------------------------------------------------------
Staff memorandum to Senator Fulbright on the Liberty Lobby's
registration with Congress____________________________________
List of United States-Lithuanian treaties -------------------------
Article entitled "Independence Gone, But the Party Goes On," from
the Washington Post, February 17,1967_______________________
Statements and letters submitted for the record:
United Auto Workers__________________________________________
American Veterans Committee__________________________________
Friends Committee on National Legislation_______________________
League of Women Voters_______________________________________
Nicholas D. Kazarinoff, professor, University of Michigan--------
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America_______________________
Alabama Conservative Council__________________________________
Defenders of the American Constitution, Inc______________________
Jewish War Veterans of the USA________________________________
Catholic War Veterans_________________________________________
National Society, Daughters of the American Revolution------------
American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, Inc_____________________
American Jewish Congress______________________________________
Southern States Industrial Council_______________________________
George B. Robinton, New York City ________-___
Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism ------------------
page
141
155
156
157
APPENDIX
1. Text of consular convention between the United States and the U.S.S.R.,
together with a protocol thereto-------------------------------- 283
2. Letter to Mr. Carl Marcy from Ambassador MacArthur, February 14,
1967, concerning State Department action on the 1963 Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations, and including a chronology of U.S.-
U.S.S.R. consular and diplomatic relations, a memorandum compar-
ing the proposed consular convention and the Vienna convention,
3. American Legion resolutions of 1964, 1965, and 1966---------------- 319
4. Resolution on review of, U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R., by the
National Captive Nations Committee---------------------------- 321
5. "Ten Reasons Against the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention," article
by Dr. Dobriansky-------------------------------------------- 328
6. "Historical Lessons in Totalitarian Trade," article by Dr. Dobriansky__ 332
7. Prepared statement of Mr. Lay ------------------------------------ 342
8. Exhibits of the Lithuanian-American Council----------------------- 345
9. "Russia's Baltic Window on Europe," speech by Anthony J. Rudis--- 372
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
(Executive D, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.)
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice at 10:05 a.m., in room 318,
Old Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present : Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse Lausche,
Church, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams,
Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
Also present : Senator McGee.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
We are meeting this morning to hear the Honorable Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State, and the Honorable Nicholas deB. Katzenbach,
Under Secretary of State, testify on the proposed consular conven-
tion with the Soviet Union. They are accompanied by the Honorable
Foy Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
and, as you know, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and the
Honorable Leonard Meeker, State Department legal adviser.
I wish to insert in the record at this point a letter from Mr. J. Edgar
Hoover in response to a letter, or an invitation, from me to a pear be-
fore the committee, together with a copy of a letter from the Secretary
of State to Mr. Hoover and Mr. Hoover's reply. They will be made a
part of the record and give, I think fairly clearly, the position of the
Director of the FBI. Also to be made a part of the record is a letter
from Assistant Secretary of State MacArthur, together with some
statistics relating to the other countries that would be affected by the
proposed consular treaty.
(The letters referred to follow:)
Hon. J. EDGAR HoovER,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
WasMagton, D.C.
DEAR MR. HOOVER : The Committee on Foreign Relations has scheduled a pub-
lic hearing at 10 :00 o'clock on Monday, January 23, in Room 318, Senate Office
Building, on the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union (Ex. D, 88th
Cong., 2d sess.). Several Members of the Committee have expressed an interest
in your views with respect to this Convention, particularly in the light of your
testimony before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations
in March, 1965.
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2 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
The purpose of this letter, therefore, is to invite you to appear before us,
together with Secretary Rusk and other witnesses from the Executive Branch'
on Monday morning so that we may explore your views further.
Sincerely yours,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Washington, D.C., January 20,1967.
Hon. J. W. FULBRIOHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAn MR. CHAIRMAN : I have your letter of January 19, 1967, inviting me to
appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on Monday,
January 23, 1967.
While I, of course, desire to be helpful in any matter of mutual interest, I
must of necessity refer you to the Acting Attorney General, who quite properly,
is the ranking member of the Department of Justice to pass on matters of.,
legislation.
Frankly, the subject of your referenced latter-the matter of a Consular Con
vention with the Soviet Union-has been a chief item of correspondence between?
Secretary of State Rusk and me. I advised Mr. Rusk on September 16, 1966?
in answer to his letter of September 14, 1966, that he was basically correct'
in his assumption that rather than my opposing a Consular Treaty, I had pointed'
out to a House Appropriations Subcommittee the possibilities of an increased''
problem of internal security proportionate to the number of consulates to be.
established. I did not imply that this problem could not be handled by the red-'
eral Bureau of Investigation. My testimony before this Subcommittee occurred
prior to such legislation being considered by the Congress.
My views today are, of course, the same as those expressed in my letter to
Mr. Rusk of September 16, 1966. An appearance before your Committee would
result in my testifying to the same views. For your convenience, a copy of`
Mr. Rusk's letter to me and my reply will be found attached to this letter.
Sincerely yours,
TIIE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, September 14, 1966.
Hon. J. EDGAR HoovER,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
DEAR MR. HOOVER : I am writing with reference to the Consular Convention
with the USSR now pending before the Senate. On August 3, 1965 the Committee
on Foreign Relations reported favorably on this Convention. Five members of
the Committee filed dissenting views, and some other Senators later expressed':
reservations about the Convention. The concern of the dissenting Committee
members and of other Senators apparently stemmed in large part from your
testimony before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations
on March 4, 1965. In that bearing you stated "our Government is about to allow
(the Soviet Union) to establish consulates in many parts of the country which,'
of course, will make our work more difficult."
Your statement was widely interpreted as one of opposition to the proposed
treaty. I did not so interpret it. I thought, rather, that you were merely,
pointing out that any such agreement necessarily results in an increased problem
of internal security proportionate to the number of Soviet consulates actually
established, without, of course, implying that the problem could not be handled
by the FBI. I assume also that you were not expressing any judgment as to.
the relative value of countervailing advantages for the United States and Ameri
can citizens under the Convention. As you know from my testimony before the
Foreign Relations Committee, the Administration attaches importance to the'
Convention and considers that it would afford markedly increased protection to
large numbers of Americans who visit the USSR as tourists or on business or`
under the exchange program.
In this connection, I might mention that the coming into force of the Consular;
Convention would not confer any right on either Government to establish,
consulates in the territory of the other country except with the latter's consent!
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We would expect initially to see established perhaps one consulate in each
country, on a basis of reciprocity. The number of consular officers who would
enjoy immunity by virtue of the Convention would be only 8 to 10 in a consulate ;
thus the number of additional Soviet officials with immunity who would be
stationed in this country as a result of the Consular Convention would be mini-
mal in comparison with the large number already here. For example, there
are currently 6,310 persons attached to foreign embassies in Washington who
enjoy diplomatic immunity ; of these, Soviet Bloc nationals number 487, includ-
ing 205 USSR representatives. In New York the number of representatives to
the United Nations possessing diplomatic immunity is currently 1,458; of these
264 are Soviet Bloc nationals, including 116 USSR representatives.
Moreover, the Consular Convention accords to the receiving state the right
to agree to or withhold acceptance of individual consular officers. Similarly,
the receiving state may require the departure of any accredited consular officer
whom it no longer wishes to receive.
I should appreciate greatly your confirming my understanding of your view-
point, as this could have a significant bearing on the attitude and action of the
Senate concerning this Consular Convention.
Sincerely yours,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., September 16, 1966.
Hon. DEAN RUSK,
The Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. RUSK : I have your letter dated September 14, 1966, and find, upon
closely examining the contents, that you are basically correct with respect to
your interpretation of my testimony before a Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on Appropriations as of March 4, 1965.
The facts as mentioned in the second paragraph of your letter are, therefore,
correctly stated.
Sincerely yours,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 20, 1967.
Hon. J. W. FULSRIGHT,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : During the January 16, 1967 appearance of Secretary
Rusk before the Foreign Relation's Committee, Senators Morse and Hicken-
looper raised several questions concerning the consular convention between the
United States and the Soviet Union. In particular, clarification was requested
upon the relationship of the criminal immunity provision in Article 19 of that
Convention with other American consular agreements having the so-called
most-favored-nation provision.
The United States has thirty-five agreements presently in force with other
states requiring this country to afford most-favored-nation treatment to con-
sular officers and occasionally, to consular employes of those states. A list of
these thirty-five states is given as an enclosure to this letter. Based upon a
recent survey, twenty-seven of those states have consular establishments in the
United States, and include approximately 577 entitled consular personnel. A
list of these states and tabulation of the number of consular personnel each has
in the United States is also given as an enclosure to this letter. The criminal
immunity provision contained in Article 19 of the US-USSR consular conven-
tion would be applicable to those personnel should the sending state concerned
agree to give reciprocal treatment to American consular officers and employees
assigned there. Our Embassies in those twenty-seven states were requested to
give their assessment as to whether most-favored-nation treatment would ac-
tually be sought on a reciprocal basis. The replies indicated that at most eleven
states would probably request such treatment, and that approximately 290 of
their foreign consular officers and employees in the United States would be
affected.
Should the US-USSR consular convention be ratified, the United States
might allow on a reciprocal basis the opening of one Soviet consulate in this
countr. It is estimated that such a Soviet consulate would have fifteen or
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4 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Based upon the above figures, it is our best estimate that a total of 305
foreign consular officers and employees could enjoy full criminal immunity
stemming from the entry into force of the US-USSR consular convention. This
figure needs to be compared with the estimate of 9400 foreign diplomatic officers
and employees and members of their families presently entitled to full diplo-
matic immunity in the United States. I am enclosing a breakdown of this figure
as well.
It is our conclusion that there is no ground for concern arising from the most-
favored-nation aspect of Article 19 of the Convention. First, the numbers of per-
sons affected are small. Second, the protections made a part of the US-USSR con-
vention would apply reciprocally in the case of countries requesting most-
favored-nation treatment. You will recall that as a receiving state we have the
right to declare consular personnel persona non grata. We have also the right
to screen all nominees for foreign consular assignments in advance, and to
utilize the same visa screening process and customs controls as would be ap-
plied to Soviet diplomatic personnel. Finally, we have found from experience
that foreign consular personnel in the United States are involved only very
rarely in actions raising the possibility of criminal prosecution.
If I may provide additional information on this matter, please let me know.
Sincerely yours,
Enclosures.
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
[Enclosure 1]
LIST OF STATES HAVING MOST-FAVORED-NATION PROVISIONS IN AGREEMENTS WITH
THE UNITED STATES
Argentina
Germany
Paraguay
Austria
Greece
Philippines
Belgium
Honduras
Rumania
Bolivia
Iran
Saudi Arabia
Colombia
Ireland
Spain
Costa Rica
Italy
Sweden
Cuba
Latvia
Switzerland
Denmark
Liberia
Thailand
Estonia
Mexico
Yemen
Ethiopia
Morocco
Yugoslavia
Finland
Nepal
Zanzibar
France
Norway
[Enclosure 2]
POSSIBLE MOST-FAVORED-NATION COVERAGE OF STATES WITH CONSULAR
ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Possible
Possible
most-
most-
favored-
favored-
Total
nation
Total
nation
Country
consular
coverage
Country
consular
coverage
personnel
based upon
personnel
based upon
American
American
Embassy
Embassy
estimates
estimates
Argentina------------
1s
--------------
Italy-----------------
151
151
Austria---------------
3
3
Liberia ---------------
5
5
Belgium--------------
15
15
Mexico ---------------
58
Bolivia---------------
3
-
Norway--------------
17
Colombia------------
33
-
2
Costa Rica
9
9
Philippines
28
Denmark
16
--------------
Rumania
0
Ethiopia
0
--------------
Spain----------------
14
Finland
7
--------------
Sweden--------------
15
France---------------
44
-------------_
Switzerland
22
Germany
41
--------------
hailand----------_-_
0
Greece---------------
H
d
9
1
--------------
Yugoslavia-----------
13
on
uras------------
Iran------------------
-
0
15
-
10
15
-
Total-----------
577
290
Ireland---------------
30
30
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CONSULAR CONVEN
[Enclosure 3]
PERSONS PRESENTLY ENJOYING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY IN TIIE UNITED STATES
There are approximately 9,400 persons presently enjoying full diplomatic im-
munity in the United States. Full diplomatic immunity is construed to include
immunity from both the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the United States. The
figure of 9,400 is broken down as follows :
(1) Diplomatic officers and employees and members of their families
attached to embassies and legations in Washington--------------- 6,600
(2) Members of delegations to the United Nations and members of their
families ------------------------------------------------------ 2,200
(3) Members of delegation-s to the Organization of American States and 300
members of their families--------------------------------------
(4) Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standing Group 300
- and members of their families----------------------------------
COMMITTEE HEARINGS
The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Rusk was originally scheduled to appear
today in open session to discuss Maur foreign policy generally and pros-
pects in the coming year. At the request of the administration, the
committee has postponed that hearing to permit the Secretary to testify
on the consular convention.
As I previously announced, the committee will begin next week a
series of public hearings on the responsibilities of the United States as
a world power. On Monday, January 30, Ambassador George F.
Kennan will discuss the Communist world in 1967; former Ambassa-
dor Edwin O. Reischauer will appear on Tuesday, January 31. His
subject will be Asia, the Pacific and the United States.
Before the Secretary and the Under Secretary proceed with their
statements, I will briefly review the legislative history of the consular
convention.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CONSULAR CONVENTION
The convention was signed in Moscow on June 1, 1964, and was
submitted to the Senate on June 12 of that year. This committee
held an executive hearing on July 12,1965, to hear the testimony of the
State Department Legal Adviser, Mr. Meeker, and the Acting Assist-
ant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Mr. Richard Davis. A
public hearing was then held on July 30, 1965, at which Secretary
Rusk and Mr. Meeker testified. The committee considered the con-
vention in executive session on August 3, 1965, and decided by voice
vote to order the convention reported favorably tea the Senate. Minor-
ity views, opposing the convention, were submitted by five members
of the committee. The convention was not taken up in the Senate
itself.
There has been considerable public interest in the convention. It
is regarded by some as a threat to the security of the United States.
Others consider that it provides badly needed increased protection
for American visitors to the Soviet Union and for any American of-
ficials who may be assigned there in the future if consulates are
established.
We are pleased to have the Secretary and the Under Secretary of
State with us this morning to present the arguments in favor of ratify-
ing the convention. I hope that in their statements, and in the ques-
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tions that follow, they will also discuss the objections that have been
voiced to the convention.
(The text of the consular convention appears on page 283 of the
appendix.)
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOM-
PANIED
BY RON. NICHOLAS deB. KATZENBACH, UNDER SECRE-
TARY OF STATE; HON. FOY D. KOHLER, DEPUTY UNDER SECRE-
TARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS; AND HON. LEONARD C.
MEEKER, LEGAL ADVISER
Secretary RUSH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and distin-
guished Senators.
I am very happy to have a. chance today to discuss the consular con-
vention and to urge the committee and the Senate to act favorably on
this consular convention with the Soviet Union.
This convention was proposed by the United States.
It is a step carried to agreement in 1964 after five years of pain-
staking effort.
It is a step proposed and endorsed by three administrations rep-
resenting both political parties.
The committee will recall that the negotiations were undertaken
while Mr. Herter was Secretary of State during the presidency of
President Eisenhower. They were continued through the presidency
of President Kennedy, and brought to a conclusion under President
Johnson.
It is a step reported favorably by this committee 18 months ago.
It is a step, we believe, which at little cost would be very much in
the national interest.
MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT TREATY
Why then has the Senate not so far acted on this treaty? I believe
this has been largely because of certain misunderstandings.
There are a number of detailed aspects of the convention, which
the committee explored at length in 1965, and in a certain sense I
would wish to refer to the presentations made at that time and, per-
haps, to incorporate some of that testimony in what I say today.
You may wish to raise these aspects, however, with the two dis-
tinguished gentlemen who have come here with me : Under Secretary
of State Katzenbach, who can discuss these questions with the exper-
tise of a former Attorney General, and Ambassador Foy Kohler, now
Deputy Under Secretary of State, who can respond from his long
experience as Ambassador in Moscow. As you indicated, Mr. Chair-
man, it was Ambassador Kohler who negotiated and was instructed
to sign this convention in Moscow in 1964.
But whatever the details of the convention, I would like to spend a
few minutes discussing a single, simple; central fact of this matter-
a fact which has been misunderstood.
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BASIC PURPOSE OF CONVENTION IS PROTECTION FOR AMERICANS IN THE
SOVIET UNION
It has been argued-and widely thought-that the purpose of this
convention is to authorize the opening of consulates by both countries.
That is not its basic purpose. What this convention is primarily in-
tended to do, immediately upon going into effect, is to permit the
United States promptly to protect and assist its citizens when they
are arrested and detained in the Soviet Union.
Even if no consulates were ever to be opened by the two countries,
this convention would give American citizens in the Soviet Union
more rights than any Soviet citizen possesses-rights which any So-
viet citizen already has in our open society without such a treaty.
The importance of this result would be considerable, both quanti-
tatively and qualitatively. It must not be underestimated.
UNITED STATES AND SOVIET TRAVELERS
Quantitatively, the importance of the protections this convention
would afford to Americans increases every year. The number of
Soviet tourists and visitors to this country is small and has remained
fairly constant in the past five years. It was about 900 in 1962 and it
was about 900 in 1966. But the number of American tourists and
visitors in the Soviet Union has increased steadily during the same
period. In 1962, 10,000 American travelers went to the Soviet Union.
In 1966, there were 18,000; and I would wish, if the committee is will-
ing, to supply the figures for the record on that.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Without objection they will all be included.
(The figures referred to follow:)
1962--------------------------------------------
1963--------------------------------------------
1964--------------------------------------------
1965--------------------------------------------
1966-------------------------------------------
Soviet travelers to
United States
Tourist (ap-
proximately) I
Exchange
visitors
Exchange
visitors
9,000
1,161
952
10,000
537
589
15,000
874
646
17,000
916
832
15, 000
23,074
786
1 No exact count is available of the number of U.S. tourists visiting the Soviet Union, so the figures in
this let column are approximate. You will notice that we have revised upward, from 12,000 to 15,000 our
1964 estimates in this category. This we did after checking data from all available sources, including Soviet
sources as well as our own Passport Office.
2 The sharp increase in U.S. exchange visitors to the U.S.S.R. in 1966 was largely attributable to heavy
U.S. attendance at a number of major international conferences.
Secretary RUSK. In 1966, for example, there were 15,000 tourists
and some 3,000 exchange visitors, a. sharp increase in exchange visitors
due to a substantial number of international meetings that had been
held in 1966 in the Soviet Union.
The convention thus would benefit both countries, but on simply a
numerical basis-comparing 900 of their people visiting with us and
18,000 of our own people visiting with them, it is more valuable to
the United States.
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0 VENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
PROTECTION FOR AMERICAN CITIZENS IN THE SOVIET UNION
At least as important, however, is the qualitative argument-the fact
that this convention would allow the United States to take protective
action in those incidents when American citizens have been detained
for long periods with little or delayed assistance from their Govern-.
ment.
To those accustomed to the vigilance of American courts in pro-!',-
tecting the right of arrested individuals, it is jarring to recognize
that, under Soviet law, access to an arrested person can be refused`
while the case is under investigation-for a period of weeks or even!,
longer, up to nine months.
Were is not even a present requirement that the United States must".
be notified of an arrest.
Such treatment is not only unjust by our standards but must have!
wounding impact on the individuals involved. Surely such incidents
have serious public impact in this country. Without rules of the kind
this convention would provide, the arrest of an individual quickly be-
comes an international incident.
CASES OF AMERICANS ARRESTED
That I am not exaggerating is evident from recalling even briefly
a few of the recent cases. One was the case of the RB-47 flyers in
1960 and 1961. Another was the case of Professor Barghoorn, whose
arrest in 1963 we learned of only after twelve days, and whom we were
never permitted to see in prison.
Another was the tragic 1965 case of Newcomb Mott, in which 9 days
elapsed before any American official was allowed access to him, and
then only for one hour. Only three other consular meetings were al-
lowed in the next ten weeks prior to trial. Mott was sentenced to 18
months in prison. Apparently in a state of despondency, very likely
related to the isolation in which he had been held, he died shortly
afterward in circumstances that have yet not been fully explained.
Thomas Dawson, a Peace Corps volunteer, was apprehended by
Soviet border guards on September 11, 1966, while gathering seashells
barefoot near the Soviet-Iranian border. Our Embassy was never
notified of his arrest and it was not until September 20 that consular
access was accorded.
And the most recent instance, which is still unresolved, is that of
the arrest of Buel Ray Wortham and Craddock Matthew Gilmour on
October 1, 1966, for currency violations and theft.
In just the 30 months since this convention was signed, we know of
at least 20 cases where Americans have been detained by the Soviet
police. Some of these Americans acted foolishly-or worse. Some
committed acts which are regarded as criminal under Soviet but not
American law, some apparently committed acts which would be crimi-
nal in both countries. In none of these cases did the Soviet authorities
adhere to the standards of notification and access provided for by
this convention.
I cannot assure you, Mr. Chairman, that if this consular convention
had been in force, we could have prevented the tragic outcome of the
Mott case or prevented these other Americans from being jailed. But
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 9
the standards provided by this convention would have greatly as-
sisted us in our efforts to assure them the protection that is normal
among most states.
Equally important, this convention could well have eliminated the
need for the United States to make repeated representations at very
high political levels, in order to secure even late and limited access to
our citizens.
The rights of international due process which this convention would
provide would be available without question, without delay, and with-
out the need for continuous and insistent high-level diplomacy. They
should be accorded as a matter of course, and we would expect that
under this convention.
That goal-the maximum possible protection and assistance for
American citizens on a regular and routine basis-is our central pur-
pose in this convention, a purpose about which I cannot imagine any
serious question.
May I add that, if there are channels by which such cases can be
handled on a routine basis, that it is itself a protection against the in-
trusion of the type of prestige consideration that makes the solution
of the cases even more difficult.
This convention is not ' necessary, Mr. Chairman, to authorize the
reestablishment of consulates between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The President's foreign policy responsibilities under the Con-
stitution already give him the authority to permit the establishment
of foreign consulates in this country.
That is an authority which has been acted on repeatedly, not only
with a number of other countries, but specifically with the Soviet
Union. Soviet consulates were established in New York and San
Francisco in 1934 and in Los Angeles in 1937. The United States
established a consulate in Vladivostok in 1941 and was prepared to
open another in Leningrad in 1948, when both countries withdrew
their consuls.
What this convention would do, however, through its various tech-
nical protections, is to provide the basis on which we believe we could
prudently reestablish consulates on a reciprocal basis.
Given these protections, we would like to open a consulate with
10 or 15 American employees, probably in Leningrad, to provide bet-
ter protection for our citizens in the Soviet Union. In return, we would
be expected to permit the Soviets to open a parallel consulate in a
comparable American city.
It is not true, Mr. Chairman, that we contemplate opening a large
number of consulates in both countries as a result of this convention.
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10 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
We ourselves have felt that it would be useful and important for the'
United States, if possible to have a consulate in Leningrad with its
rapidly growing number of American tourists. Leningrad is a very'
attractive city for them. They go there in very substantial numbers.
Those members of the committee who have been there can understand
why. The Soviet Union has restored Leningrad as one of the great,
historical European cities. Its Hermitage art collection is one of the:;
most interesting and most splendid art collections in the world, and so
we have a good deal-and expect to continue to have a good deal-of
consular business in Leningrad in the period ahead.
RISK OF ESPIONAGE NOT INCREASED BY THIS CONVENTION
Some have expressed the fear that a comparable Soviet consulate in
the United States, coupled with the reciprocal criminal immunity pro-
visions of the convention, would encourage Soviet espionage and sub-
version. They have argued that this danger outweighs the benefits
which the convention might bring to the United States.
The possibility they fear must not be ignored, but I do not see how
this consular convention can add significantly to the risk of espionage.
Let me outline my reason for these conclusions:
First, the anticipated increase in the number of Soviet personnel
in this country is small. At present, there are 1,018 Soviet citizens
in this country, 452 of them with diplomatic immunity. Our Soviet
consulate would add only ten or fifteen.
I should point out that this figure of 452 includes both Soviet diplo-
mats assigned to the Embassy in Washington, and Soviet personnel
with diplomatic immunity at the United Nations.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you happen to have the breakdown?
Secretary Russ. Yes, sir. We will furnish it for the record. We
have it with us.
The CHAIRMAN. Please do that.
(The information referred to follows:)
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 11
01,
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12 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Secretary Rusx. Second, the immunity provisions of this conven-
tion would give these added representatives no exemptions which So-
viet diplomatic personnel do not already have--and in fact would pro-
vide less, since they would not be immune from civil action in matters
not connected with their official duties.
Third, we are all aware of the excellent work of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation in controlling possible espionage by foreign repre-
sentatives and agents in this country over the years. I believe they can
cope with a few more-a belief with which, as you know, Mr. J. Edgar
Hoover, is in basic agreement. Our confidence in the FBI's work in
this field reduces even further the already small risk involved in the
establishment of such a Soviet office.
Fourth, adoption of the criminal immunity provision in this con-
vention could affect bilateral agreements with 27 other countries and
could result in similar immunity for some 290 consular personnel-
none of them from bloc countries. But this is not a large number
when compared with the total of 9,400 persons in the United States
with full diplomatic immunity. Nor is it a dangerous precedent.
According to a State Department survey, between 1939 and 1964 there
were eleven consular officers charged with crimes. Five of these were
for traffic offenses. Two of the 11 were convicted.
I might also say on this point, Mr. Chairman, that several of the
other countries whohave a most-favored-nation privilege with us with
respect to such matters either have negotiated or are negotiating their
own bilateral consular arrangements with the Soviet Union. For ex-
ample, Britain and Japan have just announced those, and we under-
stand the French are discussing the same subject.
The CHAIRMAN. Similar to ours?
Secretary RUSK. Not identical.
The CHAIRMAN. Similar.
Secretary Rusx. But I think the relevant point is that those coun-
tries who have their own bilateral consular treaties with the Soviet
Union would be unlikely to ask us to change our arrangements on a
most-favored-nation basis, because they are taking care of their own
needs in another way.
Fifth, under the convention, all persons enjoying immunity are
under a duty to respect the receiving country's laws, including traffic
laws. To enforce this obligation, the convention expressly provides
for the unrestricted right to declare an individual persona non grata.
I have discussed, Mr. Chairman, the merits of the convention. Like
every other treaty, this convention must, of course, be judged on its
merits. However, we should be mindful, too, of its place in our overall
relations with the Soviet Union.
As President Johnson said in his state of the Union message to the
Congress.
Our objective is not to continue the cold war, but to end it.
I should like to reiterate our national policy of expanding our con-
tacts with the U.S.S.R. so as to end the mutual isolation of our two
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 13
societies. Increased contacts can reduce misunderstandings between
our two countries, and lead, in time, to international cooperation in
areas where we are able to find common interests and mutual advan-
tage, even though there might exist very important and sharp and
sometimes even dangerous differences between us.
Mr. Chairman, I firmly believe this convention would serve our
national interests. It would support and promote important objec-
tives of our foreign policy. More tangibly, it would substantially
strengthen the capacity of the United Mates to protect a large and
increasing number of its citizens who travel to the Soviet Union. And
I believe that this practical gain justifies support of the convention by
those who may not share our view about larger objectives.
In practice, the possible risks of espionage and of enlarged criminal
immunity are both small and controllable.
In short, Mr. Chairman, the committee and Senate approval of this
consular convention would benefit the Nation and our citizens, and I
strongly urge your support.
Thank you very much for this privilege of making this short state-
ment, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
What do you think would be the effect if the Senate refused to ratify
the convention?
Secretary Ruses. I think in the first instance we would continue to
be limited in the protections which we can afford to our own citizens
traveling in the Soviet Union.
Our citizens, as you know feel that they ought to have the maximum
freedom to travel, and the Aupreme Court has reinforced that feeling
on their part as to the right of citizens to travel.
But wherever our citizens travel, there is an obligation on the part
of the U.S. Government to offer them protection-and even where the
citizens travel into areas where we are not represented, and even when
citizens themselves say, "Oh, we will not ask for protection, we waive
any interest in protection, we take our own risks." Nevertheless,
when they get in trouble, both they and their families and you gentle-
men here, expect us to do everything we possibly can to give them
protection.
The obligations of a government to its citizens are not something
that can be waived by citizens, and are not something that the govern-
ment can take lightly.
So I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we need this to protect our
citizens.
Secondly, I do think that it is important that we find ways to try
to bring these vexatious cases under better management and control so
that they can be handled as a matter of agreement and handled as a
matter of consular arrangements rather than have each case become
a matter of the highest controversy and feeling between the two gov-
ernments at the very top. And we would feel, therefore, if the Senate
refused to pass this, that it would set us back in an effort to solve some
problems that are a constant irritation to the relations between our
two countries.
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14 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned that one of the areas of concern is
the question of immunity. I was rather surprised by the figures that
you gave that only two foreign consular officials have been convicted.
Were those traffic violations for which they were convicted or more
serious crimes?
Secretary Russ. May I just take a look at my table on that?
The CHAIRMAN. You say :
Five of these were for traffic offenses and two of the 11 were convicted.
Secretary Rusg. In 1960, by the U.S. District Court of the Southern
District of Florida, a consul general of the Dominican Republic was
tried under conspiracy-conspiracy under Federal law-to bribe and
smuggle. He was convicted and given five years' probation.
In 1958 there was a trial of a consul of Guatemala for fraud. He
was convicted in the district court but appealed, and in that case his
status as a consul was apparently not made a part of the proceedings.
But those are the two cases my records show we were able to find.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is rather a good record.
You mentioned one case, of course, in which I have a very special
interest because the young man comes from my State, Buell Ray
Wortham. He was tried and convicted in Russia. It has been well
publicized. I will not go into the details. But in any case this con-
sular convention would have made the problems of our Embassy much
easier in the initial stages. The final outcome of the conduct of the
trial was not objectionable. There have been differences of opinion
as to the severity of the sentence. That is another matter.
Secretary Russ.. Yes. Mr. Wortham's case is now under appeal,
and I would want to be a little guarded myself as to what I would
say about it. He is out on bail, and his case is under appeal. But
under this convention, you see, we would be notified of his arrest, with-
in from one to three days after his arrest, and we would have consular
access to him within two to four days after his arrest.
The CHAIRMAN. I only mention it in passing.
You do refer to bloc countries. I was a little interested in the
words, "bloc countries." Who constitutes the bloc? Is Yugoslavia
part of the bloc?
Secretary Russ.. That word is somewhat anachronistic, Mr. Chair-
man. Perhaps it was not the most happy word.
The CHAIRMAN. I think we might drop that. word for the moment,
do ou not? That bloc is becoming a little unglued in places, is it not?
Secretary Russ. That is correct, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be a little difficult to define it very
accurately at the moment.
Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions?
Senator SPARKMAN. Very, very briefly.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 15
BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON TREATY
Mr. Secretary, you say that the convention was proposed by the
United States. When did the United States first propose this? When
did negotiations start?
Secretary RUSK. My understanding, and Ambassador Kohler can
refresh my memory on this, is that Secretary Herter proposed to the
Soviet Union that we undertake negotiations on this subject in 1959.
SOVIET CONSULAR CONVENTIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
Senator SPARKMAN. Does this convention differ from the consular
conventions that the Soviet Union has with other Western countries?
Secretary RUSK. We do not have the full text of all those at the
present moment, sir. There is some discussion still going on with
certain other countries. I understand the British text is public, and
in the case of the British text, my understanding is that it is very
similar to ours on questions of immunity, except that families of con-
sular officers and employees are included. In other words, it is some-
what broader than this particular convention.
Senator SPARKMAN. It is broader than this one.
Secretary RUSK. The Japanese text, I think, is public and is the
same as the British.
Senator SPARKMAN. How long have those conventions been in effect,
do ,you know?
Secretary RUSK. They have been completed since we last presented
this convention to you, sir. May I put the exact dates in the record?
Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I would be very glad for you to do that.
(The information referred to follows:)
Japanese-Soviet convention : signed July 29, 1966.
British-Soviet convention : signed December 2,1965.
PREVIOUS EXCHANGE OF CONSULATES WITH SOVIET UNION
Senator SPARKMAN. You mentioned that prior to 1948 there were
Soviet consular officers in the United States, and we had consular
offices in the Soviet Union 5 is that right?
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.
You will recall-and this we discussed in our earlier hearing that
an employee of a Soviet consulate in New York jumped out of the
window, and the conduct of the consul at that time was such that we
asked that he be withdrawn. The Soviet Union then closed its con-
sulates, its three that it had in this country, and we closed our con-
sulate in Vladivostok.
Senator SPARKMAN. Was that the woman who jumped out?
Secretary RUSK. That is right. That was Madam Kasenkina.
Senator SPARKMAN. That was the incident that led up to the closing
of the consulates.
Secretary RUSK. That is correct.
Senator SPARKMAN. You said you had authority since 1948?
NEW SECURITY AND IMMUNITY ARRANGEMENTS
Secretary RUSK. We have that authority today, but the arrange-
ments would not be the arrangements in this consular convention if
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16 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Senator SPARKMAN. I notice you made that point. Actually the
authority exists, but the thing that does not exist, that you are trying
to tie in with it, is a better security arrangement for our people
traveling in Russia.
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. The two things that would
not be there if we were to try to open a consulate in each country
today would be the provisions in this convention for immediate ac-
cess to our citizens who might be held in the Soviet Union-that, to
me, is the overriding and the most important element in this conven-
tion-and, secondly, the provisions for certain of the immunities
which this convention would provide if we did open a consulate.
Senator SPARKMAN. As you may imagine, we are getting a good
many telegrams and letters regarding this at the present time, and
reference is made in many of them to the great number of consular
offices that would be opened in this country, and the great number of
Russians that would be brought in.
Just what is anticipated with reference to opening a consulate?
Secretary RUSK. Our thought at the present time was that we would
like at some point to discuss with the Soviet Union opening up one
consulate in each country. At the present time consular services are
provided by consular sections of the Embassies, their Embassy in
Washington, our Embassy in Moscow.
We have a considerable interest in having consular services avail-
able in Leningrad, for example. And they then would presumably
have access to a consulate in some comparable city in this country.
Those things have not been determined. They have been discussed
in a preliminary way. There is no agreement, and, as I indicated
to this committee when we had our last hearing on this subject, we
would, of course, be in consultation with the committee before taking
such a step.
Even if we were to conclude agreements providing for one additional
consulate in each country tomorrow, this would add, perhaps, ten to
twelve Soviet employees covered by this agreement. The same on our
side in Leningrad, and that personnel would be subject to our agree-
ment to their admission to perform this function, and our ability to de-
clare them persona non grata, and to ask them to leave. And this
would be ten or twelve in addition to several hundred that are already
here an that basis.
Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, you would have the same con-
trol over the personnel that you have over those coming to their em-
bassy now.
Secretary RUSK. Or to the United Nations when they violate Amer-
ican laws, if they violate American laws.
Senator SPARKMAN. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ilickenlooper.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
GRANTING OF IMMUNITY TO CONSULAR OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
Mr. Secretary, have we ever in the history of diplomacy, so far as
you know, granted immunity to consular officials and employees of
the sending country? Has that been a. custom?
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 17
Secretary RUSK. I think the granting of a certain immunity to con-
sular employees is new in this treaty. When we thought about it, the
principal question to us was : is such immunity valuable for the United
States-if it were extended to Americans in our consulate in the Soviet
Union.
We felt the answer to that was, yes. This would only be possible if
we granted similar immunity to their people here. We took a look at
their problems on that.
Senator HICKENLaOPER. Why was it considered necessary to grant
immunity to their employees?
Secretary RUSK. The problems of the convention include the pro-
tection of officials and citizens in each-officials and citizens in each
other's country. We felt that in the case of consular personnel, the
extension of immunities to nationals of the sending country-that
would be Soviet employees in the United States, and United States
employees in the Soviet Union-would be of advantage in carrying out
the purposes of the consular convention.
NO RECIPROCAL EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL NATIONALS IN EMBASSIES
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do the Russians employ any American na-
tionals in this country in their diplomatic mission here?
Secretary RUSK. It is my understanding that they do not, sir.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do we employ Russian nationals?
Secretary RUSK. In Moscow?
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. In Moscow.
Secretary RUSK. I wonder if I could ask Ambassador Kohler to
comment on that, and if so, which ones, what type.
Mr. KOIULER. On a contract basis, Senator, we employ quite a num-
ber of Soviet nationals in the Embassy in Moscow; about 125.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. What do you mean on a contract basis?
Mr. KOIILER. Just that.
Senator HICKENLaoPER. What do they do under the contract, build
buildings?
Mr. KoHLER. No. They are chauffeurs, for the most part, service
personnel, charwomen, cleaners, some translators.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. But they are in a position to look and listen.
They will not have any Americans in their Embassy here who are in
a position to look and listen.
Secretary RUSK. They work, Senator, in the unclassified section of
the Embassy.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. It has been my impression, from what I
read in the papers, that there is no place in our Embassy at Moscow
that is secure.
Secretary RUSK. We had better go into that under other circum-
stances, Senator. I think I would not completely agree with that.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. So we are permitting them to bring in addi-
tional people into this country with criminal immunity, that is, with
immunity from criminal prosecution, while we employ in Russia a lot
of Russians, and they do not employ any Americans here. Is that not
rather inward-looking on their part?
Secretary RUSK. Oh, yes, sir. I think that historically that coun-
try has been inward-looking, and it is not to me very surprising that
it would be that way.
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18 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
We do have already in this country some 452 Soviet officials with
diplomatic immunity, and a consulate would add, perhaps, ten to fif-
teen to that number.
MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE IN OTHER CONSULAR TREATIES
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I believe in connection therein, as stated in
the letter which Ambassador MacArthur wrote to Chairman Ful-
bright on January 20 about this matter, and I am quoting from the,
second paragraph :
A list of these 35 states-
Those are the 35 states that, as I understand it, have the most-
favored-nation clauses in their treaties with the United States-
A list of 35 states is given as an enclosure to this letter.
That list is attached as an enclosure. He further states as follows:
Based upon a recent survey, 27 of those states have consular establishments
in the United States, and include approximately 577 entitled consular personnel..
If they demand equal treatment that would not only enlarge the
immunity numbers from, let us say, ten to fifteen which might be in-
cluded in one Russian consulate, if that is all they established, but it
would include immunity from arrest and prosecution to at least 577
in the consulates of the 27 countries which are already in this country.
There are some countries which do not have consulates in this country,
but could establish them, isn't that true?
RECIPROCITY IN IMMUNITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
Secretary Rusx. That is correct, sir, and there are some that have
consulates in this country that have a most-favored-nation provision,
but we judge they would not exercise it because they would not wish
to extend reciprocity to us in this matter.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is a guess at the moment, is it not?
That is an opinion at the moment. Next year or the year after they
could change their minds and say, "All right, we will reciprocally ex-
tend this immunity to give our people immunity from prosecution."
Secretary RusK. It is somewhat more than a guess. We have dis-
cussed that with our embassies in those countries, and some have dis-
cussed that matter with their host countries.
Nevertheless, it would be fair to say, as far as the strictly legal
basis is concerned, that these countries could at some time in the future
ask for it, providing they were willing to give us the reciprocity. We
know some of them are not interested in this kind of reciprocity.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are getting a little away from the
point, at least I assume we are. They may say today they are not
interested in this reciprocity nor in this immunity situation. But who
knows, in a lot of these countries they could have new governments
six months from now or three months from now or a year from now,
and change their minds on it and say, "Now we want to take advan-
tage of this." They would have the right to do that, would they not?
Secretary RUSK. They would, sir. That is as a matter of law, but,
if you look at the list of the countries you will see that the majority
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 19
of them are countries with long-established diplomatic systems and
practices of their own, and we would not suppose that we would be
deluged with requests for extension of their present arrangements
with us.
We have estimated that perhaps 290 additional individuals might
be covered if the countries moved to invoke this procedure, but we
have no information that they wish to do so.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then could you clear up my understanding
between Ambassador MacArthur's letter of January 20,1967 to Chair-
man Fulbright, and your statement of today when you say :
Adoption of the criminal immunity provision in this Convention could affect
bilateral agreements with 27 other countries and could result in similar immunity
for 290 consular personnel.
That is your statement.
Now, undoubtedly it is the same statement. I just do not under-
stand it, but in Ambassador MacArthur's letter he says-
Based upon a recent survey 27 of those States having consular establishments
in the United States and include approximately 577 entitled consular personnel.
Now, there is quite a discrepancy there between 290 consular per-
sonnel and 577. That may not be fatal, but I just do not understand
it.
Secretary RUSK. We have said, in Mr. MacArthur's letter, that our
Embassies in those 27 states were requested to give their assessment as
to whether most-favored-nation treatment would be actually sought on
a reciprocal basis. The replies indicated that at most, eleven states
would probably request such treatment, and approximately 290 of their
foreign consular officers and employees in the United States would be
affected. That is column 2 in the enclosure to Ambassador Mac-
Arthur's letter, and that was the figure that I used because that is our
best assessment as to what this, in fact, would be.
Senator HrcKENLOOPER. I am in thorough agreement with the ad-
vantages which a consular treaty of this kind would have, namely, to
allow visitation by our people to our nationals in Russia, or any other
country, who are put in jail or charged with crime, incarcerated some
place. I can understand the advantage of being able to see those
people and being able to help them and extend the assistance of the
United States.
But since this treaty was first presented to us, I have not been able
to understand why, in' the formulation of this treaty, it was necessary
to extend this immunity provision which, I think, is a very bad prece-
dent. Why extend it to the nationals of the country who are merely
employees of the consulate.
I think the Russians in this country bring their own chauffeurs,
their own maids, their own janitors, everybody. There is no reason
to believe that the consulate would not do the same thing as the
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20 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Embassy does. I have been searching for something because I think
there is an advantage in having this treaty. But I think there is a dis-
advantage. I think there is a dangerous and unwarranted precedent!
also in this treaty. I do not know why we entered into a treaty of this
kind that goes that far.
Secretary RUSK. Well., Senator, we would expect, if a consulate
were opened in each country, that the numbers, the total involved,,
would be ten to fifteen; and that number would include employees and!
consular officials in the usual sense.
Now, how they would balance those among consular officers and
employees would be for them to decide, as it would be for us to decide.
in the Soviet Union. Each country would have the privilege of not
accepting the other's list in a matter of that sort ; that is, they would
have to come in with approval.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that. I understand that a lot'
of people come into this country and I do not know why we approve
them, but international comity seems to indicate that they should be
approved and, therefore, they are approved and get into this country.,
Now we are probably, I think, enlarging the situs of the infection in,
many ways. I probably am a little adamant about this thing. You
and I have talked about this two or three times. I think you are con-'':
vinced. But it is very difficult to convince me otherwise on this matter.;
Secretary RuSK. Senator, I think that actually it comes to the"
point-as you say, we have discussed it-as to whether there is a
genuine reciprocal advantage flowing to us in this arrangement that to.
us is at least as important as the advantage that the other side might
get from this arrangement.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I could see some persuasive justification,.
perhaps, for saying that the consular official himself and his immediate
family might be entitled to immunity. I do not know that I would go'
along with that necessarily, but I can see a lot of persuasive arguments
in that.
But to include all and sundry who come in the baggage train with,
him from the sending country is something I just do not see.
Now, could you tell us who insisted on this unrestricted immunity;
for all the personnel? Did we insist on it or did the Russians?
Secretary RUSK. I think it might be well for Ambassador Kohler,;
who was in the negotiation, to comment on that. But I would say that,,
when the matter came up, we felt the advantage to having this im-
munity for our people in the Soviet Union was at least as important:
to us as this might have been to the other side.
Ambassador Kohler, how did it come up?
Mr. KOHLER. Senator, the original proposal came up from the
Soviet side during the course of the negotiations. I may be a bit sub-`
jective on this, but personally I was a great proponent of this, andI
urged the Department to consider this even though it is a change from
traditional practice.
The formula in the convention would mean that American officers,
and American clerks and employees going to an American consulate in
the Soviet Union would have the same status as those who would be in
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 21
and serve in the Embassy now. I think it is desirable, very desirable,
that they have such protections.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is there any reason why employees of the
Embassy cannot be assigned to, and do the occasional necessary work
for the consulate, and retain their immunity?
Mr. KOIILER. They would not be in the same geographic location
though, Senator.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, is that bad ?
Mr KOIILER. I think it is very bad. I have a personal assistant or a
secretary, who obviously knows as much about the work as I do. I
think it is desirable that she be protected-as I am protected if I am
serving in Leningrad.
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. We have a certain number of personnel
in the Embassy in Moscow and they have diplomatic immunity.
Mr. KOHLER. All Americans serving in the Embassy in Moscow have
diplomatic immunity.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. All right.
If you have a consulate in Leningrad, can't you assign periodically
from time to time some of that personnel to help out with the work of
the consulate in Leningrad and give the consul immunity without hav-
ing the reciprocal extension of immunity to all personnel ?
Mr. KoubER. No, sir. There are specific.provisions in this treaty
that cover this point. It is possible to assign someone from-the Em-
bassy in Moscow to, let us say, a consulate general in. Leningrad. In
that case, during the period of service in Leningrad, he comes under the
terms of this treaty. And this can only be done by agreement, because
all-personnel assigned must be approved by the receiving government.
CONSULAR PROTECTION FOR AMERICAN CITIZENS
Senator HICKENLOOPER. If he has immunity only while in Moscow,
how does he gain anything under the terms of the treaty which gives
him immunity?
Mr. KOHLER. It also gives him rights and privileges in terms of his
work in protecting American citizens and being able to advance their
interests.
Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, without this convention those peo-
ple would not have access to American citizens who might be arrested
by the Soviet Union.
Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.
OPERATION OF THE TEN-MINUTE RULE
Senator LAUSCHE. I reluctantly raise this point of order, but it was
raised by Senator Hickenlooper earlier. He has used more than ten
minutes, and I would like to know whether in these hearings those of
us who rank low in membership will have to wait with the passing of
time, while certain of our members use more than the ten minutes
usually allocated.
Are we operating under the ten-minute rule?
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22 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
The CHAIRMAN. No, sir; we are not.
Senator LAUSCHE. Why not?
The CHAIRMAN. We are not operating under it.
Senator HscKENLOOPER. In order to keep peace and harmony in the'
committee I hereby surrender the rest of my time, Mr. Chairman, and
you may pass it on to other members.
Senator LAUSCHE. Who has decided we are not operating under the
ten-minute rule?
The CHAIRMAN. The chairman decided it.
I think the Senator from Ohio is out of order. The Senator from
Iowa may proceed.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. No. I believe in peace and harmony in the
committee.
Senator LAUSCI-E. I am sorry to have interrupted the Senator from
Iowa.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is out of order. We are proceeding
in exactly the same manner as we proceeded last Monday.
Senator LAUSCHE. We are proceeding in a manner completely con-
trary to all of the proceedings that we have had in open meetings since.
I have been in this Senate. The ten-minute rule has prevailed con-
stantly. Today it is changed by the chairman and that is arrogating
a rather powerful force to himself. [Laughter.]
The CHAIRMAN. That is an example of the arrogance of power.'
[Laughter.]
Senator HICK.ENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, if I may say just one thing,
I would like to say that the chairman did not tell me, I raised the same
question last Monday, and the chairman told me specifically that we
were not operating under the ten-minute rule then, and he did note:
want to for a while.
The CHAIRMAN. We did not and there was no complaint at that
time.
Senator LAUSCHE. That is not a good excuse for the elimination
of it.
The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the Senator would allow the committee
to proceed.
Senator LAUSCHE. I will yield to the statement that I am out of
order, but I will want this subject brought up in closed session so that
there can be a determination by the entire body and not solely by the
chairman. I know that he knows a lot, and that he is, to a substantial
degree, impeccable and infallible.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator. [Laughter.]
Senator LAUSCHE. But I still want to bring this up.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield?
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, first may I say that you are
the chairman of this committee, and unless agreements are entered into
you have the authority to determine how long each member shall
speak.
I ask that my questions be answered briefly and that I be gaveled
down at the end of ten minutes.
NO DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION FOR U.S. EMPLOYEES OF FOREIGN EMBASSIES,
Mr. Secretary, do U.S. employees of foreign embassies in this coun-,
try have diplomatic protection?
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 23
Secretary Rusx. U.S. employees of foreign embassies in this coun-
try are not entitled to diplomatic immunity.
TREATY NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN IN 1959
Senator MANSFIELD. Now, I believe in response to a question raised
by Senator Sparkman you stated that negotiations covering this
convention. began in 1959.
Secretary Rusx. That is correct, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. In other words, this convention has met with
the approval of President Eisenhower, former President John F.
Kennedy, and President Johnson.
. Secretary RUSK. President Eisenhower's administration initiated
the negotiations. They had not been concluded while he was President,
so that I could not say that he had an opportunity to see the final draft.
But the idea for such a consular convention and its main items were
before him, his administration, and they initiated the discussions.
Senator MANSFIELD. You have indicated quite strongly that rati-
fication of this convention would be to our advantage.
Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.
SENATORIAL PROTECTION IN TIIE U.S.S.R.
Senator MANSFIELD. When Senators go to the U.S.S.R. what pro-
tection do we have?
Secretary Russ. You have no special protection as Senators, except
that I think the Soviet Union would be rather more hospitable to you
than they would be to ordinary tourists. But at the present time, under
Soviet law, they could seize a Senator and during a period of investi-
gation keep him without access of an American consul for nine months
or more.
Senator MANSFIELD. In other words, this convention would give us
some protection as well as other citizens.
Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. Don't you think that other citizens should be
given as much protection as Senators?
Secretary Russ. Yes, sir; I do.
Senator MANSFIELD. Now, Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding
that consular offices can be opened in the United States now without
this convention.
Secretary Rusx. That is correct, sir. Under the circumstances that
would obtain under existing law in the two countries.
Senator MANSFIELD. One or two more questions.
It is my understanding that there are 20 times as many American
tourists going to the U.S.S.R. as there are Soviet citizens coming to
this country.
Secretary Russ. That is correct, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. So it would xnean that this level in tourism,
which seems to be going up all the time, would and should have some
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24 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
added protection through the inauguration of a consulate or consu-
lates as the times call for.
Secretary RUSK. That is our very strong view, Senator.
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Mott, a citizen of Massachusetts, I be-
lieve, was taken into custody by the Soviet police because he inadver-
tently crossed into the Soviet Union from Norway, I believe, a year
at two ago.
Secretary RusK. That is correct.
Senator MANSFIELD. After being held in custody, as I recall it, he
was beingtransported from a place in the north down to Leningrad or
Moscow, and during the course of that trip he committed suicide.
Would it not have been possible that had we had a consulate at
Leningrad at that time that Mr. Mott might be alive today?
Secretary RUSK. It is entirely possible, sir. For nine days they held
Mr. Mott without allowing an American official to see him, and then
only for one hour. There were three other consular meetings with him
in the ten weeks prior to trial, and this is not the standard of protec-
tion we would like to be able to offer.
Senator MANSFIELD. But had you had this convention in operation,
the consulate at Leningrad, if there were one there, would have had
access to him in a far shorter period of time. His needs would have
been looked after more carefully. He would have been given the pro-
tection and the immunity under this convention which would apply
to all citizens, and he might be alive today.
Secretary RUSK. That is entirely possible, sir. Certainly under
this convention we would have been entitled to notification of his ar-
rest from within one to three days, and entitled to a consular visit
within two to four days after his arrest.
Senator MANSFIELD. I thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.
