CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050009-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 14, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

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March 14, 1967
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
or yellow skin and pay homage to other
religions.
On the surface, the deficiency lies in the
policies and priorities of the advanced coun-
tries. More deeply viewed, the stagnation of
policy and commitment points to the shrink-
ing moral boundaries of peoples whose com-
forts are increasing dramatically. And at
bottom, widespread complacency in the face
of accelerating disparity is building up to a
massive indictment of the breadth of outlook,
adequacy of theology, compassion and efficacy
of action of Christians and their establish-
ments in the industrialized countries.
No area is more subject to misleading fig-
ures than the aid field. Grants, long-term
loans, hard bank loans, strictly commercial
export credits, surplus food, private invest-
ment for profit, and contributions to inter-
national organizations can all be loosely
called "aid" Lumping together all these ap-
ples and oranges, The New York Times on
July 20, 1966, headlined the annual stock-
taking meeting of the "rich man's club"-
the Development Assistance Committee of
the Organization of Economic Cooperation
Development-as follows: "Aid to the Poor
Nations Soared to Record $10.98 Billion in
1965." Nothing could be more misleading.
Few readers could be expected to draw
from the article the real news: that once
again there was no significant increase in
governmental aid; that no progress was being
made in liberalizing interest rates and matu-
rities; that the slump in new commitments in
1965 threatened to become an actual drop in
the future flow of aid.
The unvarnished fact is that governmental
foreign aid for development from the dozen
or so rich countries to the hundred poor ones
has reached a dead level-less than $6 billion
a year-where it has remained stuck for the
past five years. The total represents six-
tenth of 1 per cent of a trillion-dollar econ-
omy. This level becomes steadily less im-
pressive as the economies of Europe, America
and Japan reach new highs, as repayments
of principal and interest from the poor in-
crease, and as the terms of trade (what can
be bought from the rich by the exports of the
poor) remain unfavorable. Even now over
half of the flow of development finance is
offset by the return flow of amortization,
dividend and interest payments. At the
present rate the world of the poor will, in
shortly more than a decade, be repaying the
rich more than it receives, It is already
arguable that the flow of brains has been at
least as much to the rich as to the poor.
This stagnation of developmental aid has
taken place at a time when the administra-
tive capacity of the developing world, the
national and regional planning of practical
projects and uses for resources, together with
the population and its other needs, have all
increased. What could have been a brilliant,
historic, developmental achievement of the
last decades of this century seems to be turn-
ing into a Sargasso Sea of wrecked hopes,
frustration, mutual recrimination and de-
spair.
THE MYTHOLOGY OF FOREIGN AID
All too few Americans are aware of this
global grinding to a halt. Even fewer would
point an accusing finger at the United States.
In this field, particularly, we subscribe un-
critically and arrogantly to a mythology that
has less and less resemblance to facts.
The first myth is that we are giving either
just enough or too much aid. (A 1965 poll
showed only 6 per cent of Americans favor-
ing an increase.) Actually we are fast ap-
proaching an annual gross national product
of $795 billion. Each year's increase exceeds
the total combined product of all but seven
developing nations. We can take a special
lack of pride in seeing our aid percentage of
GNP decrease from 2,5 percent in the Mar-
shall Plan era to less than three-tenths of 1
per cent today.
In absolute terms we are spending far less
today on our entire overseas development
programs than when we were one-third as
wealthy and helping only our white Christian
neighbors in Europe. Aid accounts for less
than 2 per cent of the national budget. Our
balance of payments ledger shows the over-
seas aid expenditures have been out from
nearly a billion dollars in 1961 to less than
$250 million in 1965-a small fraction of our
net deficit.
In 1966, Congress, after the usual dreary
debate, cut the President's "bare bones" aid
request by 13 per cent to the lowest level
since 1958. And this year the prospect is
even more dismal, with the President's re-
portedly seeking even less for aid than he
requested last year-and from a more hostile
Congress,
Where we are heading is crystal clear, Our
average yearly per capita income is $3,000.
That of the 80 developing countries that
are members of the World Bank is $120.
Our growth is 5 per cent a year, theirs is 1
per cent. By the year 2000, our average per
capita income will have risen by $1,500 and
theirs by $50. The gap will have widened
by a ratio of 30 to 1. In 15 years, accord-
ing to Hugo Fisher of the Resources Agency
of California, the U.S. will have 95 per cent
of the total population and will be using
83 per cent of the world's natural resources,
He adds that the understatement that the
rest of the world will take a "dim view" of
such consumption (The New York Times,
March 20, 1966).
A second myth is that we are the only
nation giving substantial aid. In fact the
countries of Europe, Canada and Japan have
already given more to the developing world
than they received under the Marshall Plan.
The U.S. is not first, but fifth, in the size of
its aid program in relation to its income.
Others give a larger proportion of outright
grants, send more experts and teachers over-
seas and make loans on more generous terms.
Indeed, as the Western world's top aid pol-
icy-makers were _meeting in Washington last
summer, Canada announced its new policy
of making interest-free dvelopment loans,
while the U.S. Senate sought to increase our
interest rate for the third time in recent
years.