REASON FOR INCREASE IN AMERICAN TOURISM TO RUSSIA
Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, what is the particular appeal of
Russia which has resulted in such an increase of American tourists
visiting that country in the last four or five years?
Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, that one reason is that it is a
country-and this is true of some of the other Eastern European coun-
tries-to which American tourists have not been accustomed to going
in the past. It is a new country to most of them.
And there are things there which American tourists would like to
see, if possible. For example, I think they would find the Kremlin
establishment itself interesting in Moscow. I think they would find
the Heritage Museum in Leningrad a fascinating place to visit. I
think this was the opening of -a possibility that was not there before,
and offers the usual kinds of things that are of great interest to
traveling Americans.
Senator AIKEN. What sort of Americans travel there?
Secretary RUSK. I would think a cross section from the point of
view of social status or wealth or profession or activities back here at
home. It is a general cross section.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Senator AIKEN. Particularly those who can afford to go one way
or another get to Moscow.
Secretary RUSK. That is, of course, the first requirement. They
have to be able to pay their way.
Senator AIKEN. Is it because they cannot afford to come here or
because their Government does not lot them come here that we do not
have many Russian visitors?
Secretary RUSK. We have hoped that they would send more tourists
to this country. I think it is both a matter of foreign exchange and
a matter of their not being as open as we are about these matters.
We have had increasing numbers,of Soviet citizens coming here on
delegations to international meetings and for exchange programs.
But there is very little private tourism in the usual sense between the
Soviet Union and the United States from their direction..
Senator AIKEN. With the average wage in Russia being, shall we
say, about $100 a month, that would not permit them to stay long in
America even if they got here, would it?
Secretary RUSK. I think it would be much more difficult for them,
for large numbers of their people, to travel on their own private
resources.
AMERICANS IN TROUBLE WITH TIIE SOVIET LAW
Senator AIKEN. You have given us the figure of about 18,000 Ameri-
cans having visited Russia in 1966. How many of those 18,000 Amer-
icans got in trouble with the Russian law?,
Secretary RUSK. During 1966? May I just pause a moment?
About a half dozen cases, Senator, have come to the official attention
of the Government.
I think. I would have to say that tourists in many countries fall into
minor infractions of local law in u variety of ways, just as they do
here, and I suspect that there are: a number of cases which did arise
which we never heard of : the. Soviet Union ,simply brushed it aside
and let those people depart.
Senator AIKEN. Out of the 18,000 people who visited Russia, only 18
ran afoul of the law.
Secretary RUSK. I think I have cited since we signed this conven-
tion about 20.
Senator AIKEN. Mr. Katzenbach tell us of the about 18,000 Ameri-
cans who stayed in this country, 'how many ran afoul of the law?
[Laughter.]
Mr. KATZENBACH. It would be difficult to have the same cross section
as far as wealth is concerned. But as far as viewpoint is concerned,
I would say on your crime rate it would not be very different than that.
Senator AIKEN. You mean not very different from the tourists
abroad?
Mr. KATZENBACH. On those figures you Would be taking 20 out of
about some 40,000, I suppose, of those who ran afoul of the law in a
fairly serious sense, you would not run to much more than 20 on that
figure. I think running afoul of the law in terms of traffic tickets or
parking tickets, might run to a slightly higher percentage.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Senator AIKEN. Some of the troubles in Russia were not much more
serious than, well, maybe a little more serious than, parking violations,
but not much more serious than taking hotel towels in America would
be.
Mr. KATZENBACH. There are differences here, Senator, between
Soviet law and the law of the United States, just as there are in other
countries which tourists go to, and difference in attitude sometimes
with respect to that law as to how serious they take offense about
something that would not be a serious offense in this country, and that
would be true of other countries as well.
Senator AIKEN. What is it, fear or respect which makes Americans
act better in foreign countries?
Secretary RusK. We call the attention of our tourists to taking
seriously local regulations about such things as exchange of currency,
to stay away from the black market. And I would not advise Ameri-
can citizens going to the Soviet Union to take towels out of hotels-or
iron bears, for that matter-because they take a more severe view
of that in the Soviet Union than American hotels would.
Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, you refer to the bloc countries,
whether that is the right term or not, the bloc countries of East Ger-
many, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and others. Do they have consulates in
this country?
Secretary Russ. Poland. In an official sense Poland has a con-
sulate in Chicago, but otherwise they conduct their consular business
out of consular sections of their embassies here in Washington.
Senator AIKEN. I suppose the terms of this consular treaty apply to
those other countries, too?
Secretary Rusx. No, sir. It would be bilateral between us and the
Soviet Union. Before such arrangements would apply to them we
would have to negotiate special arrangements.
Senator AIKEN. Do you think they would have to get the consent.
of Russia before they could establish consulates in this country?
Secretary RUSK. I would think that if they attempted to negotiate
with us a convention similar to that we would have with the Soviet
Union, they would probably have no trouble getting permission. They
would probably not even ask for it.
Senator AIKEN. We talk about the Russians maintaining large
forces of men and tanks and so forth in these bloc countries, if that is
the name for them. Do you think that they maintain these strong
forces in, shall we say, Poland and Hungary to be ready to launch an
attack on the West or do they maintain those strong forces there to
make sure that the countries where they are stationed do not get out,
from under their domination, similar to Hungary in 1956?
Secretary Russ. I would think there are mixed reasons, and more
than one reason, for the deployment of their forces.
I think that they, by and large, have their forces there in relation to
the situation between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO countries.
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But I would not dispute the possibility there may be other things in
their minds.
Senator AIKEN. They did suppress the Hungarian revolution.
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.
Senator AIKEN. And we did not offer to help at all.
Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.
Senator AIKEN. That is all.
Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I hold in my hand a brochure issued
under date of January 1967 called the Liberty Letter. It is a repre-
sentation from an organization generally known in the Congress as
the Liberty Lobby. I ask your consent that it be publishes in the
record at this point.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be inserted.
(The document referred to follows:)
(Liberty Letter, Washington, D.C., January 1967]
CONSULAR TREATY To ALLOW SOVIET AGENTS IN YOUR CITY
ACTION NECESSARY NOW TO STOP KATZENBAC11 PLAN
The Johnson Administration plan to allow Soviet spy nests in American cities
is with us again after being repulsed by a horrified public outcry in 1965.
With their unrelenting drive for a socialized America slowed down by the 1966
election returns, the Administration planners are now turning their full attention
to what they call "building bridges" to the Communist enemy. In the forefront
of this appeasement drive will be an all-out effort to ratify the notorious "Con-
sular Treaty."
Consulates maintained by free nations are offices where normal commercial
and tourist business is conducted. But, as pointed out by FBI Director, J. Edgar
Hoover, the main function of a Soviet consulate is espionage.
If the Consular Treaty is ratified by the Senate, American consulates in the
Soviet Union will be busily occupied with increasing trade with the enemy, while
Russian weapons are being used to kill and maim American boys in Vietnam.
Soviet consulates in this country will be busily engaged in dispatching spies
throughout America. And, by the terms of Article 19 of the Treaty, these spies
will be immune from prosecution by any American authority, State or Federal.
According to FBI information given to Sen. Thomas Dodd, more than 400
Soviet espionage and intelligence agents would be assigned to proposed consulates
in New York, Chicago, Detroit and Los Angeles.
The spectre of this Soviet fifth column, operating with impunity in every part
of the country, caused patriots to flood the Senate with an unprecedented amount
of protest mail in 1965, appealing for the defeat of the Treaty. This public
demand, Inspired by Liberty Lobby, was so great that the Senate leadership
backed away from its plan to bring the Consular Treaty up for a vote.
The drive to secure ratification of the "Soviet Spy" treaty is being led by
Nicholas Katzenbach, who was moved from the Justice Department to his present
post of Undersecretary of State as part of the President's program for "friend-
ship" with the enemy. What better way to begin his new career than to press
for ratification of a treaty which J. Edgar Hoover has called "a cherished goal
for the Soviet intelligence services?" (Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover before
the House Appropriations Committee, March 4, 1966.)
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed by Senator Fulbright, is very
likely to report the Consular Treaty to the Senate floor early in the upcoming
session of Congress.
There are men in the Senate who recognize the danger to our national security
posed by this treaty. If you give them enough support now, you can stop the
Consular Treaty.
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LAS CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Write or wire your two Senators now.
Tell them you feel that a vote for the Consular Treaty would be a breach of
faith with our boys in Vietnam, where Russian arms are killing Americans.
Tell them that you are concerned about the possibility of Soviet espionage,
agents being given freedom to operate in American cities.
Tell them that you do not want Soviet spies living and working in our cities.
Tell them that you and your neighbors would find it very hard to understand
how any Senator could ignore the warning J. Edgar Hoover gave in his testi-
mony before the House Appropriations Committee.
Warn your friends and neighbors of the dangers hidden in the Consular
Treaty, and encourage them to write or wire their Senators.
Remember, your influence counts . . . use it !
Senator MORSE. The headline is :
Consular Treaty to Allow Soviet Agents in Your City. Action Necessary Now
to Stop Katzenbach Plan. The Johnson Administration plan to allow Soviet spy;
nests in American cities is with us again after being repulsed by a horrified
public outcry in 1965.
Similar extremist statements permeate the document.
STATE DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM OF COMMENT ON LIBERTY LETTER
I think it is one thing for the Department of State to make a com-
ment or an answer to it on its own initiative, but it is quite another
thing for them to reply to the committee. I would like to make a
request, Mr. Secretary, and I should think Mr. Katzenbach would be'
the most appropriate official to answer it. I think it would be helpful
if you would agree to file with us a memorandum commenting upon
the contents of this statement, because it is a statement that will have
wide circulation, not only within Congress, but throughout the country.
Although I grant that its extremism speaks for itself, nevertheless
not all people take that objective attitude toward such a document.,
Secretary RUSK. I understand, sir.
Senator MoRSE. And, therefore, Mr. Chairman, I would respectfully`
request that the State Department file a memorandum of comment on
this document.
The CHAIRMAN. You will be glad to do that?
Secretary RUSK. We are prepared to do that, Mr. Chairman, and
we will try to do so with suitable restraint.
(The memorandum referred to follows:)
Liberty Letter Number 71, dated January 1967, raises several questions about
the proposed Consular Convention between the US and the USSR. To assist
people in making up their own minds we shall quote the Letter's allegations with
respect to each question and set beside them the Administration's understanding,
of the matter.
1. Whose idea is the Convention?
What the Liberty Letter Says:
"Action Necessary NOW to Stop Katzenbach Plan.
"The drive to secure ratification of the `Soviet Spy' treaty is being led by
Nicholas Katzenbach, who was moved from the Justice Department to his present)
post as Undersecretary of State as part of the President's program for `friendship'
with the enemy."
Wltat the History of the Convention Shows:
Former Secretary of State Christian Herter first proposed a consular conven-
tion to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko when Premier Khrushchev met with
President Eisenhower at Camp David in 1959. The Kennedy and Johnson Ad-
ministrations have since approved the step-by-step process by which the treaty
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 29
now before the Senate was negotiated. President Johnson most recently called
for its approval in his State of the Union Message on January 11, 1967.
The primary purpose of the Convention is to provide for the protection of
American citizens traveling in the Soviet Union. This protection, which comes
into being whether or not we ever open a consulate in the Soviet Union, involves
the requirement that the Soviet Government must notify our Embassy whenever
an American has been taken into custody, give access to him within a short period
of time, and given continuing access to him thereafter. Soviet nationals in the
United States already have ample protection under our Constitution.
2. How many additional Soviet officials would be stationed in the United States
as a result of the Convention?
What the Liberty Letter Says:
"Consular Treaty to Allow Soviet Agents in Your City.
"According to FBI information given to Sen. Thomas Dodd, more than 400
Soviet espionage and intelligence agents would be assigned to proposed con-
sulates in New York, Chicago, Detroit and Los Angeles."
What the Convention Provides:
The Convention itself permits not a single additional Soviet official to be sta-
tioned in the United States. Only if a consulate was actually established would
consular officials of the Soviet Government be allowed to reside in this country.
Neither the Johnson Administration nor the Kennedy Administration ever
considered letting the Soviets establish consulates whenever or wherever they
wish. The Consular Convention provides that a Soviet consulate can be opened
only if the US Government approves. Such approval could only follow separate
negotiations with the Soviet Government.
When and if we do decide that our national interest requires opening of an
American consulate somewhere in the USSR we would consider opening negotia-
tions with the USSR that could lead to each country establishing one consulate
in the territory of the other. We would be prepared to send 10 to 15 Americans
to an American consulate in the USSR. If the Soviet Union were to accept
such ,a proposal, it would then be allowed to send an equivalent number of persons
to a consulate here. (The USSR now has over 1,000 people stationed in the
United States). In any event, this is in the future. We have had no formal
discussions with the Soviets about the opening of consulates and no such discus-
sions are now being planned. Moreover, Secretary Rusk has stated he will
consult with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before any such negotia-
tions, and seek the advice of state and local officials concerned before permitting
the Soviets to open a consulate.
If we permitted the opening of a Soviet consulate in the United States, its
staff would be subject to the same travel controls applied to Soviet personnel at
the Soviet Embassy in Washington and at the Soviet Mission to the UN in New
York. They are now excluded from some 25 per cent of the United States, in-
cluding those areas where sensitive defense installations are located. They
must notify us 48 hours in advance of any trip taking them more than 25 miles
from the city where they are stationed, and we can refuse permission for such
a trip without providing any explanations.
In summary, this treaty has nothing to do with letting Soviet citizens into
this country. It does not authorize, propose, suggest, provide for, permit or
require the opening of a single United States consulate in the Soviet Union or
a single Soviet consulate in the United States.
3. What is the danger of espionage created by this Convention?
What the Liberty Letter Says:
"Soviet consulates in this country will be busily engaged in dispatching spies
throughout America. And, by the terms of Article 19 of the Treaty, these spies
will be immune from prosecution by any American authority, State or Federal."
What the Convention Provides:
If a Soviet consulate is ever opened, the 10 to 15 Soviet consular officials con-
cerned, like the 452 Soviet diplomats and members of their families now in this
country, would be entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution. Unlike the
diplomats, consular officials would not be immune from civil suits relating to
their private acts. The families of the consular officials, unlike the families of
diplomats stationed here, would not be immune from either civil or criminal
prosecution. Any suggestion that simply because of criminal immunity the
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
activities of 10 to 15 known Soviet officials could not be effectively controlled,
in the same way that the activities of the much larger number of Soviet diplo-
mats are now controlled, ignores the history of the FBI's work in the counter-
intelligence field.
Moreover, the Consular Convention contains specific provisions to guard our
Internal security. We would have the opportunity to screen each Soviet con.
sular official before letting him into this country. State and local authorities
could investigate and observe his activities if we let him in. These provisions
are particularly important in view of the fact that our investigative agencies
tell us that it is easier to observe a known person with a fixed address than it
is to identify and observe a faceless agent. If any official's actions were con-
sidered improper or if we had any other reason for wanting him out of the
country, we would expel him without explanation. In addition, we could order
the consulate closed. Finally we could terminate the Convention itself on six
months' notice.
Most important of all, the Convention's provisions on immunity from criminal
jurisdiction are considered to be of definite benefit to the United States. Should
we decide to open a consulate in the USSR, we would have to protect the Amer-
icans we would send there from harassment and arbitrary arrest by the Soviet
police. Since 1946, 31 American employees at our Embassy in Moscow have
been expelled from the USSR, most of them on allegations of espionage. With-
out the shield of diplomatic immunity, these Americans could have been jailed
and severely punished on trumped-up charges. Critics of the Convention must
consider whether they would really wish to see Americans assigned to posts in
the USSR without the protection of immunity from criminal jurisdiction.
4. Will the Convention lead to an increase in trade with the Soviet Union?
What the Liberty Letter Says:
"If the Consular Treaty is ratified by the Senate, American consulates in the
Soviet Union will be busily occupied with increasing trade with the enemy,
while Russian weapons are being used to kill and maim American boys in
Vietnam."
What the Convention Provides:
The Consular Convention is wholly separate from the issue of our trade
policy with the Soviet Union and says nothing on that question.
If and when an American consulate were ever opened in the USSR, it could
be called upon to look after the interests of American businessmen trading withI
Soviet firms, as well as other US Interests, but it could do little trade promotion
work. It is the Soviet trading monoplies in Moscow which buy from abroad,'
and they generally deal diredtly with American traders either in Moscow or,
through their commercial representatives in this country.
5. Could a Soviet oonsnlate in the United States become a safe haven for fugitives
from justice?
What the Liberty Letters Says:
A cartoon in the Liberty Letter shows a Soviet consulate with a sign on the
door-"Warning to Police-Forbidden by Federal Law to Enter in Pursuit of
Murderers, Kidnappers or Spies."
What the Convention Provides:
Should a Soviet consulate ever be opened in the United States, its premises,'
like all diplomatic iestablishments In the United States, including the Soviet
Embassy and the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, could not be entered
without permission. A US consulate in the USSR would of course enjoy the
same protedtion. As a practical matter, the United States would take the
necessary diplomatic steps to obtain removal from the Soviet consulate of any
person who had taken refuge In it. In no event could the Individual be removed
from the United States without the permission of the United States Government
and of local authorities.
SAFEGUARD PROVISIONS IN TREATY
Senator MoRSE. Mr. Secretary, speaking about a hypothetical case
now, let's assume that a consulate is established or consulates are'
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 31
established, and let us assume that the Russians do participate in a
course of conduct that we consider to be misconduct, and they are
caught engaging in espionage and other violations which we do not
think can be countenanced by us.
Will you tell the committee what provisions contained in this
convention permit withdrawal from the arrangement.
Secretary RusK. Yes, Senator.
In the first place, as far as individuals are concerned, we can require
their removal from the country. There is no question about that.
Secondly, if we become dissatisfied with the consular agreement, we
can bring it to an end by notification. It would terminate six months
after notification.
If necessary, from a security point of view, we can impose certain
limitations on the movements of these people. We, as you know,
already do that in some areas.
Quite frankly, Senator, the problem of espionage is not a problem
of 10 to 15 additional consular officers here. It is a far more sophisti-
cated and complicated question than that. I have no doubt myself
that the FBI can fully take care of any small increment of a problem
that might arise from our establishing a consulate.
Senator MORSE. I asked the question to elicit that answer because
I knew there was no other answer you could give. I think it is very
vital because of the fear arguments that are going to be stirred up in
this country if we do not meet them head-on. As your answer points
out, there are checks throughout this convention that protect our na-
tional interest in the event that Russia should follow a course of sub-
versive action-which I think is perfectly absurd to assume she would
follow because it could not be in her interest to do so. Were Russia
guilty of a course of action of misconduct on her part, our people are
protected by the checks that are written into the convention itself.
That is true, it is not?
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir; and further, at the end of the
day, one can always close up the consulate if there is a major
infringement.
FEAR ABOUT TREATY IN TIIE COUNTRY QUESTIONED
But, may I just comment briefly, sir, on the question of fear.
I do not get the impression-of course you gentlemen get more letters
than I do on this particular subject, I suspect-but I do not get the im-
pression that there is a-widespread fear around the country on this.
We have had expressions of interest from some cities, a number of
cities, saying they would like to have a foreign consulate in their city,
and one or two people down here at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue
have said they hoped such a consulate might be in their neghborhood.
But I do not get the impression there is a general fear about what 10
or 15 or more people might do in this country.
Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, does the convention in any way
codify the existing rights of asylum?
Secretary RUSK. It does not affect political asylum at all. It does
not change that in any way.
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32 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Senator MORSE. Does the convention change in any way or grant in-
creased rights in respect to tax exemptions?
Secretary RUSK. May I ask the legal adviser to comment on that?
Senator MoRSE. Yes.
Mr. MEEKER. Senator, in articles 22 and 23 the tax exemption pro-
visions of the convention are set forth. The changes which they:
would make are basically with respect to taxes imposed by the states.:
Under the Federal income tax, consular officials would be exempted'
anyway on their official salaries by virtue of provisions of U.S. statutes.!
Some of the larger states which have consulates in their cities have
comparable exemptions in their income tax laws. But in cases where:
a state does not provide an exemption for income tax on a consul's
salary, this convention would make a difference. It would provide
an exemption.
The same thing is true in a few other limited situations such as, for:
example, a consular officer dying in the United States while assigned
here as a consul. His personal effects and property which he had with:
him in this country as a consul would be exempt from inheritance'
taxation by virtue of this convention.
Senator PELL. Would the Senator yield on the question of asylum?
Senator MoRSE. Yes.
Senator PELL. It would seem to me under article 17, the right of
asylum is extended because until now Mulder international law only the
consular archives are inviolable. Under this treaty the residence of the,
head of the establishment, and the consulate establishment itself, are',
inviolate.
Mr. MEEKER. Senator Pell, this is a standard provision which:
appears in our other consular convention. The fact that law enforce-
ment officers of the receiving state are now allowed to enter the prem-
ises without having given their consent, does not in any sense mean;
that the consul is permitted by international law or by agreement;
between the two countries to retain asylees in the consulate regardless
of the circumstances.
In other words, this convention leaves us where we were before,
namely, any right of political asylum which the United States does.
not recognize is not granted by this convention.
Senator PELL. I will return to that in my time.
TAX IMMUNITY PROVISION SIMILAR TO THOSE IN OTHER CONSULAR,
CONVENTIONS
Mr. KATZENBACH. Could I add just one brief point, Senator? The'
provisions in this consular treaty with respect to tax immunity and'
those types of provisions are virtually boilerplate of other similar:.
consular conventions with other countries, and are quite customary
not only with respect to this country but in international law generally.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 33
Senator MousE. Mr. Secretary, some of my m&il indicates confusion
on the part of the writers in regard to the sovereign rights of the
United States in this country and the sovereign rights of Russia in
Russia to enforce their laws, criminal as well as civil.
Except for the immunity provision, the limitations of which you
have already discussed, if a Russian tourist is in the United States, is
there anything in the convention that prevents the administration of
American criminal justice in regard to that person as an individual?
Secretary RusK. No, sir; there is nothing at all in it. We would,
udder this convention, give them notification of arrest within one to
three days and give consular access in two to four days, but we do that
anyhow, and we would like to get that reciprocally from the other side.
Senator MORSE. The same is true with regard to an American tour-
ist in Russia. They have jurisdiction to proceed to arrest him and to
try him, but the convention does set out some very basic procedural
guarantees that at least we think are pretty vital from our heritage
of lkriglo-Saxon justice in order to protect the individual from the
application to him of what we term police-state procedures.
Secretary Rusa. That is correct, sir. The provision for notification
and for consular access is utterly fundamental if we are to give our
citizens traveling in the Soviet Union any adequate protection.
Senator MORSE. Two more questions and I am through.
You have spoken several times about our original plan to have one
Russian consulate and one American consulate in the respective coun-
tries, and you have referred to the figure ten to eleven persons.
Is there anything in the convention that prevents Russia, if she
establishes a consulate, to have more than 10, 11, 25, or 30 personnel,
if she wanted to? Is the number restricted in the convention?
Secretary Rush. Article 2, paragraphs 5 and 6 make it clear that
the receiving country, would have the privilege of denying individ-
uals or numbers that we did not wish to accept.
Senator MORSE. And they have the same reciprocal right?
Secretary Rosa.. That is correct, sir.
Senator MORSE. I think that is so important, Mr. Secretary, be-
cause part of the propaganda to which I referred seeks to give the
impression that this opens a floodgate and Russia not only can estab-
lish whatever number of consulates she wants to-which I have al-
ready pointed out is not true-but any number of personnel she wants
to. What I want to stress in my colloquy with you is that this con-
vention has written in it check after check protecting the interests of
the Government of our country and our people from just such allega-
tions as have been presented to us.
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34 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
CONSULATES MAY BROADEN OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIPLOMATIC
INTERCOURSE
My final question, Mr. Secretary, goes to the whole foreign policy
program of seeking to develop, or at least increasing, the diplomatic
intercourse between our country and Russia, and other countries be-
hind the curtain, and increasing our economic and cultural inter-
course with them, greater exchange in the field of tourism and. so on.;
Do you feel that the establishment in the first instance of a consulate
apiece is going to broaden the opportunities for an intensification of
diplomatic intercourse between the two countries?
My final comment by way of a question to you is do you think that
ratification of this convention on the part of the Senate of the United'
States would be an inducement to improving and expanding our,
diplomatic intercourse with the Soviet Union?
Secretary RUSK. This is one of its important purposes, Senator.
There are some who feel that the subject of this convention is not
very important in the presence of some large and even dangerous
issues with the Soviet Union. We are under no illusions about the
difficulties of these problems. I am reminded of a phrase Dr. Ray-
mond Fosdick used : he referred to spinning the infinite of threads that.
bind peace together.
Here is a thread, here is a thread that might help us to resolve some
of these issues on the basis of understanding and agreement rather
than confrontation and hostility.
We would hope, sir, that, if we can regulate these questions of indi-
viduals and get them out of the range of the most inflammatory and
excitable restige considerations between the two governments, that
would help to open the way for putting relations on a more normal,
basis.
May I illustrate, Mr. Chairman, if I could have just a moment on'
this, illustrate it with the purposes of protocol. One hundred fifty,
years ago ambassadors would be fighting in the streets in London to
see who would step forward first in a particular process. Now, the
i'
purpose of protocol is to answer automatically a lot of those questions
which would otherwise cause great disturbance. If we can get the
adequate protection for citizens in the Soviet Union on a normal, rou-
tine businesslike basis, so that it does not represent an engagements
between the Premier of the Soviet Union and the President of the:
United States every time somebody gets arrested, this is a move in a,
very constructive and proper direction.
Senator MORSE. I would like to illustrate it and then I will close;
with another example. You are a much better witness than I am be
cause you knew all the details. I knew some of them in my capacity
at the time as chairman of the subcommittee on Latin American Af-
fairs. How well I remember those tense critical hours in October 1962
when the world, in my judgment, was on the verge of a possible nuclear
war. It was accessibilit through existing diplomatic channels and
those from the United Nations to Moscow which made it possible for
the conversations that you know very well contributed greatly to the
success of the President of the United States in saving the world
from what could have been a great nuclear holocaust. In the propa-
ganda already afloat against this convention is a proposal that we not
extend relations, but had better take a long look as to whether or not
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 35
we don't already have too many with Russia, and with other countries
behind the Iron Curtain.
I think a step even though it may appear to some to be small is very
much worthwhile taking.
Senator MoRsE. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson?
PRESENT RESTRICTIONS AGAINST SOVIET CITIZENS TRAVELING IN THE
UNITED STATES
Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, as I gather from your testimony
here this morning, the principal concern of the State Department and
our Nation in regard to this consular treaty is to open up further
communications, not necessarily to open up consular offices in the
Soviet Union, or the Soviet Union here. What are some of the re-
strictions we have presently against travel of Soviet citizens in the
United States?
Secretary RUSK. Well, we have very open permission for American
citizens to visit the Soviet Union, and the other countries of Eastern
Europe. That really basically turns on who is entitled to a passport;
and a citizen who is entitled to a passport has our permission to visit
the Soviet Union.
As you know, there are certain limitations on the issuance of pass-
ports. It has been a matter of some litigation, too. But we would like
to extend those contacts.
One of the reasons, Senator, is that we believe that free, open so-
cieties need not fear peaceful competition with the types of societies
you find in Eastern Europe, and that we ought to break down some of
the walls that separate us rather than have them built up further.
But I would say that the overriding interest we have in this particular
consular treaty is to give us better opportunities to offer usual pro-
tection to Americans who might find themselves in difficulty in the
Soviet Union.
In the case of opening of consulates, we have not contemplated in
any event more than perhaps one in each country, and we have not
even begun discussions on that with the Soviet Union, as to whether
and when and where such might be done.
The overriding purpose is the matter of access and protection for
American citizens.
Senator CARLSON. What are some of the restrictions that we in the
United States have on the travel of citizens of the Soviet Union?
Secretary RUSK. Well, there are certain area restrictions in both
countries. In the Soviet Union there are certain areas where Amer-
ican citizens cannot travel-American citizens or officials-and we have
similar areas in this country. Otherwise, in the absence of other re-
quirements under our immigration and nationality laws, we are pretty
liberal in our issuance of visas to Soviet tourists who want to come here.
Even so, the number is very limited.
INCREASED TRAVEL BETWEEN TIIE TWO COUNTRIES
Senator CARLSON. My point is, could not increased travel between the
two countries be arranged through negotiation rather than to enter
into this consular treaty?
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36 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Secretary RusK. Well, we feel, sir, we need a stronger legal base?.
having to do with access to our citizens in the Soviet Union, and we see,
no way of getting that except on the basis of the treaty relationship;
with the Soviet Union giving us those provisions, because, for example,
under present Soviet law in the absence of s, treaty, they would not be
able to extend to our citizens some of the protections that are included
in the convention. They don't extend those to their own citizens, for
example. So that we feel that it is important to have a legal basis so
that there can be a clear understanding on each side as to what is re,-:
quired, and to try to get these matters into a more routine framework of
handling rather than let each case be a highly sensitive political issue
between the two countries.
Senator CARLSON. As you state, we have been rather generous in our
restrictions, although there are some, on travel of citizens of the Soviet'
Union in this country.
In 1965 the Soviet Union held a trade fair in Kansas City, and it was
not only well received, it was well attended. I think the citizens of the
middle west appreciated the Soviet Union bringing its trade fair to.
Kansas City. Therefore, we do not have restrictions that prohibit or
prevent the Soviet Union from travel although there are restrictions'
which I am familiar with and you in the State Department have been'
cooperative on one or two occasions in helping where, I thought right-
fully so, in securing the travel of some of the citizens that were re-j
stricted.
SOVIET UNION HAS NOT RATIFIED TIIE CONVENTION
Has the Soviet Union ratified this convention?
Secretary RUSK. They have not, sir.
Senator CARLSON. If they have not, is there any question they might
not do so if we ratified it?
Secretary RUSK. We have no reason to think they would not ratify
it. I think, because of the differences in our procedure, they are waiting
for us-to see whether the Senate will give us permission to ratify.
Senator CARLSON. Does the convention override any Federal or state`
laws?
Secretary RUSK. May I ask my lawyer that, Sir?
Mr. MEEKER. Senator, the convention would supersede state laws:
only in those areas where consular conventions have traditionally done,
so. This would be in those few and relatively not very important cases`
of tax exemption to which I referred in the answer to Senator Morse's
question.
In regard to another matter in which the legal profession has been
interested, namely the administration of decedents' estates, this conven-,
tion would not supersede any state laws, and indeed it expressly pro-
vides that the activities of consuls would be undertaken in conformity
with state laws.
Senator CARL SON. Based on that statement, then, assuming that a.
consulate was established in a state that had some restrictive laws on
taxation and other matters, would this consular arrangement with the,
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 37
Soviet Union and their consulate in a state be different than previ-
ously entered into agreements for other consulates?
Mr. MEEKER. No, sir, it would not. It would be the same.
Secretary RUSK. And I think sir, that we would in any event wish
to discuss with the governor oft the state and the mayor of the city
whether or not they saw any problem about opening a Soviet con-
sulate in their areas.
Senator CARLSON. I think that would be very important, because it
could have some effect, particularly from a tax and tax exemption
standpoint.
Secretary RUSK. Right.
Senator CARLSON. Having served as a Governor myself, I am in-
terested in knowing if a Governor objected to the establishment of a
consulate, what would happen?
Secretary RUSK. Well, I wouldn't want to make a categorical com-
mitment, Senator, because there are some constitutional issues in-
volved in that that I am not prepared to abandon one way or the
other, but I wouldn't think that we would press to put a consulate in
a city that would find it unwelcome or a state that would find it
unwelcome.
We know there are others that would welcome it.
FUTURE AMENDMENTS TO TREATY WOULD REQUIRE SENATE APPROVAL
Senator CARLSON. Assuming that the consular treaty is ratified by
the Senate in regard to future amendments associated between the
State Department and the Soviet Union, would they be subject to the
advice and consent of the Senate?
Secretary RUSK. Any amendment to this consular convention would
require the approval of the Senate before it could take effect.
Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?
QUESTION OF IMMUNITY OF CONSULAR OFFICIALS FROM PROSECUTION
Senator LAUSCIIE. Mr. Rusk, I want to direct your attention first
to the purpose of exploring the provisions of article 19. That article
deals with immunities accorded to consular officers and their em-
ployees from obedience to criminal statutes and otherwise.
My first question is, are the officials and the employees of the am-
bassador's office in Washington fully immune from prosecution for
all criminal cases, whether they are misdemeanors or felonies?
Secretary RUSK. They are, sir.
Senator LAUSCIIE. Thus this treaty will not at all affect that
situation?
Secretary RusH. That is correct, sir. And this treaty does not
make consular officers immune to civil suits except those arising out of
the performance of official functions.
QUESTION OF IMMUNITY OF CONSULAR OFFICIALS FROM PROSECUTION
Senator LAUSCIiE. No. two in the past, have the consular offices and
their employees been wholly immune from prosecution, both for
felonies and misdemeanors?
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0 IO WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Secretary RUSK. Foreign consulates in this country?
Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.
Secretary RUSK. Would you comment on that?
Mr. MEEKER. Senator, foreign
Senator LAUSCIIE. I wish you would answer "yes" or "no" to begin'
with so the record will be clear.
Mr. MEEKER. They have been immune with respect to misdemeanors,
only if a treaty grants them this immunity.
Senator LAUSCi-m. All right. Then they are not immune.from pros
ecution for felonies?
Mr. MEEKER. That is correct.
TREATY WOULD PROVIDE IMMUNITY IN ALL CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS.
Senator LAUSCIIE. This treaty will make consular officers and all
employees who are nationals of the sending country immune from
criminal prosecution in all criminal violations?
Mr. MEEKER. That is correct.
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. That is, those individuals who
are accepted for us by entry to perform the function.
Senator LAUSCHE. Under existing law immunity was granted from
prosecution only in cases of misdemeanors or as sometimes said viola-
tions which do not carry a penalty of imprisonment of over one year.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Could I make a very brief comment on that,
Senator?
Senator LAUSCIiE. Yes; if you will, please.
Mr. KATZENBACH. It would be true today that diplomatic officials of
our country or Soviet officials here, performing what normally are
consular services would retain their existing diplomatic immunity
without the treaty.
Senator LAUSCHE. Consular officers and employees of the consular
establishment who are nationals of the sending state shall enjoy im-
munity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. That
means they are immune from prosecution in all cases, whether it is
the equivalent of a purpose to destroy our Government, whether it is
murder, burglary, rape, the violation of a traffic ordinance or any-
thing
else; is that correct?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir; that is absolutely correct.
Senator LAUSCIiE. Why has this change been made?
Secretary RUSK. Well, first, Senator, let me say that this immunity
does not constitute a license to commit crime.
Article 28 says "without prejudice to their privileges and immuni-
ties, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immuni-
ties to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state, including
traffic regulations."
And the record of criminal acts by those who enjoy diplomatic im-
munity over the last 40, 50 years shows this is not, has not been, a
serious problem.
I will put some statistics in on that particular subject.
I think that the desire here was to put the consular officers, em-
ployees of a consular establishment., say in Leningrad, on the same
basis in this regard as are the Embassy officials who now exercise
consular functions for us as a part of the Embassy.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 39
IMMUNITY EXTENDED TO CONSULAR OFFICES FOR FIRST TIME
Senator LAUSCIIE. In the history of our country, have we ever
granted immunity of this character?
Mr. KATZENBACII. For a consular officer or employee?
Senator LAUSCIIE. Yes.
Mr. KATZENBACII. To those who have carried out consular functions
as members of Embassies, but I think this is the first time we have ex-
tended it specifically to officers and employees of consulates.
CRIMINAL IMMUNITY PROVISION WAS PROPOSED BY SOVIETS
Senator LAUSCIIE. Was this provision included in the proposed
treaty that was submitted by our country or was it only accepted after
Russia said it would not sign the treaty unless complete immunity were
granted?
Mr. KATZENBACII. Mr. Kohler, would you comment on that?
Senator LAUSCIIE. Mr. Kohler can answer that, I think.
Mr. KoiiLER. This provision was originally put forward during
the final course of the negotiations by the Soviet side.
Senator LAUSCIIE. It was proposed by the Soviets?
Mr. KOHLER. Yes, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. And it wasn't included in our proposal origi-
nally?
Mr. KouILiu. That is correct, sir.
Senator LAUSCIIE. And isn't it a fact that the Soviets say, "Unless
you grant complete immunity we will not further discuss the subject."
Secretary RUSK. Senator, the question didn't come up in that form.
Senator LAUSCIIE. How did it come up?
Secretary RUSK. Because when we looked at this proposal and
looked at the reciprocal advantage to us in having the same arrange-
ments for our people in the Soviet Union, we felt that this would be
a constructive thing to do from the point of view of our own interests.
Otherwise we could have said "No, let's don't have any consular con-
vention."
We could establish consulates under existing law. But what we
would not have would be those protections for Americans, both special
protection for American officials working in the Soviet Union and the
notification and access protection with respect to American private
citizens traveling in the Soviet Union.
Senator LAUSCIIE. I have been using quite a bit of time.
Under the most-favored-nation clause how many other nations will
be entitled to this same immunity? I know Rumania and Yugoslavia
will be entitled to it. I-low many will be?
Secretary RUSK. In Mr. MacArthur's letter he pointed out there are
35 agreements presently in force which would require us to give most-
favored-nation treatment on a point of this sort, on a reciprocal basis.
Senator LAUSCIIE. Which are what we call the captive nations, and
which are the satellite nations that would become entitled to the same
treatment.
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40 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Secretary RUSK. The only countries of Eastern Europe who are
among those would be Rumania and then Yugoslavia.
Senator LAusciul. I want to direct your attention to article 11, which`
Senator Carlson dealt with briefly :
A consular officer may recommend to the courts or to the competent authorities,
of the receiving state appropriate persons to act in the capacity of guardians or'
trustees for citizens of the sending state or for the property of such citizens
when this property is left without supervision.
Does that language mean that the sending state, the consular office,
will be allowed to dictate who shall be the guardian, the executor, or,
the administrator or the trustee of anestate?
Mr. KATZENBACH. No, Senator, it doesn't.
Senator LAUSCHE. Why doesn't it?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Because it has to have the approval of the courtt,,!
Senator.
Senator LAUSCHE. All right.
Now, listen to this. I read further from the language. You say it
must have the approval of the court.
Mr. KATZENBACII. Yes, Sir.
SenatorLAuscHE (reading) :
Iii the event that the court or competent authorities consider that the recom-
mended candidate is for some reason unacceptable, the consular officer may
propose a new candidate.
Doesn't that mean that the consular officer in the end will determine
who the trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian shall be?
Mr. KATZENBACII. In accordance with law.
Senator LAUSCHE. Then it might go on interminably where the
consul would recommend, the court would reject, the consul would
recommend and the court would reject.
I think you are correct in that, but it is a rather deplorable situation
that might arise.
Mr. KATZENBACH. No, sir, because the court, I think, in those events'
could simply appoint, I don't think there is anything in here that does'
any more than give the consul the opportunity to suggest a name. If
that is unacceptable, to suggest one other name. If that is unacceptable
to the court, the court could appoint anyone that it chooses in its dis-
cretion to do so.
MFN TREATMENT FOR HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND BULGARIA
Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Rusk, in the event you enter into diplomatic
relations with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, will those nations
become, under the most-favored-nation principle, entitled to immunity
provisions?
Secretary RUSK. No. We have diplomatic relations with those coun-
tries. They would not be entitled to most-favored-nation treatment
under this convention.
Senator LAUSCHE. Why not?
Secretary RUSK. I mentioned Rumania and Yugoslavia.
Senator LAUSCHE. Why not?
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 41
Secretary Russ. Because we don't have an agreement with them
providing most-favored-nation agreements.
Senator LAUSCIE. That is all.
Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt?
Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, I wish that I could, knowing you,
share your feeling we were discussing this treaty in an atmosphere of
sweetness and light so far as Russia is concerned, but I think real-
istically we should consider this treaty in terms of the framework of
world affairs as they exist today.
If all we had was the cold war going on with the U.S.S.R. I think
that would be one set of circumstances.
But what we have actually is a war going on today in Vietnam in
which the Russians are supplying virtually all, if not all, of the so-
phisticated weapons which are killing American boys every day of the
year. Just about the time that the agitation developed again for the
approval of this treaty we read in the newspapers that the U.S.S.R.
has supplied another hundred new Migs to be used against our boys
out of Hanoi.
iSo I think we have to recognize this framework. The last two
times you appeared before this committee sitting where you are now
in this room, as I recall, was, one, to make a very eloquent and persua-
sive appeal for why the American policy was correct in not recogniz-
ing Red China now or admitting her to the U.N. now. The other was
to make an equally persuasive appeal as to why it would be injurious
to the free world and to America if we would lose the war to com-
munism in Vietnam.
With those facts staring us in the face, it would seem to me that
the presentation of this treaty now is at best a masterpiece of bad
timing, because I don't believe that conditions have changed suffi-
ciently so we can go back and allude to this as just a treaty with a
country with which we are establishing a detente, without any tangi-
ble evidence as to what is involved in that detente.
,So within that framework, I want to ask my questions, unless you
disagree with the framework of world 'affairs as I have summarized
them.
TREATY IS AN EFFORT TO PUT RELATIONS WITII SOVIETS ON A PEACEFUL
BASIS
Secretary RUSK. Senator, I would make a comment on it because
we must admit there are some very important and dangerous ques-
tions that still are unresolved between us and the Soviet Union.
I would hope that we could make steady progress on those larger
questions of which you spoke, but I think it is also important for us
to try to find those points at which we can put relations on a more
normal and peaceful basis wherever possible.
This is one of those. We hope very much that there will be before
you shortly a space treaty which we believe would be in the interests
of peace and, specifically, in the interests of the United States.
President Johnson took the initiative to press for that earlier last
year, and we were pleased that those negotiations succeeded in the
United Nations.
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42 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Now in one sense, Senator, one could make the argument that, if our
relations with the Soviet Union have their difficulties, it is all the more
important that we have opportunity to give our own citizens traveling
in the Soviet Union adequate protection. I do not look upon this
treaty as conferring a favor upon the Soviet Union. This is a recip-
rocal treaty which provides us a chance to give more adequate protec-
tion to our own citizens in the Soviet Union. I think, on a direct
reciprocal basis, there are very substantial advantages in this for us
particularly because we have far more citizens traveling in the Soviet
Union than they do here, and since their laws in some respects are,
somewhat different than ours, and their approach to law may be some-
what more severe than ours on certain kinds of offenses, for example,
in trading in currency, for example, to which tourists all over the
world seem somehow to be addicted.
But we do believe that despite some of the difficulties which you
refer to-serious difficulties-it is in the interest ofthe United States
to proceed with this convention.
Senator MUNDT. I don't want to dwell on that except I think the
word "difficulties" is unusually mild as a description of a country,
which is sending sophisticated weapons to Vietnam which are killing
American boys. I think it is a little more than I would attribute to the
word "difficulties."
ADVANTAGES TO THE UNITED STATES IN TREATY QUESTIONED
But let's go to your major argument which, if I understand it, is
that this is to the advantage of the United States, one, because it,
would give better protection to American citizens in Russia, who are
or have been arrested by the Russians, and two, it would give us an,
opportunity to open a consulate in Leningrad, and the second reason
doesn't have much appeal to me.
I have been in Leningrad, I have flown from Moscow to Leningrad.
How long does it take, Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. KoJILER. About an hour and a half.
Senator MUNDT. About an hour and a half. I thought it was two
hours, but they have speeded up, I suppose, transportation. An hour'
and a half.
I see no advantage to be gained except to save an hour and a half
whether a consulate or office in Leningrad is available to see U.S. cit-'
izens or whether you send somebody from Moscow where we have an
Embassy to make an intercession.
Secretary RUSK. Senator, the overriding interest we have in thisj,
consular convention is in the protection it gives to American citizens
traveling in the Soviet Union with regard to notification of any arrest,
and immediate consular access by consular officials.
The question of whether or not we establish a consulate in each
country on a reciprocal basis is largely a matter of administrative con-
venience to ourselves and to substantial numbers of Americans who,
might be traveling in a particular area. And we do know large num
hers of our tourists do wish to travel in Leningrad.
The same thing occurs in other countries. But the most important
element is the additional protection it gives to the growing number'
of American citizens traveling in the Soviet Union.
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CONSULAR `CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 43
Senator MUNDT. I want to get to a major question now because when
there is a credibility gap-I hear much about a credibility gap in this
town but I never hear about one with Secretary Rusk. You have been
very forthright and I admire you for it. I think, however, there is
an oversight or misstatement in your presentation which would create
a credibility gap if we permitted it to go unchallenged.
You say :
... 9,400 persons in the United States with full diplomatic immunity.
Soviet bloc countries, and I do understand what you mean by a bloc
country. You say this is not a dangerous precedent.
According to a State Department survey, between 1939 and 1964 there were 11
consular officers charged with crimes. Five of these were for traffic offenses.
Two of the 11 were convicted.
It just happened that about the time you were making this pres-
entation I was reading the report of the Director of the FBI on Janu-
ary 5,1967, through Acting Attorney General Ramsey Clark in which
he listed specific offenses much greater than this by diplomatic per-
sonnel from Iron Curtain countries occurring in 1966 alone which
would more than offset the minor ones.
But before you answer I want you to have the full picture before
you.
. Secretary RUsa. Senator, these figures here refer to consular offi-
cers. They do not involve diplomatic officers who already have the
immunities we were talking about. These are consular officers because
this has to do with consulates.
Senator MUNDT. I want to get the whole picture before you.
May I ask, Mr. Chairman, do we have in the record the exchange of
letters between Secretary Rusk and Mr. Hoover?
The CHAIRMAN. I put them in at the beginning.
Senator MUNDT. I ask unanimous consent at this time if I may put
in the record a letter which I wrote to J. Edgar Hoover on January 21
subsequent to that exchange of letters and a letter received by me from
J. Edgar Hoover.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.
(The letters referred to follow:)
Mr. J. EDGAR Hoovun,
Director, Federal Bureaa of Investigation,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR EDGAR : I am both concerned and confused over the various interpreta-
tions being given to your reply to the letter written you by Secretary of State
Rusk on September 14 with regard to the position of the FBI on the probable
consequences likely to result from ratification of the Consular Treaty now before
the United States Senate. Inasmuch as I am one of the five Senators alluded to
by Secretary Rusk's letter as having in mind your testimony of March 4, 1965
when we signed our minority report, I am understandably eager to know your
precise position because the whole matter is now again before our Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations. Hearings will begin next Monday morning.
It was my interpretation of your views and testimony when I helped prepare
the Minority Views which we signed that you were not counseling the Congress
on all possible ramifications of the so-called Consular Treaty but that as the
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44 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Director of the FBI charged with protecting the internal security of the United
States you were very properly pointing out the increased dangers and likelihood
of subversive actions by foreign communists if they were brought to this country
in increased numbers and granted extended immunity. That was my interpreta-
tion of your views and it remains so today and I see nothing in the exchange of
letters between Secretary Rusk and you which either indicates you have changed
your views as presented to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on March 4
or that you are retracting the warning signs which you flashed about the proba-
bility of increased challenges to our security here in the United States which
would "make our (the FBI's) work more difficult". Was I in error in my orig-
inal interpretation of your testimony or in the way I continue to interpret it
today?
Specifically may I inquire of you :
1) Have you in any way changed your views or has any evidence developed
since your testimony of March 4, 1965 to make you change your mind about your
testimony concerning subversive actions by communist diplomats as you related
it and the fact that added communist diplomatic personnel in our midst with
extended immunities would necessarily "make your work more difficult" in meet-
ing the responsibilities of the FBI?
2) Since March 4, 1965, has there been a cessation of attempts by communist
diplomatic personnel in this country to engage in acts of subversion or attempted
espionage? Do these efforts still continue? Can you supply me a list of these
attempts as they are available for public information, segregated by calendar
years, over the past six to ten years?
Finally, Edgar, let me say that as I read the exchange of letters between you
and Secretary Rusk, I feel you have reiterated precisely the interpretation which
I placed on your testimony at the time I helped prepare our Minority Views for
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1965, but due to the very much
expanded and inclusive interpretations being placed upon these letters by some
others, I would like to receive from you a reply to this letter and the questions
presented so that there can be no misunderstanding on the part of any who are
concerned.
Since our Senate Hearings on the Consular Treaty begin on Monday morning,
I would deeply appreciate it if you could have your reply delivered by hand by
Monday noon if this is possible; if not, the earlier I receive the letter the better
opportunity we shall have to keep the record straight and clear.
With warmest personal regards, I am,
Cordially yours,
KARL E. MUNDT,
U.S. Senator.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., January 23,1967.
HOD. KARL E. MUNDT,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR KARL : I have received your letter of January 21, 1967, in which you ad-
vised that you are concerned and confused over the various interpretations being
given to my letter of September 16, 1966, to Secretary of State Rusk, "with re-
gard to the position of the FBI on the probable consequences likely to result
from ratification of the Consular Treaty now before the United States Senate."
It should be clearly understood that the FBI is the investigative arm of the
Department of Justice and, as such, it is our responsibility to gather and report
facts. The FBI is not a policy-making agency and we do not express opinions.
Since 1924, when I became its Director, the FBI has refrained from injecting
itself into the area of legislation. The Consular Convention between the Soviet
Union and the United States, which is now before the United States Senate, is
no exception to this long-standing rule.
Because the Consular Convention does involve considerations which have a
direct bearing upon the responsibilities of the FBI, I appreciate your interest in
requesting the following facts from me. Again I emphasize that the FBI is, not
recommending a course of action or expressing an opinion.
You specifically inquired whether I had changed my views or whether any
evidence has developed to make me change my mind about my testimony of
March 4,1965. The answer is an unequivocal no.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
During my testimony before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee on march 4, 1965, I called attention to the fact that the establishment
of Soviet consulates in this country, "of course, will make our work more diffi-
cult." At no point in my March, 1965, testimony-nor following the release of
that testimony by the House Appropriations Committee in May, 1965-did I
state or imply that the Consular Convention would impose any additional bur-
dens of responsibility upon the FBI that we are incapable of handling. Nor did
I express any opinion concerning the matter of ratification. The simple fact is
that the work of the FBI in combating Soviet-directed espionage activities in
this country has increased through the years commensurate with the increase in
Soviet representation here. I can also state without equivocation that com-
munist-bloc diplomatic establishments in this country serve as focal points for
intelligence operations.
You inquired whether, since March 4, 1965, there has been a cessation of at-
tempts by communist diplomatic personnel in this country to engage in acts
of subversion or attempted espionage. The answer again is an unequivocal no.
You asked whether these efforts by communist diplomatic personnel still con-
tinue. They most certainly do. Representatives of the KGB (Soviet Committee
of State Security) and the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence Service), compris-
ing a large segment of the Soviet diplomatic corps in the United States, are con-
ducting an intensive campaign aimed at the most sensitive data regarding our
scientific and technical developments, our military and defense programs and
the future plans of our Government.
You requested that you be supplied with a list of attempts by communist dip-
lomatic personnel to engage in acts of subversion or attempted espionage as they
are available for public information, segregated by calendar years over the past
six to ten years. In accordance with your request, there is attached a list of
Soviet officials stationed in this country who have been arrested or expelled
from the United States since January 1, 1957.
With every good wish,
Sincerely,
J. EDGAR HOOVER.
SOVIET OFFICIALS STATIONED IN THE UNITED 'STATES WHO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED
on EXPELLED SINCE JANUARY 1, 1957
Name
Al 1 R R Malinin Employee, Soviet Embassy, Washington,
e isey . .
D.C ------------------------------------------------- ----- Oct. 31, 1966
Valentin A. Revin, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Washington,
Sept. 1, 1966
D.C ----------------- --
Stefan M. Kirsanov, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Washing-
ton, D.C--------------------------------------------------- June 1,1965
Boris V. Karpovich, Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington,
D.C ------------------------------------------------------- Jan. 7,1965
Vladimir P. Grechanin, Assistant Military AttachS, Washington,
D.C ------------------ ------ Dec. 14,1964
Aleksandr V. Udalov, Assistant Air Attache, Washington, D.C--- Dec. 14, 1964
Vasiliy V. Zadylinsky, Military AttachS, Washington, D.C------- Dec. 14, 1964
Vladimir I. Olenev, Employee, Soviet United Nations Mission,
New York City--------------------------------------------- Oct. 30,1963
Yuri A. Romashin, Third Secretary, Soviet United Nations Mis-
sion, New York City---------------------------------------- Oct. 30,1963
Gleb A. Pavlov, Attachg, Soviet United Nations Mission, New
York City ------------------------------------------------- Oct. 30,1963
Igor A. Ivanov, Chauffeur, Amtorg Trading Corporation, New
York City ------------------------------------------------- Oct. 29,1963
Ivan D. Egorov, Employee, United Nations Secretariat, New
York City ----------------------- ----------------------- Oct. 11,1963
Aleksandra I. Egorova, Wife of Ivan D. Egorov________________ Oct. 11, 1963
Gennadiy G. Sevastyanov, Attache, Soviet Embassy, Washing-
ton, D.C--------------------------------------------------- July 1, 19(;3
Yevgeni M. Prokhorov, Second Secretary, Soviet United Nations
Mission, New York City__________________ Sept. 29, 1962
Ivan Y. Vyrodov, Third Secretary, Soviet United Nations Mis-
sion, New York City --------------------------------------- Sept. 29, 1962
Yuri V. Zaitsev, Attache, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.------- Aug. 3, 1962
73-953-67----4
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46 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
OFFICIALS STATIONED IN THE UNITED STATES WHO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED
OR EXPELLED SINCE JANUARY 1, 1957-Continued.
Name Date
Igor Y. Melekh, Employee, United Nations Secretariat, New
York City------------------------------------------------- Mar.
24,
1961
Valentin M. Ivanov, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Wash-
ington, D.C------------------------------------------------ Aug.
13,
1960
Peter Y. Ezhov, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Wash-
ington, D.C------------------------------------------------ July
22,
1960
Vadim A. Kirilyuk, Employee, United Nations Secretariat, New
York City-------------------------------------------------- Dec.
Yevgeniy A
Zaostrovtsev
Second Se
r
t
S
i
E
17,
1959;
.
,
c
e
ary,
ov
et
mbassy,
Washington, D.C-____-__-___.--_____-_ ------------------------------------------- May 13,
1959
Kirill S. Doronkin, Employee, United Nations Secretariat, New
York City-------------------------------------------------- Jan.
15,
1959
Nikolai I. Kurochkin, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Wash-
ington, D.C------------------------------------------------ June
6,
1958
Gennadiy F. Mashkantsev, Employee, Soviet Embassy, Wash-
ington, D.C------------------------------------------------ Apr.
17,
1957
Vladimir A. Grusha, First Secretary, Soviet Mission to the
United Nations, New York City________________________ ___ Mar.
25,
1957
Vasilly M. Molev, Employee, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C___ Jan.
25,
1957
Yuri P. Krylov, Assistant Military Attache, Washington, D.0 ---- Jan.
14,
1957
Senator MUNDT. I will comment on them briefly. I will put the
whole letters in the record.
I started out by saying to Mr. Hoover :
I am both concerned and confused about the various interpretations being
given to your reply to the letter written you by Secretary Rusk an September 14
with regard to the position of the F.B.I. on the probable consequences likely to
result from the ratification of the Consular Treaty now before the United States
Senate.
I was intrigued by the fact that the Director made his reply in less
than 25 percent of the words in replying to your letter that you took
in writing to him. It looked a little bit terse and perhaps inadequate
but in any event having read his report to which he alluded to, I asked
him to set out in a report more specifically his position.
SUBVERSIVE ACTION BY COMMUNIST DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL
Specifically Isaid I would like to have the answers to two questions;
No. One :
Have you in any way changed your views or has any evidence developed since
your testimony of March 4,1965-
which was in the House committee-
to make you change your mind about your testimony concerning subversive
actions by communist diplomats as you related it and the fact that added
communist diplomatic personnel in our midst-
granted, not felonies as well as misdemeanors-
would necessarily "make your work more difficult" in meeting the responsibilities
of the F.B.I.
The second one is :
CESSATION OF ESPIONAGE ATTEMPTS BY COMMUNIST DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL
Since March 4, 1965, has there been a cessation of attempts by communist
diplomatic personnel in this country to engage in acts of subversion or attempted
espionage-
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I was looking for this elusive detente which you have mentioned,
Mr. Secretary.
Do these efforts still continue? Can you supply me a list of those attempts as
they are available for public information, segregated by calendar years, over the
past six to ten years.
That is from my letter which I have put in the record.
The answer came in this morning :
I have received your letter of January 21, 1967, in which you advised that you
are concerned and confused over the various interpretations being given to my
letter to Secretary Rusk.
It should be clearly understood that the F.B.I. is the investigative arm of the
Department of Justice and, as such, it is our responsibility to gather and report
facts. The F.B.I. is not a policy-making agency and we do not express opinions.
Since 1924, when I became its Director, the F.B.I. has refrained from injecting
itself into the area of legislation. The Consular Convention between the Soviet
Union and the United States which is now before the United States Senate is no
exception to this long standing rule.
To that extent he says in his reply to you, you will recall, that he
was in basic agreement with your interpretation.
MR. HOOVER'S 1965 TESTIMONY
Now, getting down to the facts that I have asked him for:
Because the consular convention does involve considerations which have a
direct bearing upon the responsibilities of the F.B.I., I appreciate your interest
in requesting the following facts from me. Again I emphasize that the F.B.I. is
not recommending a course of action or expressing an opinion.
You specifically inquired whether I had changed by views or whether any
evidence has developed to make me change my mind about my testimony of
March 4, 1965. The answer is an unequivocal no.
I asked that question not because you, in any way, at any time, mis-
represented that exchange of letters to us, Mr. Secretary, but many
editorials, many columnists, many commentators have roamed far
afield in their interpretation of the implications of the Director's
answer to you.
I quote again from the letter :
During my testimony before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee on March 4, 1965, I called attention to the fact that the establishment
of Soviet consulates in this country, "of course, will make our work more diffi-
cult."-
That is in quotation marks from what he has said before the House
Committee on Appropriations.
-At no time in my March 1965 testimony-nor following the release of that tesr
timony by the House Appropriations Committee in May 1965-did I state or
imply that the Consular Convention would impose any additional burdens of
responsibility upon the F.B.I. that we are incapable of handling. Nor did I
express any opinion concerning the matter of ratification. The simple fact is
that the work of the F.B.I. in combating the Soviet-directed espinoage activities
in this country has increased through the years commensurate with the increase
in Soviet representation here. I can also state without equivocation that com-
munist-bloc diplomatic establishments in this country serve as focal points for
intelligence operations.
You inquired whether, since March 5, 1965, there has been a cessation of
attempts by communist diplomatic personnel in this country to engage in acts of
subversion or attempted espionage.
I was again searching for that elusive detente which you have
alluded to but which you have never identified by specific act.
Quoting again from the Hoover letter :
Approvecye
u asked x ettte = ~_7t AW9 QQQ50Q3,2-5
tinue. They most certainly do. Representatives of the KGB (Soviet Committee
 A
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48 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
of State Security) and the GRU. (Soviet Military Intelligence Service), co-- Prising a large segment of the Soviet diplomatic corps in the united States, are
conducting an intensive campaign aimed at the most sensitive data regarding;
our scientific and technical developments, our military and defense programs;
and the future plans of our government.
SOVIET OFFICIALS ARRESTED IN AND EXPELLED FROM TIIE UNITED STATES;
You requested that you be supplied with a list of attempts by communist diplo-
matic personnel to engage in acts of subversion or attempted espionage as they are
available for public information, segregated by calendar years over the past six
to ten years. In accordance with your request, there is attached a list of Soviet
officials stationed in this country who have been arrested or expelled from the
United States since January 1, 1957.
With every good wish,
Sincerely,
J. EDGAR HOOVER.
Now, I call attention to this statement because I didn't want a cred-
ibility gap to develop between you and me in which you say again :
Nor is it a dangerous precedent. According to a State Department survey
between 1939-
please note the year, 1939, that is a long period of time-
and 1964, there were 11 consular officers charged with crimes. Five of these were
for traffic offenses ; two of the 11 were convicted.
I hold in my hand the list of Soviet officials stationed in the United
States who have been arrested or expelled since January 1, 1957, not
going back to 1939. From 1957 down through 1966.
Secretary RUSK. That includes diplomatic personnel and not just
consular personnel, I gather, Senator. Is that correct?
Senator MUNDT. I think that is correct.
Including quite a few of them in 1966.
Secretary Rusg. May I ask, are any consular personnel on that list
at all? I just wonder if it is dealing with the same subject.
Senator MUNDT. I will give you the titles.
One is an employee, third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, counselor,
Soviet Embassy; assistant military attache.
Of course they are not going to be located in consular offices we have
not permitted to open as yet. But they are the same kind of people
employed by the same government, following the same pattern of per-
formance which J. Edgar Hoover says is to induce whoever diplo-
matically represents the U.S.S.R. to participate in intelligence efforts.
You would not deny that, would you, Mr. Secretary?- You wouldn't
deny that every consular officer, every diplomatic personnel from
Russia, is at least potentially a Russian espionage agent? You
wouldn't ,deny that?
Secretary Rusg. It is a matter to which we have to be alert.
Senator MUNDT. You wouldn't deny it?
Secretary Rusx. No.
Senator MUNDT. So the question you ask may be all right as far as
classifications are concerned and I am perfectly willing to agree with
you that consular officers who are not yet here, because we don't have
any consular offices opened as yet, have committed not any crimes but
those who are here have committed 28 of them. Twenty-eight of them
have been expelled or arrested between 1957 and 1966, not just 11 that
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH, THE SOVIET UNION 49
were committed from 1939 to 1964. So I think you will agree also that
left unchallenged your statement gives the wrong implication, I
wanted to eliminate that credibility gap.
Secretary RUSK. May I comment on that?
Senator MUNDT. The floor is yours.
QUESTION OF CONSULAR OFFENSES
Secretary RUSK. That 11 has to do with consulates of all nations
during this period and=they were referring to consular officers.
If I may say so, the question You directed to the Director of the FBI
and his reply had to do with the existing situation basically, that is, it
discussed the problem we already have under existing arrangements
with the Soviet Union and other countries.
Senator MUNDT. Right.
Secretary RUSK. Now, we are talking about what the effect of this
consular convention would be on that and other problems. And I
would suggest that, when the Director of the FBI indicates that this
consular convention would not create problems that he could not ade-
quately handle, that he is saying, since I would suppose we are talking
about one consulate as a possibility in each country
Senator MUNDT. To start with.
Secretary RUSK. If ten or fifteen consular officers and employees are
located somewhere in this country, the FBI, perhaps with some addi-
tional personnel, could take care of the problem an the same basis on
which it is being taken care of now.
ABILITY OF FBI TO COPE WITH ADDITIONAL SOVIET PERSONNEL
Senator MUNDT. I quite agree and if it leads to consular office No. 2
which it should and would under your proposal and another 15
comes in I think they can cope with that. In fact if you open them up
on the west coast as you well may be asked to do if this thing prevails,
if we open them all up, and we add 1,000 or 2,000 more consular officers,
I quite agree the FBI with additional personnel can cope with it, but at
what cost and at what expense and for what purpose simply because
you have had 18 people who have been arrested over on that side, some
of them an hour and a half away from Moscow, where we have diplo-
matic personnel that you can fly over there at much less expense than
opening up a consular office to intercede if such intercession is in fact
going to be meaningful.
CASE OF ANGUS WARD
We did not find it meaningful in Vladivostok when Angus Ward
was
Secretary RUSK. That was a period when consular relations were
bad, and we would like to get them sorted out on a basis of understand-
ing between the countries.
senator MUNDT. The answer is it did not work.
Secretary RUSK. We did not have the convention for Angus Ward.
Senator MUNDT. And it did not work.
I wanted that to go in the record primarily because I think it is very
important in our deliberations but especially because what I read in
what you gave me, gave me a wrong impression. You do not intend
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50 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
to leave wrong impressi Or
ons, that I do know, because you are forth-
right and candid, and I wanted to correct the record, and I think
we now have the record set clear.
You were talking about consular offices which are not here, not
opened up yet, and I am talking about communist diplomats who were
here operating on 16th Street in Washington, D.C.
Secretary RUSK. Senator, you and I, neither of us, wants to give a
wrong impression.
Senator MUNDT. That is right.
Secretary RUSK. The statistics you have in your reply from Mr.
Hoover have to do with the framework of existing diplomatic rela-
tions. What I am talking about is what the effect would be if we
opened up an additional consulate, one in each country. But I have
also made the point that to us the important thing is not the question
of o ening up the consulates it is getting the additional protections
for American citizens in the Soviet Union with respect to notification
and consular access.
Senator MUNDT. We do not get very much for very many in return
for letting them bring in return fifteen more espionage agents.
OPENING UP OF ADDITIONAL CONSULATES
At the beginning did you say in your statement or am I wrong,
I think you said if you have this consular treaty you will not have to
come back to this committee for permission to open up additional con-
sulates. The President has the plenary power.
Secretary RUSK. Senator, for that we do not need to have this con-
sular treaty at all. We can do it this afternoon.
Senator MUNDT. I know you do not, but you want to do it for re-
ciprocal and other reasons but if you get what you ask for now, you
will not come back to the Congress and say to this committee, "May
we have also one additional Russian consulate now in San Francisco
and Los Angeles and El Paso and Kansas City and Minneapolis."
That you can do once this is established.
We are not talking about the possible limitation applying only to one
consulate office. We are talking about whatever the President might
decide to do with his constitutional authority in opening up new offices.
Secretary RUSK. Well, as a matter of fact, in terms of numbers of
consulates, that still is a matter that is open today under existing con-
stitutional legal arrangements.
Senator MUNDT. Under entirely different terms as to how they
function than if you have this consular treaty.
Secretary RUSK. We have never discussed or even considered the
matter of strewing consulates all over the Soviet Union and the United
States. We are talking about the advantages of opening up one con-
sulate in each country. I said I would be prepared to come back and
discuss this matter before this committee before action were taken on
it. We are not discussing it with the Soviet Union at the moment.
That is a matter which is to be considered a possible additional step
after we get the basic protections that we feel are important, that are
written here in this consular convention.
Senator MUNDT. This treaty, however, sets up an entirely different
set of rules for a different kind of ball game as far as exchange of
consular offices is concerned.
Secretary Rusx. But on a reciprocal basis.
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CONSULAR : CONVENTION W]TH THE SOVIET UNION
Senator MUNDT. It does for me.
Secretary RUSK. On a reciprocal basis.
EXERCISE OF COMMITTEE OPINION ON WISDOM OF CONSULATES
Senator MUNDT. The President can do it or you can do it acting as
his emissary without coming to this committee, so if this committee
wants to make a determination as to whether it is now in the interests
of the United States, given the framework of world conditions under
which we discussed this matter, whether that is wise to open up the pos-
sibility of an unlimited number of consular offices depending upon
the judgment of the executive, if we are going to have anything to say
about it, we had better say it now.
Senator CASE. Would the Senator yield?
Senator MUNDT. After the Secretary answers the question.
Secretary RUSK. Senator, under the present situation, we can open
up additional consulates.
Senator MUNDT. But in the new ball park with a new set of rules
we would be out of the pictture now.
Senator RUSK. No, sir, you are not.
Senator MUNDT. After we set the rules up, we are out of the picture.
Secretary RUSK. No, sir, no more than usual in the sense that the
President has certain authority now.
Senator MUNDT. Now.
Secretary RUSK. He would have authority if you approved this con-
vention to establish consulates. He would have it in either case.
Senator MUNDT. That is right.
Secretary RUSK. I have said to the committee that, when we get to
the point of discussing opening up a consulate in each country, I would
be down to consult with your committee on the subject, but the consti-
tutional position remains what it has been all along.
Senator MUNDT. I just want to get clear in the record. I am not
talking about what will happen, but talking about the powers of this
committee, our power, to be sure that there are not numerous consular
offices established in this country, under the new set of rules on that
matter, the congressional power must be exercised now or never.
Secretary RUSK. No, sir.
Senator MUNDT. Once the new set of rules is approved by ratifica-
tion of the treaty, then the Executive from then on into perpetuity has
the authority to set up as many consular offices as it wants to under
this new set of rules.
Secretary RusK. It would have authority to act under the law just
as it has now, and presumably it would exercise that authority in con-
sultation with the key committees involved, as we have in the past.
Senator MUNDT. I have a great many more questions. I am not sure
whether we are operating under the ten-minute rule or not. I am sure,
however, I have taken more than my ten minutes, and I think I should
yield to my colleagues.
I would hope, Mr. Chairman, on a matter of this significance and
importance that we would have the Secretary back until all members
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52 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
of the committee have had a chance to ask those reasonable questions
they might want to propound.
Senator CASE. Would the Senator yield?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, there will be a meeting tomorrow, but not on
this subject. But it can be opened again if the committee wishes to.
Senator MUNDT. We have not completed the questions.
The CHAIRMAN. There is no desire to rush through. Everyone is to
be satisfied he has had an opportunity to question the Secretary.
Senator MUNDT. In fairness to my colleagues, I will yield but I wish
to interrogate the Secretary on other aspects.
The CHAIRMAN. I think that could be arranged.
Senator MUNDT. I yield.
Senator CASE. I just want to make one point, if I may, on the
Senator's questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
EXTENT OF TREATY ENCOURAGING ADDITIONAL CONSULATES
Senator CASE. Related to this question, the extent to which this will
lead to a great multiplication of consular officers both here and abroad;
I think, is the question of the effect of the convention on inducing us
to do that. I am in general accord with the great desirability of estab-,
lishing the protection of American citizens abroad in Russia and other
places on a reciprocal basis with the countries involved. But I am
rather surprised that the rights of Americans to have their represen-
tatives have access to them, the rights of Americans to have their,
country's officials notified when they are arrested and so forth, are not.
generally established. They are only established in reference to a
consular establishment.
Suppose we have no consular establishment set up with Russia fol-
lowing this treaty, will none of these rights come into existence?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
MATTER OF CONSULAR DISTRICTS IS UNCLEAR
Senator CASE. I would like to have the treaty interpreted, because
I do not want to have these rights of Americans that we are seeking
to establish in Russia rest on any such flimsy basis as their being in a
consular district
Secretary RUSK. Oh, no.
Senator CASE (continuing). At the time. But if you read the
treaty, I do not find that this is very clear. I, therefore, suggest
maybe there will be pressure to create consular districts all over, in
every country, in order to make Americans' rights secure.
Secretary RUSK. Senator, I appreciate the question. It makes it
possible to clarify that point.
The consular convention would apply throughout the Soviet Union
and would provide for consular access throughout the Soviet Union.
Senator CASE. It says within his district.
Secretary Rush.. That would have to do. If we established a con-
sulate in Leningrad, then the Leningrad consular district would have to
be defined.
Senator CASE. Would have to be defined to include all Russia.
Secretary RUSK. No, sir, because we have an embassy in Moscow
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 53
which has consular functions to perform, and presumably the Mos-
cow Embassy would deal with this matter in all parts of the Soviet
Union.
Senator CASE. This is not as clear to me as I would like. In article
12 it says, "A consular officer shall have the right within his district
to meet with," and so forth, "any national," and the same pattern of
language applies in section 2 of article 12 in regard to notification,
section 3 in regard to visit and communication, and in article 13 in
regard to a consular officer having access to vessels, and of course in the
protocol which sets out these specific times which shall be reasonable
for notification by one country for the arrest of a national of another,
and access of the latter's representative to that national.
Secretary Ruses. Well, Senator, it is customary in consular arrange-
ments, where there is not a single consular district for the entire
country, as is now the case with us in the Soviet Union, to have con-
sulates which have known and designated areas of responsibilities.
For example, a consul in New Orleans would cover states A, B, G, and
D, so that everyone knows where the normal points of contact are
for the transaction of business.
If we established a consulate, we would expect that it would be
given a certain area of responsibility geographically for the con-
venience of American citizens traveling there, and we would then
continue with the Embassy to cover the rest of the country. This is
normal.
Article 29 points out that the rights and obligations of consular
officers provided for in the present convention also apply to members
of the diplomatic staff of the diplomatic mission of the contracting
parties charged with the performance of consular functions in the
diplomatic mission and who have been notified to be in a consular
capacity to foreign affairs ministries.
Senator CASE. I do understand that section. It is not as clear as I
would like to have it, and it still does not clear up the matter of a
consular district.
Suppose this convention is ratified by both countries, and it comes
into force but no consular districts or no consular offices are set up
for some time. Would its benefits in regard to access, notification and
whatnot be applicable in Russia and in the United States? We would
follow this anyway, presumably, but who would be the consular
officer or who would get notice of something that happened, not in
Moscow, not in Leningrad, but in Vladivostok or somewhere else?
Would this apply to the whole country?
Secretary Rusx.. The rights with respect to notification and con-
sular visitation would become immediately applicable with the ex-
change of ratifications of this treaty. All of the Soviet Union would
be in the consular district of Moscow served by our Embassy in Moscow.
Senator CASE. I just wanted to have that very clear, because read
narrowly this suggests the other way and I could not see why you
talked about rights of Americans as vast as this being related only
to a consular office.
Secretary RUSK. No, it is customary where there would be more
than one consulate in a country that they determine in consultation
with the host country what the geographical areas of responsibility
of their respective consulates would be.
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54 CONSULAR CONVENTION; WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Senator CASE. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.
Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
EMBASSY PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN EXPELLED rROM TIIE UNITED STATES
AND FROM THE SOVIET UNION
As I understand it, the Senator from South Dakota has submitted
for the record a list of the officials in the Soviet Embassy in Washing-
ton, not assigned to the U.N., who have been expelled over a period of
time.
Senator MUNDT. Not my list, it is the list of the FBI.
Senator PELL. Right, the list furnished by the FBI.
Senator MUNDT. I do not know whether it is U.N. people, but if you
go through the list, each one is identified as you will find.
Senator PELL. I think we are only concerned with those stationed
at the Embassy, not the U.N. The U.N. is a different problem. Would
you agree on that, sir?
Senator MUNDT. Well, I would assume that they have the same
diplomatic immunities in the U.N. as they have, but I will yield to the
Secretary on that.
Secretary RUSK. We have the breakdown of figures between those
employed in the U.N. and the Soviet mission in the U.N.
Senator MUNDT. The question is whether there is any difference
in the diplomatic immunity as applied to Russians in the any
as dis-
tingguished from 16th Street.
Secretary RUSK. Where it is available, it is the same.
'Senator PELL. I would like to ask the Secretary to submit for the
committee a list of American officials in Moscow who have been ex-
pelled over the same period of time.
(The material referred to follows:)
American officials stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow who have been
expelled since Jan. 1,1916 2 (total, 31)
Name Date
Lt. Robert Dreher, Assistant naval attache-------------------- Apr. 26, 1948
George F. Kennan, American Ambassador--------------------- Oct. 3, 1952
Lt. 'Col. Howard L. Felchlin, assistant Army attache------------ July 3, 1954
Maj. Walter McKinney, assistant air attache-------------------- Do.
Mrs. Karl E. Sommerlatte (wife of second secretary) ------------- Oct. 26, 1954
Lt. Col. John S. Benson, assistant Army attache------.---------- May 7, 1955
Capt. Walter Mule, assistant Army attache-------------------- Do.
Capt. William R. Stroud, assistant Army attache--------------- Do.
Maj. Hubert E. Tansey, assistant Army attache---------------- Jan. 30, 1957
Capt. Charles W. Stockell, assistant Army attache-------------- Do.
Capt. Paul R. Uffelman, assistant naval attache---------------- Feb. 7,
1957
Lt. William S. Lewis, assistant naval attache------------------ Do.
Martin S. Bowe, attache------------------------------------- May 7,
1957
John A. Baker, second secretary------------------------------ May
14,
1958
Russell A. Langelle, attache---------------------------------- Oct.
16,
1959
Col. Edwin M. Kirton, air attache----------------------------- Aug.
10,
1960
George P. Winters, attache----------------------------------- Aug.
26,
1960
Maj. Irving T. McDonald, assistant air attache---------------- Nov.
21,
1960
Comd. Raymond D. Smith, assistant naval attache-------------- Oct.
5,
1962
Kermit S. Midthun, first secretary-------------------.---------- Oct.
12,
1962
Richard C. Jacob, secretary-archivist-------------------------- Nov.
4,
1962
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 55
American officials stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow who have been
expelled since Jan. 1,19461 (total 31) -Continued
William C. Jones, second secretary---------------------------- May 13, 1963
Capt. Alexie Davison, assistant air attache____________________ Do.
Rodney Carlson, attache_____________________________________ Do.
Hugh Montgomery, attache----------------------------------- Do.
Col. George Aubrey, Army attachb____________________________ Dec. 15, 1964
Lt. Col. Karl Liewer, assistant Army attache------------------ Do.
Maj. James Smith, assistant -air attache______________________ Do,
Richard Stolz, first secretary--------------------------------- Jan. 26,
1965
Norris D. Garnett, attache_________________________________ May 11,
1965
Donald K. Lesh, second secretary_____________________________ Sept. 12,
1966
1The Soviet Government normally has stated that American diplomats are expelled for
alleged "Activities inconsistent with their status as accredited diplomats."
In this connection, when we come to comparing the establishment
of Soviet consular offices in our country and in their country, I am
reminded a little bit of the old adage of what is sauce for the goose is
sauce for the gander, and I would think that, while it cannot be dis-
cussed in an open meeting, the views of the Director of Central In-
telligence Agency are different from those of Mr. Hoover.
RIGHTS OF ACCESS SPELLED OUT
Is not basically this convention an extension of the Vienna Co -
q$, the only differences being the rights o access are
ve on f 1.
spells out and there is an extension of criminal immunities.
Secretary RUSK. The right of notification.
Senator PELL. Right, rights of access.
Secretary RUSK. That is correct.
Senator PELL. Another technical question. Why is it under the
convention that an exequatur is issued only to the head of the consular
establishment and not the vice-consuls as in all countries?
Mr. KATZENBACFI. It has been customary for many countries under
the same long periods of international law that you are talking about.
Senator PELL. You will find in most countries that exequaturs get
issued to all members of a consular establishment, vice consuls and
consuls.
Mr. KATZENBACII. It is the Soviet practice on this. I do not know
there is significance to it, Senator.
Senator FELL. There is a difference, I guess, in the Soviet Union.
This convention would not apply to honorary consulates, is that
correct?
Secretary RUSK. No, it would not.
Senator PELL. To return to the question of Senator Morse but on
my own time, it would seem to me, and I think it is a good think,
that this convention does modify the present rights of asylum in
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56 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
a consular building. The reason I say that is drawn from my own
personal, somewhat bitter, experience when I had an interpreter while
I was in the Foreign Service who had been badly beaten up and
tortured and returned to me. I thought the local officials wanted,
to pick him up again, but I had no right of asylum nor did I have!
any building with that right of asylum, so we put a sign marked "con-
sular archives" on our door which seemed to serve the purpose of pre-
venting the police from coming in and extracting him.
This treaty, I am glad to see, gives some sort of immunity to the
residence and the office of a consul, is that not correct?
Secretary RUSK. I would like the legal adviser to comment on that,
if I may, sir.
Senator PELL. Thank you.
Mr. MEEKER. Senator, the treaty provides, as you have pointed out,
in article 17, for inviolability of archives and buildings. This, how-
ever, does not entitle the sending state to provide political asylum to
anybody at all.
Now, if there were present in a consular building someone who had
taken refuge there, this would have to be then discussed between the
sending state and the receiving state as to what would happen.
The United States takes a view of asylum which is different from
the view taken by some countries, the view being that asylum may be
afforded in a situation of immediate danger to life and limb, but this
is different from the right of political asylum which is asserted to
exist in some countries particularly in Latin America. This conven- `.
tion does not bear at all on the question of the rights and duties be-
tween the sending state and the receiving state in regard to asylum.
RIGHT OF CONSUL TO PROVIDE ASYLUM
Senator PELL. Extending the question of Senator Morse's, and ask-
ing
you for an answer to the specific, am I not correct in saying that
without this treaty being signed, if the consul, the man in charge of
the establishment, chooses to give asylum to a resident of the receiving
country, could not the local police come in and pull him out? Under
this convention the police could not do so, and I submit this is an
extension and a oood one.
Mr. MEEKER. It would be true under the convention, which it is not
true now, that the building would be inviolable, but this again is dif-
ferent from the question of whether the sending state is entitled vis-a-
vis the host state to give asylum.
Senator PELL. Granted, but there is an extension of the right of
consul if he wished to do it under this convention, and I applaud it.
I am just trying to pin you down on this.
Secretary RUSK. But how long that right could be sustained in the
relations between the two governments in those cases where we our-
selves, for example, do not provide certain kinds of protections to the
citizens of the host country is something that would be settled on the
basis of issues not arising under this convention.
Senator PELL. Understood. But I still submit there is an exten-
sion not of the right of asylum, but the right of the freedom of the
consul to give it if he wants to. Would that not be correct?
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Mr. MEEKER. Senator, I think you are pointing out a practical cir-
cumstance which we all recognize.
Senator PE, LL. I have been through those circumstances twice, that
is why they are vivid in my mind.
Mr. MEEKER. That is, if there is a building which by treaty is in-
violable, more time will be taken before the receiving country, the host
state, does something about it. But ultimately, of course, and in fact
in a rather short period of time, the receiving country can close up the
consulate if it is unsatisfied with the conduct of the consul.
Senator PELL. Correct.
Mr. MEEKER. That is made clear by article 2 of this convention.
Senator PELL. When that happens there is no possible way the man
could be taken from the building across the border. Then, the local
government could pick him up at that time. But until that consulate
is closed and taken over, the police could not come in, correct?
Secretary Rusx. Correct.
Mr. MEEKER. Those results flow from the provisions on inviolability
and they are not the result of any new obligations in regard to asylum
that either country is taking on.
Senator PELL. I am not a lawyer and I can see your point, but will
you agree with me that the fact is that the local police cannot go out
and pull out this poor fellow as long as the consul wishes the police
not to do so and the consul has his valid exequatur.
Mr. MEEKER. That is correct.
Senator PELL. Thank you.
Along this general line, I would like to applaud the Secretary for
pressing ratification of this convention. I was a vice consul behind the
Iron Curtain for a year. Igo back behind the Iron Curtain every
couple of years, and was back just a month ago. I know from my own
experience half my employees were either arrested or fled when the
Communists took over. I had a man who worked as my chauffeur
who was beaten to death. These things are not happening to the same
extent now as the system cools off a bit behind the curtain, but the
necessity for this treaty is very real.
Speaking as a former vice consul who has myself suffered a certain
amount, because of not having some of these rights, I would hope
immensely that the treaty would be ratified. I think it would be far
more to the interests of the United States, to our citizens abroad who
get abused far more than do Soviet's citizens. All told I think it
should be ratified.
I came across one case in Eastern Europe where a man had been in
jail for two months and we had not been notified about it, since the
receiving government had no obligaition to do so. If this treaty had
been in effect with that particular country, we would have known
within two days. If we can take early action in such cases, the brain-
washing and the treatment that is given to people when they have no
access and feel completely alone, would it not be so effective, and pris-
oners would be more able to stand up on their own feet and not admit
to a brainwashed confession.
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5!3 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Along this line, why are we not pursuing similar treaties with other
Eastern European countries? .
Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, we had better see what the Senate
would do with this one.
The CHAIRMAN. That is right.
Secretary RusK. We have treaties with Rumania and Yugoslavia,
and I would think
Senator PELL. Not consular ones. Consular conventions?
Secretary RUSK. Most-favored-nation arrangements in treaties of
friendship, commerce, and navigation dating from the 19th century.
Senator PELL. But the beauty of this treaty is that it extends im-
munities and it also extends the rights of access.
Secretary RusK. We do not have a treaty that is on all fours with
this one on those points; that is correct, sir.
Senator PELL. Just as one man in the Senate and Congress, I guess,
who has had more experience in this and felt more strongly on it,
and suffered more because of not having it, I very much support its
ratification.
TOWING AWAY DIPLOMATIC CARS IN NEW YORK CITY
Finally, and I do not mean to be flip, but what will be the effect of
the ratification of this treaty on Mayor Lindsay's policy of towing cars
in New York City?
Secretary RUSK. Well, we expect diplomatic personnel and consu-
lar personnel to comply with the laws of the country, including traffic
laws. Now, somewhere between that proposition and diplomatic '
immunity there is certain room for necessary maneuver. But we
have been moving in very hard on this to the point where we have
been getting reciprocal action from some of our friends abroad with
respect to traffic parking tickets for our own people. But I think we
have had more understanding of this from the diplomatic and con-
sular community in the last two years or so, and I hope we can find an
answer to it.
Senator PELL. And in conclusion, to me one of the most important
things as well as the matter of access, is this question of inviolability,
because the nervous strain on the poor fellow who is a consul with a
feeling that the local police can go in not only covertly but overtly is
not a pleasant one.
Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me it has been very
valuable to have the observations of the distinguished Senator based
upon his daily operations in the field where these matters are of daily
concern, and I want to thank Senator Pell for his observations on that
matter.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper?
NO ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULATES WITHOUT AGREEMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT
Senator CooPER. Mr. Secretary, I think it is correct to say that the
opposition to the ratification of this convention is based chiefly upon
the idea that it would give the opportunity to the Soviet Union to
expand its espionage activity. I get that from my mail and from
certain articles and newspapers.
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CON U cq%V OI~f Iii H % YIE 0
I think there is a belief that, a proper belief, teat there will be many
consulates established without any limitations on personnel. You
have already said that, but I think it would be good to summarize
that no consulate can be established without agreement of the State
Department, is that correct?
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.
Senator COOPER. And the number of personnel agreed to by the
State Department.
Secretary RUSK. And the numbers must be agreed to and the in-
dividuals must be agreed to.
Senator COOPER. And specific persons who are officials and em-
ployees must be agreed to by the State Department.
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.
Senator COOPER. And any time under this convention, if the State
Department so desires, without giving any reason, it can declare
that a certain person or official is not acceptable.
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. We can send individuals
home. We can terminate the agreement on six months' notice, or we
can simply close the consulate in extreme cases.
QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL BURDEN OF SECURITY
Senator COOPER. Then while there is the possibility for increased
activity, you do not consider it enlarging or making more radically
different the situation as it exists today.
Secretary RUSK.. No, sir, this is not in any serious sense a significant
addition to the problem that already exists with respect to the large
number of those who, as a matter of general international practice,
have diplomatic immunities and the procedures which are available
to foreign governments of ail types in an open society such as ours, to
get informtaion about this society. I think the problem of espionage
is perhaps more important outside of the framework of something
of this sort than it is in this framework, because these are announced
people who are alerted to everybody as people who are going to be
gathering information-that is one of the duties of a consulate.
Our own consulate, if we had one in Leningrad, would be reporting
on the activities that are going on in the general Leningrad area,
economic and otherwise.
So I would think that the problem of an additional burden to the
.security of the country is absolutely minimal here in relation to the
problems we have otherwise. And we are fully equipped to deal with
those problems if they should arise.
CONVENTION DOES NOT EXTEND IMMUNITY TO FAMILIES OF OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES
Senator COOPER. The convention does not mention specifically the
families of officials or employees with respect to immunity.
Senator RUSK. That is correct, sir. This does not cover families.
It is interesting that in the British and in the Japanese agreements
families are included. We felt that it was important to work this out
on the basis of those who are carrying the official functions but we did
not ourselves extend it to include families.
Senator CoorER. Would you consider that would cause any difficulty
when immunity is granted to employees, chauffeurs and cooks?
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60 CONSULAR ENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Secretary RusK. I do not recall that we have ever had any problems,
with respect to families. If there is action taken by the other side with''!
respect to diplomatic officers, it is usually against the officer, not'
against the family. I think this is something which has not arisen
to cause us concern.
Senator CooPER. I have been very much impressed by your argu-
ment for the advantages of this convention, particularly with respect
to notification of persons held in detention to right of access.
Now, I think Senator Case raised a very important question and;
that is to be sure that this right of communication, the right of notifi-
cation, would apply to any American national any place in the
Soviet Union.
Secretary Ruses. There is no question whatsoever about that, sir,
none whatever.
Senator CoorER. It is not limited to the consular district.
Secretary Rusx. Not at all, sir, because our Embassy in Moscow
now has jurisdictional coverage for our proposes of the entire Soviet
Union. The difficulty is that we do not have the right under treaty of
having the notification and the access that we would like to have, and'
this would extend that to the entire country.
Senator CooPER. I think it is important also to point out that Para-
graph 3 of the protocol provides that the right of access shall be:
accorded on a continuing basis. Do you interpret that as I would that
it would not just be limited to one visit by consular authority but, if
necessary, that there could be a continuing access to one held in
detention, that is, on a reasonable basis?
Secretary Rusii. This is very important to us, Senator, because we
do not want to have a situation where one consular visit completes the
right. We want this access at all times.
Senator COOPER. Now, these convention rights, these procedural
rights to which Senator Morse referred and you concur, would they be
rights that even a Soviet citizen would not enjoy?
Secretary Rusx. Particularly with respect to notification and access.
They can arrest a citizen of the Soviet Union and hold him during the
investigation without bringing him to the courts or publicly doing any-
thing about it while he is under investigation. It would not be pos-
siblewith respect to an American citizen under this agreement.
Senator COOPER. I was sure Ambassador Kohler would say this but
I think it would be natural in a discussion between the Ambassador
and the representatives of the Soviet Union on these questions of de-
tention of our nationals without right of communication or without
right of notification that we must not exacerbate our relations with the
Soviet Union and the United States. What is your judgment about
that? You have had to discuss these matters with the Soviets.
Mr. KoHLER. Yes, and we discussed this particular section at great
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OA" M
length, and `in terms of the Soviet police and juridical system, it is a
major breakthrough because their practice has always been that the
person is held incommunicado during a period of what they call an
investigation which can be almost indefinite in duration so this requires
a modification of Soviet law and procedures, and it has been of such
interest that a number of other countries immediately after we con-
cluded this consular convention, the British, the Japanese, and the
Italians, immediately wanted to take advantage of this breakthrough
to negotiate similar agreements.
Secretary RUSK. With the Soviet Union.
Mr. KOHLER. With the Soviet Union.
Mr. KATZENBACH. If I may add to that, Senator this is something
we cannot and do not do within this country where anybody is entitled
immediately to access to the outside, to a friend, to a lawyer, and so
forth.
Senator COOPER. I think it is easy for us to sit here and consider what
might be happening to an American national detained in the Soviet
Union, but f think it is an awful position for him to be in not to have
any rights of communication and access, and I think this holds great
hope.
ACCESS HERETOFORE HAS REQUIRED EFFORTS ON HIGHEST DIPLOMATIC
LEVEL
Secretary RUSK. And, Senator, contacts are very important in one
element I mentioned briefly earlier. During the period in which I
have occupied my present chair, the very effort to get consular access
to Americans in the Soviet Union has required attention at the very
top of Government on more than one occasion. Now, when you ele-
vate these questions to that level, considerations of political prestige in
character intrude and make the problem more difficult, perhaps for
both sides, to resolve. Whereas if this could be dealt with at a lower
level in terms of known treaty obligations, then these problems, I think,
could be settled more easily and more readily because they do not be-
come major issues of controversy between two great nations.
Senator CooPER. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, can you stay a bit longer? I think
we can finish up entirely and not have to have a second meeting.
Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I have a rather important luncheon
commitment with some foreign guests of the Congress.
The CHAIRMAN. I know what your deadline is.
Secretary RUSK. Perhaps I could stay another five or ten minutes
or so but Mr. Katzenbach would be able to continue.
The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask Mr. Katzenbach particularly a
couple of questions. Would you be content to have the Secretary stay
now, then excuse him sand go on with the others, Senator Mundt?
Senator MUNDT. I think so. I could finish in ten minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. It would save another meeting. Go ahead.
"OURISTS AND EXCHANGE VISITORS FROM EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
enator' MUNDT. To complete the record, Mr. Secretary, would
supply in addition to what you have placed in the record of
9-958-67-5
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CCii CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
i
the tourist and exchan b, visitors from the Soviet Union, will you sup-
plement that by includn'ig also tourist and exchange visitors during the
same period of time from the other bloc countries?
Secretary Russ. Yes, sir, we will do our best to do that and
promptly.
(The information referred to follows:)
Tourists and ecschange visitors from Eastern European countries, 196#-66
Bulgaria:
Tourists_____________________
58
144
Exchange visitors____________
25
71
Czechoslovakia:
Tourists_____________________
293
408
1,806
2,642
2,230
Exchange visitors____________
64
124
201
331
575
Hungary:
Tourists_____________________
260
2,018
4,446
4,047
2,9.56
Exchange visitors____________
72
48
89
144
270
Poland:
Tourists_____________________
1,306
1,076
2,270
2,822
3, 3$4
Exchange visitors____________
499
360
472
475
475
Rumania:
Tourists_____________________
259
Exchange visitors____________
165
I Since figures are not readily available for the past 6 months of calendar year 1966, fiscal years have been
used throughout.
The CIIAIRMAN. I want to identify the bloc.
Senator MUNDT. He and I understand it. You have a little different
interpretation. [Laughter.]
I will be content with his interpretation of the bloc countries.
The CHAIRMAN. He said it was an anachronism when I asked him
what it was.
Senator MUNDT. But he used it.
The CHAIRMAN. I agree.
QUESTION OF APPROVAL BY THREE ADMINISTRATIONS
Senator MUNDT. So as to clarify the record, if I understand it
correctly, somebody stated around the table this had been approved
by Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. If I understand the record
correctly, these discussions on the problems were initiated under the
Eisenhower administration.
Secretary Rusx. That is correct, sir.
Senator MUNDT. They were not consummated then however, so the
Eisenhower administration said neither yes nor no on the section of the
consular treaty before us.
Secretary RUSK. No, it is President Johnson who presents it to the
Senate for its approval.
Senator MUNDT. I understand, but you said three administrations
approved it.
Secretary RUSK. The principal issues were attitudes of the U.S..
Goverment, the reasons behind the request in 1959 to start negotiations
on this subject. There was a draft then available of a possible
convention..
Senator MUNDT. I understand and I wanted
Secretary RUSK. There was a draft available of a possible conk
tion.
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Senator MUNDT. It was changed of course.,
Secretary Rusx. In the process, yes, sir.
IS VLADIVOSTOK OFF LIMITS TO AMERICAN TOURISTS?
Senator MUNDT. Senator Case brought up an interesting point. If
I understand your answer to him if we get this consular treaty, we
are going to have really two consular offices, Leningrad for the Lenin-
grad consular district, and our Embassy in Moscow will cover the rest
of the Soviet Union.
Secretary RUSK. That is right.
Senator MUNDT. Is Vladivostok off limits and out of bounds for an
American traveler?
Mr. KOIILER. Vladivostok is today a closed city. There is a new
commercial port some 200 kilometers from Vladivostok, which is
now the new terminus of the Trans Siberian Railway, and which is
open to foreigners, and which I have myself visited.
Senator MUNDT. How about Kiev?
Mr. KOIILER. Quite open.
TREATY PROVIDES CONSULAR ACCESS
Senator MUNDT. Let's take Kiev, then.
Suppose an American citizen gets in trouble in Kiev. He is just
where he is now as far as having diplomatic assistance is concerned,
because Leningrad would not serve that, I presume. Moscow would
serve it.
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. But without this treaty that
American citizen would not have the benefit of the notification and
access rights that this treaty would provide.
Senator MUNDT. Ile would not have that?
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.
Senator MUNDT. But he would continue to be served from Moscow.
So the treaty with a consulate opening up only in Leningrad, serv-
ice would still be available to American citizens on about the same
basis as we would have now except we would have one consulate in
Leningrad.
Secretary RUSK. I am not sure that I understand your point,
Senator.
Senator MUNDT. If the treaty did not provide for opening up new
consular offices, if the treaty provided solely for these rights of interro-
gation, access to prisoners, there would be no change except those
aspects you have discussed with us today.
Secretary Rusic. The treaty itself, Senator, that is before you makes
no provision for the opening up of consulates as such. What it does
do is provide certain principles that would obtain should do so.
Senator MUNDT. Right.
Secretary RUSK. So, in voting for this treaty, you would not by that
vote vote to open up new consulates.
Senator MUNDT. Does the figure 290, as you list on your statement,
does that represent the total number of personnel from the 27 other
countries with which we now have consular offices, having the most-
favored-nations clause or is that dealing only
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Secretary Russ. No. .'That is in the second enclosure of Mr. Mac-
Arthur's letter. Those represent the numbers of those who might be'
expected to come to us and say, "We would like to have reciprocal
arrangements on a most-favored-nation basis."
Senator.MUNDT. That is your "guesstimate."
Secretary RUSK. Well, it is based upon sober estimates made by our'
Embassies abroad and by us in the Department.
Senator MUNDT. Correct. But it is not a firm figure, is it?
Secretary RUSK. No. We have not negotiated this with other gov-
ernments.
Senator MUNDT. Yes.
DECISION TO HAVE RUSSIAN NATIONALS EMPLOYED AT U.S. EMBASSY
IN MOSCOW
I am curious about a point raised by Senator Hickenlooper that has
disturbed me for a long time. That is, why is it that charwomen,
cleaners, chauffeurs, employees generally in the American embassy in
Moscow are Russian nationals, and, therefore, Communists, whereas in
this country employees of the same category in the Russian Embassy
are Russian nationals and likewise Communists. Is that a bad judg-
ment on our part or an economy move or is that something which the
Soviets insist upon?
Secretary RUSK. It is not an insistence of theirs. There are budget-
ary reasons for that. We also make arrangements inside the Embassy
where that is not a relevant factor in relation to the classified opera-
tions of the Embassy. I think that in closed session some time Am-
bassador Kohler could go over that with the committee, so you can see
what is involved there.
Senator MUNDT. I would like to because I recall very vividly that
charwomen are not always the innocent kibitzers to affairs of state that
they sometimes appear to be. At the time we were cracking the Alger
Hiss case it was the evidence provided by a charwoman or messenger
in the custodial service that helped in solving that very difficult situ-
ation between Whitaker Chambers and Alger Hiss. So sometimes:
diplomats are not as prudent as they might be in what they drop in
the wastebasket. Charwomen can be quite important.
Secretary RUSK. This is dealt with. In the section of the Embassy
in which they do their charring classified or restricted information is
not handled.
Senator MUNDT. In short, it is your testimony if we wanted to, as
Americans, insist upon our personnel in our embassy in Moscow being
Americans we could do it all through the Embassy?
Secretary RUSK. No problem as far as the Soviet Union is con-
cerned.
Senator MUNDT. This is the decision we made?
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.
Senator MUNDT. Do you know of any cases where diplomatic im-
munity has not been honored by bloc countries?
Secretary RUSK. We have, of course, diplomatic officers sent away
from the country under persona non grata proceedings. I think there
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 65
were one or two cases with people of diplomatic immunity where they
were searched on a train or something of that sort before its was estab-
lished they had diplomatic immunity. We have these kinds of prob-
lems in our own country where police officers arrest a man who says
he is an Ambassador and police officers say, "Well, I am not so sure
of that," and sometimes it takes a little time to establish it.
Senator PFLL. Or, if the Secretary will yield, where you can be
hauled into a local police station, as happened with me one time, until
you can establish your immunity.
Secretary RusK. That is correct. But in a sense I do not know of
any that have occurred.
Senator MUNDT. You have not?
Secretary Rusg. That is right. We will check the record on this
and see. We have had one or two cases of this sort in other countries.
Senator MUNDT. Yes, because one or two have been reported to me,
but they might not be violations of diplomatic immunity. They might
be something else, but I would like to have a categorical answer from
you, and I think we should search the records first.
(The information referred to follows:)
Violations of Diplomatic ImmunitV in the USSR and Eastern Europe
1. KHABAROVSK INCIDENT-SEPTEMBER 1964
During the night of September 28, 1964, fifteen Soviet officials forcibly entered
hotel rooms in Khabarovsk occupied by three US military attaches and one
British military attache who were on a trip through Siberia. The US officers,
attached to our Embassy in Moscow, were Colonel George Aubrey, USA, Lt. Col.
Karl Liewer, USA and Major James F. Smith, USAF. The Soviet officials made
thorough searches of the rooms and the personal effects of the officers, confiscat-
ing some of their personal effects, including photographic equipment, films and
notebooks. Despite insistent demands, Colonel Aubrey was refused permission
to telephone to the American Embassy in Moscow.
The U.S. Government protested most vigorously this violation of the diplomatic
immunity of these three officers, lodging protests with the Soviet Foreign Ministry
in Moscow and with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington. The Soviets
replied that the officers were engaged in activities incompatible with their diplo-
matic status, charged them with espionage and ordered them expelled.
The US Government rejected the Soviet charge that these officers were engaged
2. WARSAW INCIDENT-APRIL 1966
Two US service attaches were stopped by uniformed Polish militia near
Warsaw while returning from a field trip in April 1966. Despite having dis-
played diplomatic credentials upon request, they were denied permission to pro-
ceed. After spending nine hours in their vehicle awaiting permission to con-
tinue their journey, the two officers were seized, driven to a nearby militia
station, and detained for a half-hour before release.
If additional police protection is required, and presumably it would
be with new Communist consular offices opened up in this country,
would the Federal Government provide that or would the local mayor
or the city provide that?
Secretary Rusg. Well, I do not know that extra police in terms of
local police would be required if you opened a consulate with 10 or 12
people or 15 people. That would be for the local authorities to
determine.
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166 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
In the case of special demonstrations and things of that sort, they
normally would call in reinforcements in any event, rather than just
the man on the beat. There could be some problems of that sort.
Senator MUNDT. And that would be the responsibility of the local
police?
Secretary RUSK. That is right, and there might be some additional
assistance required from the FBI, but those are matters that can be
taken up in the appropriate committees.
Senator MUNDT. In a situation where people are marching in front
of a consulate, might this not raise some serious problems, as we have
had happen to us by stones being thrown into our library windows,
and so forth, in different countries but it does create a potential law
enforcement problem, which would be the responsibility of the local
police ?
Secretary RUSK. This would be if such a problem arises, there would
be that responsibility.
Senator MUNDT. I think I have taken my ten minutes.
Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I do very much appreciate the
readiness of the committee to receive me this morning to talk further
about this consular convention.
ADVANTAGES OF ESTABLISHING LEGAL BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION OF PROBLEMS
The President and I both feel it is very important for us to proceed
promptly to ratify this convention. It would help considerably to
reduce unnecessary tensions between ourselves and the Soviet Union. by
getting certain kinds of problems well understood on a legal basis
between us and to make it possible to resolve a number of these inevi-
table minor issues that come along on a lower level. and not have them
become a matter of the highest political issue between the two
Governments.
We understand that there are some real problems between our two
Governments, but we feel we must continue to chip away at them and
try to find points in which we can reduce tension rather than have every
little difference between us blow up into a major issue, not only be-
tween Governments but between the two public opinions in our respec-
tive countries.