Another myth holds that U.S. aid is poorly
planned and administered. In fact, nearly
two decades of aid activities (and particu-
larly the last four years under the leadership
of David E. Bell) have seen continued im-
provement in administration, planning, the
delicate linkage between external aid and
internal efforts and discipline, inspection
and follow-up.
Rare indeed are the bloopers that made
the headlines a decade ago (but which im-
mortally retread the stairs like Jacob Mar-
ley's ghost). And somehow a cadre of de-
velopment experts-who are the envy of the
aid ministries of Europe but prophets with-
out honor at home-has been attracted to
and stuck with this program, both in Wash-
ington and overseas,
Perhaps the myth most dangerous to our
ability to assist in this historic task of de-
velopment with grace and effectiveness is
that we expect more "progress" in remote
places and alien cultures, for our money,
than we do at home. When we fight juve-
nile delinquency, crime, narcotics addiction,
mental illness, poverty and racial discrimi-
nation, we know that success will come
slowly, that failures will often outnur.aber
successes, and that a great deal of effort and
funds will thus be "wasted." Not so with
foreign aid. If the countries we try to help
do not respond immediately with gratitude,
political support, competent planning, in-
ternal discipline and social justice, we are
all too ready to abandon the effort. We are
not content to do God's work. We want to
play God.
S 3737
OUR "CONSCIENCE GAP"
If there is a widening gap between the
rich and the poor, between supply and de-
mand, there is an equally serious "conscience
gap," a gap that represents an erosion of
spirit and a moral hardening of the arteries
of the American people-and their cousins
in Europe. It represents a missed oppor-
tunity for the modernized world. And it
represents a Pilate-like abdication by the
Christian Church at what is, for better or
worse, %watershed in history.
So far in this two-decade-old adventure in
helping other peoples, the Christian estab-
lishment can take little credit for what has
been done. I exempt from this harsh obser-
vation the quiet, steady, effective work that
has been done by the numerous Catholic,
Protestant and Jewish service agencies, to-
gether with their corps of keen and dedicated
officials, that have been active in the de-
veloping countries. But the "Church" as a
center of contemporary doctrine, under-
standing, education and inspiration appli-
cable to this historic demand on our breadth
of view and depth of concern might just as
well not have existed.
Resounding resolutions, well-drafted testi-
mony for Congressional committees, partici-
pation in conferences and last-minute
lobbying with other internationally-minded
groups to stave off disaster in Congress have
not been lacking. There has been coopera-
tive fellowship but no creative leadership.
There has been no sustained or effective
effort by top church bodies to relate our
development aid effort to Christian doctrine.
Their headquarters are woefully lacking in
staff equipped to collect, analyze and present
facts.
The result has been that an administration
or Congress can and does slash aid requests
and appropriations, raise interest rates, short-
en periods of repayment, attach self-defeat-
ing conditions and restrictions to aid, cut per-
sonnel and limit the number of countries
assisted, without any danger of hearing from
the Church or its constituency.
The President, a few dedicated officials and
a small and dwindling stable of weary Con-
gressional workhorses have had to sponsor
and defend aid policy without the assistance
of strong voices from the Church or an ef-
fective aid constituency. Any church pro-
nouncment on the need for greater, more
sustained or more effective assistance is likely
to be such a melange of factual error or in-
adequacy and sweeping generality that it
cannot be expected to influence the levers
of power.
At the grass roots, priests, pastors and
rabbis all too often exhibit either indifference
or a lack of grasp that emasculates their
effectiveness in helping to find the link be-
tween religious tradition and this most con-
temporary challenge to it. Congregations
respond generously to concrete, specific op-
portunities but not to the overriding chal-
lenge to national commitment. They will
rally generously to support a family in Chile
or a misison school in the Philippines; they
will listen with warm hearts to a returning
church worker, government employee or
Peace Corps volunteer. But when national
policy and programs of assisting other peo-
ples are discussed, Christians are just as ill-
informed, unconcerned and hostile as any-
one else.
There are signs of change. As a result of
Vatican II, there is burgeoning cooperation
between Roman Catholics and Protestants
in the aid field. The National Council of
Churches (NCC) has created an Advisory
Committee on Peace with the needs of devel-
oping countries as one of the concerns. And
the World Council of Churches' Conference
on Church and Society set forth the problem
in clear, unmistakable terms.
More recently there was the action of the
NCC in Miami that gave prominent recogni-
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S 3738
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 14, 1967
tion to the development challenge in its
peace program. But the most concrete evi-
dence of good intentions lies in the action
of the United Church of Christ, whose Coun-
cil for Christian Social Action opened a
Washington office on Jan. 3. un1ter the direc-
tion of Rev. L. Maynard Catchings, to pro-
mote substantially Increasedgovernment and
private spending on International develop-
ment The Council hopes that representa-
tives of other denominations will soon join
the staff.