I think this gives us important protections in the Soviet Union.
I think that the burden, if any, which it places upon our own situation
here is a minimal burden, and I would think that prompt ratification
of this treaty would be a very constructive development in our total
foreign relations at this point.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you allow one minute for the Senator from
Pennsylvania?
Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I think you have made a very convincing statement in
support of this treaty. In my opinion, the treaty is in the national
interest, and I shall support it not only in the committee but on the
floor.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 67
I have no questions. Thank you very much.
Secretary Russ. Thank you very much, Senator Clark.
The CHAIRMAN. We will excuse the Secretary, but I want to ask the
Under Secretary a few questions. Perhaps Mr. Kohler could stay a
few minutes longer.
EFFECT of TREATY'S SUCCESS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Mr. Secretary, in this morning's issue of the New York Times is an
editorial. I won't read it all, but I will put it in the record. I
want to, read one or two sentences from it, and then ask a question. I
do this in view of the fact that you were so recently the distinguished
Attorney General of this country before you came to the State Depart-
ment, and you have, therefore, I think, a rather unusual qualification
to comment upon this aspect of this matter.
(The editorial referred to follows:)
[From the New York Times, Jan. 23, 1967]
CLEAR IT Wirn HOOVER
Even after publication of the curious correspondence between Secretary of
State Rusk and J. Edgar Hoover, it is far from certain that the Administration
will be able to override the veto Mr. Hoover has hitherto exercised against the
long-stalled Soviet-American consular treaty.
There can be few, if any, precedents for the spectacle that correspondence
presents : the Secretary of State, in effect, asking a Federal police official of
sub-Cabinet rank to stop blocking United States foreign policy, and then receiving
a reply so cryptic and ungracious that it can only further encourage opponents
of the Administration policy. It is a reminder of the magnitude of Mr. Hoover's
power, with implications, that go far beyond the immediate issue.
The fate of the consular treaty is crucial, and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee has acted wisely in'altering its schedule to give priority to the treaty's
consideration. Ratification means more than normalizing Soviet-American dip-
lomatic relations and providing badly needed additional protection to American
citizens traveling in the Soviet Union. What happens to the treaty will fore-
shadow the probable outcome of the rest of the Administration's constructive
program for trying to improve relations with Moscow.
If the consular pact cannot be ratified, then the East-West trade bill is probably
dead and the space treaty may have been still-born. The entire direction of
American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union at an extraordinarily critical
moment in world history is at stake.
I shall read part of the editorial as follows :
What happens to the treaty will foreshadow the probable outcome of the rest
of the Administra'tion's constructive program for trying to improve relations with
Moscow.
If the consular pact cannot be ratified, then the East-West trade bill is probably
dead and the space treaty may have been still-born. The entire direction of
American foreign policy 'toward the Soviet Union at an extraordinarily critical
moment in world history is at stake.
Personally I agree with that statement, but I wanted to address it
to you. I think you might interpret the significance of the letters
which have been put in the record and the statements made by the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which was part of
the Department of Justice which you headed for some three years.
I wonder if you would care to explain this to the committee and
interpret it for the benefit of the committee and the country because
I believe this is the really critical element in this whole thing.
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68 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
BUILDING BRIDGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Mr. KATZENBACH. Let me approach it, if I may, Senator, in three
ways. I do think that this is important in terms of our relationships
with the Soviet Union in terms of trying to find areas of accommoda-
tion and agreement where there is an advantage to each side in this,
and where it is the judgment of the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, that the advantage to the American side of
this is sufficient to warrant concluding this treaty.
So I do think it is related in this sense to finding areas of accommo-
dation, building bridges, anything else you wish to call it, and as the
Secretary so eloquently said, getting rid of problems that otherwise
become problems of involvement at a high level, so I think that is
important.
PROTECTION GRANTED TO AMERICANS IN SOVIET UNION
Let me say, secondly, if none of those considerations were present, if
we had no particular interest in any of those things, this treaty would
still be a good treaty to ratify from the U.S. point of view. So you,
could be totally opposed to any kind of East-West rapprochement, the
building of bridges, anything of that kind, and still in good conscience
vote for the treaty that will enable us to give some protection to a large
number of American citizens who are traveling within the Soviet
Union, rights that they presently do not have and rights which they
have in this country as a matter of our own Constitution, law, and
practice.
So I would say, whether or not you accepted that premise, it would
be a good treaty to ratify in order to protect Americans traveling in
the Soviet Union, and I put a very high degree of importance to ful-
filling those rights and those obligations with respect to American
citizens traveling abroad, particularly when I think the trend will be
to have an increased number with the direct air service, and I would
expect that to further increase.
The CHAIRMAN. If we have the air treaty there will be many more
tourists in Russia.
Mr. KATZENBACH. I would predict that this would continue to in-
crease as it has increased, and I think that would be a factor in increas-
ing it, so we can expect more Americans traveling in the Soviet Union
and therefore to give greater importance to our being able to protect
them.
Now, let me go to the third aspect of that.
CRIMINAL IMMUNITY PROVISION
If there is an argument to the extent that there is opposition to this
treaty, I think it has been based upon the fact that personnel assigned
to consulates, if consulates should be opened, would acquire an im-
munity from criminal jurisdiction, and that is correct, and that is a
fact. I think that has to be looked at in the context of the total problem.
I agree, I agree with everything that Mr. Hoover said in that letter.
I think the record indicates that espionage activities have from time to
time been conducted in the manner described by Mr. Hoover. Cer-
tainly it was my experience as Attorney General that this occurred.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION
When those espionage activities are conducted, if there is diplomatic
immunity, then the result is that all we can do is the persona non grata
procedure, and thereis no punishment involved. It does not make the
espionage activities any different than they would be with or without
the immunity, but it does mean in terms of your capacity to punish
them, that is gone and it is interesting to note that not all of the es io-
nage activities which have been conducted with Soviet espionage here
have been conducted by the people who had diplomatic immunity.
In fact, in two of the more recent cases, the Egorov and the Ivanov
case, at least those two people were not entitled to diplomatic im-
munity. So it is not only people with diplomatic immunity who may
conduct acts of espionage.
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES
Senator MoRSE. May I interrupt to say that also everything you said
about Russian espionage also involves American espionage abroad in
Russia and elsewhere.
Mr. KATZENEACII. We are entitled to the same immunities that {hey
would be entitled to in this country, that is certainly correct.
Senator MoRsE. If Russia had a director of an FBI he probably
would give a similar report.
Mr. KATZENBACII. If I can carry on in that, there are presently here
and in New York some 452
Senator MoRSE. I assume silence means consent to my question.
Mr. KATZENBACH. The rights are absolutely reciprocal, and if the
activities were reciprocal the same rights would apply.
The CHAIRMAN. You are not implying that we do not carry on
espionage activities, are you?
Mr. KATZENBACII. Well, it is the normal duty to report various
intelligence.
The CHAIRMAN. Every country does, does it not? Certainly every
major country has its normal espionage.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Has its intelligence.
Senator MoRSE. I support it and vote for millions of dollars for it
every year.
The CHAIRMAN. As long as we are living in such a world, everybody
has to do it.
Mr. KATZENBACII. In terms of what is the additional threat to the
security involved in this, and I think for this purpose one should
assume that any personnel who have this immunity, as well as people
who do not have this immunity, might be engaged in espionage activi-
ties, I mean to start on that assumption, whether they are or not, they
might be, and they would have diplomatic immunity.
There are presently 452 persons in the United States who can travel
to the same parts of the United States which any consular officials
would be permitted to travel to, who are entitled to that immunity.
The CHAIRMAN. From Russia?
Mr. KATZENBAGII. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. There are many others.
Mr. KATZENBACH. We start with that, plus any other people who
come in, any tourists who come in, anybody else who might be en-
gaged who would not have the immunity. There are presently that
many.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
ONE ADDITIONAL CONSULATE CONTEMPLATED
All that is contemplated under this, and even that might not come
to pass, is as the Secretary described, the possibility of opening a con
sulate which we could open, whether or not this agreement applied.
But if this agreement were ratified, people would have diplomatic
immunity, if we did consent to the opening of the consulate, both their
people here and our people there. All that has been contemplated
over the foreseeable future has been the possibility of one additional
consulate in this country, and one additional consulate of ours in theirs.
This would have ten to fifteen people added to it.
RISK OF ESPIONAGE NOT APPRECIABLY INCREASED
Therefore, the risk of additional espionage of those ten to fifteen peo-
ple with diplomatic immunity should be viewed in the context of 452
people who presently have it, so you are going conceivably from 452,
if this should come to pass, to 467, which does not seem to be a tre
mendous increment from the point of view of security, and I would
add one more thing to that, and it is it would be entirely possible for
that 452 to go to 467 or 480 or 490 without this agreement simply by
adding to the list of people entitled to diplomatic immunity now, which.
is a matter of the basis on which we deal with the Soviet Union'
If it were contemplated that hundreds of consulates would be
opened-and I cannot imagine why we would need hundreds of con-
sulates in the Soviet Union-but if that were contemplated with an,
additional 2,000 Americans with diplomatic immunity going to Soviet
Russia, and an additional 2,000 from Soviet Russia coming here, then
the order of the problem and the magnitude of the problem would be
an entirely different thing.
But I cannot, frankly it is incredible to me, conceive of how we
would use 2,000 consular officials in the Soviet Union. That would be
almost as many consulate officials as there are tourists, and in the
Soviet case it would be twice as many consular officials as there are
Russians traveling in the United States.
EXCHANGE OF CONSULAR OFFICIALS REQUIRES APPROVAL
Senator MoRSE. If the Chairman will permit me to point out just
for emphasis what the Secretary said, however, that nails this right
down. They cannot send consular officials over without our approval,
and we cannot send them over there without their approval, so there
is your check.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir; and the only reason that this could
happen would be because we want to open consulates 'all over the
U.S.S.R. and put a great many people there, because it is strictly re-
ciprocal. Only if we wanted to do that and saw a major advantage
to the United States doing that, would the problem even occur as far
as Soviet consulates in this country are concerned.
FBI AFFECTED BY INCREASE OF COMMUNISTS IN THIS COUNTRY
The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps you do not care to pursue this, but I am
trying to interpret the attitude of the Director of the FBI.
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It seemed to me implicit in his statement that the question of politi-
cal judgment, as to whether a particular treaty is made or not, is not
within his jurisdiction. "It is not for me to say when I am asked," as
he was, about the effect upon his agency, and when he goes before an
appropriations committee and, naturally, I think most agencies like
to get all the appropriations they think they need, and the only logical
answer is, "Yes, I will need more agents and, therefore, more appro-
priations."
I do not wish to misinterpret it, but this was the reason given to me
by some of my colleagues why they thought the action on this treaty
should be deferred. They did not tell me they were opposed to it.
They thought it should be deferred for further consideration.
My own feeling is that Mr. Hoover was not trying to usurp the
jurisdiction of the State Department and the President. He was
simply stating a fact that if you had one consulate and you had only
one more man, he would probably need some additional surveillance,
perhaps, or one more man, commensurate with whatever the increase is.
From your point of view, do you wish to comment on that, as you
are familiar with the procedures of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation?
Mr. KATZENBACH. That is correct, that is absolutely correct, Mr.
Chairman, and I think that is borne out not only by his correspondence
here but it is also borne out by his conduct, high conduct, of his office
over a period of years, and I have talked personally on this. He said
he never took a position with regard to the treaty pro or con, nor
would he. As far as factual information is concerned he would point
out simply, as he did in his letter to Senator Mundt, which I say I
accept, point one, that espionage activities have been conducted out of
the Soviet Embassy in this country.
Point two, they have been conducted, for the most part, but not ex-
clusively, with respect to people who have diplomatic immunity.
And, third, that any increase of personnel anywhere with a similar
immunity, raises a problem.
Fourth, he can cope with that problem, and I do not think anybody
on this committee or in the country would doubt the FBI's capacity
to do so.
The CHAIRMAN. Carried to its logical conclusion, it would greatly
decrease the duties and responsibilities of the Department of Justice
if we do not have any foreigners at all in this country in any diplo-
matic agency, would it not?
Mr. KATZENBACrr. Yes, sir. It would be a lot easier if we did not
have certain citizens.
The CHAIRMAN. I supose any one of them is a potential threat to
intelligence-gathering, but if we did not have any people, Russians or
others, with whom we have a cold war, it would be easier, so he could
truthfully testify it would be easier, it would be better for his agency
if we had none at all, would it not?
Mr. KATZENBACH. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. The Secretary
made a point there which I think is worth reemphasizing. We live in
an open society. A great deal of material can be gathered in this
country, a great deal of material that would be regarded as high
security in a more closed society is public information and public
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-'knowledge in this country and available to any foreign tourist,
7traveler, diplomat, or any one else. Whereas reciprocally on this
point, it is far more difficult-Mr. Kohler could bear me out-to
gather information within a closed society that does not have the
hundreds and thousands of newspapers, and with their hundreds and
thousands of sources of information, the technical magazines, all of
this which occurs in a free society. I am glad that it does occur, but
it certainly gives an intelligence advantage to anybody who lives in
a more closed society.
Senator M1NDT. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?
The CHAIRMAN, I have one more question to ask of Mr. Kohler and
then I will yield.
There was one point I thought that was not quite tied down in your
response to Senator Hickenlooper. He seemed to suggest that there
would be no problem for you to assign personnel with immunity out of
the Embassy in Moscow to at least temporary duty in Leningrad.
Could you clarify this? Why couldn't you?
Mr. KATZENBAOH. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Either one of you. I thought Mr. Kohler would
be more familiar with the matter but if you wish to, you may comment.
Mr. KOHLER. No, that is not possible because that involves
The CHAIRMAN. Make it clear why it is not. Senator Hickenlooper
raised a question, and it was not clear to me why you cannot take ten
people out of your Embassy in Moscow and staff a consulate in Len-
ingrad.
Mr. KOHLER. Well, the answer is really very simple because we can-
not set up another office in the Soviet Union without the Soviet Govern-
ment's permission.
The CHAIRMAN. So you just could not have one.
Mr. KOHLER. That is right.
Now, it is quite possible for us to send an officer to Leningrad or to
another city to see a man. But he cannot set up business in that city.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Nor at the moment may he know that man is in
trouble with no notification or no access.
Senator MORSE. That is the important point.
The CHAIRMAN. That is the important point. I just wanted to
clarify that.
Senator MUNDT. I need a little more enlightenment, Mr. Secretary,
on how this will operate in terms of this unusual, and, to my way of
thinking, unwise, double standard which we operate under, according
to Mr. Kohler at our initiative, whereby we employ Soviet personnel
in our embassy at certain levels, and they at the same time insist on
employing Soviet personnel over here.
My question is how far down in the present circumstances in the list
of jobs that they have here on 16th Street in their Embassy is diplo-
matic immunity presently extended to the Soviet personnel employed
by them at low-level jobs ?
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 73
Mr. Koni,ER. All officers and employees of Soviet nationality. The
same is true--.1 x
Senator MUNDT. Even to the charwoman, is that right?
Mr. KoH- LER. Yes.
Senator MUNDT. If they are Soviet personnel.
Mr. KOHLER. It includes their service personnel if they are of Soviet
nationality. In the same way all of our personnel in Moscow are pro
tected under an understanding between us.
Senator MUNDT. So as of now every Soviet citizen employed by the
Soviet Embassy has diplomatic immunity.
Mr. KonLEIi. Yes.
Senator MUNDT. Right?
Mr. KOHLER. That is correct, sir.
Senator MUNDT. And that would be extended if we opened up. con-
sular offices, all Soviet personnel at any level that they happen to
include in whatever number they brought over?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Which we would agree to in advance, and which
would be reciprocal with the number of people that we had there,
which I think is important.
Senator MUNDT. Right. I come to that next point. If it is im-
portant, and I want to know why, because they are employing their
own we are employing, their personnel, their nationals in our em-
bassy. Now, what impact would this consular treaty have on them?
Would it make any difference whatsoever?
Mr. KOHLER. On which, now?
Senator MUNDT. On the Soviet personnel working in our American
Embassy or consular office?
Mr. KoHLER. None whatsoever.
Senator MUNDT. It would not make any change. The consular,
treaty does not have any impact on them whatsoever .
Mr. KOHLER. No.
Senator MUNDT. Now, if there are Americans working for the
Soviet diplomatic people over here, and maybe there are none, maybe
it is just entirely Soviet personnel, would it have any impact on them?
Mr. KATZENBACH. No, it would not, Senator. The immunity-I
assume you are referring to the immunity provisions of this?
Senator MUNDT. Rigt.
Mr. KATZENBACI-I. They apply only to nationals of the sending state,
and they do not apply to American nationals and they do not apply to
any other foreigners. If the Soviet Embassy were to hire a French
chef it would not apply to him.
Senator MUNDT. Just their own people.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir.
Senator MUNDT. Just their own people.
I wish you would state a little more, Mr. Kohler, as to why you con-
sider it for us, other than for budgetary reasons, why we rely on Soviet
personnel, as we do, in our Embassy in Moscow.
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74 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Mr. KOHLER. Senator, not exactly. We are aware-this is a con-
trollable problem from the point of view of what I gather is in your
mind.
Senator MUNDT. The danger of leaks is what I am talking about,
dancer of leaks.
Hr. KOHLER. That is right. This is under control. I beg you to
believe we have had a great deal of experience in this. It is a delib-
erate, pondered decision.
Senator MUNDT. I do not think this was during your service in
Moscow, but I can recall sitting in the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee when they brought in a great seal of the United States which
was in the office of our Ambassador over there, which was placed
thereby some of the Soviet personnel with a listening device which had
been operating for some considerable length of time before we even
discovered it. I do not believe that an American citizen employed,
in an embassy over there-I would hope not-would install that kind of
a listening device, but I can well imagine that is one of the functions of
the Soviet personnel allegedly serving our diplomatic mission over
there. Remember that?
Mr. KOHLER. Very well. I have seen that seal many times.
Senator MUNDT. It looks rather innocent when you look at it. It
is not what it appears to be.
Mr. KOHLER. But I do beg you to believe there are many details of
this question I could not go into at a public session, but it is a problem
that we are aware of and it is a controllable problem, and the Embassy
in Moscow is able to operate with the required security.
Senator MUNDT. Well, I would hope so. But the control on that
occasion came a little late in terms of the operating functioning of that
seal as it had been changed. Right?
Mr. KOHLER. There are places which you assume are insecure; let me
say.
Senator MUNDT. That would have to include the Ambassador's
office.
Mr. KOHLER. This was not in the Ambassador's office in the Em-
bassy. This particular seal of which we are talking was in his study
in his residence which is not regarded, I may say, as a secure area.
Mr. KATZENBACH. I remember many years ago, Senator, when I was
taken as a prisoner of war up to a questioning camp, and there was an
Italian guard there who had lived 17 years in Boston, and he was
good enough to point out to me that there was a bug in the ceiling
of this particular room where I was staying. I found it very useful
to express some of my more private views that I would have found
difficult to have expressed face to face as to how I regarded the general
situation and the conduct of the war at that point. [Laughter.]
Senator MUNDT. I quite agree with you, but I very much doubt that
any of the Soviet personnel in our Embassy in Moscow would be quite
that cooperative to tell you in advance. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse, do you have any questions?
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 75
EVALUATION OF MR. HOOVER'S COMMUNICATION
Senator MoRSE. I want to thank Mr. Katzenbach and Mr. Kohler. I
think they have made a good case for the treaty, and I particularly
appreciate your evaluation of Mr. Hoover's communication and the
material contained therein. I agree with you. I think it is very
helpful.
I may say that the Director of the KGB in Moscow would probably
make exactly the same points. That is just the way international rela-
tions are going to exist for some time until we can work out a detente.
The CHAIRMAN. There was one point, I do not think it is particularly
important, but while you are here I would like to make the record as
complete as I can.. I was rather surprised at the small number of
violations of law that were cited by the Secretary earlier, and only two
convictions, was it not, in eleven? Would you elaborate a bit on this.
Mr. KATZENBACH. No. The question had been raised, Senator, as
to whether or not other countries, taking advantage of the most-fav-
ored-nation clause, should they wish to do it, would raise an additional
problem of immunity.
Now, in the first place, those countries that have most-favored-nation
clause, would get most-favored-nation treatment in this respect, they
are friendly countries, so that is not an espionage problem in the sense
we have been discussing it heretofore.
In the second place, we thought it relevant to that inquiry to find out
how much difficulty consuls had been in with respect to the law when
they did not have diplomatic immunity, to see how much immunity you
would be giving them.
Looking at those consuls from the friendly countries, we found only
the eleven difficulties that they had gotten into over a period of time,
and it was for that reason, and it was not with relevance to the espion-
age not with relevance to the Iron Curtain, not with relevance to any of
that, but with relevance to most-favored-nation treatment with other
countries, we wanted to find out how much immunity one was giving
because this can be important.
There are problems with immunity, not from the espionage sense,
but from other points of view. We have them ourselves.
WAIVING IMMUNITY
The CHAIRMAN. It is a great temptation to do a_ little smuggling if
you have immunity, is it not?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think it should be, but I would not expect that
from our Foreign Service personnel, and those entitled to it. But if a
husband shoots a wife one can waive the immunity. I mean the Gov-
ernment can waive the immunity, otherwise it may be impossible to get
the witnesses, and so forth, to try the case. So there are problems of
plain ordinary common law crimes going unpunished that come with
immunity, even though the Government can waive that, and govern-
ments have from time to time waived that.
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76 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
The CHAIRMAN. You mean that when a Government has nationals
who have committed a crime even under this treaty, it may waive im-
munity in certain cases?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes. They may if they are satisfied with the
fairness of the procedures and with the guilt of the person, and so:
forth. The immunity is not a personal immunity. It is an immu-
nity that the Government possesses and which the Government can
waive.
MUTUAL EXPULSIONS
The CHAIRMAN. Are a number of those explained by mutual expul-
sions? I have seen cases where one side. expels someone, and the
other one does it more or less in retaliation regardless of the par-
ticular individual's conduct. Has that not happened?
Mr. KATZENBACH. It is a fact, Mr. Chairman, whenever we declare
a Soviet diplomat persona non grata because he has been engaged in
espionage activities, one of the people in the Embassy at Moscow is
within a short time declared persona non grata.
The CHAIRMAN. Does it work only that way? Do we ever retaliate
if they throw one of ours out, by throwing one of theirs out?
Mr. KATZENBACH. In cases that I am familiar with or have any-
thing to do with, they have run the other way.
The CHAIRMAN. The matter of crime, I would guess, has not been
a very major one. The most irritating are the traffic violations, are
they not?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, and they are irritating. I think most em-
bassies here, just as our personnel abroad, do take seriously comply-
ing with the laws of the host country.
The CHAIRMAN. Except for traffic violations.
Mr. KATZENBACI. Traffic violations have caused a very special
problem. Sometimes the location of the consulates and embassies:
further aggravates the problem, and in a city like New York almost
everybody seems to take some chance on double parking, in my ex-
perience.
Senator MORSE. We have problems not only with diplomats but with
Members of Congress.
The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no, you would say that. [Laughter.]
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think you are more of an expert on that than
I am, Senator. [Laughter.]
The CHAIRMAN. Do we have anything further you would like to-
add? If not, thank you very much. We will adjourn until tomorrow
morning when we will have another hearing.
(Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.)
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
(Executive D, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.)
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1967
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to recess at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New
Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presid-
mPresent: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore,
Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carl-
son, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
We are meeting today to continue public hearings on the proposed
consular convention with the Soviet Union.
Our last open hearing on the convention was January 23, when the
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Under Secretary Nicholas Katzen-
bach, the Deputy Under Secretary Foy Kohler, and the Department's
LeOgal Adviser Leonard Meeker testified.
Our witnesses today are Mr. W. B. Hicks, Jr., executive secretary
of Liberty Lobby; Mr. Warren H. MacDonald, director of research of
the American Legion; and Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky, president of the
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Inc.
Professor Dobriansky has been invited to testify at the request of
Senator Karl Mundt of the committee, and Senator Mundt has also
asked me to call Mr. Herald E. Stringer, national legislative director
of the American Legion as the first witness. Mr. Stringer, will you
come forward please?
I believe, Mr. Stringer, you requested to be heard by the committee.
Did you not?
Mr. STRINGER. I am just here to present our witness, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Who is your witness?
Mr. STRINGER. Mr. MacDonald is our witness.
The CIAIRMAN. Mr. Warren H. MacDonald, director of research of
the American Legion.
Mr. MacDonald, we are very pleased to have you.
Mr. STRINGER. May I, for the record, state my name. It is Herald
E. Stringer, director of legislation for the American Legion, and I
want to express the appreciation of the American Legion for the op-
portunity to be heard.
Our witness this morning, Mr. Chairman, is Warren H. MacDonald.
Mr. MacDonald is director of research for the American Legion, and
73-955-67--6 77
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78 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
he also provides staff services for our foreign relations commission.
He is here with me and prepared to testify.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.
Mr. MacDonald, you may proceed, sir. Do you have a written
statement?
Mr. MACDONALD. I do, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. Will you proceed, sir?
Mr. MacDonald, just for the record, please state very briefly-we
all know what the American Legion is-but state for the record how
many members you have.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, that is referred to
in the third paragraph.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that in your statement?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. I did not see it.
STATEMENT OF WARREN H. MacDONALD, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH,
THE AMERICAN LEGION
Mr. MACDONALD. We are most grateful to you for providing us this
opportunity to present the views of the American Legion on the pend-
ing consular convention between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
The Legal Adviser of the Department of State has defined a con-
sular convention as "a treaty in which the contracting powers regulate
the activities and functions of consular establishments and their offi-
cers and employees." This bilateral consular convention, with protocol,
was signed in Moscow on June 1, 1964, and eleven days thereafter
was transmitted to the Senate of the United States by President John-
son, with the recommendation that the Senate give early advice and
consent to its ratification. The subsequent legislative history of "Ex-
ecutive D" is well known to the members of this committee.
The American Legion is opposed to U.S. ratification of this treaty
with the Soviet Union. This position was established through resolu-
tions adopted by our annual national conventions in 1964, 1965, and
1966. Those conventions were comprised of approximately 3,000 dele-
gates, coming from every state and representing the more than 21/2
million American war veterans who are members of our organization.
This treaty raises a variety of issues. We think the more important
of these are :
One. Is it consistent with overall U.S. foreign policy to enter into
an agreement of this nature with a communist power that is-at the
same time-providing massive military assistance to a third party with
which the United States is engaged in combat?
Two. Is it in the interest of the United States to permit the reestab-
lishment of consulates in major American cities by a government
which has as its primary objective the subversion of the Government
and people of the United States?
Three. Is the treaty itself sound in all respects?
Four. Will all of the predictable or possible consequences of ratifi-
cation be of benefit to the United States?
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 79
We are convinced that all four of these questions should be answered
in the negative. Thus, we oppose the treaty on principle and because
we believe certain of its provisions-specifically, those contained in
Article 19, section 2-would, if given effect, be both an unwise prec-
edent and an unnecessary threat to the internal security of the United
States.
In the more than 21/2 years this treaty has been before the Senate,
most opponents of ratification have emphasized the dangers of the
"diplomatic immunity" clause in Article 19, section 2, while the pro-
ponents have emphasized the gains to be derived from the "notification
and access" clauses in Article 12, sections 2 and 3. It is our feeling, that
even if the Soviets were to comply fully with the "notification and ac-
cess" provisions, this otherwise desirable objective would not be worth
the risks inherent in Article 19.
Lately, the leading proponents have expressed the thought that the
delay in Senate action is due largely to misunderstanding about the
treaty among both opponents and supporters of ratification. In this
connection, great stress is placed on the fact that the treaty itself is not
an agreement to establish any consulates anywhere. On January 25,
1967, the Department of State's press and radio briefing put the point
as follows:
The Consular Convention does not authorize, propose, suggest, provide for,
or require the opening of a single United States Consulate in the Soviet Union, or
a, single Soviet Consulate in the United States. It does not permit the Soviets
to send a single extra person to this country, nor does it let us send anyone to
the Soviet Union.
True enough, but we do not think the opponents have been confused
in this regard, and we do not think the Department's explanation will
mislead anyone into believing that ratification would not result in the
establishment of Soviet consulates in the United States.
RUSK EXPRESSES HOPE THAT U.S. AND U.S.S.R. WILL EXCHANGE CONSULATES
The Secretary of State made clear in his testimony to this com-
mittee, both in July 1965 and on January 23 of this year that-follow-
ing ratification by both parties-the United states does hope to open a
consulate, probably in Leningrad; and, in return, we would permit the
Soviets to open a parallel consulate in a comparable American city.
Although the Soviet Union previously maintained consulates in New
York, 'an Francisco, and Los Angeles, it is currently speculated that
the Soviets are now interested in Chicago as the site of their initial
consulate to be opened pursuant to this treaty.
The Secretary also pointed out that, as to the opening of such a
Soviet consulate, this treaty is unnecessary because the President al-
ready has authority, under his foreign policy responsibilities, to permit
the establishment of foreign consulates in this country even in the ab-
sence of a consular convention. Poland, for example, has a consulate in
Chicago although a consular convention with that communist country
has been in the negotiating stage for some time.
On the other hand, Secretary Rusk indicated that the consular con-
vention under consideration here would provide the legal framework
on which the administration believes it could prudently reestablish
Soviet consulates in the United States, on a reciprocal basis.
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80 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
BASIC r J RPOSE 01" TREATY
Nevertheless, from the State Department's point of view, the basic
purpose of this treaty is not the authorization of the opening of con-
sulates in both countries. Rather, it is said that the primary inten-
tion of the treaty is "To permit the United States promptly to protect
and assist its citizens when they are arrested and detained in the Soviet
Union."
Considering the unfortunate case of Newcomb Mott and those of
numerous other Americans who have been arrested in the Soviet
Union, the American Legion earnestly wishes that this goal of the
State Department soon might be realized. We do not necessarily
agree, though, that this is the basic purpose of the treaty. In fact, we
think it is not. Instead, it is but the primary reason why its U.S.
proponents want it ratified.
If I might digress, we do not want to add to the confusion that
has been injected into this issue, but there is a difference between the
purposes of this treaty and the reasons why some people want it
ratified.
Also, we fear that the treaty would not be a guarantee of attainment
of that desired goal and,in any event, we think other considerations
make the goal (assuming Soviet compliance) too costly.
This committee, and the Senate generally, must look at every treaty
submitted for its consideration from the viewpoint of not only the
United States, but that of the other party or parties as well. What
does the other side have to gain? On balance, is the United States
getting as much as it gives? And, when the other side is a communist
government, we think the Senate is entitled to view the treaty's provi-
sions in the light of both the record and the intentions of communists
generally.
What is the purpose of this consular convention from the viewpoint
of the Kremlin?
WHAT THE U.S.S.R. HAS TO GAIN BY TREATY
It seems obvious to us that the purpose of this treaty from the Soviet
side is exactly the opposite from that expressed by its U.S. proponents.
To the Soviets, we think the main purpose of this treaty definitely is
to reestablish their consulates in this country, with a new and unusual
rule to apply to all of its agents posted to those consulates; that is,.
absolute protection against prosecution by the United States for any
crimes committed by them, including the crime of espionage against
the United States. This is the intent of Article 19, section 2, to the
Soviets.
The treaty's provisions regarding "notification and access" in arrest
cases-that is, Article 12-are hardly the purpose of the treaty from
the Soviet viewpoint. Those are simply what they gave up-on paper,.
at least-=to gain new islands of diplomatic immunity in America's
industrial and transportation heartland.
If this were not true, the Soviet negotiators would have had no
interest in the treaty. They definitely would not have troubled them-
selves if the document were to have been restricted to the provisions of'
its Article 12 and the protocol related thereto. They had nothing to
gain in that regard; we have always given them prompt notification
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about and unrestricted access to any of their nationals whom. we have
arrested here. To them, the extension of full and absolute diplomatic
immunity to their consular officers is the quid pro quo.which outweighs
the concession they made, on notification and access, as'to our nationals
arrested in their country. Communists have never been known to
enter into an agreement with non-communists which they did not
expect to be of greater advantage to them.
We ,infer from the available public record that it was the Soviet
'44
11 ' d th tt
f 11 d 1 t
t h
t
ay raise e m a eru ip oma c m-
J.I.
l I
i
nego is
ors w o n
munity for purposes of this consular convention. (See committee's
print of hearing, July 30, 1965 p. 30.) The provisions of full dip-
lomatic immunity for all consular officers has not been a part of our
general practice. It was not a feature of our consular convention with
Japan, which entered into force on August 1, 1964, and which, we
assume, was negotiated at about the same time as the pending con-
vention with the Soviet Union. More significantly, it was not made
a feature of the multilateral Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions which was signed by a U.S. representative, and by the represent-
atives of 31 other nations, on April 24, 1963. Representatives of 20
additional nations have since added their signatures, making a total of
52 signatories.
I will refer further to the multilateral Vienna Convention on Consu-
lar Relations in another connection. At this point, I only wish to
stress the point that its immunity provisions, set forth in Article 41
thereof, follow the usual 'and traditional rule; that is, consular officers
shall not be liable to arrest or detention (in the receiving state) "ex-
cept in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the
competent judicial authority." Consulates have demonstrated that
they can perform their proper functions without the cloak of full
diplomatic immunity for their employees.
Article 19(2) of the pending treaty with the Soviet Union provides,
on the other hand, as follows :
Consular officers and employees of the consular establishment who are na-
tionals of the sending state shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction
of the receiving state.
Thus, under this rule, if a Soviet consular officer, posted in Chicago,
for instance, commits or attempts to commit a serious crime, our only
recourse is to demand his expulsion. This is true no matter how mon-
strous the offense, and no matter how vital its bearing on our national
security. And, however often we declare a Soviet official persona non
grata, we may be sure the Soviet Government will soon thereafter
demand the recall from that country of a comparable U.S. official.
Under this treaty, reasons for such action need not be given; but, in
previous cases of this nature, it has been Soviet practice to make, and
to publicize widely, 'false spy charges against the U.S. official con-
cerned. (This game of diplomatic tit-for-tat can have, temporarily
at least, a disruptive influence on a mission's efficiency. We should not
unnecessarily take steps that would surely serve to increase its inci-
dence.)
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82 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
CONTENTION THAT SOVIETS WILL USE CONSULATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND
PROPAGANDA
With regard to the immunity provisions of the treaty, Senator
Cotton of New Hampshire has observed that the Soviets negotiated
this consular convention-
not as a bilateral pact for improving Soviet-American relations, but as a cold
war maneuver to enhance and expand the intelligence gathering network of the
U.S.S.R.
We too, are satisfied that the Soviets have every intention of utiliz
ing any consulates they establish here as centers for espionage and
subversion.
The Soviet intelligence services have regularly used that Govern-
ment's diplomatic and other establishments in this country as bases
from which to carry on their espionage activities. These activities
are known to increase in proportion to the number of Soviet repre-
sentatives here.
Those who recall the previous abuse by the Soviets of their consular
privileges in this country fear that this treaty will provide Soviet
agents with increased opportunities for the intimidation, extortion,
bribery, blackmail, or even the kidnaping or murder, of persons living
here but who have relatives or property in the Soviet Union.
At a minimum, new Soviet consulates in any of our major cities
will facilitate the securing, by communist "consular officers," of all
manner of technological data which could serve to promote the Soviet
Union's warmaking potential. Also, these consulates would doubt
less be used as centers for the distribution of communist propaganda,
aimed primarily, we feel sure, at the more receptive elements on our
college campuses.
The counterargument to much of the foregoing is that we would
be enabled, through our new consulates outside of Moscow, to gain
equivalent benefits in terms of information about their society. This
is unconvincing. The Soviets are still operating a closed society in
which it remains extremely difficult for an American official to make
any contacts .or secure any information not previously sanctioned by
Soviet officials.
I might digress here to point out also that while the treaty itself
does not speak to the matter of travel restrictions, we do understand,
that those restrictions would be applicable in the case of both our.
new consular officers there and their consular officers here.
The city of Leningrad, while it is not off limits, all of the areas sur-
rounding that city is off limits.
Furthermore, we could be sure that whatever "premises" the Soviets'
helped us acquire for our consulates, in accordance with Article 5, these
would be thoroughly "bugged" with the latest in electronic listening
devices, just as has been the case in all offices we occupy in communist
countries.
We stated earlier that we believe the diplomatic immunity provi-
sions of this treaty establish, for the United States at least, an unwise',
precedent. We may soon find that other countries, with which wei'
have a consular treaty that contains the so-called most-favored nation',
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
clause, will request extension of the greater immunity protection to
their consular employees in this country. While this would be re-
ciprocal in its application, the spread of this new rule on a haphazard,
bilateral basis could well work to our detriment.
It is our understanding that as many as 33 existing consular treaties
between the United States and other countries include most-favored-
nation provisions. The State Department has estimated that if all of
these countries exercised their option, we would be extending criminal
immunity in this country to an additional 400 or more foreign na-
tionals.
The countries involved include Communist Rumania and Yugo-
slavia. While Rumania now has no consulates in this country-
other than its consular section in its Washington embassy-it might-
following the lead of the Soviet Union-seek to establish one or more,
with full diplomatic immunity as would be Rumania's privilege under
the most-favored-nation-rule. Also, Yugoslavia now operates a num-
ber of consulates in this country, as was dramatically brought to
our attention last Sunday morning. These are in New York San
Francisco, Chicago, and Pittsburgh, in addition to their combined
consular staff in Washington. W may soon find that we will have
a great deal more than only ten or fifteen new communist agents in this
country with full diplomatic immunity.
Poland already has a consulate in Chicago. Following the model
of our treaty with the Soviet Union, that country could be expected
to seek to complete negotiations on a similar consular convention with
us. And, considering our "bridge building" advances to the other
communist countries of Eastern Europe, all of them may shortly
be seeking consulates here, with the same immunity provisions.
NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS PROVISION NOT AVAILABLE TIIROUGII
MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE
But where, the most-favored-nation clause is applied, we will not
necessarily gain back the quid pro quo we received in our negotiations
with the Soviet Union. Whereas, were there exchanged the "diplo-
matic immunity" provisions for the "notification and access" provi-
sions, the same exchange would not be applicable in the case of a third
country asking for the diplomatic immunity privileges for its consular
officials. All we could get back then is reciprocity on that score alone.
This is an important consideration in the case of the communist coun-
tries of Rumania and Yugoslavia.
The same disadvantageous development might occur in the case of
several non-communist countries which do not provide our consular
officers with ready access to our nationals when they have been ar-
rested. Italy and a number of other countries, the laws of which
have been derived from the Roman code, hold their prisoners in-
communicado until completion of investigation. In Mexico this can
go on for as long as 18 months. Our consular officials are barred
from seeing imprisoned Americans under such circumstances, just
as they have been in the Soviet Union and most other communist
countries.
The United States has been unable to secure "notification and
access" rights from Italy and several others with similar laws. Yet,
we have a consular treaty with Italy that includes a most-favored-
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is CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
nation clause. Thus, if this consular convention with the Soviet;
Union is ratified, we may be asked by Italy to extend to its consular
officers here the diplomatic immunity provisions of Article 19, but we,
will not get the "notification and access" provisions of Article 12 in
return.
The CHAIRMAN. Why? How do you reach that conclusion?
Mr. MACDONALD. Because this treaty, sir, is between the United
States and the Soviet Union. The notification and access privileges
are in that treaty. We have no such rights in Italy.
The CHAIRMAN. But they are reciprocal. In that treaty they are
entirely reciprocal.
CAN ITALY CLAIM PRIVILEGES CONTAINED IN PROPOSED CONSULAR TREATY?
Mr. MACDONALD. The reciprocity, sir, would go to the matter of
diplomatic immunity. We have not been able to get reciprocity from
Italy and other non-communist countries on this matter of notification
and access.
But I am just pointing out here that with their most-favored-nation
privilege they can come to us and claim the diplomatic
The CHAIRMAN. They might claim it, but you do not think they
would get it, do you?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. They can claim anything they like.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any precedent where they have
claimed and obtained a nonreciprocal advantage?
Mr. MACDoNALD. Sir, the reciprocity would be on diplomatic im-
munity privileges. We would under the most-favored-nation rule
give in on that point just as we did in the case of Russia.
The CHAIRMAN. You think, then, that they could pick and choose
whatever part they wanted of this agreement and demand its
reciprocity ?
Mr. MACDONALD. Sir, our treaty with Italy does not now have the
diplomatic immunity privilege in it. It does not have notification
and access in it. It does have a most-favored-nation clause which
means that if they look to this treaty after its ratification and say to
the United States, "You have given to the Soviet Union a privilege you
have not given to us, we demand it," the most-favored-nation clause
requires we do so. The reciprocity is only on that point. It has
nothing to do
The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. I did not mean to interrupt you. I
do not believe it is, but that is all right.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Italy would have to grant the same im-
munity to our people.
Mr. MACDONALD. Diplomatic immunity only, sir.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. They would have to grant diplomatic im-
munity to our consular officers. It would be a reciprocal exchange of
diplomatic rights.
Mr. MACDONALD. Agreed on that point.
Senator HICKENI.ooPER. I want to clear it up. I am not arguing
with you.
Mr. MACDONALD. It has nothing to do with the access and notifica-
tion provision.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 85
We have been trying for 12 years to negotiate that with Italy, but
if they, under the most-favored-nation clause, come to us on this treaty,
it won't have anything to do with notification and access.
The CHAIRMAN. It is your theory that in any treaty they could
pick and choose those provisions which they like and ignore all other
provisions?
Mr. MACDONALD. Sir, this treaty between us and the Soviet Union
is a treaty only between us and the Soviet Union and not between us
and Italy.
Should these new immunity provisions spread generally, due to the
precedent of this consular convention, they will eventually facilitate
the spread of the Soviet Union's subversive influence almost every-
where. Others have pointed out withlogic that our friends in Latin
America would have difficulty in resisting the establishment of Soviet
consulates in their cities, once the barrier to their reestablishment in
this hemisphere is broken, through ratification of this treaty.
It is not difficult to imagine how the communists would turn this
to their advantage, especially when armed with full diplomatic pro-
tection for all their agents in Latin America. Surely the establish-
ment of Soviet consulates there would result in intensified political
warfare throughout that continent. Castro would get a large boost
in his plans to export his (and the Soviets') brand of revolution.
While our Government may well be enabled to cope with a small to
moderate increase in communist agents here, are we certain that the
intelligence services of the developing countries can do so? It is
questions such as this that have caused so many opponents of the
consular convention, and its special immunity provisions to wonder
if we are not about to open a door which we will not be able to close.
Turning briefly to the "notification and access" provisions of Article
12, we think it pertinent to point out that these-even if scrupulously
observed by the Soviet Union-cannot of themselves eliminate the
frictions which arise when that country wrongfully, or for frivolous
reasons arrests an American citizen, and charges him with crimes out
of all proportion to his acts. No amount of notification and access
will make such cases mere administrative matters, as has been sug-
gested in arguments for the treaty. And, prompt notification plus
full access do not necessarily spell freedom for the individual con-
cerned. Furthermore, it can be expected that the Soviets-if they
apply the provisions at all-will deny that they cover "dual na-
tionals"; that is, persons who were born in the Soviet Union (or any
other communist country) and who subsequently acquired American
citizenship through naturalization.
We are not certain, either, that Article 12 would become applicable
immediately upon ratification by both parties, as the proponents indi-
cate would be the case, and without regard to the opening of consulates
here. We do not think the language of the article in question (or the
treaty as a whole) is all that clear on the point. There is leeway, per-
haps, for a different interpretation. At any rate, if the Soviets were
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86 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
to be delayed in getting what they want out of the treaty-more agents
in America with more protection they certainly would not honor
Article 12 indefinitely.
Nevertheless, the Soviets have had ample time to demonstrate good
faith with regard to Article 12. In his January 23 appearence before
this committee, Secretary Rusk reported that-
In Just the 30 months since the convention was signed, we know of at least.
20 cases where Americans have been detained by the Soviet police * * * In none
of these cases did the Soviet authorities adhere to the standards of notification
and access provided for by this convention.
He might also have brought into account in that connection the
infamous handling of. the Kazan-Komarek case in which there was
obvious Soviet complicity to get that man back into the hands of
the Czechs.
NUMBER OF THOSE VISITING UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R.
Before leaving this particular area I would like also to digress in
order to comment on the, what I call the, numbers game that has been
brought into the argument for ratification.
It has been pointed out that while only some 900 Soviets visit this
country annually, that we have over 18,000 Americans traveling in
Russia and that, therefore, we are going to gain so much more. This
is specious reasoning, in, my opinion. Those 900 Soviets over here
are in no danger. They should not even be given consideration in
this connection.
We are thinking of the 18,000. But, if those 18,000-of those
18,000, how many are affected? In recent years it has been on an
average of just under one a month that are arrested. They are not
arresting 18,000.
Senator SYMINGTON. Are you saying you do not want protection
for American citizens who go to Russia?
Mr. MACDoNALD. I am saying we do want protection.
Senator SYMINGTON. But I thought you implied the opposite.
Mr. MACDONALD. No. I have said repeatedly here, Senator
Symington, we are all for that. We just think we are giving up too
much to get it.
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, may I say that I got the im-
pression that the man who is now testifying stated that the 900 Soviet
citizens over here are in no danger and, by implication, the 18,000
American citizens who travel to the Soviet Union are in danger?
Mr. MACDoNAL D. Sir, if I may clarify the point.
Senator SYMINGTON. I think you ought to clarify it.
Mr. MACDONALD. I will, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. I certainly got the same impression as the Ma-
jority Leader.
Mr. MACDoNALD. Yes, sir.
Now, it has been said that because only 900 Soviets come here and
18,000 Americans go there, we are getting greater advantage out of
the notification and access provisions.
But those 900, as to the 900, we are giving notification and access on
any of those whom we might arrest. So you cannot balance 900 and
18,000 here. But when you look to the 18,000, that is a rather large
figure to be using in this argument.
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As I say, they have been arresting only something of an average of
11 per year, 11, not 18,000. There is what we are talking about.
Senator SYMINGTON. All we are trying to do is protect the 18,000
visitors who go to Russia.
Senator MANSFIELD. American visitors.
Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.
Mr. MACDONALD. We are trying to gain access rights for anyone
arrested, anyone arrested.
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement?
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield, the Majority Leader.
Senator MANSFIELD. It is my understanding that if this protection
is not given to these visitors, they will be subject to Soviet law just as
Soviet citizens here are subject to American law under the Constitu-
tion. But under the Soviet system of law, they can be held incom-
municado up to nine months. Do you or do you not want to see that
Americans are given as much protection as possible in a closed society?
Mr. MACDONALD. The American Legion earnestly hopes that can be
brought about.
Senator MANSFIELD. That is what we are trying to do in this consular
convention.
Mr. MACDONALD. Our counterargument, sir, is that we are giving
up too much to get that.
Senator MANSFIELD. I cannot follow your argument.
Mr. MACDONALD. I think, further, sir, that we would not necessarily
get that protection we seek.
Senator MANSFIELD. How would you propose that the American
citizens get that protection?
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, it has been pointed out that we should have
demanded it years ago on the basis of reciprocity alone. I am not
saying that would have worked. We are not getting it in many of
the countries with which we have friendly relations, from Italy, for
example, from Mexico-
Senator MANSFIELD. We are not considering Italy.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. We are considering a U.S.S.R.-United States
consular convention
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir; I understand.
Senator MANSFIELD (continuing). And what I am interested in is
the protection of Americans who are sent to the Soviet Union to repre-
sent us, and that American citizens have access to a consulate which
will see to it that they will be given consideration within one to four
days rather than at the end of a possible nine months of being held
incommunicado.
Mr. MACDONALD. Senator Mansfield
Senator MANSFIELD. I am certain that you would desire the same
thing. .
Mr MACDONALD. We do, sir, and our testimony states that.
But we think there are reservations which ought to be brought into
this consideration, and I have several of them referred to in the
testimony.
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88 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Senator SYMINGTON. You say the American Legion. Did you have
a vote of members of the American Legion over the entire United
States, on this subject?
Mr. MACDONALD. We adopted a resolution at our national conven-!
tion, and that has been given wide circulation.
Senator SYMINGTON. I can say this. You ito not speak for a lot of
the members of the American Legion. That I am sure of.
Mr. MACDONALD. I think I speak for the majority, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. If they knew all the facts, I would not agree.
The CHAIRMAN. Will you continue, Mr. MacDonald?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
The Soviets have also failed to take the first step toward ratification
of this treaty. The Presidium has the power to ratify at its discretion
and it can be called into session at any time. It obviously is awaiting
U.S. Senate action.
Before leaving this subject, we think it of interest to compare the',
language of Article 12 -
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question there?
You mention the fact that the Presidium has, as yet, not acted.
Who initiated this proposal?
Mr. MACDONALD. I do not know whether we went to them first on
the question of consulates.
Senator MANSFIELD. We initiated the proposal, and it is my under-
standing that it was initiated at the time that President Eisenhower
was the Chief of State of this country. Mr. Nixon was the Vice Presi-''
dent of this country. I understand that it had some sort of genesis
from the so-called "kitchen debate" between Mr. Khrushchev and;
Mr. Nixon in Moscow, and I believe that the initiation was conducted
under the aegis of the then Secretary of State, the now deceased and!,
former colleague of ours, Mr. Christian Herter.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, let us just. keep the record
straight on this. The proposals for a consular convention between,
Russia and the United States-or the Soviet Union and the United
States-were instituted by President Roosevelt in 1933 in the Litvinov
papers.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard again? This
particular consular convention was started in the Eisenhower
administration.
Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator yield just for a
moment?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may just have a word, it is my
understanding that the proposal made by the Americans, even in
this particular case, and I happen to favor this treaty, related not to
the matter of diplomatic immunity of consular personnel but rather
to the other parts of the treaty.
Now, I think we are really engaged in a lot of childishness when
we do not talk about the substance of the thing rather than who is
responsible. I think this is a good treaty and ought to be ratified,
and I think whoever is responsible for it should take credit for it, and
I am very happy that the Republicans had a hand in it.
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Senator MANSFIELD. I am delighted, for what I was trying to do
was to give credit where credit was due.
Senator CASE. Beware of the credit coming from Montana.
The CHAIRMAN. I am sure we can straighten out the precise steps
taken in regard to this treaty, and we will see that that is done. I will
ask the staff, together with the legal counsel, and Mr. MacDonald, to
straighten out that situation.
(See "Chronology: U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular and Diplomatic Rela-
tions, 1933-1967" which was enclosed in the letter from Ambassador
Douglas MacArthur to Mr. Carl Marcy dated February 14, 1967,
which appears on page 293 of the appendix.)
Will you proceed to get your testimony over so that we can go on to
some questions.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
COMPARISON OF ACCESS AND NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS IN PROPOSED TREATY
AND VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS
Before leaving this subject, we think it of interest to compare the
language of Article 12 of this treaty with the comparable provisions
of the earlier mentioned Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
The latter seem much more detailed and explicit and, therefore would
seem to be more desirable from the U.S. point of view. The docu-
ment in which they appear was signed by a U.S. representative more
than a year prior to the signing of the Tlnited States-Soviet Consular
Convention. Many other nations have also endorsed the Vienna
Convention.
(The comparable provisions follow:)
1. A consular officer shall have the right within his district to meet with, com-
municate with, assist, and advise any national of the sending state and, where
necessary, arrange for legal assistance for him. The receiving state shall in no
way restrict the access of nationals of the sending state to its consular estab-
lishments.