THE CHURCH AS CATALYST
Notwithstanding these straws in the wind,
I sense a blandness, a proclivity to phrase
general propositions, an avoidance of any
program smacking of action, Barbara Ward
closed her eloquent call to action In the
Feb. 8, 1968, issue of CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS
with the question: "What shall we do?" It
seems to me that we begin by doing what we
have power to do-and not by issuing ring-
Ing pronouncements. The crying need Is for
the soil of Christian spirit to be tilled at
home and abroad. This is a humble but
doable task If the Church is so minded.
The specific tasks start with the develop-
ment of Christian doctrine consistent with
the task ahead and the setting of Its priority.
The work should continue with equipping
the Church with headquarters and field staff
to collect, analyze and present facts and
Issues, while developing training programs
and materials for its clerical and lay leaders.
At the same time the Church should strive
to be a catalyst for a truly national, broadly
representative, nongovernmental, continuing
effort to stimulate and sustain understand-
ing and support of this dimension of na-
tionsil policy, Finally, there should be a
joining of forces with the Christian and
Jewish communities abroad, toward the end
of revitalizing the conscience of the rich.
It may well be that the task is too big.
But failure is less to be feared than striving.
For while this is a crisis for the times, it is
also a crisis for the Church.
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further morning business? If not, morn-
ing business l concluded.
111- / WYV7
'r CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE
SOVIET UNION
The PRESIDING OFFICER, Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The pending question is on the adop-
tion of Reservation No. 1, offered by the
Senator from South Dakota, to the reso-
lution of ratification. Debate is limited
to 4 hours, to be equally divided and
controlled by the Senator from South
Dakota [Mr. MUNDT] and the Senator
from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT).
RECESS UNTIL 1:30 P.M. TODAY
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the Senate
stand in recess until 1:30 p.m.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TAL-
MADGE In the chair.) Is there objection
to the request of the Senator from Mon-
tana? The Chair hears none, and it is
so ordered.
Thereupon (at 12 o'clock and 10 min-
utes p.m.) the Senate took a recess until
1:30 o'clock p.m., the same day.
At I o'clock and 30 minutes p.m., the
Senate reassembled, and was called to
order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. TAL-
MADGE in the chair).
CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE
SOVIET UNION
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the Consular Convention between the
United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, together
with a protocol relating thereto, signed
at Moscow on June 1, 1964 (Ex. D., 88th
Cong., second sess.).
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum, and
ask that the time be taken out of both
sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will call the roll.
'T'he assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MORTON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, It is so ordered.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr, President, I yield
myself 20 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from South Dakota is recog-
nized for 20 minutes.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, before
getting into a discussion of the reserva-
tion which is now before us, Executive
Reservation No. 1, I should like to read
into the RECORD two statements which
have come to my office today.
Yesterday, during the colloquy intro-
duced by the Senator from California
[Mr. MURPHY], during the discussion led
by the Senator from Nebraska [Mr.
IIIIUSKA], some interesting observations
were made in connection with the rather
surprising fact that none of the national
pollsters had taken polls, or at least had
not reported them generally in the press,
or. this very important and difficult ques-
tion now before us.
Early last evening I received a tele-
phone call from a Mr. Jim Nicholls, of
KDAY, a radio station in Tacoma, Wash.,
who operates a program called "Party-
line." He said that this radio station In
the State of Washington read been con-
ducting a poll for severa days on this
particular topic. I said:
That Is Interesting. Why don't you send
me a telegram and tell me what is in it, and
I will be glad to read it into the RECORD?
A telegram from him came this morn-
ing. I shall read it into the RECORD. I
should add I shall be pleased to place
Into the RECORD any other authentic polls
which can be secured from radio sta-
tions, newspapers, or the famous poll-
sters, George Gallup and Louis Harris,
both of whom have apparently over-
looked taking a poll in connection with
this question, to see how those who are
interested have expressed themselves on
this subject. I reaffirm what I said yes-
terday. I think on issuer of this kind,
when we should hear and heed, as I think
we do, the hopes and prayers of people
everywhere for an early conclusion of
this czar, that at least their expressions
should be heard by Members of the
Senate.
The telegram reads:
Senator CARL MUNDT,
The Senate,
Washington, D.C.:
In F. phonein written poll on the Consular
Treaty on my radio program covering the
greater Tacoma area thirteen hundred ten
opposed and one favorable. This sampling
appears Indicative of how the average citi-
zen feels ...
Then follow some com;)liments about
my efforts here, which it might be im-
modest for me to recite. However, I shall
have to put them into the RECORD be-
cause they are a part of the telegram,
but that part will appear in the RECORD
without my reading it.
I mk unanimous consent that the tele-
gram be printed in the RECORD at this
point.
There being no objection, the telegram
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
TACOMA, WASH.,
if arch 14, 1967,
Senator KARL MUNDT,
The Senate,
Washington, D.C.:
In a Phonein writin poll on the Consular
Treaty on my radio program covering the
greater Tacoma area thirteen hundred ten
opposed and one favorable this sampling
appears Indicative of how the average citizen
feels many thank God for your courageous
leadership in opposing the chief suppliers
of arms killing American boys In Viet Nam.
JIM NICHOLLS,
' Partyline," KDAY,
Mr. MUNDT, Second, this morning
I had a group call at my office represent-
ing the Military Order of the World
Warr, the District of Columbia Chapter,
and they asked me to present to the
Senate the judgment and the recom-
mendations of their order, which is com-
prised solely, of course, of distinguished
officers and soldiers who have fought for
our colors in previous wars.
Their resolution is dated March 10,
and reads as follows:
Resolution relative to the Consular Con-
vention between the United States and the
Union of Soviet Socialist, Republics now
pending before the United States Senate:
The District of Columbia Chapter, the
Military Order of the World Wars held its
usual luncheon meeting at Noon, Thursday
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair lays before the Senate the pend-
ing business, which the clerk will state.
The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK, A
Consular Convention between the United
States of America and the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics, together with a
protocol relating thereto, signed at Mos-
cow on June 1, 1964 (Ex. D., 88th Cong.,
second secs.).
The Senate proceeded to consider the
convention.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I suggest the absence of a
quorum; and I ask unanimous consent
that the time for the quorum call be
charged against the time allotted to the
junior Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FUL-
BRIGHT].
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll,
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
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March 14, 1967
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
9 March 1967; at which the members present
unanimously adopted the following Resolu-
tion;
Resolved, That the District of Columbia
Chapter petition the United States Senate
not to ratify the Consular Convention pend-
ing between the United States and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Attest:
HUGH H. HARTLEY,
Adjutant.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the resolution of the Military
Order of the World Wars be printed in
the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the resolu-
tion was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD., as follows:
[From the Military Order of the World Wars,
District of Columbia Chapter]
Resolution relative to the Consular Con-
vention between the United States and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics now
pending before the United States Senate:
The District of Columbia Chapter, the
Military Order of the World Wars held its
usual luncheon meeting at Noon, Thursday
9 March 1967;. at which the members present
unanimously adopted the following Resolu-
tion;
Resolved, That the District of Columbia
Chapter petition the United States Senate
not to ratify the Consular Convention pend-
ing between the United States and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Attest :
HUGH H. HARTLEY,
Adjutant.
Mr. MUNDT. Now, Mr. President, so
that Senators who are not present, and
who may have occasion to reflect upon
what is being debated this afternoon
when they read the RECORD tomorrow
morning-unhappily, after they have
voted-and also so that those who study
the RECORD back home, and historians
who may comment upon the decisions we
are about to make may have ready access
to the focus upon which this debate
hinges, I ask unanimous consent to have
printed at this point in the RECORD the
full text of Executive Reservation No. 1.
There being no objection, the reserva-
tion was ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
Before the period at the end of the resolu.
tion of ratification insert a comma and the
following: "subject to the reservation that
no exchange of instruments of ratification of
the convention shall be entered into on be-
half of the United States until the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics shall have agreed
(1) to permit.the distribution to the Soviet
press or any segment thereof by United States
diplomatic and consular officers of announce-
ments of United States public policy, both
foreign and domestic, and answers to any
criticism of such policy contained in the So-
viet press, and (2) not to impose or enforce
any limitation on the number of United
States citizens permitted to be in the Soviet
Union at any time as representatives of the
United States press which would effectively
reduce them below the number of Soviet
press representatives entering the United
States, or to impose upon them any condi-
tions of travel or objective reporting which
do not prevail for Soviet press representatives
within the United States.'."
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President; as I see
the decision which we are about to make
by a rollcall vote sometime this after-
noon, two major questions are involved;
and the same two questions will be in-
volved when we vote on a much more sig-
nificant and far-reaching proposed res-
ervation which I have proposed some-
time late tomorrow afternoon.
The first of these considerations, it
seems to me, is the question of whether
or not the U.S. Senate still has the
right-and I believe the responsibility-
to exercise its full constitutional preroga-
tive of both advising and consenting on
the matter of international treaties.
The second consideration is, of course,
the desirability, the usefulness, and the
wisdom of the specific reservations being
discussed.
I propose to discuss first, Mr. President,
what I consider to be the continuing re-
sponsibility of,Senators, all of whom took
the oath, as they entered the Chamber
for the first time, to support the Con-
stitution of the United States. I think
that oath carries with it the constitu-
tional responsibility of facing up to the
responsibility of advising the Executive
on treatymaking, as well as registering
their dissent or assent.
Lest anyone may have forgotten the
exact language in the Constitution, it is
found in article II, section 2, clause 2 of
our hallowed Constitution; and in dis-
cussing the powers of the President and
the powers of the Congress, I refer to
that constitutional language, which
reads--
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, may we
have order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senate will be in order. The Senator will
suspend until the-Senate is in order.
The Senator from South Dakota may
proceed.
Mr. MUNDT. The language reads as
follows, under the heading "Powers of
the President":
He shall have Power, by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur.