2. The appropriate authorities of the receiving state shall immediately inform
z consular officer of the sending state about the arrest or detention in other form
of a national of the sending state.
3. A consular officer of the sending state shall have the right without delay to
visit and communicate with a national of the sending state who is under arrest
or otherwise detained in custody or is serving a sentence of imprisonment. The
Tights referred to in this paragraph shall be exercised in conformity with the laws
and regulations of the receiving state, subject to the proviso, however, that the
said laws and regulations must not nullify these rights.
EXCERPTS PROM VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS
ARTICLE 36
Communication and contact with nationals of the sending State
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to
nationals of the sending State :
,(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the
sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State
shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access
to consular officers of the sending State ;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within
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its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any
communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in
prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities
without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned with-
out delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph ;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the send-!
ing State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond
with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have
the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, custody
or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless,
consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national
who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in'
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the:
proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect
to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article
are intended.
QUESTION OF WHY VIENNA CONVENTION HAS NOT BEEN REFERRED TO
SENATE
We are curious, of course, as to why the Vienna Convention has not;
been submitted to the Senate for consideration. It was prepared by a
conference called under auspices of the United Nations, with 84 polities
participating. Representatives of 32 of these, including the United
States, signed the convention on April 24, 1963; and, representatives of
20 more signed it subsequently. The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations will enter into force on the 30th day following the date of
deposit of the 22d instrument of ratifications or accession with the
Secretary General of the United Nations.
At present, we understand that 21 nations, or only one short of the
required number, have deposited such instruments with the United
Nations Secretary General. Yet, the document has not been brought
before this body for formal study.
We raise the question of the Vienna Convention because it appears
to be a far more comprehensive treaty than the bilateral one before you,
and it does appear to contain even better notification and access pro-
visions. (It does not, however, provide for a specified number of days
in which notification and access is to take place, ,is does the protocol
affixed to the United States-Soviet treaty).
The American Legion has not made a formal study of or taken a
position on the Vienna Convention. Tentatively, it would appear to
be a step in the right direction to have one basic consular convention,
to which the United States and most other nations could adhere.'.
Then, when this committee is asked to pass judgment on a bilateral
consular treaty, such as the one now before you, it could do so against
the background of the basic treaty on the subject. Special consular
agreements between the United States and another country could be
weighed against a generally accepted standard. Also, assuming the
terms of the Vienna Convention to be otherwise agreeable to the United
States, we wonder if our Government should not lend its prestige to
that document so as to help insure its wider acceptance among nations.
This would tend to advance the cause of international law and order,
an avowed objective of U.S. foreign policy.
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AMERICAN LEGION'S REASONS FOR OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED TREATY
The American Legion believes there are many reasons why the
Senate should not advise and consent to the ratification of this con-
sular convention with the Soviet Union. We have dealt largely,
above, with what we considered to be a technical defect in the treaty;
namely, that Article 19 would provide the communist "consular"
agents in America with a license to spy.
Going beyond the terms of the treaty itself, however, we are satis-
fied that its ratification would in no way produce a meaningful im-
provement in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations or a true abatement of tensions
= between us; it would not serve to increase normal trade between the
two countries, assuming-but not agreeing-this to be a desirable ob-
jective at this time.
On the other hand, ratification would tend to increase unduly the
Soviets' prestige among the uncommitted nations; it would tend to
enhance their capacity for the spread of communism; it would add
greatly to the complications and costs of combating Soviet-directed
intelligence activities here; and, it could place in jeopardy our policy
of nonrecognition of the Soviets' forceful takeover of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has failed to settle its
debts with the United States and has failed to make proper arrange-
ments regarding the property rights of American citizens who are
former nationals of the U.S.S.R.
However valid the foregoing reasons for nonratification of this
treaty, there is-in the final analysis-one overriding, all-important
reason that must not be ignored.
"DOUBLE-STANDARD" POLICY TOWARD SOVIET UNION
The American Legion insists that this is not the time to be entering
upon courses of interaction which give the appearance that we are
in peaceful partnership with the Soviet Union.
Senator SYMINGTON. Does that mean that you want to give the
impression to the world that we are anxious for a nonpeaceful rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union which would lead to a war, possibly
a nuclear war?
Mr. MACDONALD. No, Senator Symington. It only means that,
as I state subsequently in my statement, they are at great odds with
us today over the Vietnam question. They are pouring the war
materials into the other side, and they are saying to us
Senator SYMINGTON. We ourselves have sold a good many billion
dollars of war equipment all over the world ourselves in recent years,
have we not?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
That country's leaders have made perfectly clear that they are in
the Vietnam conflict to stay. When Soviet President Podgorny com-
menced his state visit to Italy, less than ten days ago, he declared
blatantly that-
The Soviet Union is giving and will continue to give * * * North Vietnam
ever-growing aid until the full triumph of the just cause for which the Viet-
namese people are struggling.
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The U.S. News & World Report distributed last week documents
the massive nature and value of the vital war supplies now flowing,
in ever-increasing amounts, from the Soviet bloc countries to North
Vietnam (article entitled "Russia : The Enemy in Vietnam?").
Russian-made and perhaps Russian-mannemissiles and guns are
killing American flyers almost daily. Lately, there have been re-
ports of Russian mines planted in the ship channel leading into
Saigon. The Soviets have a radar and communications vessel in
the Tonkin Gulf, monitoring our carrier activities there and provid
ing timely warning to the gun and missile crews, and the MIG pilots
of North Vietnam.
Mr. Chairman and members, both our free world allies and our
communist enemies interpret our double-standard policy. toward the
Soviet Union as a sign of weakness, if not confusion. Britain, France,
and West Germany have told us bluntly that if the United States
sees fit to increase trade with the Soviet bloc, they can see no reason not
to trade with Red China, and Cuba, in addition to the rest of the com-
munist world.
WESTERN TRADE WITH RED BLOC
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to interrupt, but
doesn't the witness understand that the British for over ten years have
been trading with Red China?
Mr. MACDONALD. I do, Sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. And so have the French with communist
countries, and so have the West Germans.
Mr. MACDONALD. I do.
Senator SYMINGTON. Then why do you say that, if we see fit to trade
with the Soviet bloc they will start trading with the Red Chinese?
They are trading with the Chinese, plenty.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, and I would like to make the point that they
are following through in this connection today with deals that are
detrimental to our best interests, both in Red hina and in Cuba.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. MacDonald, please finish your statement.
Could you confine it as much as possible to the treaty and not to the
Vietnam war?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator MUNDT. Point of order, Mr. Chairman. I do not think
you should blame the witness.
The CHAIRMAN. I am not blaming him. I am trying to help him
get through with his statement.
Senator MUNDT. If the committee members would extend the cour-
tesy to the witness of permitting him to finish--certainly you cannot
blame the witness when he tries to respond to questions put to him by
members of the committee.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not blame the witness. I want him to finish
his statement. I will plead with the members of the committe to allow
the witness to complete his statement.
Go ahead Mr. MacDonald.
Mr. MAZONALD. And they are following through with large deals,
involving materials and technical know-how, which have distorted
the term "strategic" beyond repair. And, this trend seemingly was
sanctioned by our Government when it recently removed 400 "non-
strategic" items from what had been a "strategic" list, unilaterally
maintained by the United States.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 93
U.S. POLICY SEEN AS INCONSISTENT
Yes, there is bewilderment among large segments of the American
public today. It is due, we believe, to the concern and confusion that
is caused by the glaring and frequently incomprehensible inconsist-
encies in U.S. approaches to the Communist world.
What is worse, our fighting forces in Vietnam do not understand
why our official policy is to increase trade with the Soviets and their
satellites. Our men there know full well-often from bitter personal
experience--that the Soviets are backing to the hilt the enemy they
face daily.
It is true that the morale among our troops in Vietnam is out-
standing. But many Of the men there with whom we have had con-
tact, both personally and through correspondence, are puzzled and
disturbed by what they consider to be an illogical and dangerous East-
West policy on the part of their Government. They are being asked
by that Government to bear the brunt of its policies in the "hot war"
with communism; they need to know that its "cold war" policies
are equally realistic and that both have the same objective.
The American Legion respectfully urges that this committee not
act favorably on the pending consular convention with the Soviet
Union.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. MacDonald.
I will try to move along.
STEPS AIMED AT RELAXING TENSIONS CAN BE MISINTERPRETED
It is fair to say, Mr MacDonald, in view of your statement that
the American Legion's primary objection is to our foreign policy in
general with regard to Soviet Union? You are opposed to steps to-
ward relaxation of tensions?
Mr. MACDONALD. I am opposed to steps
The CHAIRMAN. To any steps ?
Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir. We are not opposed to any steps. I am
opposed to steps which are being interpreted wrongly, perhaps
wrongly, by both the public in America, by our allies around the
worl even perhaps by the communists; and misinterpreted by our
men in Vietnam. They are being misinterpreted.
The CHAIRMAN. Maybe they are misinterpreted. But do you admit
that it is possible that such a thing as this treaty or others could bring
about more normal relations and the ending of the war in Vietnam?
Mr. MACDONALD. I do not agree that this would serve
The CHAIRMAN. You do not agree?
Mr. MACDONALD. I do not agree that this would serve to bring about
that condition. I would like to see that condition come about. This
treaty, under those circumstances, could be a good treaty.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any steps designed to normalize our re-
lations with the Soviet Union that are now being taken or that are
currently under consideration that you approve of ?
NATURE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, I would have to first point out that the
Soviet foreign policy is a very realistic one. It is consistent in all its
parts and it is always in keeping with current circumstances.
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94 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
The CHAIRMAN. That is, of course, a matter for debate. I would,
not want it to pass that I believed the Soviets are supermen--
Mr. MACDoNALD. I did not get to answer the question.
The CHAIRMAN (continuing). And everything they do is success
ful. I do not agree with that at all.
Mr. MACDONALD. Successful-I did not say that.
The CHAIRMAN. Realistic, then, if You like.
Mr. MACDoNALD. Realistic; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, realistic. I do not know what you mean
by realistic.
Mr. MACDONALD. If I may finish my answer : they are telling us
today there can be no relaxation of tensions under any circumstances until we give up in Vietnam.
The CHAIRMAN. I would take it, then, that you feel it is untimely
to make any moves, particularly this move, toward a normalization
of our relations with the Soviet Union.
Mr. MACDoNALD. I think it is untimely to make this particular
move.
The CHAIRMAN. What do you think about trading with them?
Mr. MACDoNALD. Trading of a type that is now under considera-
tion at this time; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me there is very little for us to talk,
about, in view of the overall position that you are just against any
kind of change. It is not just this treaty that you oppose in other
words, it is any mover-I suppose you would call it any friendly move-
toward the Russians. Is that correct?
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, you have to understand the position I have
tried to express here, what we do in a friendly way is misinterpreted
among our public, it is misinterpreted among our men in Vietnam,
misinterpreted by our allies, misinterpreted by the communists. They,
in turn, are not looking at these moves as moves to bring about a
rapprochement.
SOVIETS SHARE INTEREST IN AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR
The CHAIRMAN. Flow do you know that? I mean, is it inconceiv-
able to you that the Russians might be interested in avoiding a nuclear
war with us?
Mr. MACDONALD. Absolutely they are. They are very anxious to
avoid a nuclear war with us. Very anxious to avoid a nuclear war
with us.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is inconceivable that they think that this
kind of a treaty, which we requested them to enter into-I am in-
formed that they did not initiate this treaty-I think you stated that,
didn't you, or someone else.
Senator MANSrIELD. I did.
The CHAIRMAN. The Majority Leader did. Is it inconceivable to
you that they might believe that this treaty might improve the pos-
sibilities of avoiding a. ituclear war with us?
Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You seem to assume that this and every other move
they make is designed only either to spy upon us or to undermine us.
This might well be the case. But what bothers me is your generaliza-
tion, which seems to me to make almost irrelevant any discussion of
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 95
the treaty itself. You are against any move in the direction in which
this treaty is designed to move.
Mr. MACDONALD. Senator Fulbright, I did not say it quite that
way.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am trying to elicit just what you do mean
by it.
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, fine. That would, perhaps, require me to
go back over materials that I have stated in my testimony.
The CHAIRMAN. I hope you don't do that.
If I am wrong, can't you, without going all the way back, correct
whatever I said that was a misinterpretation of what you said?
AMERICAN LEGION'S ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNISM
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir. Let me preface my answer with the fact
that, in my personal opinion, and I believe in the opinion or the
approach that the American Legion has taken for nearly 50 years on
the subject of communism, that there is no move, friendly or other-
wise, that this country can make toward that country that will in any
way bring about the end of the dilemma
The CHAIRMAN. Normalization.
Do you feel that there has been no change in the character of the
countries in Eastern Europe or of Russia-either in their internal
characteristics or in their attitudes toward the western countries,
particularly toward the United States-in the last 30 years ?
Mr. MACDONALD. Sir, that is a lot of questions for me to answer,
but let me answer it this way : There have been changes in the Rus-
sian society, there have been changes in the East European society, but
communist governments are still in control.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you think all communists governments are
alike?
Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir; I do not. I am not one who looks at the
various communist parties around the world as one monolithic struc-
ture. The newspapers make it evident they are not today.
The CHAIRMAN. Then what was the significance of saying they are
all controlled by communists if they are all different?
Mr. MACDONALD. Those individual governments are all controlled
by communists. A good handful of them, a very healthy handful
of them, are controlled out of the Kremlin.
The CHAIRMAN. Which ones are controlled by the Kremlin?
Mr. MAC'DONALD. Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Rumania, and, to some degree, Yugoslavia. Also, Cuba.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not know, Mr. MacDonald-I am interested
in ,the question raised by the Senator from Missouri about whether or
not you represent the thinking of the clear majority of the American
Legion with regard to our overall posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
It seems to me this question is far more. serious than what you think
about this particular treaty.
I suppose we can get along with or without the treaty. I personally
think it is a very minor step toward relaxation of this tension. I
would like to liquidate the cold war insofar as I can, and I had thought
that there were slight changes toward more friendly relations with
the Soviet Union since the time of Stalin, for example, ten years ago.
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96 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
But I gather from you, if you speak for the American Legion, that
this is not so-that it is not your view.
Mr. MACDONALD. I am speaking for the American Legion today on
the American Legion's views on the consular treaty.
The CHAIRMAN. But the overriding reason for your position on the'
treaty, I gather from your statement, is your overall attitude toward
the Soviet Union. The consular treaty is a minor matter.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, toward the Soviet Union today.
AMERICAN LEGION OPPOSES EAST-WEST TRADE
The CHAIRMAN. I would think you would not approve of East-West
trade. Is that correct?
Mr. MACDONALD. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. And you would certainly not approve, I would
think, of the air agreement, because it surely gives the impression of
our wanting to encourage greater exchange of people, trade, and tour-
ism. If we enter into that trade agreement, thousands more Ameri-
cans will be exposed to danger in a country without the protection;
provided under this treaty.
Mr. MACDONALD. Mr. 'Chairman, the American Legion has not taken
a specific position on the air agreement, but we have taken a position
year in and year out on the subject of East-West trade.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to pursue it further, but am I cor-
rect in saying that those things-the air agreement and East-West
trade-would appear to be inconsistent with your attitude, or the over-!,
riding consideration as you put it, toward the Soviet Union?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir, and its attitude toward us.
The CHAIRMAN. That is true. I do not see that it is necessary or
productive for me to try to pursue specific provisions of this treaty.
You are just against it.
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, we did
The CHAIRMAN. You are just against it, period.
Mr. MACDONALD. We did develop--
The CHAIRMAN. I know you did, in detail.
Mr. MACDoNALD. Technicalities which we think are flaws.
CAPITALISTS MAKE AGREEMENTS TO THEIR DISADVANTAGE:
The 'CHAIRMAN. One statement you made which aroused my curi-'
osity was :
Communists have never been known to enter into an agreement with non-
Communists which they did not expect to be of greater advantage to them.
I just wonder, do capitalists customarily make agreements which
they know to be to their disadvantage?;
Mr. MACDONALD. Some governments representing capitalists have.'.
The CHAIRMAN. Knowingly? Which governments? Do you mean
our Government?
Mr. 'MACDONALD. In this connection, yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think our Government is so improvident
that it goes about dWell, things to its own disadvantage?
Mr. MACDONALD. now, I did use the term here "greater ad-
vantage." I think our Government goes about it very fairly and tries;
to get a balanced treaty.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman.
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MEMBERS OF AMERICAN LEGION NOT BOUND BY OFFICIAL VIEW
Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. MacDonald, of course what you are saying
represents the official view of the American Legion toward the con-
vention, does it not?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator SPARKMAN. You do not contend that individual members
are bound by this view, do you?
Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir; oh, no, sir.
Senator SPARKMAN. I happen to be a member of the American
Legion, and I am sure there are several others around this table
who are also. You surely expect the individual members to exercise
their own judgment.
Mr. MACDONALD. I do, sir.
Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me that in addition to Senator
Fulbright's line of questioning concerning our general relationship
with Russia, there is another point that you have made about the
advantages as balanced against the disadvantages.
In fact, it seems to me that that imbalance was really what led to
your reservations as far as this treaty is concerned-aside from gen-
eral principles and attitudes-is that right, sir?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator SPARKMAN. Do you admit that the part of the treaty which
grants access and assistance to Americans traveling in Russia is good?'
Mr. MACDONALD. Very desirable objectives, if not too costly to get.
Senator SPARKMAN. You contend that the other part of the treaty
the part which would grant immunity to a limited number of Russians
in this country, should additional consulates be opened-is the coun-
terweight which is bad.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir, and it would not necessarily be a limited
number.
Senator 'SPARKMAN. I said,, "should additional." What was it you
said?
Mr. MACDONALD. It would not necessarily be the "10 or 15" that
have been spoken about.
NUMBER OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES WHO
HAVE FULL IMMUNITY
Senator SPARKMAN. Do you know how many Soviet citizens here in
Washington connected with the Embassy have full immunity?
Mr. MACDONALD. I have the figures here. I do not have them in
my head, on top of my head.
Senator SPARKMAN. According to my information there are 452 in
the United States-not just in the Embassy here, but also in New York
at the United Nations.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator SPARKMAN. Do you know how many persons there are in
the United States from all of the countries in the world who have full
diplomatic immunity?
Mr. MACDONALD. I am generally aware of the magnitude of it.
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Senator SPARKMAN. About 9,400, I understand, throughout the
United States.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator SPARKMAN. If there were one more consulate opened, ac
cording to testimony given to us, there would be ten or fifteen addi-
tional persons.
Mr. MACDONALD. One more consulate, yes, sir.
TREATY DOES NOT ESTABLISH CONSULATE, BUT STEP IS CONTEMPLATED
Senator SPARKMAN. One more. Of course you realize, and I be-
lieve you said this in your paper, that the President has the authority
to open additional consulates without any treaty.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir. We have one here from Poland.
Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.
Mr. MACDONALD. With no treaty.
Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. So I presume you would be willing to
concede that we need not expect a great number to be opened since he
has had this right all the time and has not opened any.
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, sir, I think that the Secretary of State
clarified this when he said that we looked at this treaty as a legal
framework upon which we may prudently reestablish a Soviet con-
sul ate in this country.
Senator SPARKMAN. But he also said that they contemplated only
one, that we did not want but one in Russia. That would be in Lenin-
grad.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes sir.
Senator SPARKMAN. And that certainly we would not grant to the
Soviets any more in this country than we had in their country.
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, I do not know. Under the Litvinov agree-
nient, the Soviets opened two here in 1934, another in 1937 and, as I
understand the record, they did not permit us to get one until 1941,
and then only in order to help them with the program euphemistically
called lend-lease.
Senator SPARKMAN. I am not going back to that. I am going back
to the testimony that Secretary Rusk gave here.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, Sir.
Senator SPARKMAN. And I believe he said in that, did he not, that
we only wanted one in Russia-in Leningrad--and that there would
not be established in this country any more for the Russians than we
had in Russia.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator SPARKMAN. Well, that is what I am going by now.
Mr. MACDONALD. I understand that the State Department is going
to insist on strict reciprocity on this score.
Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.
Mr. MACDONALD. On the other hand, sir, if I may
Senator GORE. Would the Senator yield?
Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.
QUESTION OF RECIPROCITY
Senator GORE. Because this question of reciprocity has been referred
to here so frequently, I undertook to try to clarify it, and I have a
statement just delivered to me by the Legal Adviser of the State De-
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partment, if the Senator would be willing for me to read it.
Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.
Senator GORE. This is a memorandum from Mr. Meeker, Legal
Adviser of the Department of State :
Many U.S. bilateral consular treaties having the so-called most-favored-nation
clause specifically require reciprocity before such clause takes, effect. Other
earlier U.S. treaties do not havg such a condition of reciprocity. The Department
of State has, however, for many years made reciprocity a prerequisite for ac-
cording most-favored-nation treatment with regard to these earlier treaties.
Concerning the possible most-favored-nation application of Article ' 1l of the
U.S.-U.S.S.R. convention, the Department of State will specifically require a
written advance assurance of reciprocity prior to according most-favored-nation
treatment to entitled consular officers and employees.
QUESTIONS IN DECIDING ON HOW TO VOTE ON TREATY
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you.
Let me conclude with just this: It seems to me that there are just
two questions which we ought to turn over in our minds in decid-
ing how we should vote on this : first, whether or not the advantages
of having protection for the great numbers of Americans traveling
in Russia outweigh the disadvantages of having a relatively small
number of Russians in this country who would have complete im-
munity; and, second, whether or not we believe that we. ought to be
willing to take any steps leading toward better relations with coun-
tries that have Communist governments.
Is that a fair statement?
Mr. MACDoNALD. Yes, sir, I think it is a fair statement. We have
said in our statement here that the imbalance in this treaty and its
consequences outweigh the merits of ratification.
Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I realize that, and I say that is a question
each one of us has to answer for himself.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes sir.
Senator SPARKMAN. And the second thing is the relationship with
communist countries.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes.
Senator SPARKMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CFIAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.
LITVINOV AGREEMENTS PROVIDED FOR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS
Senator HICKENLooPER. Mr. MacDonald, as you pointed out, I
think, one of the important and, perhaps, vital sections of this pro-
posed treaty is the section concerning notification and visitation for
nationals of the sending country who are apprehended in the receiving
country where the consulate is located.
We have accorded that right to Russian nationals in this country
and the nationals of every other country when they are apprehended
and put in prison.
Are you aware that the Russians agreed in 1933 to accord American
nationals that same privilege and have never complied with it?
Mr. MncDoNALD. Yes, Sir.
Senator HICKENLOCYPER. In the Litvinov ac reerrrents.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir. I have a large book there that goes
into it.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I can read you the exact language if it
would help in the record. I wonder if we have any reason to believe
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TH THE SOVIET UNION
now that they would comply with their word as expressed in the form
of a treaty any more than they complied with what was in the solemn
agreements they made in order to get U.S. recognition in 1933?
Mr. MACDONALD. I know of none.
Senator HICKENLOOTER. Now, the argument is made that Mr. Lit-
vinov said as follows, addressing a letter to President Franklin
Roosevelt. This is dated November 16,1933:
MY DEAR MR.. PRESIDENT : Following our conversations I have the honor to'
inform you that the Soviet Government is prepared to include in a consular
convention to be negotiated immediately following the establishment of rela-
tions between our two countries provisions in which the nationals of the United
States shall be granted rights with reference to legal protection which shall not
be less favorable than those enjoyed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
by the nationals of the nation most favored in this respect.
Now, the argument is made that the key word in this is it will be
"included" in a consular convention which was never accomplished.
The letter continues as follows :
Furthermore, I desire to state that such rights will be granted to American
nationals immediately upon the establishment of relations between our two
countries.
In other words, he does not not say we will wait until the consular
convention is adopted, but we will establish it immediately if you
will just recognize Russia.
That is the connotation of the letter.
Then he calls attention to Article 11, and the protocol of Article 11,
of the agreement concerning conditions of residence, and business
and legal protection in general concluded between Germany and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on October 12, 1925.
He incorporates, by reference, the provisions of protection for na-
tionals and notification and visitation contained in those agreements,,
and implies "that is what we will do with you immediately"-not
upon the conclusion of a consular treaty, but immediately upon
recognition and resumption of relations.
So far as I know, they never kept their word on that at all, and I
wonder if there is any reason to think that they would keep it more
in this treaty than before. They gave their word at that time and
abrogated it repeatedly ever since.
Mr. MACDONALD. I believe not.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are you aware that a great amount of
comment has been heard around the country concerning the test-ban-
treaty?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator HICiENLOOPER. Are you aware that the Russians have
violated their treaty more than once since they entered into it?
Mr. MACDONALD. I have not a personal knowledge on that, but r
have seen comment to this effect in the newspapers.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. The violations have occurred especially
with respect to setting off explosions underground which vent debris
into the atmosphere which can drift over another country.
One wonders, after examples of this kind, whether or not they con-
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Sider a treaty a scrap of paper-or agreements of this kind scraps of
paper-such as the German Kaiser did before World War I.
Mr. MACDONALD. The record suggests so.
Senator HICKENLOOrER. Well, it is a very troublesome problem. If
we could devise some way of assuring that we would have notification
and rights of visitation in connection with American citizens who are
apprehended in Russia, I think it would be a very fine thing.
FELONY IMMUNITY PROVISION
But it is difficult for me to understand in my mind the reason for
this immunity. Why did we agree to the felony immunity? As far
as I know, we did not ask for it. It was not in our proposals to the
Russians. They asked for it.
We have granted misdemeanor immunity and other immunities.
But it is possible that this provision may open a Pandora's box
through the most-favored-nation clauses in various treaties, and I am
frankly troubled.
It has been charged, by various people who are not informed, that
I have made up my mind one way or the other on this treaty. That
is not true. I have not taken a position on this treaty, but I am con-
cerned about it. I do not believe in being "pollyannaish" about the
Russians changing their coats too much. I think we have been fooled
before on many, many occasions. We have made repeated overtures
to the Russians over the years for comity, friendship, and cooperation
in the best interests of humanity and of the world of peace, and we
have been getting cavalier treatment in return.
I see no real evidence that they are acting differently at this mo-
ment. This treaty may be a good thing, and it may not be a good
thing. I do not know.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Montana.
FREE WORLD TRADE WITH COMMUNIST BLOC
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. MacDonald, in your statement you say :
Both our free world allies and our Communist enemies interpret our double-
-standard policy toward the Soviet Union as a'sign of weakness-
This, I must say, interpolating, is news to me-
if not confusion.
It is also news to me that-
Britain, France, and Germany have told us bluntly that if the United States
sees fit to increase trade with the Soviet bloc they can see no reason not to
trade with Red China and Cuba in addition to the rest of the Communist world.
Is it not a fact that France, West Germany, and Britain are today
trading with the Communist bloc?
Mr. MACDONALD. That is a fact, and, as a matter of fact the
British have always traded with Red China. Perhaps we did not
draw out exactly the point we wished to make. I am talking particu-
larly about such deals that are going on today as a steel mill to China,
a fertilizer plant to Cuba, buses to Cuba, all over the specific objec-
tions of this country.
They are saying back to us, "Well, if you want to trade more with
Red China and its satellites, if you want"
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102 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Senator MANSFIELD. We are prohibited by law from trading with
Red China in any shape, degree or form.
Mr. MACDoNALD. We are. I intended to say Russia and its
satellites.
Senator MANSFIELD. Yes, we are. I know of no attempts being
made to increase trade in any degree with China, and I would point
out that France and West Germany are carrying on trading activities
with China. You say Britain is, and I will take your word for it. In
addition, Britain has in the past year entered into a $25 million con-
tract with the government of Castro; and West Germany in the last
year-through a consortium of $150 million-entered into a $150 mil-
lion deal to build a rolling mill in China.
As far as trade is concerned, our trade with all the Soviet bloc, I
believe, amounts to less than one percent of our total trade, and if by
chance the East-West trade bill-which you brought into this testi-
mony, and has nothing to do with the consular convention-goes into
operation, I would not anticipate that that act would increase our
trade to any appreciable degree. I would hope however, that if it
does become a reality, it would bring about a greater demand-on the
part of the communist citizen in the street and on the farm-for
capitalistic goods, and ideas usually go with goods.
C'THE NUMBERS GAME"-A GAMBLE
Now, this treaty, as I understand it, was started in 1959. This is
the particular matter which we are discussing specifically. You have
used the term "the numbers game." I found it a little disparaging
when you mentioned it-but the more I think about it the more I like
it, because it was used in relation to the 18,000 U.S. citizens who visited
the Soviet Union last year, and the less than 1,000 Soviet citizens who
visited the United States this year. So you get the 18-to-1 ratio.
The use of the term "numbers game" usually comes up in connection
with gambling, does it not?
Mr. MACDoNALD. Yes, sir, and I regret that you thought that I was
disparaging your remarks on the subject.
Senator MANSFIELD. Maybe you are right, because we may be gam-
bling with some of those 18,000 U.S. citizens who will visit the Soviet
Union this year and in the years to come. The figure seems to be
increasing all the time.
Mr. MACDONALD. About eleven of them on the average are arrested.
Senator MANSFIELD. All right. But those eleven are subject to So-
viet laws, and if those laws are enforced, it means, of course that those
who are arrested can be held incommunicado for nine months. That is
a gamble which would, at least in part, I think, be overcome by this
convention-and may I say that I speak as a member of the American
Legion also. I happen to have been a seaman, second class in the
First World War-not very high, but at least high enough to have a
voice in the membership.
Soviet consular employees and Soviet citizens in this country are
given-both in the case of those having first diplomatic immunity or
embassy employees, and in the case of the Soviet citizens-the same
rights as an American citizen has under the laws of this country and
the Constitution of the United States. Is that correct?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 103
RECIPROCITY OF LAW HANDICAPS U.S. CITIZENS IN U.S.S.R.
Senator MANSFIELD. The U.S. citizens in the Soviet Union are now
subject to Soviet laws just as Soviet citizens are. That is a form of
reciprocity in which each country evidently or supposedly reflects the
laws of the other. But, as a matter of fact, is it not true that as far as
the U.S. citizen in the Soviet Union is concerned, being placed on the
same basis or status as a Soviet citizen, he is handicapped because he
is subject to being held incommunicado up to three months.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. It appears to me that this is a form of reci-
procity which should be overcome, and that any person who is inter-
ested in protecting as fully as possible the rights of American citizens,
fellow citizens, abroad, should consider with some degree of interest, at
least, the fact that the proposed consular convention will give to U.S.
citizens in the Soviet Union not the rights now held by Soviet citizens
to which U.S. citizens are entitled, but better rights through the fact
that they would have access to the members of the Embassy or the
consulate, if one is established, and only one is under consideration.
Wouldn't that be a point in favor of this convention?
Mr. MACDONALD. It is the only point I know of.
Senator MANSFIELD. It is.
SHOULD STAFF OF CONSULATE OF ONLY THE CONSUL HAVE DIPLOMATIC
IMMUNITY?
Now, if perchance the President established a consulate in the Soviet
Union-and he has that right right now and has had it for years-
would you be in favor of having a consulate established in which, per-
haps, just the consul himself would be entitled to diplomatic immu-
nity or protection, and the rest of the staff-such as the secretary who
takes notes of a confidential nature, and others who might comprise
the ten-to-fifteen staff-would be subject to Soviet law? Are they
entitled to protection?
Mr. MACDONALD. Wouldn't that depend on our agreement with
Russia?
Senator MANSFIELD. Are they entitled to protection?
Mr. MACDONALD. There are no Soviet consulates here now so if you
are asking
Senator MANSFIELD. I said "if."
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes. If one is established, treaty or no, would the
head of that office be entitled? Yes, I think so.
Senator MANSFIELD. No, I did not say that Mr. MacDonald. I said
that if a consulate were established in the Soviet Union, and if the
consul alone had diplomatic immunity, do you think it advisable that
the rest of the staff-the private confidential secretary and the other
ten to fifteen members-should not be given that immunity as well?
Do you think it advisable that they should be made subject to Soviet
law, and, perhaps, pressures?
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, the tradition is that, and the history is
that, consulates have operated very well for centuries without this
unusual rule of full diplomatic immunity for all employees.,
Now, I am not saying that in itself is a good or bad idea, Perhaps
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when the world comes to a better order we might be able to say it's
a good idea, although not necessarily one that is essential.
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. MacDonald, I find it a little difficult to
follow you. But if I understood you correctly you express little or
no interest in diplomatic immunity being given to consular employees
apart from the consul, if he has diplomatic immunity, of the United
States, in seeing that they are protected. You say it has worked out
fine, is that correct?
Mr. MAcDONALD. I did say that consulates have traditionally per-
formed their proper functions quite well without full diplomatic
immunity for employees.
Senator MANSFIELD. In the Soviet Union?
Mr. MACDoNALD. Yes, sir. I do not know of any trouble we had in
that regard with our employees in the one consulate we once had there
in Vladivostok.
Senator MANSFIELD. Then if the President, on the basis of his au-
thority and responsibility, were to set up a consulate in the Soviet
Union at, say, Leningrad, or some other place, you would be willing
to see the consul himself be given diplomatic immunity and protection,
but you would not favor protection being given to the ten to fifteen
other employees of the consulate, some of whom may be handling
very confidential and secret documents?
Mr. MACDONALD. I did not say that and I do not believe our state-
ment says that.
Senator MANSFIELD. What would you say? Would you be in favor
of that, or do you think they all should be given diplomatic immunity?
Mr. MACDONALD. Sir, we are referring today to the treaty itself.
Senator MANSFIELD. We are indeed.
Mr. MACDoNALD. We have said in our statement we are not for that `'.
provision, that diplomatic immunity extension with Russia today-
at this time.
Senator MANSFIELD. You are in favor, then, if a consulate is estab-
lished, that all U.S. employees comprising the staff be given diplomatic
immunity and protection?
Mr. MACDONALD. I have not spoken to that point.
Senator MANSFIELD. That is in the convention. Are you in favor
of it or not?
Mr. MACDONALD. I am not in favor of ratification of this treaty
because of the diplomatic immunity and all the consequences that can
flow from it.
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. MacDonald, I stated, and you have ad-
mitted, that the President has the authority to set up consulates if
he so desires.
Mr. MACDONALD. We state that in our paper.
WHO SHOULD HAVE IMMUNITY IF CONSULATES ARE ESTABLISHED?
Senator MANSFIELD. If he goes ahead and sets up a consulate on
a quid pro quo basis which will give Soviet members of the consulate
staff in this country full protection under American laws and the
Constitution, like any other American citizen, you would not then be
in favor of giving the particular special type protection which comes
from diplomatic immunity to U.S. employees of a similar consulate in
the Soviet Union?
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 105
Mr. MACDoNALD. Sir, I think our position here today does not have
to reach that issue.
Senator MANSFIELD. This is in the convention.
Mr. MACDONALD. What we do not want now-we do not now want.
consulates, reciprocity or not, today with Russia.
Senator MANSFIELD. If there is going to be a consulate, let me say
it for the fourth time, the President has the right to establish one
Mr. MACDONALD. We state that in here.
Senator MANSFIELD. Do you want those U.S. members of that
American consulate to have the special protection guaranteed by dip-
lomatic immunity?
Mr. MACDONALD. I will answer that on a personal basis at this time.
I have not spoken to it before. I have not given it any thought before,
but I will answer if they are going to have it here, we should have it
there.
Senator MANSFIELD. Well, the answer is "Yes"-if they get it here,
we should have it there. That is just what the convention says, and
would you be in favor of this convention which gives American citi-
zens the right in Russia to have better protection than Soviet citizens
there by means of access to a consulate or an embassy?
Mr. MACDONA.LD. We are very much in favor of that goal if it is
not too costly.
Senator MANSFIELD. What do you mean by "not too costly ?"
Mr. MACDONALD. I thought we had drawn that out in the statement,
sir. I will go over it again.
Senator MANSFIELD. Would you do it hastily?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
The diplomatic immunity provision is a quid pro quo in this case.
We think it is too much to give to Russia and the other Communist
countries that would come into it at this time.
Senator MANSFIELD. We are only considering one particular con-
vention applicable to one particular country. The cost relative to it,
a question which you raised but which has not yet been answered,
would be minimal as far as the protective rights are concerned.
I think Mr. Hoover could very well take care of the situation and,
may I say in that respect, that I think Mr. Hoover's letters are very
applicable. They were in answer to specific questions. Mr. Hoover
recognizes that he is not a policymaker. He is there to carry out pol-
icy. I certainly have enough confidence in Mr. Hoover-just as much,
if not more than I have in the KGB, which is the Soviet internal
security police, in looking after the interests of this country if and
when a consulate were established.
But in addition to the protection, diplomatic immunity, given to
the members of the consulate staff, if a consulate is established-I must
repeat that, and which you think should be given to them-would you
agree that this special consideration, the right of access and so forth,
should be given to American citizens who travel in the Soviet Union?
Mr. MACDONALD. I will repeat, we think that is a very desirable ob-
jective if not too costly.
Senator MANSFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.
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 169
Senator AIKFN. Mr. MacDonald, I am not going to use much time.
You may recall that last fall the heads of 20 to 30 of the largest cor-
porations in this country-the biggest capitalists we have-made a
trip through Eastern Europe for the purpose, as they said, of creating
a friendlier feeling between that area and the United States and look-
ing to an increase in trade between the two areas. This group was
headed by Henry Luce of Time-Life magazines. I do not remember
the names of all the corporations but they were the largest in this
country, including Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Ford Motor Co., and
others. I think two or three of the largest banks were also repre-
sented on the trip.
Would you say that their objective and their trip was not in the best
interests of the United States?
Mr. MACDCNALD. The American Legion thinks any people-to-people
exchange is very much in the best interests of the United States. But
to have-
Senator AIKEN. They were seeking to increase trade.
Mr. MACDONALD. But to have a group of business interested travel-
ers to that country, I think we know that they will be talking not to
comparable businessmen in Russia. I do not know of any there.
They would be talking with the representatives of the communist gov-
ernment of Russia, and with its government trading organization.
And I would like again to stress, Senator Aiken, that I personally do
not think there is any such means of increasing friendliness-in the
way we understand that between individuals-between the U.S. Gov-
ernment and the communist government of Russia.
Even if occasionally it appears that they are interested in something
we have got, even if it occasionally appears that they are making
moves and noises that we might sometimes call a thaw, it has nothing,
in my judgment, to do with the overall end product of communism;
namely, the communization of the world.
Now, for that reason I look with some degree of skepticism about
moves which our people here, government or otherwise, are making
and taking and advocating about friendlier relations with their com-
munist-government counterparts.
Senator AIKEN. That was the express purpose of the trip, as I
understand it.
Mr. MACDONALD. I know.
Senator AIKEN. Mr. Luce has never been considered exactly a
radical in world affairs.
Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir, Senator.
Senator AIKEN. The countries they visited were communist coun-
tries which have so-called communist governments, although they have
been adopting quite a few capitalistic ideas recently.
Mr. MACDONALD. Wisely so.
Senator AIKEN. But you do not think do you, that these people
would venture on a program which would be harmful to the country
or to the form of government which has enabled them to become the
heads of billion-dollar corporations?
Mr. MACDoNALD. I think they would not intend to.
Senator A IKEN. You think they may be mistaken ?
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Mr. MACDoNALD. I think that perhaps they are mistaken in the
notion that more trade between their corporations and Russia is going
to be in the long run in the best interests of the U.S. Government and
its people.
DOES EASTERN EUROPE TRADE WITH U.S. LESSEN ITS DEPENDENCY ON
U.S.S.R.?
Senator AIKEN. Has it ever occurred to you that our unwillingness
to trade with some of the countries in Eastern Europe has been largely
responsible for their being so dependent on Russia? If we can loosen
their ties with Russia economically, isn't there a chance that the loosen-
ing of political ties will follow?
Mr. MACDONALD. I do not believe so, and it would take some time
to develop my answer to that point, but let me state first that it was not
the United States that established the COMECON arrangement. The
Kremlin established that.
Senator AIKEN. Yes.
Well, I leave it to you to convince Mr. Luce because it was he who
arranged this party, as I understand it, and took all the top officers
of Time-Life with him as well as the heads of, perhaps, 20 billion-
dollar corporations. Ii they are not billion-dollar corporations, they
are pretty close to it.
I think that economically we are getting very international in our
views, even though we may not be politically. Our economic problems
seem to be knocking the political barriers pretty flat in some areas of
the world.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
(The article regarding the visit of the executives follows:)
[From the New York Times, Oct. 21, 1966]
TWENTY-FOUR U.S. EXECUTIVES VISITING RED BLOC; SEEK To STIMULATE TRADE
IN FIVE-COUNTRY TOUR
Executives of 24 American corporations departed yesterday on a tour of five
East European nations to open the door to potential trade.
The tour, organized by Time magazine, will take the group to Hungary, Ru-
mania, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. The participants will pay their
own way beyond the cost of flying.
The importance of the trip was enhanced recently by the Johnson Administra-
tion's decision to liberalize trade with Eastern Europe. Administration officials
will receive a report on the prospects of expanding financial and trade relations
when the delegation flies from Belgrade to Washington on Nov. 1.
The following Time executives are accompanying the delegation : Bernard M.
Auer, the publisher ; James A. Linen, president ; Andrew Heiskell, chairman of
the board ; Henry R. Luce, editorial chairman ; Hedley W. Donovan, editor in
chief ; Lawrence E. Laybourne, assistant publisher ; Otto Fuerbringer, managing
editor ; Champ Clark, senior editor, and Robert C. Gordon, advertising director.
TO SEE, LISTEN AND TALK
Members of the delegation have made it clear that their intention is not to
propose any modification of United States policy but to see and be seen, to listen
and talk. It is expected that they will be received by the heads of state and other
officials.
John L. Loeb, senior partner of Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., who is in the dele-
gation, said :
"I am confident that the trip could definitely further the Administration's
recently stated policy.of increasing trade with Eastern Europe."
The delegation, he said, plans to explore possibilities of expanding financial and
commercial relations and to develop better understanding of American industry.
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108 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Among the business leaders in the delegation, in addition to Mr. Loeb, are
John L. Atwood, president, North American Aviation, Inc. ; Eugene N. Beesley,
president, Eli Lilly & Co.; James H. Binger, chairman, Honeywell Inc.; William
Blackie, chairman, the Caterpillar Tractor Company ; Edgar M. Bronfman, presi-
dent, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. ; Joseph F. Cullman 3d, president, Philip
Morris Inc., and Russell DeYoung, chairman, the Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company.
Also, A. P. Fontaine, chairman, the Bendix Corporation; Henry Ford 2d,
chairman of the board of the Ford Motor Company ; Keith Funston, president
of the New York Stock Exchange ; Gordon Grand, president, Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corporation ; John D. Harper, president of the Aluminum Company
of America; Robert S. Ingersoll, chairman, the Borg-Warner Corporation; George
A. Murphy, chairman, Irving Trust Company ; Robert S. Oelman, chairman,
National Cash Register Company ; Frank Pace Jr., president, International Exec-
utilve Service Corporation, and S. Warner Pach, president, Gillette Safety Razor
OTHERS IN DELEGATION
Also, Henry R. Roberts, president, Connecticut General Life Insurance Com-
pany ; Willard F. Rockwell Jr., president, Rockwell-Standard Corporation ; C.
William Verity Jr., president, Armco Steel Corporation ; Leslie H. Warner, presi-
dent, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation ; Rawleigh Warner Jr.,
president, Mobil Oil Corporation, and Kendrick R. Wilson Jr., chairman, Avco
Corporation.
In addition to the business leaders and Time magazine executives, the delega-
tion includes Dr. Alexander Heard, chancellor of Vanderbilt University, and
Whitney M. Young Jr., executive director of the National Urban League.
The group is traveling on a jet chartered by Time.
Mr. Auer recalled that the magazine had sponsored two similar trips in the
past-one to the Soviet Union in 1963 and another to Southeast Asia in 1965.
Mr. Auer said all the participants shared the expenses beyond the cost of the
aircraft. He said that the magazine hoped the journey would offer "information
and insight into countries that were once part of a monolithic bloc but now
appear to be moving toward considerable autonomy."
Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make a state-
ment for the record to the witness in telling him how sorry I was
in not getting here sooner than now. I have been serving as the
acting chairman at the hearing on mine safety, a. series of nomina,
tions, and I have just finished those hearings. I have not had an
opportunity to read the testimony, but I shall with great care. I
want to express my appreciation for your being here.
That is all.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.
Senator GORE. I pass.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ALIGNMENTS OF COUNTRIES CHANGE
You brought up the question of trade. Who, would you say, were
the three greatest enemies the United States had in World War H?
Would you say Japan, Germany, and Italy?
Mr. MACDONALD. That is correct, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. And today are they not as good friends as we
have, along with Great Britain?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir, as good.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would you say that in World War II probably
two of the three best friends we had-well, you see my point. Things
change. The positions of various countries change.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, Sir.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 103'
Senator SYMINGTON. Today China, formerly an ally of ours, is now
considered an enemy, and France, our oldest ally, is now working
against us, politically and economically. Correct?
Mr. MACDONALD. Very much so.
Senator SYMINGTON. Therefore, there could be a change in these
governments which would make it reasonable for us to consider a
country like Soviet Russia, under this new leadership, in a somewhat.
different manner, would it not?
Mr. MACDoNALD. It would be possible.
Senator SYMINGTON. The German Government presently is doing
everything it can to improve its relationship with the Russians. That
is correct, is it not?
Mr. MACDONALD. It would seem so.
Senator SYMINGTON. And the same thing is true of the French, is
.t not?
Mr. MACDONALD. I think so. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. And the same thing is also true of Japan
ad Italy, is it not?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. So if we follow this policy of rigid intran-
igence with respect to our relations with the Russians (a) we are
loing something different from all other developed countries of the
free world; and (b) we could eventually find ourselves alone in the
world, could we not?
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, may I develop my answer?
Senator 'SYMINGTON. Certainly.
Mr. MACDoNALD. I would say, first of all, that we do not necessarily
make up our foreign policy on the basis of what our allies are doing,
I regret what they are doing.
Senator SYMINGTON. But you do think it is reasonably important in
the nuclear -age to have some friends?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir. But on the question of trade, sir, in my
judgment, trade itself is not going to generate necessarily the kind of
rapprochement we truly want. Trade will simply generate trade.
You mentioned Germany and Italy. They were massive partners,
trading partners with all the countries back in 1939 or just before 1939,
massive trading partners with all the people with whom they were
soon to fight a war. We were massive traders with Japan. What.
did this get us? We have never been a massive trader with Russia.
We have never had a war with Russia.
Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I am not sure I follow you, but as long
as we have gotten into trade, which we probably do not agree on,.
either, inasmuch as every other country in the free world except the
United States has tremendously increased its gold and its total re-
serves, and we have lost half of ours in the last ten years, I believe we
)tight to take a fresh new look at trade also.
We went over the fact that you say, if the United States sees fit to
,crease trade with the Soviet bloc, other countries can see no reason
by not to trade with Red China and Cuba and the rest of the com-
?inist world.
asked the Secretary of the Treasury in an open hearing if there
any country in the free world he knew of any developed country
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that was not doing its best to sell everything it could except sophisti-
cated war materials, behind the Iron Curtain. He said he knew of no
country. I asked the Secretary of Commerce the same question. He
said the only developed country not doing its best to sell everything
it could behind the Iron Curtain, except sophisticated war material,
was the United States.
Have you heard estimates of the number of people who would be
killed if we had a nuclear exchange with any country?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. What was the figure you heard?
Mr. MACDONALD. The specific figure?
Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.
Mr. MACDoNALD. It depends on how many cities are hit, I am sure,
but I think there was some talk of better than half of our current
population, perhaps as many as 150 million.
Senator SYMINGTON. The minimum figure of Americans I hav
heard that would be killed if the Russians attacked us, or we attacker
the Russians, would be 70 million.
That being true, from the standpoint of our obligation to future
generations don't you think we ought to do our best to reach more
understanding with these people?
Mr. MACDONALD. I think we ought to bring about a true world
order.
Senator SYMINGTON. Incidentally, I am a member of the American
Legion, too.
Mr. MACDONALD. We are proud of that, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. And I have two sons who are members, one a
disabled veteran.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. I am thinking about their children as we pur-
sue this discussion.
WHAT SHOULD OUR POLICY BE TOWARD THOSE WHO TRADE WITH CHINA
AND HELP OUR ENEMY IN VIETNAM?
The fact is that the Russians are making ammunition that could
harm our boys in South Vietnam. You would not break off relations
with France today, would you?
Mr. MACDONALD. Perhaps not break off relations, but I think we
might ask for our Government to take a little harder look at the way
Mr. De Gaulle is undermining our best interest.
Senator SYMINGTON. You would think about breaking them off if
they-the French-did not stop shipping arms to North Vietnam.
Mr. MACDONALD. I did not reach that far.
Senator SYMINGTON. I thought you implied that. Were you think-
in fit?
gOr. MACDONALD. That would be part of the consideration, perhaps
Senator SYMINGTON. Would you break off relations with German-
also selling heavy quantities of material to China?
Mr. MACDONALD. No, Sir.
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Senator SYMINGTON. Would you break off relations with Great
Britain, who has moved her ships into Haiphong harbor with
materials?
Mr. MACDONALD. I would not break OR relations with them, but
I would tell them personally; you are asking me if I were Secretary
of State, I think, are you not?
Senator SYMINGTON. That is right.
Mr. MACDONALD. I would very quickly tell them to knock off the
Cuban deal and get their Hong Kong ships out of the Haiphong trade,
and if they do not, we will reverse our position on the Rhodesian
matter.
Senator SYMINGTON. Well, let us assume we have told them that, I
think it is a fair 'assumption. Then they tell us, which I believe they
have done, that is just too bad, that they are going to continue to do
business with these countries whether we like it or not.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Then would you break off relations?
Mr. MACDoNALD. No, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. So you would not break off relations with any
of the countries shipping goods to harm our boys in South Vietnam,
but you would not take any steps to improve our relationship with
Russia because they are
Mr. MACDONALD. Sir, I am sorry, if you are saying I would not
break off relations with countries doing their best to harm our boys
in Vietnam yes, I would. But that was not the question you put to me.
Senator AYMINGTON. Have you been to Vietnam lately ?
Mr. MACDONALD. I have, sir, in December.
Senator SYMINGTON. Were you impressed by the degree the French
are working against us in Vietnam?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir; and I think the basis of the trouble there
is the way France exploited that country.
Senator SYMINGTON. Then you would break off relations with
France?
Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. I just cannot follow you.
When people write me about this treaty, I tell those who write :
"There are more than three times as many American visitors to the
Soviet Union now than there were when this treaty was proposed
under the Eisenhower administration in 1959." That is done to show
it is a bipartisan matter.
PRIMARY PURPOSE OF CONSULAR CONVENTION
"The primary purpose, then, as now, is to protect and assist Ameri-
cans visiting the Soviet Union." You would agree that is the purpose,
would you not?
Mr. MACDONALD. That is not the purpose of a consular treaty.
That is the reason why our State Department and other proponents
want it ratified.
Senator SYMINGTON. Then you think the State Department is not
telling the truth when they say that is the primary purpose?
Mr. MACDONALD. No. sir-only, I think it is a semantic problem.
The purpose of a consular treaty, as the Legal Adviser himself said,
it is a treaty in which the contracting powers regulate the activities and
functions of consular establishments.
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112 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Now, the reason why the proponents want this treaty is something
else again.
Senator SYMINGTON. Now I say in my letter :
As you may know, an accused person in the Soviet Union is not permitted to
consult with a lawyer or anyone during the period of investigation which can
last for nine months. Under this treaty, which would afford an American citizen.
arrested in the Soviet Union a higher degree of protection than that enjoyed by a
Soviet citizen, in from one to three days United States officials must be notified
of the arrest of an American and visits by American officials with the arrested
American would be guaranteed.
Is that correct, as you understand it?
Mr. MACDONALD. That is what the treaty says, and the protocol;:
yes, sir. But notification and access is not freedom for that individual.
It would not have-if we had had prompt notification in Newcomb
Mott's case, and full access, we would not necessarily have kept him
from dying under mysterious circumstances.
Senator SYMINGTON (reading) :
The treaty does not itself provide for the opening of consular offices in each
country. It simply provides the legal framework for their operation if they
are opened. Under the proposed convention, the receiving country has the right
to approve the number and the persons in the consular office.
That is correct, is it not?
Mr. MACDONALD. That is correct.
Senator SYMINGTON (reading) :
The consular officials and employees are granted immunity from the receiving
country's criminal but not civil laws. It should be borne in mind that, after
admission, a Soviet consular officer or employee is subject to being declared:
persona non grata and expelled from the United States.
Is that correct?
Mr. MACDONALD. That is correct.
Senator SYMINGTON (reading) :
Secretary of State Dean Rusk has stated that, should the treaty be ratified by
both the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States would contemplate
the opening of one consular office with 10 to 15 persons. If that occurred, sim-
ilarly the Soviet Union could open one consulate here to which would be assigned
10 to 15 nationals.
Would you agree with that?
Mr. MACDONALD. That is the record; yes, sir, my understanding-
of the record.
Senator SYMINGTON (reading) :
It is my understanding that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, for whom I have high re-
spect, does not take a position on this treaty pro or con, -
Is that your understanding?
Mr. MACDONALD. I understand that the Acting Attorney General
said that his department was not competent professionally or officially
to ass on that.
Senator SYMINGTON (reading) :
and [that Mr. Hoover] has given assurance that the FBI is fully capable of
handling any additional work created by the small increase of potential espio-
nage agents.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 113
Would you agree with that?
Mr. MACDoNALD. I have every confidence that the FBI can, assum-
ing a higher staff and at more cost, keep up with the ten or fifteen if
that's all it happens to be. I do not know the ratio of agents it takes.
Senator SYMINGTON. Suppose it is 30 or 40, do you think we could
do it then?
Mr. MACDONALD. I am not privy to the operations of the FBI in
this regard.
Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I would say that if that is the way you
feel about it, my confidence in Mr. Hoover's capacity is considerably
greater than yours.
Mr. MACDONALD. You misinterpreted my remark. I have great
confidence in him.
Senator SYMINGTON. But I asked if you thought he could handle
30 or 40 more Soviets in this country in the same efficient fashion he
handles the hundreds of them who are presently in this country.
Mr. MACDONALD. I do not know the ratio it 'takes, the ratio of FBI
agents it takes, to Soviet intelligence agents in this country.
Senator SYMINGTON. Have you ever known Mr. Hoover to request
anything from the Congress he did not get in the last 25 years?
Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think if he felt he needed more people
he would come up here and ask for them?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. herefore, then you do think he could handle
any additional Russian agents up to 30 or 40 the Soviets put in here?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir. I think it is a costly and an unnecessary
step to take.
Senator SYMINGTON. What is costly?
Mr. MACDONALD. The additional agents.
Senator SYMINGTON. You mean firteen additional Soviets would be
costly and unnecessary to us, or to Mr. Hoover?
Mr. MACDONALD. To us-well, to all of us, yes.
Senator SYMINGTON. As a taxpayer, you would not want to pay
to see these people watched by the FBA?
Mr. MACDONALD. If they are brought into the country, which the
American Legion opposes-then the taxpayer is going to have to
? bear that burden, and we would be for it.
The CHAIRMAN. I would like to insert in the record of the hearing
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's budget estimates for the years
1958 through 1967 and a listing of the appropriations voted for Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation during the same years. It is interesting
to note that in every instance except one the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation's budgetary requests have been granted without change. The
one exception was a supplementary request in 1963 for $5,500,000. The
actual appropriation made was $5,225,000.
I might also observe that the appropriations for the Federal Bureau
of Investigation were $101,450,000 for 1958 and $175,465,000 for 1967.
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114 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
1958--------------------
$101,450,000
1958--------------------
1958 Pay Act Supp------
4,112, 000
1958 Pay Act Supp------
1959--------------------
102,500,000
1959--------------------
H. Doc. 58--------------
9,611,000
Supp. (2d 1959) ---------
1960--------------------
114,600,000
1960--------------------
1961--------------------
118,000,000
1961--------------------
Supp. (Inc'd pay,
H. Doe. 58) -----------
7,550,000
Supp. (3d 1961) ---------
1962--------------------
127,216,000
1962--------------------
1963--------------------
130,700,000
1963--------------------
Supp. (Inc'd pay,
H. Doc. 63) -----------
5,500,000
Supp. (1963) -----------
1964--------------------
146,900,000
1964--------------------
1965--------------------
150,445,000
1965--------------------
Supp. (H. Doc. 80) -------
110, 635, 000
Supp. (2d 1965) ---------
1966--------------------
165,365,000
1966--------------------
Supp. (Inc'd pay,
H. Doc. 405) ----------
3, 735, 000
Supp. (2d 1966)---------
1967--------------------
175,465,000
1
1967
_-------------------
1 Includes $5,605,000 for increased pay costs.
$101,450,000
4,112,000
102,500,000
9,611,000
114,600,000
118,000,000
7, 550, 000
127,216,000
130,700,000
5,225,000
146,900,000
150,445,000
110,635,000
165,365,000
3,735,000
175, 465, 000
POSSIBLE EFFECT OF TREATY ON VIETNAM \VAR
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know how much the South Vietnamese
war is costing us a month?
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, it is increasing constantly, but it is running
around $2 billion a month today.
Senator SYMINGTON. I think you are about a half billion per month
short.
Mr. MACDONALD. I am going by the administration figures, $2
billion a year.
Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I am not quite sure the lower figure is
right. It isn't according to the Senate Appropriations Committee
staff (reading:)
Of the 1,000 Soviet citizens residing in the United States today, 452 have dip
lomatic immunity. I believe the FBI can be responsible for 10 or 15 more.
The rights in this proposed treaty are reciprocal ; and it is interesting to note
that last year, whereas 900 Soviet tourists and exchange visitors travelled here,
18,000 travelled in the Soviet Union.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON (reading) :
It is indeed unfortunate that this proposed treaty comes before the American
people at a time when the Soviet Union is supplying materials and weapons used
in Vietnam against American military forces. But we do not see how the refusal
of the United States to ratify this treaty could, in any way, affect Soviet activity
in Vietnam.
Would you agree with that?
Mr. MACDONALD. It would not affect them.
Senator SYMINGTON (reading) :
If its ratification would affect our military efforts out there, I do not believe.
it would have been brought to the Senate.
There are a great many areas of disagreement which exist in the world today ;
and I believe, it important to increase areas of agreement which could serve the
interests of the United States as well as other countries.
Would you agree to that ?
Mr. MACDoNALD. Sir, no, not at this time. If we are talking about!
the specifics of this particular treaty or the trade act, because to the;
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 115
men in Vietnam and to a wide segment of the American public, they
simply do not understand this.
Senator SYMINGTON. Who does not understand what?
Mr. MACDONALD. The American public and many men in Viet-
nam. They do not understand why we want these little things that
we think or we hope
Senator SYMINGTON. Little what?
Mr. MACDONALD. These treaties, agreements, that we think-I
say "little,"-put that in quotation marks-in comparison with the
massive attempts that the Soviet Union is making and is doing to
t
h
l
th Vi
N
e
nam.
p
or
e
These are minor things in that connection, and they would not
bring about friendlier relations, they would not bring about an end
of the Soviet Union's help to North Vietnam.
Senator SYMINGTON. I said I believed it important to increase areas
of agreement. Does your answer mean you think it important to in-
crease areas of disagreement? I am being sincere, not asking the
question in any snide fashion at all.
Mr. MACDONALD. I understand.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would our diplomacy continue to foment sus-
picion and distrust among the two nuclear countries, when we know
what a nuclear exchange would do? Or should we sit down and say,
"We probably don't agree with a lot of things you think, and you don't
agree with a lot of things we think, but let's see whether we can have a
little closer understanding, so we don't blow the world up."
Isn't that a fair way to look at things?
Mr. MACDONALD. We have been trying to get an arrangement with
them and an understanding with them ever since they got their nuclear
capability.
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. MacDonald, your testimony worries me a
great deal. I have spent the last 26 years of my life trying to attain a
strong America so we can have a free America. To find the repre-
sentative of the largest organization of veterans, of which I am a mem-
ber, actively opposing any better relationship with the one country in
the world that could very seriously hurt the United States I must say
worries me a lot.
Thank you.
Senator SPARKMAN (presiding). Senator Carlson.
Senator CARLSON. Mr. MacDonald, I have noticed that it seems to be
necessary to at least present one's membership or familiarity with the
American Legion before getting too far into the questioning. In
order to get the record started correctly, I want to state that I helped
organize the Davies-Crook Post No. 76 in 1919, and during all these
years my membership has been current. I have been proud of the
American Legion, of its representation and of its organization.
I was not here at the time you read your paper, but I have read it
since coming into the committee room. I shall not interrogate you
because you have already answered many questions.
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116 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
I just want to state that I personally think you and the American
Legion have rendered a real service this morning by calling attention
to some of the difficulties in the proposed treaty.
There are good provisions in this treaty and there are bad provisions.
But I have the feeling if this treaty cannot stand the light of day, we
ought to analyze it paragraph by paragraph; and after we have
analyzed it, if we think it is in the interests of this Nation, we should
support it, and if we do not, then we should oppose it.
I feel rather badly about the situation when we have such important
matters before this committee, it seems as though when there is oppo-
sition to a proposal-not just this one but others-we may have to ap-
prove it without a thorough analysis. I think that. is an unfortunate
situation. I just want to say I appreciate very much your appearance
here. Thank you very much.
Mr. MACDONALD. Thank you, Senator.
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Dodd ?
Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to say to you, Mr. MacDonald, that I think you have been
a very good witness and have shown great restraint and patience.
NUMBER OF VISITORS FROM UNITED STATES TO U.S.S.R. AND
NUMBER OF ARRESTS MADE
I want to be sure I understand all the aspects of your testimony.
You have used the figures 900 and 18,000. The former is the figure
,of the number of Soviet citizens that visited the United States last
year. I take it the latter is the figure of the number of American
-citizens who visited the Soviet Union.
Do you have any figures to show, say, over the last five years, how
many Americans visited the Soviet Union and how many were
arrested ?
Mr. MACDONALD. Senator, the figures, the estimated figures, of
Americans visiting the Soviet Union over the past five years, I believe,
accompanied Secretary Rusk's statement on January 23. They are
rising, and the current estimate is 18,000. But as to the arrest cases,
he himself stated that just in the 30 months since this treaty was signed
in Moscow there have been at least 20 cases.
Senator DODD. Twenty?
Mr. MACDONALD. Twenty cases, or roughly eleven a year.
Senator DODD. In 30 months?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator DODD. How many Soviet citizens were arrested in this coun-
try in the same period?
Mr. MACDONALD. I do not have the figure, but even if all 900 of
them had been arrested, they would have had their consular officers
who would have had prompt notification and prompt access.
Senator DODD. I understand that, but I thought you might have
some figures.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIE
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS QUESTIONS ASKED WITNESS
Now, you were asked a question about whether or not we were selling
weapons. I believe you were asked whether or not we were selling
weapons to countries around the world?
Mr. MACDONALD. I understand we are.
Senator DODD. I do not recall what your answer was in detail. Are
we selling any weapons to any country engaged in aggression?
Mr. MACDONALD. Not to my knowledge. In fact, I think it is our
policy not to.
Senator DODD. You were also asked if you were aware of the fact
that we are trading with Japan and West Germany and Italy, and
they are now our friends but they were our enemies in World War II..
The question suggests that situations change. Is that how you
understood it?
Mr. MAcDONALD. That was my understanding.
Senator DODD. Well, they did change, did they not?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes.
Senator DODD. And it took a dreadful war to change them and the
objectives of those countries have all been changed, haven't they?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator DODD. They no longer are seeking our destruction, are they ?'
Mr. MACDoNALD. No, Sir.
Senator DODD. I would think this might be an important point,,
wouldn't you?
Mr. MACDONALD. I agree.
Senator DODD. And we might add, or would you agree that we might
add, that when our enemies change that is the time for us to change?'
Mr. MACDONALD. That is the time.
Senator DODD. You were asked if you favored breaking relations
with France and West Germany and Great Britain. You remember
you were asked that question?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir; I do.
Senator DODD. I understand your answer was that you were not in
a position to make that decision.
Mr. MAcDONALD. That is correct, sir.
Senator DODD. I think that is a competent answer to that question..
Mr. MACDoNALD. Thank you.
Senator DODD. I have observed from what I have read and from
what I have heard that we are constantly reminded that the opening
of one consulate or maybe two would involve no more than fifteen per
sons, and then I heard a figure as high as, perhaps, 40. How would
you feel about fifteen? How would you feel about 40? I take it you
have no way of making a judgment as to what numerically the influ-
ence or hazard would be with respect to us on a number basis?
Mr. MACDoNALD. Not specifically, but I think we can get it in a:
number of ways.
Senator DODD. Am I right in understanding that if the treaty or-
agreement were ratified that all other countries with whom we have
most-favored-nation agreements can ask for the same set of arrange-
ments?
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Mr. MACDONALD. And get it on the basis of reciprocity.
Senator DODD. And get it.
Do you have any idea how many other communist countries would
be involved?
Mr. MACDONALD. Communist countries?
Senator DODD. Yes.
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, first of all, we have Yugoslavia, with at least
four consulates in this country today outside of Washington. They
would be involved.
We have a consular treaty with them containing the most-favored-
nation clause. So, right away, we would get beyond ten or fifteen addi-
tional.
Poland has a consulate in Chicago. I do not know how many em-
ployees it has. We do not now have a consular treaty with Poland,
but it is in the negotiating stage. You can be assured, I think, that
Poland would very quickly follow the suit of its leader and its con-
sular employees in Chicago would be added to the ten or fifteen.
Senator DODD. Can I help you to save time? I was only trying to
get an idea, roughly and in general, how many more consular people,
possibly we would have from communist countries in this country.
Mr. DfACDONALD. I do not know specifically, but it is a considerable
number, a considerable number, far above fifteen.
Senator DODD. Would it run into the hundreds?
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, the Secretary of State has testified that if
all 33 nations asked for the most-favored-nation treatment we would
right away go well above-correction, we would go above 400. How
many of those would be communists I am not prepared to state at this
time, but I foresee that other communist countries will join in the
trend and seek such a treaty with the United States.
Senator DODD. I think that is an important matter to take into con-
sideration when we are talking about the numbers that are possibly
involved.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator DODD. If it is possible that there would be hundreds, I think
that we ought to know it.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir. In this case it is, and it gets into a ques-
tion of costs and personnel of our countersurveillance.
CHANGE TOWARD WEST ON PART OF THE SOVIET UNION
Senator DODD. I take it that your view is that, insofar as you know,
there has been no fundamental change in the attitude of the Soviet
Union toward the United States or the free world?
Mr. MACDONALD. I know of no fundamental change. I have every
reason to believe that there is no such change
Senator DODD. But you recognize that
Mr. MACDONALD (continuing) . In the Government.
Senator DODD (continuing). There are always shifts and changes.
At one time or another, for several reasons-
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.
Senator DODD (continuing) They are not able to maintain the
same degree of harsh discipline, for example, in their own society.
They have to give a little here and there, make moves of all kinds.
Mr. MACDoNALD. Yes, sir.
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If I may, sir, I liken it-I liken the changes we have spoken of in
these communist societies as the changes that we see constantly going
on in the population of a prison.
Senator DODD. Well, the point I want to get clear so that I can un-
derstand it is just that.
Do I understand that you would say that if they will give us some
indication of some real change we will be more than happy to meet
them more than halfway?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir. Let them tear down the Berlin wall;
let them withdraw their support to North Vietnam; let them come to
a real agreement on the German question.
Senator DODD. I am glad you testified. I say again, as I said at the
opening, I think you have been a good witness. Obviously, you have
spent some time on this. I read your paper before I come in.
Mr. MACDONALD. Thank you, sir.
Senator DODD. I think there will be a lot more said on it before we
are through. Yours ought to be a very helpful piece of testimony
for all those interested in arriving at an objective and fair judgment
on the best position for the United States of America.
Mr. MACDONALD. Thank you.
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Morse.
Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Mundt has just motioned
to me that I take a minute for I have an emergency call here that takes
me to the floor on an amendment, to which I am a party. I want to
say, Mr. MacDonald, that since coming into the room I have read your
statement, and I think it is a very able presentation of the advocacy
against the treaty, and it deserves the careful consideration of the com-
mittee, which it will receive, irrespective of what our present views are
as we have expressed them publicly.
I would like, with the Senator's permission, to insert in the record-
the chairmen tells me it has not been inserted 'in the record-the
President's statement yesterday at his press conference in support of
the treaty.
(The document referred to follows:)
THE PRESIDENT'S NEws CONFERENCE OP FEBRUARY 2, 1967
The PREsmENT. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
I have been asked to give a statement about the Consular Convention that is
pending before the United States Senate.
I should like to say very briefly that I hope the Senate will give its advice and
consent to the proposed convention with the U.S.S.R. I feel very strongly that
the ratification of this treaty is very much in our national interest. I feel this
way for two principal reasons :
First, we need this treaty to protect the 18,000 American citizens who each
year travel from this country to the Soviet Union. The convention requires
immediate notification to us whenever an American citizen is arrested in the
Soviet Union. It insures our right to visit that citizen within 4 days, and as
often thereafter as is desirable.
We think that we need these rights to help to protect American citizens.
These are rights which the Soviet citizens already have who travel in this
country, because they are guaranteed by our Constitution.
Second, the convention does not require the opening of consulates in this
country or in the Soviet Union. It does provide that should any such consulate
be opened, the officials would have diplomatic immunity.
The Secretary of State informs me that no negotiations for consulates are
underway and that the most that he can envision in the foreseeable future is
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120 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
the opening of one consulate in each country, to be manned by from 10 to 15
people.
There are presently 452 Soviet officials in the United States who have dip-
lomatic immunity. If an additional consulate were opened, and if another 10
were added to the 452, Mr. Hoover has assured me that this small increment
would raise no problems which the FBI cannot effectively and efficiently deal
with.
In short, I think we very much need this convention to protect American
interests, and to protect American citizens abroad. In my judgment, it raises no-
problem with respect to our national security. Therefore, I hope very much that.
the Senate, in its wisdom, after full debate, will see fit to ratify it.
Senator MORSE. I want the record to show that the public policy
issues raised by the Senator from Missouri, Mr. Symington, express
my viewpoint in ,that I think the decision we have to make is in deter-
mining what we think would be in the best national interests of our
country, approval or disapproval of the treaty. I happen to think
that very sincere and honest men can differ, as you differ with those,
of us at the present time, and I plan to vote for the treaty.
Tome that is the issue, and as representatives here in the Senate, we,
have to come to honest independence of judgment of what will best pro-
mote and support the national interests.
I think to date the President and the Secretary of State and the
administration witnesses, would receive my verdict as a legislative
juror.
VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS : BLANKET VERSUS
BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
But there is one part of your statement I want to make very clear,,
and comment on. You say :
Before leaving this subject, we think it of interest to compare the langauge
of Article 12 of this treaty with the comparable provisions of the earlier men-
tioned Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
Then you go on to say :
We are curious, of course, as to why the Vienna Convention has not been
submitted to the Senate for consideration.
I want the record to show that if I had the choice to make as to what
our consular arrangements would be, it would be a ratification of the
Vienna Convention pending before the United Nations. But I have
been around here long enough to be realistic enough to know that it is
not before us, and it is not going to be before us for some time. I do not
know when it will, if ever.
I would like to see us pressing for action in the United Nations on
the Vienna Convention, as I think we ought to press for some other
actions before the United Nations.
Mr. MACDONALD. Sir, if I may
Senator MORSE. If I may finish this sentence-We are put in this
position, however in which we have this provision before us for a
vote up or a vote down. Although I would prefer first to have a gen-
eral uniform consular understanding among the nations who are mem-
bers of the United Nations, I know we are not going to get it. There-
fore, I cannot evade my responsibility of voting on this consular
treaty, and unless the hearings show justification for changing my
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 121
mind, I am going to stand with the point of view expressed by the
.Senator from Missouri and vote for the treaty.
Mr. MACDONALD. If I may just comment on the Vienna Conven-
tion, sir, only one more country has to turn in its papers of ratification
to the Secretary General, and that convention will be an effective con-
vention for 22 nations, at least, and I assume that one more will come
in. There were 52 signatories. If it is a good treaty, I regret the
United States is not among the first 22.
Senator MORSE. Well, I have already made clear that I would
prefer a uniform-shall I say, blanket-consular policy to the continu-
ation of bilateral arrangements. But we are confronted with a bi-
lateral arrangement with the President. and Secretary of State advanc-
ing arguments that I think at the present time cause me, as a legislative
juror, so to speak, to render my verdict in favor of the Administration.
I want to thank the Senator from South Dakota. I am sorry I have
to go to the floor for the Clark-Morse amendment.
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Mundt.
Senator MUNDT. Thank you.
We all confront the problem that there is an amendment on the
floor that is coming up now under a time-limit arrangement.
AMERICAN LEGIONS POSITION ON TREATY IS CONSISTENT
First of all, though, let me say I join in the congratulations extended
to you by other members of the committee for rendering not only a
concise and, to me, most convincing statement, but also one which
reflects a rather consistent viewpoint.
It seems noteworthy to me to mention on behalf of the American
Legion that they have three times, in three national conventions offi-
cially come out against the ratification.
Mr. MACDONALD. That is correct, sir.
Senator MUNDT. This is not some Johnny-come-lately viewpoint
that recently has been arrived at by the American Legion.
Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir. It is of course, possible that many
Legionnaires do not agree with this position but certainly not the
majority.
Senator MUNDT. I would not expect them to because in 21/2 million
members, we would not want to have a monolithic society in the
Legion, as we would not want to anywhere else.
There is also a considerable body of Legionnaires who, if they had
not liked what you had done the first time, could have objected the
second time.
Mr. MACDONALD. Right.
Senator MUNDT. And if they did not like it after you had twice
passed and ratified it in a national convention, they had a third
opportunity to express disapproval, but again they approved it.
Mr. MACDONALD. Right.
Senator MUNDT. So if there is anything to be said about consistency,
here is a fine example of a consistent stand taken by the Legion in three
national conventions.
Mr. MACDONALD. As I might add, sir, it is consistent with all of the
positions the American Legion has taken throughout the years on
East-West relations.
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122 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
SOVIETS FIRST. PROPOSED IMMUNITY PROVISION
Senator MUNDT. Correct. I think that is absolutely sustained by
the record. So far it has not been brought out very clearly, but I
think it should be made clear here, that you were asked a great many
questions about whether or not the immunity provision was important
in providing protection, and it was suggested that, perhaps, this
immunity thing was contrived by President Eisenhower. The record
should be clear from the testimony of the Secretary of State that
whoever proposed whatever was proposed to the Eisenhower adminis-
tration, proposed a consular treaty which did not have these immunity
provisions to which you object.
The second point that is clear from the record and from the testi-
mony of the Secretary of State is that the suggestion for extending the
immunity, for the first time in American history, to include felonies
came from the Russians and not from us.
Mr. MAcDONALD. The record is clear on that point.
Senator MUNDT. I do not think anybody is going to allege that
President Eisenhower is a Russian. This was not his suggestion.
It did not come from him. But whatever its merits or demerits, it is
a proposal that the communists wanted to get into a treaty for the
first time, for reasons best known to them, and I presume pretty closely
associated with the reason which you attributed to them.
WHY IIAS STATE DEPARTMENT NOT SUBMITTED VIENNA CONVENTION TO
SENATE?
On this Vienna Convention, I am curious, too, as to why the State
Department elected to send down this special and unusual consular
treaty with Russia, instead of sending down for our consideration
the Vienna Convention.
If we had the votes that would have made it effective multilaterally,
I wonder why they singled this out, singled out this bilateral treaty,
with its most-favored-nation clause whereby we lose control of our
situation in other countries once we adopt it for one.
Why do you think the State Department did not send down the
Vienna Convention?
Mr. MACDONALD. Frankly, I am baffled as to why the State Depart-
ment has not seen fit to ask the President of the United States to trans-
mit that Vienna Convention to this Senate. It was signed more than
a year before this bilateral convention was signed, and it has been my
observation that the internationalists among our foreign policy ad-
visers always rush to support anything of this nature which has been
brought about under the aegis of the United Nations. In this case,
the U.S. Government appears to have no plan to bring that convention
before you.
Senator MUNDT. You are the first witness to raise that question, and
I agree with Senator Morse it is a very significant question. I think
we will have to pursue it with the Department of State to try to find
out why they put that one in cold storage and instead bring to us
directly one connected with the Soviets.
WILL SOVIET UNION RATIFY PROPOSED CONVENTION?
You mentioned that Russia, although they have the means available
to do so, has not ratified this treaty. Would ou care to cam e
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what you believe the chances are for ratification of this pact or why
they have been dragging their heels?
Mr. MACDONALD. You mean, sir, do I feel that they might not ratify
this?
Senator MUNDT. Yes.
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, this is just a personal observation, but I
strongly and seriously doubt that the Presidium will proceed to ratify
this document under the current world circumstances. We must keep
in mind that this treaty was in the negotiating stage supposedly from
1959 until 1964, and was signed on June 1, 1964.
Now, at that time our presence in Vietnam was minimal. We were
in an advisory capacity, and even by 1964 we had only had, well, at
most, 20,000 to 25,000 people in that country, these valiant young men
out in small villages. The Vietcong could have overrun them at any
time. They were no threat to the communist intentions to take over
Vietnam. We were not threatening to send airplanes over a sister
socialist state at that time.
But the picture has changed greatly since then. The Russians have
gotten their back up over this Vietnam problem. I think there was a
time when they were somewhat embarrassed about it, and wished it
would dry up and go away, but today I believe they have gotten their
back up over it. As the President of the Soviet Union said in Italy
the other day, they are in there to stay : "We are going to keep on
increasing aid to North Vietnam until that side wins."
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IS CONSISTENT
Now, I mentioned earlier that the Soviet foreign policy is always a
realistic one, consistent in all its parts and always in keeping with
current events.
They have told our new Ambassador to Moscow quite recently-and
they have repeated this on their English language broadcasts, and it
has been reported through Pravda-that there can be no relaxation of
tensions in this world today until the United States gives up in
Vietnam. Now, I believe Moscow when it says that. They are
realistic on this type of thing.
This document you have before you is not going to create anything
except, hopefully, the notification and access in Russia for us, and,
certainly, full diplomatic immunity for more of their agents in this
country. That is all it is going to create.
Senator MUNDT. Well, I would feel a lot more comfortable about
considering this treaty instead of the Vienna Convention, had the
Soviets ratified it. But what we are actually being asked to do is, not
to ratify a treaty which has been agreed to by the other side, but to sign
an official supplication to the U.S.S.R. that we are willing to make
another concession, "and will you come along." Isn't it possible we
are going to be kind of embarrassed in the eyes of the world if, having
done that, they say, "Oh, no" ?
Mr. MACDONALD. Greatly embarrassed.
Of course, the Presidium can play this one either way. They can
either let it lie on the table there until they think the time is right or
they can take an opportunity, if the propaganda value is big enough,
to slap the U.S. Senate or the United States by failing to ratify it.
Senator MUNDT. I agree with you that the Presidium-and they are
a rather compliant body-can ratify it at any time. They do not have
obstructionists and obstreperous Senators there who siggn minorityy~re-Appro~r~idsF lRe i2OflSol~ 1f21tieCl R 7O 0 8 Q0f?000 2-5
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124 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
before they are voted on. Even with the Texas arm twisting we have
not become too compliant over here. It is a little more difficult to
whip something through the Senate than it is to push somethin
through the Presidium. I have wondered about it many times, and
am trying to find out from the State Department why the Presidium
has not acted, why they have not gone through with their ratification.
I think maybe you have shed some light on that situation. I noticed
in your statement that you say : "There is leeway, perhaps, for a dif-
ferent interpretation," as to when article 12 of the proposed convention
is to become effective. Would you care to elaborate on that?
Mr. MACDONALD. My feelings as to why they might not put Article
12 into immediate effect, Sir?
Senator MUNDT. Yes.
Mr. MACDONALD. I would be pleased to answer that. But with the
Chairman's permission, I would like that answer to be off the record.
Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, it is going to be a little bit difficult
to have an off-the-record answer with as many people as we have in the
room. May I respectfully request unanimous consent that the witness'
be permitted to prepare a statement on that question and for us to
consider it in executive session?
The CHAIRMAN. Well, most certainly he may. He does not need'
unanimous consent, but without objection, he may. We will receive
an statement.
Senator MUNDT. We cannot rely, perhaps, on all newspapermen,
here to-maybe I can eliminate the word "perhaps," but we have a lot
of people who are our guests who do not understand what off the rec-
ord means. Who knows who is in the audience. Maybe the Tass rep-
resentative is here, and I do not think that we should let them have an
answer. So if that would be satisfactory to you, I think that would
be the way to handle it.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir; and I will try to get it to the Chairman
by Monday at the latest.
Senator MUNDT. The Chairman, I am sure, will circulate it to the,
,committee under our usual rule, with a little pink classified slip, and
we shall look forward to getting the answer.
(The letter referred to appears in the committee files.)
QUESTION OF WHEN TO HEAR OTHER WITNESSES
Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I Would like to inquire. I have
quite a few more questions, but I am in rather a dilemma because, at
the request of the Chairman, transmitted to me by Dr. Marcy, he said'
that he did not think that the Legion testimony would consume the
full morning. It has been most comprehensive and interesting, and
the members of the committee have asked many questions, so it has
gone longer than we anticipated. But following that request, I in-
vited Dr. Dobriansky, whom you mentioned at the beginning of the
hearing, from Georgetown University, to testify in the waning hours
of the morning session. To do so he had to. cancel a couple of classes,
deferring them until early afternoon. I would inquire only whether
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you think we will have time to hear Dr. Dobriansky this morning so
he could get back to his classwork.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thought it would be better to proceed to
Mr. Hicks at this time and, perhaps, we could dispose of him, and take
Dr. Dobriansky another time. You have quite a list, I think. You
have not given them to me yet, but you have some other witnesses to
be heard at a later time, do you not?
Senator MUNDT. Yes. I would like to call some other witnesses,
but I do not think there will be time to hear Dr. Dobriansky in that
list.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, it has taken more time then we thought. I
cannot control the time that has been taken.
Senator MUNDT. I am perfectly willing to desist with the rest of
my questions. He has only an eight-page statement, and maybe we
can call him and let him go back to his classes, otherwise he will have
to cancel the classes.
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Dobriansky and Mr. Hicks also requested to
come. We can let them both go over until later, if you would like.
,Senator MUNDT. There is not much of a committee representation
here, and there is a rollcall coming up quite soon.
The CHAIRMAN. Then I think we had better postpone both of them.
Are you ready to dismiss Mr. MacDonald?
Senator SPARKM AN. Senator Pell has not had a chance to ask ques-
tions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator MUNDT. May I complete my questioning? Then I will
yield to you.
AMERICAN LEGION RESOLUTIONS ON CONSULAR CONVENTION
Senator SPARKMAN. I wanted to ask-did you place in the record
copies of the resolutions by the American Legion?
Mr. MACDONALD. I have copies of all three of the resolutions adopt-
ed on the subject by the American Legion.
Senator SPARKMAN. Don't you think it would be well. to place
them in the record?
Mr. MACDONALD. I would be happy to. I will leave them with the
committee clerk.
(The resolutions referred to appear on page 319 of the appendix.)
Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask this question, if I may. Did the
Soviet Union sign the Vienna consular convention?
Mr. MACDONALD. Sir, the Soviet Union and all other communist
countries, with the exception of, let's say, with the exception of China,
North Vietnam and North Korea, participated. They were among
the 84 polities which sat around the table in Vienna and worked out
the terms of the Vienna conference. They signed what was called the
act, which incorporated the document.
Senator SPARKMAN. But have they signed in the sense of depositing
the papers?
Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir-one communist country has ratified it,
one.
73-958-67-8
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126 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Senator SPARKMAN. I thought you said 21?
Mr. MACDONALD. Twenty-one countries have ratified. One com-
munist country is included among them.
Senator SPARKMAN. One communist country?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes.
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you. That is all I want to know.
Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss with you
just one other aspect.
RESCHEDULING OF OTHER WITNESSES
The CHAIRMAN. Before you proceed, is it all right then to say that
both Mr. Hicks and Dr. Dobriansky will go over until the 17th of
February?
Senator MUNDT. Dr. Dobriansky is acceptable. I had nothing to
do with inviting Mr. Hicks.
The CHAIRMAN. They asked to be invited.
Senator MUNDT. Dr. Dobriansky was asked-I was asked to invite
him. I apologize to you, Doctor. You can go back to your classroom,
but we will call you.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Hicks-is Mr. Hicks here?
Mr. HICKS. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is it all right with you to go over until the 17th?
Mr. HICKS. Fine; yes, sir.
Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I do not think we are going to
have time on the 17th. You have asked me to supply witnesses.
The CHAIRMAN. That will be our next day. Then if I may, we will
go over to the 18th.
Senator MUNDT. I just do not want to be shortchanged in our
witnesses.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be a week, for all I know.
Senator MuNDT. Those of us on the committee who have some doubts
and some reservations on the treaty have been asked to supply some
witnesses to present the other side.
You, sir, are the witness invited by the full committee. But those
of us who have some doubts have been asked to bring in some witnesses
and we have them arranged for the 17th. They do not include Mr.
Hicks and they did not include Dr. Dobriansky because they were to
testify today. Dr. Dobriansky, who is one of our witnesses, will be
called in again, and Mr. Hicks who was called by the committee will
be called by the Chairman at any time the Chairman desires it, in con-
formance with his authority.
SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM DON'T UNDERSTAND POLICY
I just want to pursue one other line of questioning. I raised the
question with the Secretary of State when he first came before us about
the nature of the timing of this particular proposal, because that has
disturbed me greatly.
I get many letters, and I am sure my colleagues do, from the boys in
Vietnam, many of them just simply sort of throwing up their hands
as to what this war is all about if, at the same time, they are being
asked to fight, we are talking about increasing trade with the nation
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 127
which is supplying the weapons which are making their tasks more
difficult and killing many of their buddies. They do not understand
either what the impact is going to be on the morale of their South Viet-
namese buddies, the Thais, the Koreans, and the Filipinos, and the rest,
who are fighting with us, if while we are arrayed against the arms of
the Russians and the communists of Vietnam, they are reading in,
the paper that we are sort of cozying up to Russia. They read that.
we are signing a treaty which is going to give the Russians complete,
immunity, even for felonies, in this country if they can get attached toy
a consular office. To me it is a very serious problem in the psycho-
logical aspects of trying to win a war.
If we are not trying to win it, that is one thing. I have supported
the Administration in this war on the assumption that they did not
want to fight it forever, but if the idea is to do everything possible to
help the enemy to prolong the war, that is a horse of another color.
You raised that question very appropriately. You very appropri-
nately tied the consular agreement in with East-West trade, as have
the editors of the New York Times, and as are some of those who are
supporting most articulately this treaty.
East-West trade expansion is to me an even more serious blow at the
boys in. Vietnam and our chances of winning the war or shortening it
than this is, but they are all in the same category.
I notice you have a statement in which you say that our fighting
forces in Vietnam do not understand why our official policy is to in-
crease trade with the Soviets and satellites. You said earlier you
could not understand why we were moving in the direction of embrac-
ing a treaty which, at most, is not going to do very much for anybody,
and on the other hand, can only prolong the war and increase the
casualty lists in Vietnam.
MORALE TS HIGH, BUT TROOPS ARE PUZZLED
Now, I will ask Tou a question based on your statement that our
fighting forces in Vietnam do not understand this. Do you base that
statement on your knowledge of human psychology or have you been
there and talked with them On what do you base it?
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, sir, I essentially base it not on the knowledge
of human psychology, but I base it on personal experience and the
correspondence I am receiving today in my office here. I have been
to Vietnam three times in the past 18 months and as recently as De-
cember. The American Legion is constantly inquiring there as to
the morale of our fighting forces. Are we doing everything for them
we should be doing to help them win that war?
I am happy to report that the morale is excellent there, it is out-
standing, but they are puzzled, they are baffled, and disturbed about
what they hear from back home about the moves their Government is
making or attempting to make to bring about a peaceful partnership
with the government that is sending the missiles, the airplanes, the
antiaircraft guns, and whatnot, and is forcing the satellites to do the
same. They do not understand that. They are concerned. They ask
us about it. I do not have an answer for them. I say, "I cannot
answer your question."
Senator MUNDT. Do you understand it yourself ?
Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir, I do not.
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128 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Senator MUNDT. I cannot understand it. I have tried hard and I
have tried to get the State Department to explain it. If they under-
stand it themselves, they refuse to give us this explanation.
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir. This could lead to a breakdown in the
great morale we have got out there. I have a letter right here with me
which is typical:
"I just returned"-this is just last month--"from a tour in South'.
Vietnam serving with the U.S. Air Force. North Vietnam does not
have the facilities to support a war such as they are in. They are
receiving a lot of aid from Eastern Europe, China, and Russia. Any
trade with these countries is helping to kill our soldiers regardless of,
what the administration says."
This is typical, and I do not have an answer for them, Senator.
Senator MUNDT. Well, how can you answer that? How can you,
build an argument that will attempt to refute the fact that when you
trade and supply economic assets and the sinews of a viable economy
to a country, which admittedly and publicly is supplying every
sophisticate weapon employed by your enemy to kill your boys, how
can you deny any trade, whatever it is-any kind of civilian goods'
makes no difference-because then you release the military industrial
,complex which otherwise would have to supply the civilian goods.
Mr. MACDONALD. Not only is that true
Senator~MUNDT. Do you recall any other war in American history,
in which we have tried to feed and fight the enemy at the same time
Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir. There may have been some
Senator MUNDT. I used to teach history in college. I always hate
to say that in the presence of my beloved friend who was a college,
university president. I am sure he would never have employed me,,
by the way.
But I thought I was a fairly good teacher. I read a lot of books.'
I went to school and got advanced degrees, and I thought I knew
something about history. I cannot find another single instance in our
whole history of America where we have ever, in the middle of a war,
been advocating a policy of making the enemy stronger by supplying
additional aid.
Now, this is bloody nonsense to me. It is one way to prolong the'
war forever. If this administration or anybody else believes that they
can induce Americans to support, a policy of prolonging the. war for'-
ever, I think they are mistaken.
Mr. MACDONALD. The American Legion agrees.
Senator MUNDT. While this particular treaty does not set up East
West trade, it is the key to the door to unlock the next attack on our?
troops over there. We have got to be thinking about them. Are we.
going to play a numbers game? I will put the 18,000 civilians,
traveling for pleasure or profit in Russia against 500,000 American'
boys endangering themselves in fighting for freedom, whose job we
make more difficult because we are doing things in wartime which in
peacetime might be considered an altogether different thing, but ac-
tions which now are directly related to somebody's idea that we should
prolong the war. I am happy that the American Legion, comprised;
of veterans, comes up and speaks forthrightly.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 129
I think the best way for you to let our doubting colleagues know
whether you speak for the American Legion or not is to have the posts
of the Legion speak to the Members of the Congress.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions? How long do you wish to go
on, Senator Pell?
Senator PELL. About eight minutes.
I think that the point that is raised as to why theVienna Convention
has not been sent up for ratification is a good point, and I would like
to request the chairman to ask the Department of State to send up to
us a memorandum stating why the Vienna Convention has not been
submitted for ratification, a short chronology of Soviet-United States
consular relations, and also, if the Department has not already done
so, an outline of the differences between the Vienna Consular Conven-
tion of 1963, and the proposed treaty with the Soviet Union. These
replies could all be part of the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The staff will get that information. The
Vienna Convention has not been sent up, as you know.
Senator PELL. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much.
(The information referred to appears on page 293 of the appendix.)
RELATIVE DIFFICULTIES OF ESPIONAGE IN UNITED STATES AND SOVIET
UNION
Senator PELL (presiding). I have several short questions which I
do not think will take much time. Would you say, Mr. MacDonald,
that espionage is more difficult in a closed society or in an open
society?
Mr. MACDONALD. In a closed society, I am sure.
Senator PELL. That would be correct.
The Soviet Union has a more closed society than we do, does it not?
Mr. MACDONALD. It does, as I understand it.
Senator PELL. Hence, from the viewpoint of successfully developing
information, or of espionage, where would immunity be more im-
portant? Would it be more important for American agents to have
immunity in Russia or for Russians to have it in America?
Mr. MACDONALD. Russians in America.
Senator PELL. Why do you feel that, having just said that espionage
was more difficult in Russia?
Mr. MACDONALD. They want their agents back.
Senator PELL. We do, too.
In this connection, if the Soviet citizen is arrested in our country,
does he have access to his consul as a matter of right and courtesy?
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes; he does.
Senator PELL. If an American citizen is arrested in the Soviet
Union, does he have that right?
Mr. MACDONALD. No, Sir.
Senator PELL. Therefore, without even going into numbers, and
your figures were absolutely correct, about 20 arrests were made in
this period out of 18,000 travelers
Mr. MACDONALD. Sir, if I may make-it is only about eleven out of
the 18,000.
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130 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Mr. MAODoNAI,n. Twenty since June 1,1964.
Senator PELL. Right. But in which country would it be more ad-
vantageous to have access written into the law, if one considers the
question from the viewpoint of the traveler-in the Soviet Union or'
in the United States?
Mr. MACDONALD. Russia.
Senator PELL. They already have this right. We do not.
Mr. MACDONALD. They gam nothing on this point. This is our
hoped-for gain out of this treaty.
Senator PELL. That is right. In this connection, speaking from
somewhat bitter personal experience, having been arrested behind the
curtain and having been a vice consul, and having regretted not hav-
ing these immunities, and having had emplo ees, one of whom was
beaten to death, and one who was injured, I feel rather strongly in a
personal way about this. Aren't the chances of being arrested in the
Soviet Union far greater than they are here, because of the wider defi-
nition of what they characterize as crime, for example, economic
espionage? I have had constituents even arrested for taking a pic-
ture of Red Square.
Mr. MACDONALD. That is right.
Senator PELL. Correct.
IMPROVEMENT OF UNITED STATES-U.S.S.R. RELATIONS TO OUR ADVANTAGE
Then, finally, another point that I think should be a matter of rec-
ord, and I could not understand your reply to Mr. Symington, is this :
Do you believe that it is to our advantage or disadvantage to improve
relations with the Soviet Union?
Mr. MACDONALD. Very much to our advantage.
Senator PELL. Thank you.
Mr. MACDONALD. How we go about it-I do not think this is one
way.
Senator PELL. Right.
Now, if it is to our advantage, and I would agree with you in that,
when a citizen is arrested, and we also both agree apparently that
the chances of an American being arrested in Russia are greater than
the chances of a Russian being arrested in America, when a citizen is
arrested is it better to have this problem resolved as a matter of admin-
istrative procedure on a local consular level? Having been a vice
consul, I now how we would handle such a case so that it would not
go up to a government level. This is what would happen if this
treaty were in force. Or would it be better not to have a treaty in
force which would mean that the only way you could spring a citizen
would be to go on a government-to-government level?
Mr. MACDONALD. But, Senator Pell, what do you mean by the term
"resolved" ?
Senator PELL. Get the man freed.
Mr. MACDONALD. No, but notification and access does not spell
freedom.
Senator PELL. They do mean, first of all, that we know about it. I
was in one country in Eastern Europe where a man had been in jail
for two months, and we did not know it. He had not been permitted
to notify us. This is the sort of thing we would get under this treaty.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 131
Mr. MACDONALD. You would get notification but not necessarilly
freedom.
Senator PELL. Right. But I think you would find the problems
would be resolved if you had a consul with the right of access. You
can handle these things better if you do not have to go from the am-
bassador to the chief of government, which is the alternative.
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, I would have to bow to your judgment on
that, and your experience.
Senator PELL. I just recall in my own case the feeling of utter
frustration when I had an American citizen being beaten up, trying
to be forced to implicate our Government, and I was not able to get to
him. The longer it takes to get to him, the less is his resolution and
the more likely he is to crumble. It is terribly important, to keep from
being implicated, to get to the man quickly and let him know you
stand behind him.
Mr. MACDONALD. But I do not know that this treaty is going to
keep them from beating up our prisoners.
Senator PELL. It makes it far less likely if you have access within
48 to 96 hours. And I also am glad to add that this brutality is less
now than it was when I was stationed in that part of the world 20 years
ago. I respect your opinion very much, but in this particular instance
I would not be in agreement.
LEGION BELIEVES DISADVANTAGES OUTWEIGH ADVANTAGES
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, I wanted the record to show clearly, Senator
Pell, that the American Legion earnestly desires this particular end
result, but we think this is not the time to enter into this treaty. We
think that we are giving up, in this treaty, that which outweighs that
which we hope to get.
We are speaking, perhaps, unless the figure increases or decreases,
we are speaking perhaps of eleven arrest cases annually out of 18,000
tourists.
How many of these eleven are dual nationals, how many of them
Kazan-Komareks, in which the Soviet Union is going to enter into
complicity with a sister communist state? I just think that we are
not going to get out of this treaty, even if they give full compliance on
notification and access, enough to outweigh its obvious disadvantages
and its potential disadvantages.
Senator MUNDT. Will the acting chairman yield for a question?
Senator PELL. Certainly.
ANALYSIS OF CASE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Senator MUNDT. You mentioned the recent Czechoslovakian case,
where an American citizen, whom the communists might consider of
dual nationality, because he came from one of their countries, took a
flight and the end result was that the Russians delivered him to the
Czechoslovakians. There he had access to Americans, and they came
in and talked to him. They had two at the prison trial, but he is still
sentenced to jail for eight years. I think you are the first witness who
has pointed out there is a difference between notification and freedom.
We had notification in Czechoslovakia, but the poor fellow went to
jail anyway.
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132 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Mr. MACDONALD. Sir, if I may, it took us some little time and
trouble to get that access.
Senator MUNDT. Right.
Senator PELL. Right. I think the record should show that the real
villain in the piece was the Soviet security service which engaged in
complicity with the Czech security service. But the fact of the matter
that the individual was involved in border running was not disputed.
I think the record will show that part of the original charge was com-
plicity in murder. I think that his sentence from the viewpoint of
straight law was not altogether unjust.
Mr. MACDONALD. If I may comment on one point more on the case,
I do not know which came first the official notification from the
Czechs or the news we got of it Ly the individual's wife getting to
someone else to let our consulate know.
Senator PELL. I believe we learned from a fellow passenger on the
plane who reported his arrest. We have not concentrated enough on
the complicity of the two security services, and that is the real
RUSSIANS HAVE OTHER DEVICES-OUR DIVIDENDS ARE SMALL
Senator MUNDT. What I am pointing out is that the Russians have
found other devices for achieving the results which they want, which
are not going to be inhibited because some consular officer comes in
and has a conference in the jailhouse with some American. We can
go back to the era of brutality, and if you say it has stopped-you don't
say it has stopped, do you?
Senator PELL. It is attenuated.
Senator MUNDT. If it is attenuated, fine. And if it has not been,
after the consular official leaves, the clerk goes in and says, "What did
you tell that guy? Come on, what did you tell him?" You have not
solved a great big problem by notification, and they can still rig the
trial and still go ahead with their so-called concept of justice.
We get very small, ~v.ery minute dividends, I think. Mr. Mac-
Donald is correct in what we get. But it is very small compared to
all these broad ramifications of the impact on the war and in the
psychology of our lives, the psychology of our men, and even the
psychology of the Russians to say, "Why should we stop shipping ma-
terials, these fellows will still make a treaty with us?"
Senator PELL. But we are not talking about; arms; we are talking
about the consular convention.
Senator MUNDT. But I am talking about the entire framework.
Senator PELL. The Senator from Kentucky.
Senator COOPER. First, I would like to say to Mr. MacDonald that
while I support this convention, you have made a very forthright
statement of the American Legion's position, and I think the American
Le ion has been right on many occasions.
T remember in the twenties or thirties the American Legion was
pleading for at least a minimum defense for this country and for its
security. You recall at the time its members were called warmongers,
but I think it is very possible that if their recommendations had been
adopted then, World II might have been shorter in duration.
But I will vote for the convention.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 1
CONSEQUENCES OF CONVENTION
I would say further that while the State Department has main-
tained that only one consulate would be opened, there might be only
ten or fifteen oviet persons who would come into the United States
because of the convention, I think it is possible that if the convention
should prove fruitful, more offices might be opened and more Soviet
personnel might enter this country.
Now, assuming that, do you actually fear that our intelligence
agency, the FBI, will not be able to cope with any new opportunities
for espionage if the consulates were opened that these officials might
present?
Mr. MACDONALD. I do not disagree with that, given the necessary
budgets and ratio of personnel. I do not know what the ratio is of
FBI agents to one espionage agent.
Senator C'oorER. I think Mr. Hoover would be the last person to
say that he would not be able to cope with a situation like that.
Mr. MACDONALD. I agree.
Senator MUNDT. In the letter in the record he pointed out that he
would need more men.
WHAT STEPS CAN WE TAKE TO EASE TENSIONS?
Senator CoorER. I go on to my second point, which, I think, is the
most important one in the consideration of the convention.
You have stated in your testimony that, the Legion does not believe
that ratification of the convention would produce a meaningful im-
provement in United States-U.S.S.R. relations, or the abatement of
tensions between us.
I suppose no one can predict what its consequences would be, but,
as the Chairman stated, I think this is a very mild and a very small
step. And I would like to ask, if we do not take this step, what steps
could we undertake which would reduce tensions between the U.S.S.R.
and the United States? If we are not willing to do this, are there
any other steps that we are willing to take?
Mr. MACDONALD. Frankly, my answer to this, of course, would
have to go far afield, and I am not truly competent to give a compre-
hensive answer to that. But I would say that, in principle, the first
step would be for the U.S. Government to give to the communist
world and the world generally in its foreign policy, in its approach
to East-West relations, the feelings of the American public.
Let us stop the communist advance; and let us make clear to
communists in general that all of our approaches to them-at every
level, at every place in the world-are going to be hard, resolute, and
inflexible on that point.
Senator COOPER. Of course, I must hold a viewpoint that if we are
not willing to make some step-a very small step, such as proposed in
this convention-I do not know what step we could take.
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER SUPPORTS TREATY
I do not know that it has been mentioned in the hearing, but I think
it is important to note that, according to the press today, former Presi-
dent Eisenhower has declared his support for the convention. I think
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44 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
this would substantiate the statements that have been made that dur
ing his administration there was support for this convention. And as
a man who has had large experience in war and as President of the'
United States, I think his judgment has value. Would you agree with
that?
Mr. MACDONALD. Well, the American Legion and I personally have
great admiration for the former President and our World War II'
leader, but we feel it is still possible for us to disagree with him on a
point such as this.