In that connection, Mr. President, I
was both impressed and intrigued by
what I found in reading the CONGRES-
SIONAL RECORD which arrived in our
offices this morning, because there on
pages 53580 and S3581 the majority
leader had placed the texts of letters
received, in the first instance, by the
chairman of our Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr.
FULBRIGHT], and signed by the Secretary
of State, Dean Rusk; in the second in-
stance, by our honored and respected
majority leader [Mr. MANSFIELD], and
signed by the Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations, William B. Ma-
comber, Jr., who has only very recently
succeeded to that task, since his prede-
cessor, Doug MacArthur, has gone off to
assume ambassadorial duties; and in the
third instance, another letter received by
the majority leader, also signed by Wil-
liam B. Macomber, Jr.
The sum and substance of those letters
is to the effect that the U.S. Senate
should not, at this late hour, engage in
its advisory function, The sum and sub-
stance is that if we were to offer advice,
and it were adopted now, it would delay
the ratification of the treaty, or perhaps
jeopardize it altogether,
S 3739
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MUNDT. Surely.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am sure that the
administration would be delighted to re-
ceive any advice from the Senate. It
has received it quite often from the dis-
tinguished Senator from South Dakota
as well as from the Senator from Mon-
tana now speaking, and also from other
Members of this body.
But the Senator from South Dakota
must keep in mind-and I am sure he
does-that this convention was initi-
ated by the United States. It was initi-
ated because we thought it was in our
best interests to bave such a convention.
It is not a question of setting up con-
sulates, because the President already
has the authority to set up consulates.
Mr. MUNDT. I agree.
Mr. MANSFIELD. It is a question
primarily of furnishing protection to the
18,000 Americans who now visit the
Soviet Union every year. If reservations
are attached, it is my belief that the con-
vention will not be ratified by the Soviet
Union. That means that Americans who
visit the Soviet Union will continue to
be subject to Soviet law, just as Soviet
citizens-tourists, that is-who visit the
United States-and they number under
900 a year-are now subject to American
law which includes the'rights guaranteed
every person in this country under the
Constitution, which insure that Soviet
citizens receive prompt and speedy at-
tention to their situation.
If the convention is not ratified, be-
cause of reservations and other mat-
ters which prevent its ratification by the
Soviet Union, the 18,000 or more Amer-
icans who travel in the Soviet Union will
remain subject to the laws of the U.S.S.R.
They can now be held incommunicado
for nine months or more, and our am-
bassadorial staffs can have great dif-
ficulty in gaining access to them and
furnishing all assistance possible to them,
Advice is one thing, but attaching
reservations is another. I would hope
that the Senator from South Dakota and
the Senate as a whole will keep these
factors I have mentioned in mind.
Mr. MUNDT. The Senator from Mon-
tana has, correctly expressed the con-
sensus of the purport of the letters in the
RECORD, to which I have just invited at-
tention. He is precisely correct in em-
phasizing, once again, as it is empha-
sized in the letters, that the main purpose
of the convention is to protect Americans
who may be traveling in Russia.
But the Senator does not come to grips
with the question: Of what conceivable
use is it for the Senate, with respect to
any treaty, to offer advice, if it is not in
terms of a reservation or in terms of an
amendment? It is the world's greatest
exercise in futility to offer advice con-
cerning what may happen under a
treaty. The terms of a treaty determine
what will happen, and it is not possible
to create legislative history even to alter
that, as can be done with respect to an
ordinary legislative matter. Our advice
must be incorporated in the treaty by
reservation or amendment or it is both
futile and meaningless.
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S 3740 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
br. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator further yield?
Mr. MUNDT. Surely.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President,
there are different kinds of advice; and
I believe that I can recognize advice
which is intended to kill a treaty.
It is my belief-I may be mistaken-
that the Senator from South Dakota Is
opposed to this convention in practically
any form in which it could be ratified-
perhaps not In any form, although I am
unable to conceive of any at the moment.
If he could have reservations attached,
he could go home to the folks in Huron
and Winner and say, "This is what I did:
I strengthened the treaty."
Mir. MUNDT. That is what I want to
do.
Mr. MANSFIELD. But he would have
to tell them also that there was no
treaty; that his reservations had killed
it.
Mir. MUNDT. That is a speculation
which the Senator from Montana has a
right to engage in.
it will be the burden of my argument
to say that this is a good-faith amend-
ment to test the good faith of the Soviets
from the standpoint of wanting a rap-
prochement, in which case I think they
would be happy to accept the reservation.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator has
been diligent in his opposition to this
treaty. I know his motives are sincere.
I know that he feels as he does because
of his convictions. But I point out that
while the Senate has the right to give
advice, and should, we ought to take into
consideration the responsibility of the
executive branch.
The work which has gone into this
convention began, may I say, under
Eisenhower, and I believe the genesis
can be found in the kitchen debate be-
tween Khrushchev and Nixon in Mos-
cow: It was carried forward by Kennedy
and Is now being brought before the
Senate by President Johnson.
In the last session, I was worried about
bringing this treaty to the floor of the
Senate. And while there are organiza-
tions in this country which claim credit
for stopping such action last year, the
fact is that the majority leader, the
Senator from Montana, personally was
disinclined to bring the convention be-
fore the Senate because of what he
feared might be the ultimate result.
Perhaps it was a mistake in judgment
on my part.
Mfr. MUNDT. I think the judgment of
the Senator was excellent.
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is open to
question, but at least this year we will
face up to it, win, lose, or draw.
I hope-and the Senator has been most
cooperative-that we can bring this mat-
ter to a head this week. I have asked
every Democratic Senator to come back
and stay until this matter is finished,
and I assume that the same thing has
been done on the Republican side.
The Senator has kindly consented to
a limitation on debate on his reserva-
tions, for which I am deeply grateful,
and the Senator from Maine [Mrs.
SMITH] has kindly consented to a limi-
tation on her executive understanding.
I would hope that this matter could
be faced up to and that we can make
our arguments and explain our differ-
ences on the floor and that, in some way,
the final issue could be met and that
this matter, which has been before us for
3 years now could be settled this week.
Mr. MUNDT. As the Senator knows-
and I have told him privately, and I do
not mind stating it publicly-the Sen-
ator from South Dakota has no inten-
tion of engaging in dilatory tactics.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator Is
always accommodating and I know that
he has no such intention.
Mr. MUNDT. The Senator from South
Dakota has no Intention of filibustering
and no intention of upsetting any pro-
gram that the leadership has for a rea-
sonable amount of debate and for fixing
a time certain for this momentous and
historic vote which will accommodate as
many Senators as possible.
I am glad that the majority leader
recognizes, with the Senator from South
Dakota, that we have responsibilities as
Senators to offer advice. Let us then be
practical about this,
If that is a constitutional right, if that
Is a constitutional duty, when and where
can the Senate offer any meaningful ad-
vice except when the treaty is before It,
unless we accept the followup fact that
this is the time and now is the hour to
offer whatever advice we feel is mean-
ingful and significant?
We would otherwise have to accept the
fact that by precedent this constitutional
prerogative has been eliminated. I do
not think it should be, and I do not think
it has been.
On numerous occasions in the past,
earlier Senators, who were perhaps
sturdier than our generation of Senators,
have written In reservations, have writ-
ten Into treaties their advice at the
time the treaty was*up for consideration.
That does not mean that they killed
the treaty. If the reservations are ob-
noxious to the other side and are up-
setting to the purposes of the other side,
there might have to be renegotiation.
However, if they are acceptable, if they
are good faith amendments--as this one
is---and are incorporated in the treaty by
negotiations, there would perhaps just be
acquiescence on the part of the other
parties to the treaty.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. MUNDT, I yield.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, as far as this Senator is concerned,
my mind is not closed. I could vote
either way on the reservation or the
treaty. I believe the same thing would
be true with respect to the present
Presiding Officer, the distinguished Sena-
tor from Georgia [Mr. TALrdtiocE), who
offered an amendment the other day to
try to clear up the thing that troubled
him the most about the treaty.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator from South Dakota
has expired.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I yield
myself an additional 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from South Dakota is recognized
for an additional 15 minutes.
March 14, 1967
M::?. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, as the Senator well knows, there is
a very popular television program en-
titled "The FBI." On every second or
there", televised program of that show, the
general theme is that there are Soviet
agents in our country that are engaged
in an espionage program and have mur-
dered people and have tried to carry out
their devious schemes.
We are told that the p ngram is based
upon actual facts and that such facts
have actually happened in this country.
Mr. MUNDT. At least 28 times in the
last several years we have had to send
Russian agents in their diplomatic serv-
ice back to Russia because they were
caught in espionage activities.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If some Rus-
sian happened to be working in a con-
sulate in this country and kidnaped or
murdered someone, it would be very dif-
ficult; for me, having voted for the treaty,
to explain to the people in Louisiana why
I voted to allow that fellow to go around
killing Americans and be punished by
being sent home with nothing more than
the ?tccolade of the Russian people.
I think the amendment would prob-
ably carry if enough Senstors were pres-
ent to hear the debate. I am told that
therm is no such provision in any treaty
with any other country.
We were told in committee that this
was a much better deal for us than for
the Soviet Union. I cannot understand
what our interest is in going around mur-
dering their citizens, but if the commit-
tee Minks it is a better deal for us than
it is for the Soviets, then r would assume
that it is in this treaty because our Gov-
ernment asked for it. And if that is
what it is doing here, I should think the
Russians would be happy to have it taken
out.
Mr. MUNDT. May I clear up for the
Senator exactly how this immunity clause
crept into the treaty.
What the Senator from Montana said
is correct. This treaty had its genesis
and suggestion from the Eisenhower ad-
ministration. But I call attention to two
important documented facts of history.
In the first place, when the Eisenhower
administration made that suggestion to
Russia, we were not at war in Vietnam,
and the Russians were not supplying
every sophisticated weapon that was kill-
ing every American boy killed by such
devices in the entire war in Vietnam. So
we a,,e in an altogether different climate
now. There is no relationship now to
that earlier situation.