(President Eisenhower's statement is as follows:)
CONSULAR CONVENTION STATEMENT BY FORMER PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISEN
HOWER, FEBRUARY 2, 1967
Replying to questions concerning my opinion as to the value of a Consular
Convention with the U.S.S.R., I cite these items from the record:
At the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955 I pointed out to the Soviet Leaders
that there existed unnecessary restrictions on the flow between us of ideas
and I suggest that the barriers which now impede opportunities of people to
travel anywhere in the world for peaceful, friendly purposes, be lowered.
In July of 1959 Vice President Nixon touched on this subject with Mr. Kozloz,
Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, and suggested that the United States
establish a consulate in Leningrad with the Soviets establishing one in New
York.
When Chairman Khrushchev visited me at Camp David in September 1959,
Secretary of State Herter renewed this proposal to Foreign Minister Gromyko
and also suggested that a Consular Convention be negotiated. Such a conven-
tion was completed and signed in 1964.
I have not changed my belief that such a convention is in our national inter-
est ; that it will not impair our national security ; that it should enlarge our
opportunities to learn more about the Soviet people, and that it is necessary
to assure better protection for the many thousands of Americans who visit the
Soviet Union each year.
Senator COOPER. That is correct.
Well, that is all I want to ask, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much.
Senator PELL. Thank you.
CLARIFICATION OP KAZAN-KOMAREK CASE
I would like to make sure that the record is correct in one regard.
I am informed that the complicity in murder charge was not used
against Mr. Kazan. He was convicted, finally, of so-called antistate
espionage activities which would lead one to hope that the Czecho-
slovak Government, which is so interested in improving relations,
would see its way clear to expelling him or letting him leave. It!
remains to be seen whether they mean what they say about improving
relations, or whether they want to continue their present intransigent
position.
I would like to congratulate Mr. MacDonald on a very fine presenta-
tion. You have been patient, diplomatic, and truthful, and I think
the Legion should be proud of having sent you up here to maintain
your position.
As you can see, we all have rather strong ideas on either one side
or the other. Nobody is in between on this one. I congratulate the
Legion on having you as its representative and on your statement.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH. THE SOVIET
Before we close, I would like to have inserted in the record corre-
spondence with has come to the committee since our last meeting on
January 23. This includes another letter from the Liberty Lobby;
and
correspondence between Acting Attorney General Ramsey
Senator Fulbright regarding the appearance of Mr. Hoover before the
committee; and two letters from Assistant Secretary MacArthur ex-
plaining the Department's position on questions which have been raised
about the treaty.
(The letters referred to follow:)
LIBERTY LOBBY,
San Francisco, Calif., January 21,1967.
Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR FULBRIOHT: I note that you are quoted in the newspapers as
saying that you have finally decided, after three years, that Liberty Lobby need
not be heard by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the subject of the
Soviet Consular Convention because our "views are well known."
The purpose of this letter is to bring to your attention certain facts which
Liberty Lobby would have brought out in public hearings, had you ever held pub-
lic hearings, which you have not done. (Presumably, you do agree with the dis-
tinction between "open" hearings and "public" hearings as defined by publica-
tions of the Congress.)
Since you have decided that we need not be heard, and that the numerous other
groups and organizations which have asked to be heard in public hearings need
not be heard, I draw your attention to a matter which would otherwise have
been brought before your committee : That is, the subject of Article 19 of the
proposed treaty, which would grant "Diplomatic Immunity" to consular person-
nel and their baggage and property.
The true facts about the diplomatic immunity in the proposed treaty have yet to
be brought to Senate attention. Senate ratification of this treay would enable
the Soviet Union to import A-Bombs into this country in wholesale lots and would
nullify any anti-missile system we might ultimately adopt.
The fact is, that Article 19 of the treaty would allow Atomic Bombs, up to one-
half Kiloton in size, to be brought into the nation's major cities undetected, under
cover of "diplomatic immunity."
In classified bulletins, the FBI and the Customs Bureau have already described
such weapons, under production since 1960 by the Soviet Union, as "ADM's"-
Atomic Demolition Munitions-"which could be concealed," according to the direc-
tives, "within diplomatic pouches of Soviet diplomats."
For your information, Senator Fulbright, this type of A-Bomb is manufactured
by the Soviet Union in suitcase-size, ranging from the smallest, a 70-pound,
eighteen-inch weapon, with the power of 100 tons of TNT ; to the largest, a two-
suitcase model, with the power of more than 500 tons of TNT.
Under the proposed Soviet Consular Convention, I might note, the FBI and
Customs Bureau will be forbidden by treaty law from inspecting any "Diplomatic
Pouch" of the Soviet Union.
No wonder this treaty was described by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover as a
"cherished goal of the Soviet Intelligence services," and no wonder that in his
recent letter to Secretary Rusk he has confined himself to a disclaimer of at-
tempted policymaking.
Rusk has made an all-out effort to convince the Senate that Hoover has
"changed his position" on the Soviet Consular Treaty. This is not true. Hoover
has never taken a position on policy-matters. He simply voiced what he knew
of the Soviet opinion of the Consular Treaty, and his letter to Karl Mundt of the
Foreign Relations Committee makes it quite clear that he has not changed his
mind on the matter.
I hope this letter will change your mind, however, on the subject of holding true
public hearings on the Soviet Consular Convention.
Sincerely,
W. B. HICB:s, Jr., Executive Secretary.
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1136 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Hon. RAMSEY CLARK, JANUARY 25, 1967.
The Acting Attorney General,
Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR Mr. CLARK : As you know, the Committee on Foreign Relations is now
considering the proposed Consular Convention with the Soviet Union. There
has been considerable discussion in the Committee about the views of Mr.
J. Edgar Hoover, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr.
Hoover has expressed an opinion on certain facts relevant to the proposed Con-
vention in letters to Secretary Rusk dated September 16, 1966, and to Senator
Karl E. Mundt dated January 23,1967.
Because Mr. Hoover's views have attracted considerable attention, I wrote
him on January 19, 1967 and invited him to appear before the Committee on
Monday, January 23. As you know, he replied on January 20 saying : "While I,
of course, desire to be helpful in any matter of mutual interest, I must of neces-
sity-refer you to the Acting Attorney General, who quite properly is the ranking
member of the Department of Justice to pass on matters of legislation."
At the request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am therefore writing
to ask that you request Mr. Hoover to appear before the Committee at a mutually
convenient time.
Sincerely yours,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Hon. J. W. FULBRIOHT Washington, D.C., January 27, 1967.
,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : Your letter of January 25 has been reviewed with Mr.
Hoover. After careful consideration, Mr. Hoover and I have reached the
following conclusions.
The primary purpose of the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union is
protection for and assistance to United States citizens in the event they are
arrested or otherwise detained while in the Soviet Union. While this purpose
is obviously a matter of great national importance in the field of foreign rela-
tions, the means of implementing it is a subject clearly beyond the competence'
of this Department and its officials.
Though the Convention is not necessary to authorize the establishment of
Soviet consulates in the United States, the power to do this being lodged by
the Constitution in the President, an issue that may appropriately be con-,
sidered in connection with ratification of the Convention is whether the estab-
lishment of one or more consulates by the Soviet Union in the United States
poses any threat to our internal security.
We need only refer to the numbers involved to show that this proposal would
not add significantly to the problems of protecting our internal security. In
1966, there were approximately 900 Soviet tourists and exchange visitors who
travelled in the United States. This compares with more than 18,000 United
States citizens who travelled in the Soviet Union. In addition, there are at
the present more than 1,000 citizens of the Soviet Union residing in our country,
of whom 452 have diplomatic immunity. The one Soviet consulate which might
be opened under the Convention would add only 10 or' 15 Soviet citizens having
immunity.
While adding any number of potential espionage agents of course makes a
commensurate increase in the work of the FBI, the Bureau is fully capable
of handling such additional work. The contemplated number of Soviet officials
would not place an undue burden on the FBI.
Because the FBI is an investigative agency which since 1924 has not injected
itself into the area of legislation, because the proposal under consideration is
foreign to the competence of this Department with the limited exception noted,
and because as to that exception the impact on our responsibilities is minimal,
we do not believe that Mr. Hoover, by appearing before your committee, could
add to what has been said here and in Mr. Hoover's earlier letters which are
before the Committee.
In spite of these considerations, I would not hesitate to request Mr. Hoover
to testify if he thought his testimony could add to your deliberations. He does
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 137
not, since, as he said in his letter to you of January 20, he could state only the
same views expressed in his correspondence.
If I can be of further assistance, please advise.
Sincerely,
RAMSEY CLARK,
Acting Attorney General.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January Q7,1967.
DEAR SENATOR: There has been a good deal of misunderstanding about the
US-Soviet Consular Convention which is now pending before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. To clear up such misunderstandings, we have issued
a statement which I am enclosing in view of the general interest in this important
matter.
The statement makes clear that the Consular Convention does not authorize,
propose, suggest, provide for, or require the opening of a single United States
Consulate in the Soviet Union, or a single Soviet Consulate in the United States.
It does not permit the Soviets to send a single extra person to this country, nor
does it let us send anyone to the Soviet Union.
What it does do is to provide that we will be notified of arrests of American
citizens within one to three days, and allowed to see them within two to four
days. As matters now stand, arrested persons can be held incommunicado until
the investigation by the Soviet authorities is completed and this can take up to
nine months or more. Last year we had 18,000 U.S. citizens visiting the Soviet
Union and the number will increase. The Soviets, on the other hand, had only
about 900 of their citizens visiting our country. We earnestly believe, therefore,
that the balance of advantage in this Convention lies heavily with us and that
it will give us the tools we need to protect American citizens traveling
in the Soviet Union.
I also attach a more comprehensive but still brief statement on the purposes
and effects of the Convention which I hope you will find useful. If you have any
further questions about the Consular Convention, please don't hesitate to let me
know as I would be glad to arrange a briefing on this matter for you.
Sincerely,
DOUGLAS MACARTUUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
STATEMENT ON THE US-USSR CONSULAR CONVENTION
Following up on Secretary Rusk's testimony on the US-USSR Consular
Convention before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 23, I
would like to try to clear up a persistent misunderstanding about this agreement.
And I might add that this misunderstanding is common among both opponents and
supporters of ratification.
The Consular Convention does not authorize, propose, suggest, provide for,
or require the opening of a single United States Consulate in the Soviet Union,
or a single Soviet Consulate in the United States. It does not permit the
Soviets to send a single extra person to this country, nor does it let us send anyone
to the Soviet Union.
What it does do is to provide ground rules for the protection of American
citizens in the Soviet Union, and Soviet citizens in the United States,
These ground rules, which represent major concessions by the Soviet Gov-
ernment, specify that we will be notified of the arrest of an American citizen
within one to three days, and allowed to see him within two to four days. As
a matter of routine, we grant these rights not only to Americans, but to all
foreigners arrested in the United States. But, in the Soviet Union, even the
Soviet citizens enjoy no such rights. They are held incommunicado until the
investigation of the crime is completed ; and this investigation can take nine
months, or more.
These ground rules go into effect the minute the Treaty is ratified, without
regard to the separate question of opening consulates. The officers attached to
the Consular Section of our Embassy in Moscow will enjoy notification and ac-
cess rights under this 'Treaty the moment both parties ratify it. Thus, tying
the idea of opening consulates to the idea of approving this Convention confuses
the issue. The issue is do we need better tools to help us protect Americans
who get into trouble in the USSR. The answer is clearly yes.
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138 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET CONSULAR CONVENTION
We believe that ratification of the US-USSR Consular Convention is clearly
in the national interest and, on balance, more valuable to the United States than
to the Soviet Union. This Convention is part of our balanced strategy for peace,
aimed at limiting the areas of disagreement in our relations with the USSR while
we are resisting communist aggression wherever it occurs.
During the Eisenhower Administration, Secretary of State Christian Herter
suggested to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko that a bilateral Consular Con-
vention be negotiated and first drafts were exchanged. Negotiations were com-
pleted in 1364. President Johnson called for prompt Senate approval of this
agreement in both his October 7, 1966 speech in New York and his January 10,
1967 State of the Union message.
This Convention will permit this Government to assist and protect more effec-
tively the 18,000 or more American citizens who annually travel in the USSR,
If a citizen of either country is detained or arrested, the Convention requires
that the embassy or consulate of that citizen's country be notified within three
days and that access to the prisoner by a consular official be granted within
four days. These provisions will come into force when the treaty is ratified.
Without the protection of such an agreement, Americans have frequently been
isolated in Soviet prisons for long periods and kept from contact with American
Embassy consular officers. One, Newcomb Mott, died in Soviet hands under
these circumstances.
The treaty does not provide for the opening of consulates. Approval of the
Convention has no bearing on this question, since under the Constitution the
President can agree to reciprocal opening of consulates in the U.S. and the USSR
at any time.
There are no formal proposals or plans pending for the opening of separate
consular offices of either country in the other. If at a later date it was decided
to be appropriate to open one outside the respective capitals, it would be the
subject of careful negotiation on a strict quid-pro-quo basis. Such an office
would probably involve 10 to 15 Americans in the Soviet Union, with the Soviets
permitted to send the same number here. In accordance with Secretary Rusk's
statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we would plan to
consult that body and the state and local officials of the community to be affected,
before concluding such an agreement. While, as noted, such an arrangement
would be reciprocal, the fact that the Soviet Society is a closed one while the
United States is open, and that the U.S. citizens needing service and protection
while travelling in the Soviet Union far outnumber Soviet citizens with. like
needs in the U.S., indicate that the balance of advantage would be on our side,
This Convention gives full immunity from criminal jurisdiction to eonsular
officers and employees of both countries. We would not send American officials
or clerical employees to serve in the USSR without this protection. Since 1946,
31 Americans at our Embassy in Moscow have been expelled by the Soviets,
most often on allegations of espionage. Without immunity consular employees
could be jailed or suffer even harsher punishment on similar trumped-up charges.
Furthermore, action against American consular personnel serving in the Soviet
Union without diplomatic immunity could be a temptation to Soviet authorities
whenever a Soviet citizen was arrested in this country for espionage. Other
governments similarly protect their officials and clerical employees in the USSR;
the British and the Japanese recently negotiated consular conventions with the
Soviet Union containing immunity provisions modeled after those in the US-
USSR agreement.
The opening of one Soviet consulate in the U.S. would not materially affect
our internal security. The number of Soviet citizens now enjoying immunity,
452, would be increased by only 10 or 15 persons. We have the right under the
treaty to screen the personnel of such an office before agreeing to their assign'.
ment. We are also authorized by the treaty to prevent them from travelling to
sensitive areas in the country and to expel them if they prove to be undesirable.
We could close a Soviet consulate in the U.S. whenever we wished, and we could
cancel the Consular Convention on six month's notice.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 2, 1967.
Hon. J. W. FULBRIOIIT, -
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. (CHAIRMAN : I know that there has been considerable interest in
whether the US-USSR Consular Convention now before your Committee would
have any effect on our position and policy concerning the Baltic States and other
peoples aspiring to freedom. There has apparently been some misunderstanding
of these points and 1 should like to attempt to clarify our position on them for
the record.
The United States Government has consistently refused to recognize the forci-
ble annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into, the Soviet Union. We
continue to recognize the diplomatic and consular representatives of the last free
governments of these countries. The ratification of this Convention would in no
way change our policy in this respect. Neither would the eventual opening of an
American consulate in the USSR and the demarcation of consular districts, which,
as you know, are not required by this treaty. Recognition of the incorporation
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the USSR would, like all cases of diplomatic
recognition, require a positive statement or positive act by the United States.
This Convention contains no such statement and provides for no such act.
Whether or not this Convention is approved, if an American citizen should be
arrested or detained in .the Baltic States we would have the inescapable obliga-
tion of trying to make arrangements for his protection through the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the USSR, including access by an American consular officer.
While fortunately no Americans have been detained in the Baltic States in the
recent past, this has been our policy over the years. It will continue to be our
policy whether or not this treaty is approved.
Some have argued that this treaty should be rejected because it would confirm
or approve the Soviet Government's domination over the non-Russian peoples of
the USSR. It is United States policy to support the just aspirations of all the
peoples of the world and to look forward to the day when all will be able to
express these aspirations freely. The ratification of this treaty will not change
this policy-any more than did 'the signing of the more than 105 other bilateral
and multilateral agreements which we have entered into with the USSR.
Should the further public hearings on this Convention raise further questions
about its provisions I would be glad of the opportunity to attempt to answer
them.
Sincerely yours,
DouGL.As MACARTIIUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
Senator IIICKENLOOrru.. I would also like to have inserted in the
record, when it is received, a letter from Ambassador MacArthur in
response to a question I raised about the effect of the immunities provi-
sion of the consular convention if the convention were ratified and
subsequently terminated.
(The letter referred to follows:)
Hon. BOURKE, B. HIanENLOOPER,
U.S. Senate.
DEAR SENATOR HIOxENLOOPER : You have raised the following question con-
cerning the immunities clause of the US-USSR Consular Convention (Article
19) when read in connection with most-favored-nation provisions contained in
treaties with other countries : In the event that the US-USSR Consular Conven-
tion should be terminated pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 2 of the Convention,
would other countries with which the United States has a most-favored-nation
provision in regard to treatment of consular personnel be able still to claim the
level of treatment, in regard to consular immunities, provided for in Article 19
of the US-USSR Consular Convention?
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The answer to this question is, no. In the event of the termination of the
Convention with the USSR, the Soviet Union would no longer be the most favored
nation in this respect, and other countries would not be able to base a claim on
the level of treatment accorded by Article 19 of the US-USSR Convention.
If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to call on me.
Sincerely yours,
DouOLAS I ACARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
Senator PELL. The hearings are now recessed, until the call of the
Chairman. There will be an opportunity for further witnesses later.
(Whereupon, at 12: 55 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the
call of the Chairman.)
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
(Executive D, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.)
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1967
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMI7FEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 4221,
New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Lausche, Symington,
McCarthy, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
The Committee on Foreign Relations is meeting this morning to
continue to hear testimony on the proposed consular convention with
the Soviet Union.
At this point I would like to insert a pertinent letter to all committee
members from Assistant Secretary MacArthur.
(The letter referred to follows:)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
February 6,1967.
DEAR SENATOR: In view of the great interest in the projected US-USSR
Consular Convention, and some misunderstanding about its purpose and work-
ings, we have prepared a question-and-answer information sheet you may find
useful in responding to inquiries from your constituents as well as others. A
copy is enclosed, and I shall be happy to supply further copies upon request.
Please do not hesitate to call on me if I can give you any further information or
answer any other questions.
Sincerely,
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
UNITED STATES-U.S.S.R. CONSULAR CONVENTION
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
1. What was the historical origin of the Convention?
When we first established relations with the USSR in 1933 an exchange of
letters between President Roosevelt and Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov stated
that it had been agreed that a consular convention would be negotiated "imme-
diately following the establishment of relations between our two countries."
Other problems intervened, however, and negotiations were never begun.
It was President Eisenhower's proposal at the 1955 Geneva Summit Confer-
ence for "concrete steps" to lower "the barriers which now impede the opportu-
nities of people to travel anywhere in the world" and subsequent relaxation by
the Bulganin-Khrushehev regime of tight Stalinist controls which led to greatly
increased American travel to the USSR and to the realization that we needed to
protect U.S. citizens by negotiating an explicit consular convention with the
Soviet Union. At the Camp David talks in 1959, Secretary of State Christian
Herter proposed such a treaty to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Drafts
141
7 -958-6 ~io
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142 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
were exchanged in early 1960 but there was little further activity because of
subsequent strains in US-Soviet relations until September 1963 when formal
negotiations began in Moscow. After 8 months of hard negotiations, the Con-
vention was signed on June 1, 1964 and submitted to the Senate by President
Johnson on June 12, 1964.
2. What is the basic purpose of the Convention?
We need this treaty to secure rights for Americans in the Soviet Union that
they do not now have. Under present Soviet law Soviet citizens and foreigners
alike can be held incommunicado for nine months or more during investigation
of a criminal charge. The Consular Convention contains major concessions by
the USSR. It specifies that U.S..officials will be notified immediately (within
1-3 days) when an American citizen is arrested or detained in the USSR and
it stipulates that these officials will have rights of visitation without delay,
(within 2-4 days) and on a continuing basis thereafter.
3. Why do we need additional protection for American citizens?
Because increasing numbers of them travel to the Soviet Union and the number
which encounters difficulties rises proportionally. Between 1962 and 1966 the
number of Americans travelling to the USSR rose by 50% to 18,000, while the
number of. Soviet travelers remained static at about 900 per year. Since the
Convention was signed in 1964, more than 20 arrests or detentions of American
citizens in the USSR have come to our attention. In none of these cases have
we been notified of the incident or allowed to visit the American within a rea-
sonable period and certainly not within the time limits specified in this treaty.
Meanwhile, our own constitutional system and democratic society automatically
provide Soviet travelers here with protections similar to those our travelers
would obtain from the convention.
Without the protection of such an agreement, Americans have frequently
been isolated in Soviet prisons for long periods and kept from contact with
American Embassy consular officers. One, Newcomb Mott, died in Soviet hands,
under these circumstances. During periods of strained US-USSR relations such
as the present Soviet treatment of Americans accused of violating their law is
likely to be harsher than usual.
4. Does the Convention provide for the opening of new Soviet consulates in the
US?
No. It does. not authorize, propose, suggest, provide for or require the opening,
of a single US consulate in the USSR or a single Soviet consulate in the US.
It does not permit the Soviets to send a single extra person to this country nor
does it let us send anyone to the USSR. What it does do is to provide ground'
rules for the protection of American citizens in the USSR-ground rules which,
we badly need.
;
Under the Constitution, the President's approval is all that is needed to permit
foreign governments to establish consulates in the US. Between 1934 and 1948'
there were three Soviet consulates in the US and an American consulate in the
USSR, though there was no US-USSR consular agreement in force.
5. Why do we grant Soviet consular officers immunity from our criminal juris-
diction?
Because we believe it is vital to have the same protection for American con
sular officers and clerical employees in the USSR. Since 1946, 31 Americans at:
our Embassy in Moscow have been expelled by the Soviets, most often on allega-'
tions of espionage. Without immunity our consular employees could be jailed
or suffer even harsher punishment on similar trumped-up charges. Furthermore,
action against American consular personnel serving in the USSR without im-
munity could be a temptation to Soviet authorities whenever a Soviet citizen is
arrested in this country for espionage. Other governments similarly protect,
their officials and clerical employees in the USSR; the British and the Japanese
recently negotiated consular conventions with the Soviet Union containing im-'
munity provisions modeled after those in the US-USSR agreement.
6. Is it right to extend this immunity to clerical employees as well?
We believe that the American secretaries, file clerks and communications and'
administrative personnel whom we might send to a consulate in the USSR need
and deserve the protection of immunity as much if not more than the consular
officers. Clerical employees we would send to a consulate in the Soviet Union;
would often be young women and it would be both unfair and from a security,
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 143
point of view unwise to give them less protection than we give our experienced
officers.
Of course, the Soviets would not be allowed to station a staff of Soviet nation-
als at a consulate in the US larger than the number of Americans we send to the
USSR. If we send a staff of 10 to the USSR the Soviets may have a total of ten
here.
7. What is the prospect for the reciprocal opening of consular ojlcest
There are no formal proposals or plans pending for the opening of separate
consular offices of either country in the other. If at a later date it was decided
to be appropriate to open one outside the respective capitals, it would be the
subject of careful negotiation on a strict quid-pro-quo basis. Such an office would
probably involve 10 to 15 Americans in the Soviet Union, with the Soviets per-
mitted to send the same number here. In accordance with Secretary Rusk's
statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we would plan to con-
sult that body and the state and local officials of the community to be affected,
before concluding such an agreement. While, as noted, such an arrangement
would be reciprocal, the fact that the Soviet society is a closed one while the
United States is open, and that the U.S. citizens needing service and protection
while traveling in the Soviet Union far outnumber Soviet citizens with like
needs in the U.S., indicate that the balance of advantage would be on our side.
8. If a Soviet consulate were eventually opened would it represent a threat to the
security of the US?
The opening of one Soviet consulate in the US would not materially affect
our internal security. The number of Soviet citizens now enjoying immunity,
452, would be increased by only 10 or 15 persons. We have the right under the
treaty to screen the personnel of such an office before agreeing to their assign-
ment. We are also authorized by the treaty to prevent them from travelling to
sensitive areas in the country and to expel them if they prove to be undesirable.
We could close a Soviet consulate in the US whenever we wished, and we could
cancel the Consular Convention on six months' notice. Both Acting Attorney
General Ramsey Clark and FBI Director Hoover have stated. -that 10 to 15 addi-
tional Soviet officials in this country would not place an undue burden on their
organizations.
9. What effect will the immunity provisions have on our agreements with other
countries? Wpuld immunities received by the Soviets be automatically ex-
tended under MFN clauses to other countries?
We have 35 agreements in force with other countries which require us, on the
basis of reciprocity, to extend most favored nation treatment to consular officers
and occasionally consular employees. A recent survey shows that 27 of these
countries have consular offices here with about 577 personnel. Should these
countries agree to grant immunity from criminal jurisdiction to the 424 Amer-
ican consular officers and employees stationed there, we would have to extend
the same treatment to their people here. All twenty-seven of these countries can
be described as either friendly or neutral.
Our Embassies in these 27 countries were asked to estimate whether their host
country would ask for most favored nation treatment-and give it to us in return.
The replies indicated that at most 11 might make such requests, with 290 officers
and employees. Assuming that we eventually decide to open a consulate in the
USSR with 15 people, we would permit the opening of a Soviet consulate with. 15
people here. In this case a total of 305 foreign consular officers and employees
would be affected. This compares with the estimate of 9400 foreign diplomatic
officers, members of their families and employees who now enjoy full diplomatic
immunity in the US.
10. What do other countries do about their consular relations with the USSR?
Prior to the negotiation of the US-USSR convention the Federal Republic of
Germany and Austria were the only non-communist countries which had consular
treaties with the USSR. Neither of these treaties contained firm guarantees on
notification and access similar to those in the US-USSR treaty.
Since 1965 the French, Finns, British, Japanese and Italians have negotiated
consular conventions with the USSR. The British and Japanese conventions
are modeled after the US treaty both in the guarantees on notification and access
and in the immunities provision. Of the non-communist countries, India and
Turkey have consulates in the USSR. Italy, Japan and Finland hope to open
consulates soon.
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144 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
11. What effect does the convention have on estate and tax matters in the US?
The estate and tax provisions of this convention are the same as those in other
consular conventions which the US has negotiated recently. The United States
made no concessions about estates in this convention. In the negotiations the
Soviet Government attempted to obtain wide powers for its consular officials in
the settlement of estates of American citizens where a Soviet citizen is a bene-
ficiary, or in the settlement of estates of Soviet citizens who die in the United
States. The Soviet Govermnent did not obtain these powers.
The convention provides that consuls can play a role in the settlement of
estates only if permissible under the existing applicable local law. If the con-
vention is ratified, therefore, the laws of the individual states would continue,
as they do now, to govern the extent to which a Soviet consul can play a part
in the settlement of an estate.
This convention, like many others to which the US is a party, exempts the
consular personnel of the sending state from Federal and State taxes with cer-
tain exceptions. Also, property used for a consulate or as residences for con-
sular and diplomatic personnel would be exempt from real estate taxes. This
is normal international practice.
12. In view of the Soviet record of treaty violations, how can you make them.
observe this one? And what can be done if they don't?
It is true that, particularly in the Stalin years, the Soviet Union violated a
number of international agreements and treaties. A careful study of serious
violations can he found in "Background Information on the Soviet Union in
International Relations" prepared by the Department of State in 1961.
Despite its earlier record of repeated violations of international obligations,.
the Soviet Union is party to a number of multilateral and bilateral agreements
which it has not been accused of violating. There may have been infractions
of some of these agreements, but the Soviet Government can be said to have
generally found it to be in its interest to live up to them. Among the most
important of these agreements are the Austrian State Treaty (1955), the Antarc-
tic Treaty (1959) and the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963).
Treaties between sovereign governments are negotiated on the basis of mutual
self-interest, not as rewards for good behavior or as evidences of good faith.
We believe there are areas where the US and Soviet interests coincide, though
these areas must be carefully delineated and explored before arriving at any
agreement. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Treaty on Outer Space which
we have just signed, and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
which is now under discussion are examples of agreements covering such areas.
Each of these agreements either has built-in safeguards or is self-enforcing.
The consular treaty is no exception-it is carefully drafted to provide full pro-
tection against abuse.
Should the Soviet Union violate the terms of this agreement we could suspend
it or, with six months notice, terminate It. Should a Soviet consulate be opened
in this country and should its personnel violate our laws. or the standards of
behavior we would expect, we could expel them or close the consulate.
13. Does the Convention prejudice the position of subject peoples incorporated
against their will into the Soviet Union?
No, it does not. The United States Government has never recognized the
forcible annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Ratification of this con-
vention would in no way change our policy in this respect, nor would any subse-
quent opening of a consulate or demarcation of a consular district. Recognition
of incorporation of states into the Soviet Union would require a positive state-
ment or act by the United States. The convention contains no such statement
and provides for no such act. It is United States policy to support the just
aspirations of all peoples of the world and to look forward to the day when all
will he able to express these aspirations freely. The ratification of this treaty
will not change this policy-any more than did the signing of more than 105
other bilateral and multilateral agreements which we have entered into with
the U.S.S.R.
The CHAIRMAN. Our first witness today is Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
of the National Captive Nations Committee.
Good Morning, Doctor.
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 145
STATEMENT OF LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
CAPTIVE NATIONS COMMITTEE
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. Good morning.
My name is Lev E. Dobriansky. I am chairman of the National
Captive Nations Committee. The committee is a coordinating educa-
tional group here in Washington that was founded on the basis of
the Captive Nations Week resolution passed by Congress in July 1959,
and one of its prime functions, in association with roughly about 35
local committees throughout the country, is the observance of Captive
Nations Week each year, the third week of July, in addition to offering
educational advice on issues pertaining to any and all the captive
nations.
OPPOSITION TO CONSULAR TREATY
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, I am most grateful for
this opportunity to testify in opposition to Senate ratification of the
United States-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention. My statement ad-
dresses itself by way of refutation to every salient argument that has
been advanced in favor of the treaty, and it raises several additional
objections to it, along with a little-known contradiction in State De-
partment thinking regarding our relations with the Soviet Union.
On the scale of careful politico-diplomatic calculation the treaty defi-
nitely does not rest on a quid pro quo basis-indeed, it exposes us to
a grave net disadvantage and grants a windfall to imperio-colonialist
Moscow-and, from a positive viewpoint, should be replaced by a
concrete alternative which, on net balance, really upholds the principle
of reciprocity and mutual advantage.
Contrary to the remarks of Secretary Rusk and others, this treaty is
far more than just another consular convention. We're not dealing
in arrangements with Zambia or Chad; instead, we're dealing with
the power and survival base of the entire Red empire which challenges'
us on every major continent and, considering its relatively inferior
resources, has done a historically phenomenal job, in the instant time
.of 50 years, to negate the principles of national independence and
freedom. It would be naive of us to consider and evaluate this treaty
merely in the vacuum of "little difference" from other consular con-
ventions. For, in content, it contains an unusual diplomatic immunity
privilege that no other existing convention does and, in terms of po-
litical and security ramification and implication, it stands uniquely
alone with all the net disadvantage it would heap upon us. In short,
the treaty cannot be considered in void of realities both within the
U.S.S.R. and here, the cold war struggle itself, as well as principle and
even morality, Vietnam, the East-West trade issue, and our own se-
rious politico-cultural gap in understanding the Soviet Union.
MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT TIIE U.S.S.R.
By its own textual evidence the treaty is a pitiful product of this
.gap in our knowledge and understanding of the U.S.S.R. Though it
wasn't consummated then, it is a vestigial remain of the thirties when
similar illusions were generated in this country about the great trans-
formation and economic changes taking place in the U.S.S.R. about
"the great Soviet experiment" in what was and, in some quarters, still
is foolishly called "Russia," about the "good Communists" in America
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146 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
who join in humanitarian projects and work for "world peace," and
about increased trade and understanding with Russia, which was
one of the illusory arguments in support of diplomatic relations with
this empire-state. This vestigial remain was revived in the fifties,
when an overabundance of lipservice and timidity caused a realistic
policy to remain stillborn, and now is being pressed for acceptance
under the shopworn vagaries of "windows in Russia, mutual under-
standing," "improving communications" and "normalizing relations."
The basic, ideational structure of the treaty is not new, in fact it is
stale, unimaginative maladjusted to evolving reality, and highly dis-
advantageous to us, both politically and morally. The treaty is based
on the archaic, preconceptual notion that the U.S.S.R. is "Russia," and
its branch principle of consularism, extended to Leningrad today but
tomorrow, once general Senate consent is in the pocket, to Riga or
Odessa or Tbilisi or even Tashkent, defies the multinational, govern-
mental reality of the U.S.S.R. and plays neatly into colonialist Mos-
cow's hands. Though well known to some scholars long before, one
would think that the massive disclosures of World War II about the
deep and invincible multinational drives for independence and freedom
by the captive non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. would have made
some imprint on the framers of this treaty. Indeed, they might have,
even profited from the Senate's own study in 1965. "The Soviet Em-
ire, A' and have deduced to what extent this treaty really places its
blessings on Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism within the U.S.S.R.,
truly an imperium in imperio.
LEGAL INVALIDITY
Clearly reflecting this false, conceptual structure of the treaty are
the patent expressions in its very contents. The treaty is studded with
the notion of a Soviet national, a Homo Sovieticus or Red Moscow's
equivalent of "Russian." Throughout you read "a national of the send-
ing state," the "national flag of the sending state,. the national coat-
of-arms of the sending state" and so forth. Mr. Chairman, if you will
permit me the lingual luxury of some Brooklynese, there ain't no such
political animal in existence as a Soviet national or a national of the
Soviet Union. Nor are there such objects in existence as a "national
flag" of the U.S.S.R. or a "national coat-of-arms" of the U.S.S.R.
These concepts are applicable to the United States, which is a nation-
state, but they are myths as concerns the U.S.S.R. which is an empire-
state made up of numerous captive, national republics. Whoever wrote
up this treaty either has never read the U.S.S.R. Constitution, the,
plethora of official pronouncements on Russian/non-Russian relations,
and the United Nations' output of both Ukrainian and Byelorussian
delegrations or, if he has, then is vulnerable to a number of conjectures,
one of which is the impress of outmoded preconceptions.
In logic and reason this fact alone invalidates this convention. Be-
cause of its gross misrepresentation of the other party, if such a,
contract were brought into a court of law, one doesn't have to be a',
lawyer to know what the judge's decision would be. Mythical beings'
.and objects would scarcely be deserving of serious judicial thought,
and the contract would be thrown out of court. So, here, you as Sena-
tors and some also as lawyers are asked to judge this contract, this,
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 147
treaty. Can you in rational conscience agree to a treaty that in its very
wordage and concept entertains mythical objects?
This is not a matter of mere semantics. Words have meaning, and
in an issue as serious as this, in time they can have tragic meaning for
us and also for half of the population of the U.S.S.R. Let there be
no mistake about: it, such mythmaking on our part, as that gratuitously
proffered, serves Moscow well in its dual policy of projecting a Soviet
national, It "Soviet" like an "American," and accomplishing its cultural
and other types of genocide of the non-Russian nations. Of course
Moscow welcomes this treaty and its fantastic conceptual contents,
even to the extent of making a so-called concession regarding the arrest
of Americans in the Soviet Union, for the treaty is in essence a diplo-
matic affirmation of Moscow's imperium in imperio and an encourage-
ment for its subtle, genocidal policies.
BRANCH CONSULARISM : ONE COUNTRY MYTH
Reinforcing and reflecting the underlying myth that the U.S.S.R.
is a nation-state is the branch principle of consularism, the instrument
that supposedly attests to the "national" integrality of the U.S.S.R.
Aside from the utter legal defectiveness of the treaty, State Depart-
ment spokesmen make a great point of the distinction between the
treaty, with even greater emphasis on the touted notification and access
provision, and the subject of further negotiations for the location of
consulates. This is more for the easy sale of the treaty and its ratifica-
tion, evading objections on grounds of non-Russian nations in the
U.S.S.R., than serving any real, intellectual point. For obviously, on
the basis of the conceptual framework of the treaty as shown here,
negotiations will go beyond Leningrad to Odessa and so forth where
Americans, after all, travel, too. In fact, % ratified treaty would justify
such further negotiations, logically forcing them into such non-Russian
national directions regardless of the forms of national sovereignty
involved in each and every non-Russian republic.
Mr. Rusk is on record admitting that a dilemma would arise if
consulates were set up in the Baltic Republics. But there would be a
similar dilemma with reference to other non-Russian republics-not in
terms of recognizing the free legations of the Baltic nations are refus-
ing to recognize the latter's forced incorporation into the U.S.S.R.,
but in equally important terms of recognizing the distinctive national
identities and historical credentials of these nations and refusing to
reduce them to a populational and territorial expression deserving
of only a consulate, a branch office of our Moscow Embassy. In two
cases, the dilemma would be legal with our complete recognition of
original charter members of the United Nations, Soviet Ukraine and
Soviet Byelorussia; in all cases, the dilemma would be politico-moral
when, on the one hand, our leaders talk about "friendship with all
peoples"-"'the fifth and most important principle of our foreign
policy is support of national independence * * * the right of each
people to govern themselves and to shape their own institutions. We
follow this principle by encouraging the end of colonial rule"-and,
on the other hand, they would enforce a treaty that conceptually and
instrumentally undermines this "most important principle of our
foreign policy."
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148 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Mr. Chairman, a perfect example of the State Department's double-
talk and double standards of behavior, I think, is provided in point
13 of the questions and answers sent, I presume, to each Senator on'
February 6 by Mr. MacArthur of the Department. It not only con-
tradicts the testimony already given by Secretary of State Rusk, and
its admission that a dilemma would arise, but also, in my opinion, dem-
onstrates again the psycho-political incompetence of some in the
Department.
ADDITIONAL DISADVANTAGES
In addition to these basic intellectual, legal, political, and moral:
aspects of the treaty, there are the security, economic, and general
-diplomatic features. Let's examine each briefly but essentially. Aside
from the superficial selling point of protecting U.S. citizens in the
U.S.S.R., much is made Of the so-called Russian concession on notifi-
cation and access. But is it really a concession? It is as much a
-concession as a thief giving up stolen property. This civilized provi-
sion should have been demanded long ago on the purely diplomatic,
:ambassadorial level, on the very basis of the Roosevelt-Litvinov
agreements of November 1933 that legally have remained in force to
this day and upon which, I am given to understand, we have made a
number of Supreme Court decisions-a number of Supreme Court
decisions have been based. I repeat, on the very basis of the Roose-
velt-Litvinov agreements of November 1933 that legally have re-
-mained in force to this very day. Applying this principle, there's no
net gain in here, as the treaty's proponents would have us believe.. If
we really believe in this principle of reciprocity, we should press for
this provision now, at long last, within the present context of our
diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., and without paying the heavy
price of net disadvantage in the convention. This treaty is clearly a
sham performance of improving relations. Our right to the protec-
tion of American citizens was established in the executive agreements
of 1933, and even aside f om all this clear legalism, it should be strong=
ly emphasized that notification and access do not afford real complete
protection to our citizens no matter how many consulates we seek
to establish. Arbitrary arrest can easily continue, and brainwashing,
in fact, can even be accomplished within three days and with ease.
Moreover, there is no guarantee in this make-believe concession
that important U.S. citizens might not be arrested and held incom-
municado by the Russians indirectly, namely by the police in Poland,
.Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere in the outer empire. They work
through their associates in other spheres of activity; they can make
fitting arrangements for this type of activity, economic, political,
.et cetera. They can make fitting arrangements for this type of
activity. It is not the aggregate number of Americans who travel
to the U.S.S.R. that is important, the few important Americans for
- them in given circumstances is what counts, and this business can
be undertaken on neighboring terrain.
We are also told that risks of espionage have to be assumed in our
open society. Life is full of risks, but we don't recklessly assume them
without, rationally, seeking the realization of net gain and advantage.
In the narrow context of espionage activity alone, and although spy-
ing is a two-way street, only a relative disadvantage would be our lot
-here. One does not have to be a FBI agent to arrive at this estimate
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 149
when one considers the dominant facts that exceptionally well spy-
trained Russians would enjoy a larger pond to fish in here than we
there. Also, to merely cite that no more than 10 or 15 Russian
consular officers would be here overlooks the coefficiency of their spy
effectiveness. Even in the broader context of the treaty's analysis,,
there is no sufficient aggregate advantage to offset this particular-
disadvantage.
The risks not only of espionage but also of coercion, bribery, black-
mail of American citizens with relatives in the U.S.S.R. some of'
which the Rumanians have been engaged in, and even sundry political.
warfare tactics directed against ethnic groups here are accentuated
by the most gratuitous provision in the treaty of diplomatic immunity
for crimes beyond misdemeanors. Even our friends and allies don't
enjoy this privilege and, as admitted by the State Department, this.
privilege would be sought by others on a most-favored-nation basis,,
including other totalitarian Red governments. Guided by the De-
partment's testimonies on these points, if I am correct in all of this,,
then trading for the so-called concession on notification and access our
real concessions of politically slighting the captive non-Russian na-
tions in the U.S.S.R., granting diplomatic immunity to consular-
officers, and accepting greater risks of espionage and political warfare'
activity in our open society renders the treaty a bum deal.
The current shell game of manipulating figures-10 or 15 or 20
Russian consular personnel in this country-not only misleads the
public as to the qualitative determinants of effective espionage (it
took only a handful of spies to rob us of our atomic secrets for the
expedition of totalitarian Russian nuclearity) and the mentioned'.
most-favored-nation sieve but also conceals the fact that a Senate
confirmation of this treaty would open up a Pandora's Box of Soviet
Russian pressure against every free government in Latin America.
The immediate objective would be similar consular conventions;.
the ultimate objective would be a really intensified political warfare
in the area with a network of consulates as the prime instrument.
This is a time when many of our own officials have been warning us
to expect stepped up Red subversion throughout the continent. In the-
misplaced spirit of "easing tensions," "normalizing relations," "pur-
suing peace" and other homiletical spurities, what Latin American
government could refuse the request for a consulate after the sup-
posed leader of the free world has extended this benefit to the rulers
of the Kremlin. Beginning with 10 or 15 here we may well end up,
with several hundred additional Russian operatives in the hemis-
phere-and cloaked with diplomatic immunity.
Concerning the economic aspect, Mr. Rusk has argued that the treaty
would contribute to "increasing trade between our two countries." In
1965 I appeared before this committee on the East-West trade issue
and stressed the dangers of repeating our economic errors of the
twenties and thirties in regard to the Soviet Union. This isn't the
place to elaborate on them again except to say that as a trade wedge
the treaty may have as much commercial value, not to speak of other
values, as the expectations nourished by the British who today are
accusing Moscow of reneging on its promises to buy more British
goods, the purchases last year being lower than in 1963. As to other
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150 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
i
values it appears quite irrational to really aid the U.S.S.R. economy
through trade while it chiefly supports the Red totalitarian ally in
Hanoi to decimate Americans.
Finally, in support of the treaty we have heard about the inadequacy,
of our Embassy in Moscow, the need for mutual understanding,
normalizing relations, improving communications, opening up more
windows in Russia, and pursuing the goal of peace. Good inten-,
tions and objectives are oftentimes marred and, in time, liquidated by,'
imprudent means, lipserviced principles, and timid accommodation.
It is interesting that for years the Department has opposed the pro-
posal for direct diplomatic relations with Byelorussia and Ukraine,
because it would mean more communists here and yet today, now, the
Department is prepared to allow for more through the consular me-
dium. The net advantage of having this kind of window in the Soviet
Union-in Byelorussia, Ukraine, Armenia, and even Kazakh Turkes-
tan; in Minsk, Kiev, Yerevan, and Alma Ata, respectively-is that all
the good intentions and objectives mentioned would have the chance of
being realized, all the glaring defects of the consular treaty would
not exist, and all the accruing illusions about "communism" tagged
on an old broken-down record of the thirties would quickly dissipate.
Aiming our diplomatic efforts at the captive non-Russian nations in
the U.S.S.R., which is even accommodated by the U.S.S.R. Consti-
tution, is a new, fresh, more realistic alternative that this committee
should positively and constructively explore. Broken-down records
about "changes in communism," consulates in Russia, understand
in through trade and other familiar tunes of the thirties will not en-
able us to cope with the ever-widening penetrations of Soviet Russian
imperio-colonialism in the free world, including even our own hemis-J
Ehere. These penetrations are systematically executed through and
by leaps over our Maginot wall of containment.
Marx, who in the last century had keener insights into the historic
process of Russian expansionism, both overt; and covert, than some;
of our experts have today, left us one which deserves our sober con-
templation :
The prestige of Russian diplomacy and the renown of Russia's military,
strength can be maintained far more easily and securely in peace than in
war * * *. A system of intimidation is far less expensive than actual warfare:
Very frankly, Senators, if in some degree you are intimidated by
Soviet Russian nuclearity, at that in part launched by espionage in the
forties, while Moscow was our great "democratic" ally, if, for whatever
reason, you don't give a hoot about the freedom aspirations of some
120 million non-Russians in the U.S.S.R.; if you want, albeit inad
vertently, to lend your support to the perpetuation of Soviet Russian
imperio-colonialism and, as so many of our leaders in the past, to
become the unsuspecting guardians of Moscow's imperium in imperio
if, in your conscience, you believe that American citizens will really be
"protected" in the U.S.S.R. and that this treaty is not a sham per:
formance in "building bridges of understanding;" if you think the
floodgates would not be opened to disproportionate Russian espionage
and political warfare in our hemisphere; if perhaps you're striving for
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 151
another Russo-American alliance-an empire and a democracy, this
time against the so-called yellow peril-to insure the grounds of our
chief enemy and in inevitable time to undermine the grounds of our
national security and independence, then you have no choice but to
vote for this anachronism of the thirties. If not on each and all of
these relevant points, your right choice is to reject it, consider my
proposed alternative in tune with the sixties, and also call for a
thorough review of U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R., a sort of a great
debate, one which we have never had in our history and for which I
.offer this proposed resolution to any of you who might be interested.
? It's as simple as this : this treaty is both a symbol of our politico-culture
.lag in relation to the multinational empire-state of the U.S.S.R. and a
gift to colonialist Moscow's psycho-political strategy and war against
the free world.
Mr. Chairman, I take it, Senator Sparkman, you are occupying
the Chair. This concludes my statement, and at this point, for the
further elaboration of the arguments advanced here, I request the in-
clusion into the record of the hearings of my more comprehensive
article entitled "Ten Reasons Against the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular
Convention," and also an article on "Historical Lessons in Totalitarian
Trade," dealing with background material concerning East-West trade
and, of course, the relationship between this consular treaty and the
East-West trade issue.
Senator SPARKMAN (presiding). Without abjection those will be
included, and also the resolution which you have at the end of your
statement.
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes, please.
Senator SPARKMAN. Fine.
(The material referred to appears on pages 323 and 332, respectively
an the appendix.)
FEASIBILITY OP DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UKRAINE AND
BYELORUSSIA
Senator SPARKMAN. I should like to ask you a very few questions,
Doctor. One thing you mention in your statement concerns the mat-
ter of diplomatic relations with the Ukraine and Byelorussia. Would
you favor such relations and do you intend to suggest that they are
feasible?
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes, definitely. I favored them for some time.
Senator, you have to look at the framework in which I am analyzing
all of this; namely, I am concerned about espionage. But there are
other aspects, and I think in the treatment of a treaty of this sort,
as indeed in any issue with the Soviet Union, one has to give proper
weight to each factor and strive, if you will, toward evaluation lead-
ing toward a net balance to our advantage. In this connection, I have
emphasized the political, the moral, and so on.
Now, my main point here is that the State Department, for the
longest time, actually since 1953 when this was considered on the
House side and as approved unanimously by Mrs. Bolton's subcom-
mittee, ready to be taken before the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee, when Mr. Chiperfield was chairman of the committee, the State
Department argued consistently that this would mean more commu-
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nist missions here, more communists in the United States, and lead-
in to more spy work.
Now, here we have a consular treaty which has these obvious legal
and, I would say, psycho-political and moral defects, and it is using
the same argument in favor of the consular treaty.
Well, you cannot have it both ways.
Now, the second point one might raise, and oftentimes it is raised,
namely, would Moscow accept it?
Well, first of all, we have never tried it. The British did by record,
not what the conversations were backstage, and that was back in 1946
or 1947. We never tried it. And yet this is accommodated by the
U.S.S.R. Constitution, I believe, provision 18(a) in which each of
these national republics can enter into direct diplomatic relations with
other countries and, as a consequence, I feel that if we should try it,
then we put them definitely on the defensive. If they are truly in-
terested in furthering peaceful coexistence in having real mutual
understanding between the American people, and not this political
entity of 200 million Russians, because there are no 200 million Rus-
sians in the universe, no less in the Soviet Union, but with all of these
different nations within the U.S.S.R.
Now, finally, let me say this : You have what appears to me, and I
think I have enough international lawyers to back me up on this, we
are in a legal mess of some sort here in this sense, that we both de
facto and de jure recognize the representatives of the Ukraine and
Byelorussia in the U.N.
Mr. Goldberg, day in and day out out symbolizes, personifies, that
recognition.
While we are doing that up in the U.N. and elsewhere in interna-
tional conferences, here we are coming off with a consular instrument
that, in a sense, degrades these nations within the U.S.S.R., and that
is my point, and I think it is a point that should be considered as a con-
crete alternative to this defective treaty.
Senator SPARKMAN. Also in your statement you refer to the captive
non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. Which are those nations?
Mr. DOBRIANSIKY. These would beall the nations, for example, start-
ing with Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, then we proceed on to Byelorussia,
the Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, even some of the North
Caucasian area, those that, I would say, in Central Asia, Turkestan,.
despite the fact that Moscow has divided that area into five republics.
And I would even talk in terms of the peoples in the Urals, although
the Washington Post and other organs are still not familiar with that
concept.
But it is a thing that is in history and going all the way back to~
World War I.
Now, these are non-Russian peoples. They constitute roughly over
half in terms of some statistical analyses, in terms of others, approxi-
mately half of the population in the U.S.S.R.
Senator SPARKMAN. The non-Russian peoples would be about half
Mr. DoBRLANSKY. That is right.
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Senator SPARKMAN. Would you include White Russia?
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. Byelorussia. Yes, indeed.
Senator SPARKMAN. Kazakh?
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes. There we have a problem. Yes, I would
include Kazakh. There are representatives of this area of Kazakh in
this country, and many parts of the Middle East, who have fought
for independence. May I say this, Senator, it brings to mind the very
wonderful statement, in my opinion-it is about the best on record-
in the United Nations that was issued by our Ambassador Stevenson
back in November, November 25, 1961, in which he, in that statement,
covers all the independent drives on the part of these various peoples
and nations within the U.S.S.R.
Senator SPARKMAN. How did they become incorporated-and I am
not referring to the Baltic States, but these others that you have
named-into the U.S.S.R.?
Mr. DOBRIANSNY. Forcibly, in the same way that the Baltic States
were, practically 20 years later.
Now, in most
Senator SrARKMAN. Was it as part of the revolution?
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. No. You did not have the establishment of the
.Soviet Union until 1922-23. But when Soviet Russia or the
R.S.F.S.R. was established with Lenin at the head, there was recogni-
tion, either formal or informal, given to many of these independent
national republics, the Ukrainian Republic, Byelorussia, Armenia,
Georgia, and various others.
Senator SPARKMAN. You say recognition. Recognition by whom?
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. By the commissariat back in December 1917 led
by Mr. Lenin.