The other fact is-and no member of
the committee will dispute this, because
it is in black and white in the hearings-
that the Eisenhower proposal was for the
estatlishment of consu`ates and the
working out of confrontation and noti-
fication, with no reference whatsoever
to this entirely unprecedented oonces-
sion of immunity.
The Soviets, according to the testi-
mony In the record, Insisted on this
total imnmunity clause as a condition
precedent, before they signed the treaty.
Let us not be deluded about that.
Whether it works to their benefit or to
ours can be a matter of debate, but there
is no question that the immunity clause
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March 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
was written in because the Soviets said
it had to go in or there would be no
treaty. What the Senator says is cor-
rect, because the Soviets have put it in.
If the janitor in the consular office es-
tablished in Chicago-assuming that
they establish one there-murders the
' President's wife, all you can do, as the
distinguished present occupant of the
Chair, the Senator from Georgia [Mr.
TALMADGE], said the other day, is to bid
him a fond farewell as you ship him
back to the U.S.S.R.-not for punish-
ment, but perhaps for praise.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. As I under-
stand, nothing in this treaty would give
the 10,000 or 20,000 Americans visiting
the Soviet Union any right to murder
somebody there and come back home
soot free.
Mr. MUNDT. All it does is to give our
consular officers the right to commit
murder, with the same immunity. We
do not send them there with murderous
intentions, nor are they sent there as
trained spies.
Secretary of State Rusk has said that
we can discuss this treaty with the un-
derstanding that every Soviet consular
official coming here will be a trained
member of the KGB, their secret police
system. He was not trying to delude us.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MUNDT. I believe I can antici-
pate what the Senator is going to say.
Secretary Rusk said-and J. Edgar
Hoover agreed-that we can cope with
that situation given the necessary FBI
agents.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator
from South Dakota, if he follows his
argument to its logical conclusion, as-
sume that all the `Americans in the U.S.
consulate in the Soviet Union will be
diplomats?
Mr. MUNDT. If history has the un-
happy habit of repeating itself, which it
frequently does, I am afraid that a sur-
prisingly large number of them will be
diplomats, untrained in the kind of ac-
tivities in which the KGB officers will
engage in America.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not wish to
engage in an argument on this partic-
ular phase of the subject, but I am sure
that the Senator is well aware of what I
mean.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. MUNDT. I yield.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Frankly, I
would like to vote for the treaty, pro-
vided some of the doubts I have about
this matter could be cleared up. If not,
I might be compelled to vote against
ratification of the treaty.
If what we are told on television is
correct, the FBI authorizes the programs
about the FBI, in which Russian agents
go around murdering American citizens
and kidnaping people and engaging in
all sorts of acts of extortion to force pa-
triotic citizens to yield security informa-
tion to Soviet spies. Would the Senator
not find it a rather high price to pay for
a small amount of expanded tourist
service in the Soviet Union, the first time
they murder a dignified and outstand-
ing American citizen, without any re-
course against the murderer?
Mr. MUNDT. I am sure that the Sen-
ator from Louisiana must be as curious
as I am as to why we acquiesced to this
immunity clause. The record stands
eloquently silent, with respect to wit-
nesses from the State Department, as to
why that clause is in the treaty and what
possible good it can do for the United
States.
On pages S3580 and S3581 of yester-
day's RECORD are printed the letters from
the State Department, in support of the
treaty. Not one sentence can be found
in those letters in which the immunity
clause is mentioned. They say the pur-
pose of the treaty is to protect American
travelers. However, American travelers
do not get any protection whatsoever
from the immunity clause. It does not
apply to them; only to consular officers.
Actually, these travelers get very Little
protection of any kind.
All they get is the right to have the
consular office notified that they are in
jail. Then, within a limited number of
days, they have a right to talk to a con-
sular officer, who comes in to verify the
fact they are in jail and who attempts
to find out why. Nothing beyond that.
Nothing about guaranteeing the Amer-
ican a free trial. Nothing at all guaran-
teeing him his release.
A treaty to protect Americans? That
is what an American wants when he is
in trouble. When he is in trouble, he
wants to talk to a lawyer and to have a
free trial and a fair trial, and a chance
to express himself. He is not so much
concerned about having a conversation
through the bars of a prison cage with
a consular officer, but that is all he gets
by this treaty.
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MUNDT. I yield.
Mr, HRUSKA. Does the Senator
mean to tell the Senate that that roan
could still be held for 9 months, pend-
ing the completion of the investigation
of the charges made against him?
Mr. MUNDT. I mean to tell the Sen-
ate that that man could be held for 9
years, if it is in conformity with Russian
law. Anyone who reads this provision
will be as astounded as I was, This is
all they promise; this is what they say
we will get: the right to be notified and
the right to converse with a consular
officer. Only that and nothing more.
It would have been a much more sig-
nificant treaty and one much easier to
vote for if they had gone a step further
and said that an American citizen in
Russia shall have a right to a fair trial.
But it does not say that. This point
should be established in the RECORD.