Senator SPARKMAN. Did they go in one by one or collectively?
Mr. DOBRLINSKY. No. I am saying there was that recognition given
to these independent states.
Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. Now, following them, each of these was knocked
off on a divide-and-conquer principle so that you had the Red army
overtaking in time Byelorussia, the area of the Ukraine, these were
Sovietized, and the fiction of their independence was still maintained.
Now, for example, I think it was in the Treaty of Riga you had three
signatories; namely, Soviet Russia, one; Poland, two; and Soviet
Ukraine, three. Then after the period of Sovietization, roughly 1920
to 1922, they were brought in forcibly into the new entity called the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Senator SPARKMAN. When you speak of the Red empire, do you
mean to include all of these nations?
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. Well, this is the inner sphere. I speak of the
imperium in imperio; namely, that this is the basic empire, the inner
empire.
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154 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Then you have the outer one, taking those, of course, that were
brought under the influence and domination of Moscow since World
War II to the present, including Cuba.
Senator SPARKMAN. You make reference in the beginning of your
statement to our own serious politico-cultural gap in understanding
the Soviet Union. Would you elaborate some on that? Just explain
what you mean.
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. Well, taking the point that I made, this gap, one
could look at it in this fashion.
If one simply, let us say, reads the Roosevelt-Litvinov papers back
in the thirties, you have the same narrow preconceptions with regard
to the Soviet Union that are being expressed today and being reflected
by this treaty; namely, we have a number of our people and-they are,
unfortunately on record where they look upon the population in the,
U.S.S.R. as though you had 235 million Russians.
Now, that is a misconception. Here you have a misconception that,
in turn, weighs heavily, if you will, on contracts such as this, and
numerous others not to speak, if you will, of our considerations gov-
erning our psycho-political strategy in relation to the U.S.S.R.
A second point, namely, a lack of appreciation of the histories of
these respective non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. meaning the
striving on the part of many of these people-now, take Georgia, for
example. Georgia was a nation and a state long before, let us say, the
Christian era, long before there was any Russia, long before there was:
a Ukraine or any other area in the U.S.S.R.
Now, this is a long tradition, people with their own language, with.,
their own culture, and the like.
There is not sufficient appreciation there. I think you recall, Sena
tor, when was it, 1962, 1963-there are many other examples I could'
cite, but let us use this one-when Benny Goodman and his troupe went
to Georgia under a cultural exchange agreement operation. They.
were briefed by people in our State Department and the like. When,
they went to Tbilisi, one of the girls thought she would ingratiate the
group into the good favor of the Georgian people, and started singing-
in Russian. Well, all hell broke out, pandemonium, and they did
not know what struck them. They thought they were showing the
very gracious, the good old warm American temperament and the fact
was that it was considered an insult by the Georgians to be addressed
to them in a language fundamentally of their captor. Someone should !'
have informed them and briefed them that the people in Georgia speak
Georgian and not Russian.
Well, there are other cases, of course. Vice President Nixon, as you.
know, during the "kitchen debate," and I could cite many others.
In the proposed resolution that I have here there are quotes by our
leaders-I am not citing who the people are-but each quote actually
signifies a very fundamental misconception, outlook toward this entity
which I have contended is our basic enemy.
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Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator Carlson.
Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, I was late getting in, and did not
hear Dr. Dobriansky's statement. I am reading it now, and I shall
yield.
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Mundt.
Senator CARLSON. I shall pass to Senator Mundt.
Senator MUNDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Doctor, fora very illuminating statement and for in-
jecting into the discussions some new elements which have not here-
tofore been brought to the attention of the committee, and most cer-
tainly not to the attention of the country.
Before I begin my questioning I would like to insert at this point.
in the record correspondence I have had with the Department of State..
(The correspondence referred to follows:)
Hon. DEAN Rusx,
Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR Mn. SECRETARY : In connection with the proposed consular convention
with the Soviet Union, it has come to my attention that President Roosevelt and
Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov had an exchange of letters on November 16,
1933, which seems to me to bear on the consular convention now before the
Senate.
Mr. Litvinov, in his letter to President Roosevelt said :
"Following our conversations I have the honor to inform you that the Soviet
Government is prepared to include in a consular convention to be negotiated
immediately following the establishment of relations between our two coun-
tries provisions in which nationals of the United States shall be granted rights
with reference to legal protection which shall not be less favorable than those
enjoyed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by nationals of the nation
most favored in this respect. Furthermore, I desire to state that such rights,
will be granted to American nationals immediately upon the establishment of
relations between our two countries.
"In this connection I have the honor to call to your attention Article 11 and
the Protocol to Article 11, of the Agreement Concerning Conditions of Residence
and Business and Legal Protection in General concluded between Germany
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on October 12, 1925."
Article 11 and the Protocol to Article 11 were then quoted in Mr. Litvinov's
letter as follows :
"Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to adopt the necessary measures
to inform the consul of the other Party as soon as possible whenever a national
of the country which he represents is arrested in his district.
"The same procedure shall apply if a prisoner is transferred from one place
of detention to another.
111. The Consul shall be notified either by a communication from the person
arrested or by the authorities themselves direct. Such communications shall be
made within a period not exceeding seven times twenty-four hours, and in large
towns, including capitals of districts, within a period not exceeding three times
twenty-four hours.
"2. In places of detention of all kinds, requests made by consular representatives
to visit nationals of their country under arrest, or to have them visited by their
representatives, shall be granted without delay. The counsular representative
shall not be entitled to require officials of the courts or prisons to withdraw
during his interview with the person under arrest."
President Roosevelt replied, also on November 16 :
"I thank you for your letter of November 16, 1933, informing me that the Soviet
Government is prepared to grant to nationals of the United States- rights with
reference to legal protection not less favorable than those enjoyed in the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics by nationals of the nation most favored in this respect.
I have noted the provisions of the treaty and protocol concluded between Ger-
many,and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on October 12, 1925.
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156 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
"I am glad that nationals of the United States will enjoy the protection afforded
by these instruments immediately upon the establishment of relation's between
our countries and I am fully prepared to negotiate a consular convention covering
these subjects as soon as practicable."
I would appreciate the Department's reply to the following questions :
(1) Did the Soviet Union grant American nationals the rights contained in
Article 11 and the Protocol to Article 11, cited above, "immediately upon the
establishment of relations " between the two countries?
(2) Isn't the Soviet Union still legally obliged to grant these rights?
(3) If not, why not?
Looking forward to hearing from you, I am, with best wishes,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, February 3, 1967.
Hon. KARL E. MUNDT,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR MUNDT : The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of
January 28, 1967, regarding he proposed Consular Convention with the Soviet
Union, in which you inquire about the exchange of letters between President
Roosevelt and Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinoff on November 16, 1933.
Mr. Litvinoff's letter to President Roosevelt opened with a statement that the
Soviet Union was prepared to grant "in a consular convention to be negotiated
immediately following the establishment of relations between our two countries"
rights of consular protection to American nationals no less favorable than those
enjoyed in the USSR by nationals of the nation most favored in this respect.
The Litvinoff letter then stated that such rights would be granted to American
nationals as soon as diplomatic relations were established. This latter affirma-
tion was a unilateral undertaking, given in the stated expectation that a con-
sular convention on the same subject would be "immediately" negotiated as
stipulated earlier in the Litvinoff letter. However, no consular convention be-
tween the two countries was concluded until they signed the 1964 Convention
now pending before the Senate.
In the early period following the establishment of diplomatic relations in
1933, the Soviet Union's application of the Litvinoff affirmation was entirely,
unsatisfactory to the United States. Several cases occurred in which American
citizens were arrested and the Soviets refused to afford consular notification or
access on what we considered to be the most-favored-nation basis. In these
cases we made energetic protests to the Soviet Union. We pointed out that the'
Soviet-German Agreement of 1925 provided for notification within three to seven,
days and for access "without delay", and that these provisions were applicable
to American nationals as a result of the Litvinoff affirmation. However, the:
Soviets took the position that notification and access did not become operative
until the "investigation" of cases had been completed. We ascertained that the
Soviet Government was applying this interpretation to German nationals in
exactly the same fashion. Thus ?the most-favored-nation treatment was un-
satisfactory from our viewpoint. The issues of notification and access are
definitively resolved by the 1964 Consular Convention and its Protocol, which
make clear that notification and access must be accorded within four days
"from the time of arrest or detention."
It should also be noted that the Soviet-German Agreement of 1925 did not
survive the war and up until the time of signing the US-USSR Convention
of 1964, the specific provisions in the German Agreement for consular notification
and access had not been repeated in any other treaty from whose provisions
the United States could claim the most-favored-nation treatment pledged by
Mr. Litvinoff.
The legal deficiencies of the Litvinoff Agreement were among the reasons that
led the Department to decide that the time had come to conclude a treaty
containing clear and unequivocal provisions giving us the rights of notification
and access in cases of Americans arrested in the Soviet Union. These provisions'
are essential if American citizens traveling in the Soviet Union are to be'
afforded the consular protection that they deserve. Naturally we would watch
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 157
the implementation of the Convention with the utmost care to assure that the
obligations set forth in it are being carried out by the Soviet Union.
If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to let me know.
Sincerely yours,
DOUGLAS MAOART$UR II,
A8ststant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
Hon. DEAN Rusx,
Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.
DEAR DEAN : In reading the January 30 issue of U.S. News & World Report,
I was disturbed when I read the article entitled "Russia : The Enemy in Vietnam?"
In this article, which wasevidentally written by an editor of U.S. News & World
Report stationed in Saigon, there are statements made to the effect that it is
the Russians who are furnishing the needed materials to the North Vietnamese
which makes it possible for them to continue their war effort. Therefore, I am
enclosing a copy of the article with this letter and would appreciate having your
comments on it and the questions which I am setting forth below.
1. Is it true as stated that "It is the Russians, however, who are furnishing the
real sinews for major and prolonged war." I would like to have any comments
you care to make with regard to this statement.
2. Is it true that "The Russians now are investing close to 1 billion dollars
a year in the war." Is this a correct figure or is it more or is it less?
3. Is it true that "Most of the trucks that move the needed supplies from North
to South Vietnam, for example, come from Russia or her satellites." If it is true,
I would appreciate any documentary evidence or figures on truck supplies which
you could provide me.
4. Is it true that "Many of the automatic weapons that we capture from North
Vietnamese troops are of Russian manufacture." I would like to have any state-
ment or documentary evidence that you would have on this allegation.
5. Is it true that "Most of our plane losses have resulted from the use of
Soviet Russia's antiaircraft guns, missiles or MIG jet fighters."
6. Is it true that "Soviet aid to North Vietnam trickled along at an average
yearly rate of 35 million dollars until early in 1965, when, even before U.S. began
bombing in the North, the Russians started moving in a big way-with SAM anti-
aircraft missiles, jet fighters, military vehicles, oil, other paraphernalia of war."
7. Is the statement true that "Almost 1,000 SAM's have been fired at U.S.
Planes. These Soviet Missiles, launched by Russian-trained crews, have them-
selves destroyed 30 U.S. planes and contributed in a large measure to an over-all
loss in the North of more than 460 U.S. planes." If the figure is different and
larger or perhaps less, I would appreciate having any information which you
would provide me.
8. Is the statement true that "Cost to the Russians in spent missiles : about
25 million dollars. Cost to the U.S. In planes alone : more than I billion dollars."
9. Is the statement true "The North Vietnamese landscape is also studded with
conventional antiaircraft positions, about 6,000 in all. The original antiaircraft
system was installed by the Chinese. Now bigger guns are coming in. They are
Russian." I would appreciate having any additional comments you would care
to make about this statement.
10. Is the statement true that "The North Vietnamese Air Force now consists
of 75 to 100 fighter planes and a handful of light bombers supplied by the Soviet
Union. About one fifth of the force are the most up-to-date MIG-21s; the
remainder, MIG-15s and MIG-17s. The MIG's are replaced by the Russians as
they are lost in the fighting." I would appreciate having any information on this
statement which might supplement it and give me up-to-date information on
your estimate of what might be plane support or any'kind to the North Vietnamese
from the Soviet Union.
11. Is the statement true that "There are upward of 2,000 Russian technicians
working at air bases and at SAM sites. North Vietnamese pilots are trained in
Russia and supervised by Soviet fliers when they return to Hanoi."
12. Is the statement true that "Within the past few months, the Russians have
taught North Vietnamese to man approximately 350 SAM missiles and an es-
timated 3,000 antiaircraft guns."
73-958-67-11
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158 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
13. Would you please comment on the statement "For the first time, Soviet,
helicopters are being spotted in North Vietnam. Russian cargo aircraft are also
making an appearance."
14. Please advise me as to whether or not it is true that "The North Viet
namese war machine runs almost entirely on Russian oil. In the past 18 months,
the Russians shipped in 300,000 metric tons." The statement goes on, "Last
month alone, the Soviets shipped nearly 25,000 metric tons of gasoline and oil
into Haiphong." Since this article is January 30th, that must refer to the
month of December, 1966.
15. The article states that "The Russians use ships to transport 80 percent,
of their aid to North Vietnam." It further states that "All told, the Russians)
are said to be delivering 80,000 tons of goods a month to Hanoi." Is this state-
ment factual and I would appreciate having any comments on it.
16. The article states that "The Soviet ships going to Haiphong carry not
only civilian goods, as the Reds insist, but jet aircraft, SAM's radar gear and
antiaircraft guns." I would appreciate having your comments on this statement.
17. The article states that "Tonnage by sea from all sources-Russia, China,
East Europe and non-Communist countries-was estimated at 2 million tons in!
1966. Of that, the Russian share was estimated at half the total, Red China's
about one fourth." I would appreciate any information which you could provide'e
me as to the accuracy of that statement.
Thanking you for your kind consideration and assuring you I would appreciate
hearing from you at your earliest convenience in response to the questions 1,
have posed and any other comments which you might care to make about allega-
tions and statements in this article, I am, with best wishes,
Cordially yours,
KARL E. MUNDT,
U.S. Senator.
Iion. KARL E. MUNDT,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR MUNDT: Secretary Rusk has asked me to reply to your letter
of February 7 concerning the article in US News & World Report on "Russia : The,
Enemy in Vietnam?" which discusses the effect of Soviet aid in supporting the
North Vietnamese war effort.
It is correct, as the US News & World Report article indicates, that the USSR:
has over the past several years supplied North Vietnam with a modern air de-
fense system, as well as other military equipment. In addition, the USSR con
times to send North Vietnam a wide range of industrial and economic aid, in
eluding petroleum and motor vehicles. Although most of the Soviet aid goes:
to North Vietnam by sea, all available information indicates that almost all of
the major military equipment, such as air defense equipment, has been and is
being sent by rail across the Chinese mainland.
Although I am unable to answer in detail in an unclassified letter the specific
questions you have raised about the details of Soviet aid, I would be pleased'
to arrange an oral briefing for you on these subjects.
Please let me know if the Department can be of any further assistance to you.
Sincerely,
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II.
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
Hon. DEAN RUSK, - - -
Secretary of State, -
Department of State, Washington, D.C.
DEAR DEAN : In discussions relative to the Consular Convention with the Soviet!
Union, a question has arisen with regard to the application of the most favored
nation rule in the case of a third country should the pending treaty be ratified.
It is my understanding that there are in force a number of bilateral counsular
treaties between the United States and other governments in which there are most
favored nation clauses. If another such government seeks to exercise its most
favored nation rights, in order to gain for its consular employees in this country
the special immunity provisions of Article 19 of the pending treaty, does that gov
ernment has to accept all of the terms of our bilateral treaty with the Soviet
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 159
Union, or would it only be required to reciprocate as to the diplomatic immunity
provisions alone? More specifically, would the third country in such instance
be required to accept the terms of Article 12 (and the related protocol) as a con-
dition to our extending to its consular employees the immunity protection of
Article 19.
There seems to be some confusion on this matter, although it appears to me
that it would be well-covered by established international law and usage. Be-
cause of the confusion, however, I would appreciate an answer from you regard-
ing this as soon as possible.
Thanking you in advance for your consideration on this matter, I am,
KARL E. MuNDT, U.S. Senator.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 17, 1961.
Hon. KARL E. MUNDT,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR MUNDT : The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of
February 10, 1967, concerning the application of most-favored-nation clauses in
consular treaties in the event the proposed US-USSR Consular Convention is rati-
fied.
Specifically, you inquired if a third country seeking to exercise its most-
favored-nation rights, in Order to gain for its consular officials in the United States
the immunity provided in Article 19 of the US-USSR Consular Convention, must
reciprocate with regard to all other provisions of that Convention or merely with
regard to the immunity article alone.
While one most-favored-nation clause differs from another, it is safe to general-
ize that established international law and practice require reciprocal treatment
from the third country only with regard to the subject matter on which most-
favored-nation treatment is sought. Thus, should the US-USSR Consular Con-
vention enter into force, the United States will honor requests from those foreign
governments with which we have in force treaties containing the most-favored-
nation provision, with respect to the privileges and immunities to be accorded
consular personnel, for full immunity of such persons from the criminal jurisdic-
tion of the United States. Such requests will require prior written assurances
of reciprocity for comparable American consular personnel in the country con-
cerned. The United States will also require that the procedures contained in
Articles 2(3) and (6) of the Convention be observed. The screening procedures
contemplated by these paragraphs require advance approval of the United States
prior to the appointment of a head of a consular establishment, and advance
notification concerning the appointment of all other consular employees.
You also inquired whether the most-favored-nation would be required to accept
the terms of Article 12 and the related Protocol of the US-USSR Consular Con-
vention as a prerequisite to obtaining the Article 19 criminal immunity for its
consular personnel. As indicated above, the answer is no. In this connection
you will be interested to know that our experience with respect to notification and
access in the countries which are in a position to seek most-favored-nation treat-
ment establishes that there is no general need for the type of notification and
access provisions which we have in the US-USSR Consular Convention.
If the Department can be of any further assistance, please let me know.
Sincerely yours,
- - - DOUGLAS MAcARTHUR 11,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional, Relations.
EFFECT OP TREATY RATIFICATION ON CAPTIVE NATIONS
Senator MUNDT. As I read your statement, the arguments under
the heading, "Branch Consularism," you state your belief in that rati-
fication of this treaty would have a very serious impact on the captive
nations 'which are now reluctantly part of this Soviet empire. Is that
correct?
Mr. DOBRTANSKY. No question about it, sir, in a way of what you
might call a diplomatic degradation of their national being.
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Senator MUNDT. Congress has frequently in years past adopted reso-
lutions of sympathy and understanding and encouragement to the cap-
tive nations and set up Captive Nations Week and things of that type.
Would this, in effect, be a sort of repudiation of those resolutions if
we were now to ratify a treaty which would tend to permanentize their
reluctant position of servitude in the Russian empire?
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. I fear so, sir; and, as a matter of fact, it even
smacks, unfortunately, of some semblance of hypocrisy saying one
thing from one end of the mouth and doing something else from the
other.
Senator MUNDT. You say it would indicate that during the debate,
and our vote we should decide one way or the other. That there is
no need to chuck the captive nations under the chin and say, "We
are good friends of yours," and, at the next moment, freeze them.
into perpetuity and into a situation whereby we recognize that all of
their diplomatic contacts are to be handled by the Soviets.
Mr. DOBRIANBBY. Right.
Senator MUNDT. It seems to me that kind of hypocrisy of voting''.
them good wishes one day and then denying them any chance for any
hope of receiving American encouragement for ultimate liberation:
the next day certainly cannot make very much sense to them if they
are as intelligent as I believe them to be.
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes.
NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS RIGHTS OBTAINABLE MANY YEARS AGO
Senator MUNDT. You stress a point which has been mentioned quite'
frequently to me by visitors who have come into my office and ex-
pressed disenchantment with this ratification process.
They have said, and you seem to affirm the fact, that insofar as:
reciprocity is concerned, and insofar as our having access and contact
with the Americans who are arrested over there, that if this is im-
portant, there is nothing in the world to have prevented us from
getting it many, many years ago, except a refusal on our part to stand
up and demand reciprocity because those are conditions we have'...
granted Russian nationals in our country since time immemorial. Is
that correct?
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. That is correct.
Senator MUNDT. You have made a study of that. You are sure that
that can be done?
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes. At least the legal basis for it one finds very'
specifically, for example, in the Litvinov letter to President Roosevelt,
November 16, 1933, in which he, and this is quite explicit, and in
which he states, to quote :
Furthermore, I desire to state that such rights will be guaranteed to Americhn
nationals immediately upon the establishment of relations between our two'
countries.
Now, Mr. MacArthur, in the questions and answers that he sent
to the Senators, points out that this had to do, according to him with
the possibility of having a consular convention between the UAS.R.
and the United States at that time.
Well, there is a reference to it. But here Litvinov explicitly states,
"Once we have diplomatic relations, that from this point on, whether!
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you have a consular convention or no," and one was not consummated,
"that you have the protection of American nationals," and there were
many violations, I understand, in that period.
The other important thing is we have had Supreme Court decisions
based, if you will, on the legality in these exchanges.
Senator MuNDT. It would seem to me over and beyond that, that
it is implicit in the very interchange of diplomatic recognition and
diplomatic representatives that: there is the ri ht to demand reciprocity.
I cannot conceive of one nation-to wit, the United States-saying to
another nation-the U.S.S.R.-"we are going to have diplomatic ex-
changes. You send an Ambassador over here and you have an Em-
bassy. We send one over there and we have an Embassy. Under
these rules any time you want to you can lock our people up and we
will not.ask you to let us talk to them, but over on our side, your people
can roam around, and if we lock them up, we are going to let you
insist on talking to them."
It does not make any sense to me that we do not have a rule
of reciprocity in this whole business of diplomatic relationships unless
you have a very weak attitude on the part of this country which per-
petually appeases the position of the Russians simply because they
come from a different political culture.
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. Well, Senator, I thought that I made that point
rather clear. That actually is the way we behaved toward this thing
called the Soviet Union over the past roughly 45 years, both economi-
cally, politically, even, I would say, intellectually. It would almost
seem that we have become the guardians of their particular empire,
and this is another illustration, another symbol of this easy accession,
if you will, to the primary Russian interests.
Senator MuNDT. Of course, in this particular case we have this whole
reciprocal arrangement buttressed and fortified by the Litvinov ex-
change of letters.
Mr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes.
Senator MUNDT. So if a promise or a treaty from Russia is binding
on Russia, it is binding in that regard.
Now, the position of the State Department is that this was abro-
gated by the Russians at some time, and so we have asked them to
submit to us the date and the communication by which it was abro-
gated.
I don't know, Mr. Chairman, if that answer has been received from
the State Department? Have we had it?
Mr. MARCY. I am sorry. There has been no inquiry on that, if you
are speaking of the date of the abrogation.
Senator MUNDT. There have been inquiries and public hearings,
and if there is still any doubt about it, I again make this in the nature
of an inquiry. It has been done before. It has been done on the floor
of the Senate, and it has been done in private communications. I
think this committee is entitled to know if it was, in fact, abrogated,
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162 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
and by what kind of written communication, signed by whom and
dated when. I don't like all these vagaries about it. So we will con-
sider this an inquiry.
Senator SPARKMAN. Would you restate the inquiry just the way
you want in put to the State Department?
Senator MUNDT. Yes. I would like to know on what date the Rus-
sians abrogated this Litvinov agreement, and to have the text of the
communication by which it was abrogated, because I doubt very much
that it was done by long-distance telephone.
- Senator SPARKMAN. We will make that inquiry and get that infor-
mation for the record.
Senator MUNDT. Thank you. If there is a. misunderstanding on
the part of the State Department, i his certainly should clear it up.
Senator SPARKMAN. There has been correspondence.
Senator MUNDT'. Yes. I have had correspondence all around the
point, but I have never gotten an answer as to the date or who wrote
the communication and what was said on it.
Senator SPARKMAN. Very well.
(The information referred to follows:)
Hon. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations,
Wasliinaton, 1).C.
DEAR Ma. SECRETARY : During the hearing on February 17 on the proposed
Consular Convention with the Soviet Union, Senator Mundt stated : "I would
like to know on what date the Russians abrogated this Litvinov Agreement,
and have the text of the communication by which it was abrogated, because I
doubt very much that it was done by long distance telephone."
Senator Sparkman, Acting Chairman of the Committee, replied : "We will
make that inquiry and get that information for the record."
We would appreciate having the information Senator Mundt requested as soon
as possible.
Sincerely yours,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
Washington
Hon. CARL MARCY,
Chief of Staff, Foreign. Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. MARCY : Thank you for your letter of February 23, 1907, in which
you pass on the Foreign Relations Committee's inquiry as to when and by what
communication the "Litvinoff agreement" of 1933 was abrogated by the Soviet
Union. Your reference presumably is to Foreign Minister Litvin.off's letter to
President Roosevelt of November 16, 1933, in which the Soviet Union promised
unilaterally to extend to American nationals the provisions for consular notifica-
tion and access contained in the Soviet-German Agreement Concerning Conditions
of Residence and Business and Legal Protection of October 12, 1925. I am
attaching a copy of Mr. Litvinoff's letter which included the pertinent extracts
from the Soviet-German Agreement of 1925.
The Soviet-German Agreement was never, to our knowledge, formally abro-
gated. It ceased to have effect, however, upon the outbreak of armed hostilities
between the two countries during World War II, when each country withdrew
its diplomatic and consular personnel. After the war, and the occupation and
division of Germany, the pre-war Soviet: German Agreement was not revived.
Instead the Soviet Union negotiated new Consular Treaties with both the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany and the so-called "German Democratic Republic"-
neither of which contain any guarantees of consular notification or access to
arrested nationals. I am attaching a copy of Article 17 of the Soviet Agreement
of 1958 with the Federal Republic of Germany.
The post-war legal situation with respect to consular protection of American
citizens in the Soviet Union, prior to the 19G4 signature of the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Consular convention now pending before the Senate, may thus be summarized
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION Y
as one in which there were no Soviet treaties in force to which the Litvinoff
most-favored-nation pledge could attach. This was one of the reasons that per-
suaded the Department to negotiate the 1964 Convention, containing as it does
clear and explicit guarantees of consular notification and access,
The Litvinoff pledge itself, for what it was worth, has also never been formally
withdrawn. However Mr. Litvinoff's letter linked the Soviet pledge to the stated
expectation that the two countries would "immediately" negotiate a consular
convention on the same subject. As you know, this expectation was not fulfilled
since no convention was negotiated to agreement until more than thirty years
later. The Soviets have long been in the position plausibly to maintain that the
Litvinoff pledge was merely an interim undertaking which lapsed upon the
failure of the parties "immediately" to negotiate a consular convention.
The legal deficiencies of the "Litvinoff agreement" were among the reasons
persuading the Department that the time had come to conclude a treaty con-
taining clear and unequivocal provisions giving us the rights of notification and
access in cases of Americans arrested in the Soviet Union. These provisions are
-essential if American citizens traveling in the Soviet Union are to be afforded
the consular protection they deserve. The 19G4 Consular Convention and its
Protocol achieve this purpose by making it unambiguously clear that notification
and access must be granted within four days from the time of arrest or detention
.of an American national and on a continuing basis thereafter.
If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to let me know.
Sincerely yours,
DOUGLAS MAOARTIIUR 11,
Assistant Seoretarg for Congressional Relations.
Mr. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
President of the United States of America,
The White House.
My DEAR MR. PRESIDENT : Following our conversations I have the honor to
inform you that the Soviet Government is prepared to include in a consular
convention to be negotiated immediately following the establishment of relations
between our two countries provisions in which nationals of the United States
shall be granted rights with reference to legal protection which shall not be less
favorable than those enjoyed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by
nationals of the nation most favored in this respect. Furthermore, I desire to
state that such rights will be granted to American nationals immediately upon
the establishment of relations between our two countries.
In this connection I have the honor to call to your attention Article 11 and
the Protocol to Article 11, of the Agreement Concerning Conditions of Residence
.and Business and Legal Protection in General concluded between Germany
,and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on October 12, 1925.
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to adopt the necessary measures
to inform the consul of the other Party as soon as possible whenever a national
of the country which he represents is arrested in his district.
The same procedure Shall apply if a prisoner is transferred from one place of
detention to another.
Ad Article 11
1. The Consul shall be notified either by a communication from the person
arrested or by the authorities themselves direct. Such communications shall
be made within a period not exceeding seven times twenty-four hours, and in
large towns, including capitals of districts, within a period not exceeding three
times twenty-four hours.
2. In places of detention of all kinds, requests made by consular representatives
to visit nationals of their country ender arrest, or to have them visited by their
.representatives, shall be granted without delay. The consular representative
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164 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
shall not be entitled to require officials of the courts or prisons to withdraw
during his interview with the person under arrest.
I am, my dear Mr. President,
Very sincerely yours,
MAIM LITVINOFF,
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
CONSULAR TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. SIGNED AT BONN, ON 25 APRIL 1958 (UN
TREATY SERIES No. 4832)
1. In the performance of his official duties, a consul may apply to the com-
petent local authorities of his consular district and may make representations
to them concerning violations of the rights and interests of his State and its
citizens and of legal persons which have their head offices in the sending State
and are constituted in accordance with its laws.
2. If the consul's representations are not taken into account or if it proves
to be the case that authorities outside the consular district are concernedin
the matter, the question shall be settled through the diplomatic channel.
Senator MUNDT. Doctor, you make a point on which I wish you
would elaborate somewhat where you say "the risks are not only of
espionage," and which we have discussed, and we have had the
testimony of J. Edgar Hoover in that regard, and I think we all
understand his position on that. You go on to other points not only,
of espionage, but coercion bribery, and blackmail of American citizens
with relatives in the U.S..R., some of which activities the Rumanians
have engaged in.
I do not happen to have in my particular state many of the citizens
who have relatives in the U.S.S.R. This is a matter which had not''
been brought to my attention. Would you elaborate on that a little
bit?
Mr. DOBRIANSBY. Yes. My main point here, being the psycho-
political aspect of this, now in connection, let us say, with the ",
Rumanians, and I think this has not been brought out sufficiently,
in the public arena where, through their diplomatic personnel here,
would contact Americans of Rumanian background, let us say, in the
area of Cleveland, and after the contact is rnade, they find out the
financial standing of these individuals, also whether they have
relations in Rumania, they proceed to build up this whole case, and
then we get into the matter of bribery and some blackmail.
I understand in this case that hundreds of thousands of dollars
have been passed. "If you want your relative out of Rumania, you
have to pay."
Well, this same thing can be done in connection with any of these
relatives that Americans have in the U.S.S.R.
And Americans, let us say, of Lithuanian background or of Estonian
background or of Ukrainian background may be approached in this
same way, and when one considers the Hungarian foreign exchange
position or Rumania and practically every other part of the Red
empire, including the U.S.S.R. they could really have a heyday along
these lines.
There is this aspect that I have not explored, but I should imagine
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CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION 165
the statement given by Mr. MacArthur in one paragraph or two, but
to consult with lawyers who have had problems, let us say, in the State
of Pennsylvania, with the U.S.S.R. concerning legacies, and the rumor
that goes about is that there are many Americans of Russian back-
ground in California who have left possibly millions of dollars, and
these are things that can be easily tapped, it could be tapped, within
the present structure, but it would be facilitated if you had the
development of these consulates and Moscow, in turn, would be
encouraged to really take advantage of us.
Then a third, which I think is very important, and I will give a
specific illustration, as many of you enators know, for example, by
virtue of what the Congress did, a statue was set up here in Washing-
ton, the Shevchenko statue, to show our feelings, if you will, toward the
Ukrainian people, and the like.
Now, they have come here through their cultural exchange people.
They are highly selected. No group comes, whether it is a full group,
folk dancing, or, let us say, whether it is a journalistic group, without
having the use of the proverbial KGB guide, and we have noticed
over the past 2, 21/2 years where their objective is to infiltrate the
churches, Catholic and also Orthodox, to infiltrate highly anti-com-
munist ethnic groups here in the United States, and largely in the
North and Southwest, in the State above yours, North Dakota, where
there are quite a number of organizations along these lines, and the
whole intention there is really to undermine this anti-communist posi-
tion. Now, this is actually part of their strategy and they will be able
to even benefit and even certainly make use of a treaty of this sort, as
I stated, a diplomatic degradation with regard to the people of
Ukraine, and that would apply to those of Byelorussia and the like.
Senator MUNDT. I was interested in what you said about these Or-
thodox priests, because I had a visit in my office with two Orthodox
priests who desired to testify to the fact that they had been impor-
tuned by people, presently with diplomatic immunity in the United
States, to utilize the influence of their high office in the Orthodox
Church to pull their congregations in the direction of the Russian posi-
tion. I would very much have liked to have called them as witnesses,
but as we have only one day allotted to present the witnesses in opposi-
tion, there is no time unless somebody out of the goodness of his heart
decides to prolong his discussion a little bit so that other witnesses
can be heard. They are available to testify.
I have no personal knowledge of them, but they appear to be good,
devout Christians, and they were quite disturbed about what they
considered to be an utterly unwarranted and unjustified encroachment
upon their functions as ministers of the Gospel.
OPPOSITION WITNESSES
Senator SPARKMAN.. Would the Senator yield for a suggestion?
The Senator said only one day had been allotted for the opposition.
Of course, this is the second day, the Senator realizes.
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166 CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Senator MUNDT. Let me make it very clear; one day was allotted to
those of us who have some questions about the ratification to call wit-
nesses. The only other witness in opposition, I believe, so far haa
been the American Legion which was called by the committee.
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPARKMAN. It does not seem to me that it matters who calls
a witness in opposition. I just wanted the record to show that this is,
the second day of opposition witnesses.
Senator MUNDT. Will the Senator agree it was a day and a witness?'
Senator SPARKMAN. I think the record ought to show this is the
second day. In fact, it is the second day Dr. Dobriansky has been in. attendance.
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, as long as this question has-
come up, an advertisement has been run in my State, I understand, by
the Liberty Lobby.
I plan to leave town if possible this afternoon. As a result of this.
advertisement, I have had letters which congratulated me for taking a
position on this treaty which is not the position I have. taken. There-
fore, if it is in order, as a matter of personal privilege, after this gen-
tleman leaves the witness stand, I would like the Liberty Lobby
witness called.
Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I object to that. We have been
pushed around about as much as I think you should push around
people who have been allocated today. The Liberty Lobby has not
been called by those of us who are seeking to oppose the ratification of
this treaty. It is not one of our witnesses. It was called by the Chair-
man. He made it clear in the public record, and he made it clear in
the announcement.
I just think we ought to decide that if you do not want to hear the
opposition that we have arranged, say so, and not try to railroad this.
If you are going to hear it, let us hear it with the arrangement that was,
set up.
Senator SYMINGTON. Let me say to my able friend from South
Dakota, I did not and do not know who called the witnesses, nor do I
know whether or not you called the Liberty Lobby.
Senator MUNDT. To have the record perfectly clear, the Chairman
called it. I did not. I asked specifically that it not be called on the
day we had witnesses.
,Senator SYMMINGTON. I did not know that.
Senator MUNDT. I brought it up.
Senator SYMINGTON. I left the Joint Economic Committee to come;
to this hearing. Here is an advertisement, "The Communist Next
Door," which it would appear that I signed, along with my colleague,.
Senator Long.
The name of the Liberty Lobby is not at the end of the advertise-
ment. My name is. These ads appeared in the Kansas City Times
and in the St. Louis Globe-Democrat. The article I am inserting in
the record is from the St. Louis Globe-Democrat.
(The advertisement referred to follows:)
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 eroveA fgLRRIe , N41 1rHC -Rp,?,JppgWR000300050032-5
EXHIBIT A
I. SOVIET TREATIES
1. PEACE TREATY
A peace treaty was concluded in Moscow on July 12, 1920, between the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the -Republic of Lithuania, Article 1 of which
reads : "Proceeding from the right, proclaimed by the Russian Socialist Federated
Soviet Republic, of all nations to free self-determination * * * Russia recognizes
without reservation, the sovereign rights and independence of the Lithuanian
State, with all the juridical consequences arising from such recognition, and
voluntarily and for all time abandons all sovereign rights of Russia over the
Lithuanian people and their territory. The fact of the past subjection of Lith-
uania to Russia does not impose on the Lithuanian nation and its territory any
liabilities whatsoever toward Russia." (League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 3,
p. 106.)
2. TREATY OF NONAGGRESSION
On September 28, 1926, a Treaty of Nonaggression was signed in Moscow.
The pertinent Articles of this treaty read :
"Article 2: The Republic of Lithuania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics mutually agree to respect their respective sovereignty and also their in-
tegri-ty and' territorial inviolability in all circumstances.
"Article 3: Each of the two Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from
any act of aggression whatsoever against the other Party." (League of Nations
Treaty Series, Publication of Treaties and International Engagements Regis-
tered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. LX 153.)
Before the termination of the above-mentioned treaty, the Government of
Moscow proposed to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania that the va-
lidity of this treaty be extended for another ten years. This was done on
April 4, 1934. The Nonaggression Treaty was extended until December 31,1945.
On October 10, 1939, Lithuania was forced to sign this pact, Article 7 of which
reads : "This pact shall not affect to any extent the sovereign rights of the
Contracting Parties * * *"
Similar treaties of Mutual Security and Nonaggression were signed with
Latvia and Estonia in IM, 1932, and 1939.
For correspondence in 1940 concerning the forcible occupation of the Baltic
States and -their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see 1940 For. Rel. vol. I, pp.
357-444.
Law incorporating the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist. Republic in the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow, Aug. 3, 1940, original text in Isvestiya,
Aug 9, 1940, reprinted in English translation in 144 Br. & For. St. Paps. (1940-
42) 526; law incorporating the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic in the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow, Aug. 5, 1940, original text in Isvestiya,
Aug. 9, 1940, reprinted in English translation in 144 Br. & For. St. Paps. (1940-
42) 527; law incorporating the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic in the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow, Aug. 6, 1940, original text in Isvestiya,
Aug. 9, 1940, reprinted in English translation in 144 Br. & For. St. Paps.
(1940-42) 527.
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EXHIBIT E
[From the Chicago Sun-Times, May 12, 1966]
SOVIETS HOUND BALTIC EXILES
(By Charles Bartlett)
NEW YORK.-The question of whether Eerik Heine is a Communist agent or an
Estonian patriotic hero serves at least to direct attention to the Soviet enslave-
ment of the Baltic republics. This is useful at a time when the Kremlin is mak-
ing freedom an issue in South Viet Nam.
Whatever Heine proves to be, there are ample grounds for the charge that
Moscow sends agents 'to penetrate exile communities. Others have made this
effort. In fact, the greatest mark of Soviet concern for the nations it has oc-
cupied is the attention, it accords their exiles.
A young Estonian named Arthur Haman landed in Sweden after escaping from
Soviet territory in 1955. He took a part-time job with the Associated Press while
he studied at Stockholm University. Laster he worked with Estonian groups in
Sweden and wrote a textbook in Swedish for Estonians. He was completely ac-
cepted by his fellow exiles.
He came to the United States in 1961 to attend a congress of linguists, The
Central Intelligence Agency had established that he was an agent. He was
advised to leave the country. He returned to'Stockh:olm but disappeared during
May, 1963. A letter appeared five months later over his name in Izvestia. It
complained that he had been hounded out of the West by CIA persecution.
Soviet policy toward exiles from the Baltic states and the Ukraine is to keep
them intimidated and, if possible, divided. A Communist newspaper, Homeland,
is distributed in their native tongues and it persistently attacks the exile leader-
ship. Occasionally an exile leader is assassinated in Europe by Soviet agents.
All this activity could betray a sense of insecurity on the part of the Kremlin.
A Latvian elevated to the Soviet Presidium, Arvid Pelshe, told the party congress
there are "quite 'a few difficulties," including 'a failure to attach sufficient signifi-
cance to Marxism, In the Baltic republics. But none of the ingredients of an
uprising exists.
These nations were highly literate before the Soviets seized them in 1939 and
their cultures are being doggedly preserved against the rigors of the Communist
system. A spirit of nationalism is sustained in language and literature.
"Bourgeois nationalism" is a serious sin in Communist eyes, but its persistence
is attested by reports reaching the West that a large number of writers were
arrested in the Ukraine last fall. Such uctivities keep alive the exiles' hopes that
liberation, sparked from within, may one day be attainable.
'The prospect seems remote but it is hard to 'believe that the book has been
closed on this sordid chapter in history. The Baltic states were the first to
recognize the Soviet government in 1920 and the first to be swallowed in 1939.
Defending the treaty that preceded the physical takeover, Foreign Minister V. M.
Molotov said the talk of "Sovietizing" the Baltic states was "nonsensical."
One year of Communist rule was s'o'brutal :that the Germans were received as
liberators in the Baltic states. They had endured the rigors of false elections,
mass -deportations and shootings and they counted on the West's determination
to save them from a return of the Russians.
The United States could perhaps have used its nuclear weight to save these
countries at the end of the war. The evidence of the Heine case that the CIA is
involved with the Baltic exiles is reassurance at least that the cause of freedom is
being kept alive.
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(By Anthony J. Rudis)
There are almost one million people in Chicago, whose direct origin or ethnic
origin is Eastern European-this is the territory from the Baltic to the Black
Sea, between Russia and Germany. From this group the Baltic people in Chi-
oago number 200,000. The problems of Eastern Europe draw our close atten-
tion because it is there that the 1st and 2nd World Wars flamed up- -to
envelope the world, and where the flame still has not died.
The history of this part of Europe is most intriguing. It is here that a di-
viding line is formed between Eastern and Western civilizations. Not only did
this territory form the ancient battlefields, but it has even become the present-
day front. Today it is called "The Iron Curtain". It has divided the world
into two distinct camps-the Eastern World and the Western World.
Today I'm going to speak of a small part of Eastern Europe-but one that
is very important and one on which people are seeking information. Because
I will go into historical dates and quotations from treaties, I will necessarily
have to adhere rather closely to my written text.
The three Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, perhaps are so-
called because of their geographical location on the Baltic Sea. The title to
my discussion is not a factual one or an existing condition, it was thus called
by Molotov in September, 1939, when the Russian government informed the
Lithuanian nation that it would be necessary for -them to sign Mutual Assistance
Pacts. When a country, too small to offer assistance and to small and peace-
ful to commit an act of aggression, was approached by a big power such as
the Soviet Union, their question was why a great power demanded this of the
three comparatively small Baltic countries. Molotov's answer was that "Rus-
sia looked upon them as their Baltic Window on Europe".
Through the years, Russia had demanded treaties and pacts from these three
small nations, promising "respect to each other's sovereignty and territorial
integrity and inviolability". Yet the world knows what subsequently happened to
these people, how -the Red fire swept through these countries, consuming, scorch-
ing and destroying human freedom and civilization, brazenly tramplingon their
own promises and agreements.
The time today is too short to present a whole composite picture, but I shall
attempt to give you a clearer understanding of the Baltics, by going back sev-
eral centuries and bringing you up to 1939-the date of the final treaty, and
1940, when an ultimatum was delivered and all power was openly taken over
by the Soviet Union.
The three countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are not new political
formations. They are of Aryan stock. Their historical backgrounds differ
somewhat from one another, and as Lithuania is the largest, and figures more
prominently in history, I will dwell more on this country. The Letts (Latvians
as they are now called) and their close racial kin, the Lithuanians, occupied the
Baltic region before written history began. Phoenician and Roman coins found
in these countries testify to their existance and contact with those periods. The
Latvians and Estonians have always constituted a distinct national group, but
they could not fight off aggression and in their early history were taken over and
ruled by a succession of strong European powers=German and Swedish-before
Russian Imperialism enveloped them from about 1720 to the 1st World War,
when they emerged, as republics.
Latvia comprises 25,000 sq. miles with a population of 1,900,000. The ma-
jority of the Letts are protestant by religion. Estonia comprises 18,357 sq.
miles, with a population of 1,126,400. 78% are Lutherans. Lithuania comprises
an area of 26,500 sq. miles and had a population of 3,042,863 in 1939. 80% are
Catholic.
Today, the Lithuanian tongue, a member of the 'Indo-European family of
languages, has the distinction of being one of the oldest living languages in
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Europe-the most akin to ancient Sanskrit. Its importance as an aid to the
study of comparative philology is recognized by foreign scholars.
Ancient Phoenician, Greek, Roman, and Arab travelers and writers were the
first to acquaint the world at large with the inhabitants of the Southeastern
shores of the Baltic Sea. The oldest designation for the inhabitants of this area,
the Aistians, was first mentioned by Tacitus in the first century of the Christian
Era and repeated by other writers until the end of the 10th century. Lithuanian
historians and linguists identify their prehistoric ancestors as Aistlans.
The Chronicle, Annales, Quedlinburgenses, of the year 1009, A.D. first mentions
Litha (Lithuania). Nestor's Chronicle from the year 1056 to 1116 mentions
Lltva (Lithuania). Teutonic invaders referred to the inhabitants as Leeti or
Leedu-the Estonian name for Lithuania. Since then, Lithuanians and their
kinsmen have remained known to history.
The Teutonic Order mentions the resistance of the Lithuanians from 1215 to
1410 at the time they attempted to spread Christianity into that territory. But
the Lithuanians felt that the aims of the Teutonic Knights were political, and
not Christian, and therefore resisted strongly and became the last nation in
Europe to embrace Christianity.
History tells us that the Lithuanians had formed an official state by the middle
of .the 13th century, when their King, Mindaugas, was crowned in 1253. De-
fensive wars against the Teutonic Orders encouraged the formation of the official
state which at that time became known as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
Wars with the Teutonic Knights lasted for 200 years. During this period many
small duchies and kingdoms, including Russian duchies, knowing of the tolerance
of the Lithuanian rulers, sought protection from the Tartars, and came under
the protectorate of Lithuania to ward off the onslaught and terror. So that in
the beginning of the 15th century, about 1410, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
became a great power stretching from the Baltic to the Black Seas, and, as such,
was successfully able to continue to ward off the political ambitions of its
neighbors.
Thus, for a period of. 500 years, Lithuania not only stopped Teutonic ex-
pansion into Eastern Europe, but became known for its religious and racial
tolerance to all people within its domain-Lithuanians, Russians, Ukrainians.
Jews, and Poles.
The succession of rulers during this period, the Grand Dukes, gave asylum
to the persecuted and oppressed people of other nations, permitting them exten-
sive privileges. It is interesting to note that many Jewish people accepted this
gesture and enjoying the privilege of racial and religious freedom, built one of
their greatest religious institutions, in Telsial. Pre-Second World War, this
Institute, several hundred years old, was still world-renowned among the Jewish
Rabbis.
This fact is brought out to contrast the condition in the neighboring countries,
where despotic governments, subjugation of the people, suppression of human
rights and hatred of one nation against the other, were rife. There are many
documents today that testify to Lithuanian's great tolerance, her benign pro-
tectorate that became so extensive because it was sought by outside nations, and
not forced, through conquest. And, so we find that in the Middle Ages, Lithuania
offered a free and democratic way of life to its people.
Lithuania's desire for a just Code of Laws resulted in the Statutes of Lithu-
ania, published in 1529. It is important to note that this was the first Code of
Laws published in Europe since the time of Justin the Great. It was 15 years in
the making. This Code of Laws was adopted by other Eastern European coun-
tries and was used up to the 19th century. The first known land census of
Europe was accomplished by the Lithuanian State in 1528. Land reforms re-
sulted from this.
This method of rule was admired and envied by other countries, so that
marriage and territorial alliances were sought. These alliances, in time, and the
liberal forms of government, proved also to be the country's weakness and
subsequent downfall. The autocratic governments surrounding Lithuania-
Russia, Austro-Hungary Empire, Prussia, planned invasions and seized Lithu-
anian territories. One invasion after another reduced the country and Lithuanian
fell to Russia in 1795.
For 120 years, Lithuania suffered an exceedingly dark and dismal period.
Freedom of speech and religion was banned. The people were serfs in the full
sense of the word. For 40 years, even the Press was denied them. Insurrection
followed insurrection, until the ban on the printed word was raised. The Lithu-
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anian people seeking to escape Russian tyranny, in great numbers abandoned
their ancestral homeland and emigrated to America.
World War I released the Baltic countries from their Russian bondage of over
120 years. All the great powers of the day : England, France, Italy, Japan, and
the United States, acknowledged Lithuania free and independent. In 1921,
she was admitted to the League of Nations, and established diplomatic relations.
On July 12, 1920, Russia, acknowledging Lithuania's independence, signed a
peace treaty which stated :
1. Declaration of war upon another State.
2. Invasion by its armed forces * * *.
3. Naval blockade of the coasts or ports.
4. Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory or- which
have invaded the territory * * *.
The 3rd paragraph accents even more clearly : "No political, military or other
consideration, may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred
to in Article 2."
Similar treaties of Mutual Security and Non-Aggression were signed with
Latvia and Estonia in 1920, 1932, and 1939. One commercial treaty with Estonia,
in particular, gave them a wide open window for trade. It was extremely favor-
able to Russia-transit rights in ports were even granted.
he Baltic countries lived in peaceful and friendly co-existence with its neigh-
bors, including Russia. Nevertheless, in a speech delivered at the 18th Congress
of the Communist Party, Stalin stated that under the existing political circum-
stances, the time was ripe "for reappraisal of existing international pledges and
agreements". That same year, 1939, a map appeared, published by the Russian
general staff, showing Lithuanian territory as a component part of the Soviet
Union. In addition to its military significance, this map shows that the attack
on Lithuania by the Soviet Union was premeditated.
With the outbreak of World War II, Lithuania proclaimed her neutrality and
did not succumb to German proposals to enter the war against Poland. The
Soviet Union made the enticing offer to return her historic capital, Vilnius.
This did not deceive the government of Lithuania, which made every effort to
avoid signing a mutual assistance pact, the terms of which included the garrison-
ing of Soviet troops on Lithuanian soil. However, on October 10, 1939, Lithuania
was forced to sign this pact, Article 7.of which read : "This pact shall not affect to
any extent the sovereign rights of the contracting parties * * *" -
Yes even this did not satisfy the Soviet Union, imbued with the idea of self-
aggrandizement and communistic imperialism. Lithuania was stunned, when at
midnight, June 14, 1940, an ultimatum was delivered demanding the access of un-
limited troops and a government subservient to Moscow.
All political power was openly taken over by the Soviet Union and on August
3, 1940, Lithuania was declared to be a part of the Soviet Union. These countries
were enslaved by Moscow through friendly treaties, which the ilusians had no
intention of keeping at the time they were made. When the October 10, 1939,
treaty was signed with Lithuania, Rusia had already signed the Molotov-Ribben-
trop Pact in August of that year, by which Pact the Soviet Union and Germany
had assigned and divided amongst themselves, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and
Poland. The Kersten Committee discovered the original map designating this.
We can only understand Russia's deceitful presentation of this process, at
which they are experienced masters, when we know that Communist propaganda
always transforms acts of violence and aggression in-to impressive acts of libera-
tion. The Soviet Union is interested in conducting matters so that a conflict
can take place so that it would be possible to carry out Stalin's oath given at the
grave of "We swear to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will not spare our lives in
the strengthening and extension of the Communist International." (History
of the Communist Party in U.S.S.R., 1928)
The Soviet occupation is illegal and not recognized by the United States. On
April 29, 1954, Senator Douglas (Ill.) introduced a Resolution Into the Senate,
reaffirming the official stand taken by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisen-
hower, condemning the seizure of the Baltic States as unlawful. This Resolu-
tion passed unanimously in the Senate.
The United Nations has agreed that the only hope for avoiding war is the
signing of international treaties, however, the Russians believe that changing
times invalidate existing obligations-hence their peace treaties and signed pacts
are worthless, as they drive on seeking new windows to world domination.
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