Even a quick reading of the wording of
the treaty establishes that.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MUNDT. I yield.
Mr. MILLER. May I say to the Sen-
ator from Louisiana that I propose to
vote for the pending reservation, but f
must be fair about this. I wish to ex-
press my view on the point that the
Senator from Louisiana has raised.
S 3741
If, for example, a murder should be
committed by one of their consular offi-
cials in this country, and if he should re-
turn to Russia without anything but a
goodby from us, my guess would be that
we might well decide to call off the es-
tablishment of any more consulates and
to close those already established.
Mr. MUNDT. It would take 6 months
to do so.
Mr. MILLER. It is too bad that one
person must die in order for that to be
done, but that need not be repeated.
On the other hand, if one of our citi-
zens in Russia is involved in a similar
situation, nothing in the present Russian
scheme of doing business, as I under-
stand, would prevent them from charg-
ing our citizen with a trumped-up mur-
der charge; and in their jurisprudential
system it is difficult to say what would
happen. But the American citizen could
be put away for a long time.
So, with a view to preventing that
from happening to our own citizens, I
understand the immunity clause was put
in.
I recognize that arguments can be
made on both sides of this matter, but
I desired to respond to the Senator from
Louisiana and to tell him how I have
evaluated this part of this treaty.
Mr. MUNDT. The immunity clause
was put in for the protection of Russian
consular officials. If the Russians decide
to pick up, on a trumped-up charge, one
of these 18,000 Americans traveling for
pleasure or for profit, they can hold him
forever. All they need do is agree to
let him have a conversation now and
then with his consular officer. The
immunity does not run to the average
citizen. It runs only to the consular
official of the two countries.
Mr. MILLER. I accept the interpreta-
tion of the Senator from South Dakota.
The Senator is correct.
But if one of our consular officers in,
Russia is involved, he is assured that
there will not be trumped-up charges
made against him which might cause
him to serve a long time in a Soviet
prison. I believe that a degree of assur-
ance is provided to our potential consular
officials on this point.
.I should like to return to the point
made by the distinguished majority
leader, when he stated that it is his
opinion that if this reservation were
adopted, the treaty would not be ratified
by the Soviet Union. As the Senator
from South Dakota has pointed out,
everybody is entitled to his opinion. But
I wish the Senator from Montana would
give us the benefit of the reasons why he
is of that opinion.
I do not necessarily share that opinion.
Perhaps other Senators do not share it.
I should like to know what reasons the
Senator from Montana has for the
opinion that if this reservation is
adopted, the treaty is gone. I do not
know why that would necessarily follow.
This is, in fact, an open-skies reserva-
tion. Why should we prejudge the
leaders of the Soviet Union by saying be-
cause we would like to have an open-
skies policy adopted, therefore we ratify
this treaty subject to that understand-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 14, 1967
ing. If the Soviet Union is not going to
agree to this because they do not want
an open-skies policy, a question is raised
as to whether or not this Is the time to
ratify this particular treaty.
I believe that most of us in the Senate
have long favored an open-sky policy.
This policy goes back to the Eisenhower
days. We are saying we ratify the treaty
but that it would not take effect until
we have an open-sky policy over there.
If 1 were to vote against the convention
I would, perhaps, be subject to criticism
for abandoning an open-sky policy which
has long been supported as the policy of
our country.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MUNDT. I would be happy to
yield. However, I would like to have a
little lend-lease arrangement In order to
get additional time. I am going to run
out of time.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Surely.
Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Senator.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not know what
the Senator from Iowa means when he
refers to the pending reservation as an
open-sky reservation. That has nothing
to do with It. He asked for my opinion
about this convention.
I am for it because it Is in the interest
of the United States far more than it is
in The interest of the Soviet Union. I am
for it because this convention was under-
taken at our initiative, and, may I say
to my friend from Iowa, under a Repub-
licari President whom we revere and re-
spect.
I am for it because It gives added pro-
tection to Americans who may be travel-
ing in the Soviet Union, Had we had a
convention like this, perhaps Mr. New-
como Mott might be alive today, and
perhaps other Americans would not have
had to go through the travail which was
thei_ s because they had no protection, no
access to a consular or diplomatic of-
ficial and, therefore, were in effect help-
less; certainly so in comparison with the
rights which we, under our laws and our
Constitution, give Soviet citizens in this
country who are not in the diplomatic
corps.
Those are the reasons why I am in fa-
vor of this convention: I am interested
in protecting Americans who travel in a
closed society. For the life of me I can-
not understand why every Member of
this body is not interested In giving those
Americans the kind of protection which
this convention will allow.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from
South Dakota has the floor,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair has been advised that the time has
been allotted.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, we
yield 15 minutes from the time on this
side.
Mr. MILLER. I understand the rea-
son:s for the treaty having been proposed.
In fact, during his brief absence I pointed
out to the Senator from Louisiana [Mr.
LONGI one of the very reasons which the
Senator from Montana has just pointed
out. I pointed it out because I am in
support of the reservation pending and
I felt at the same time I should give the
Senator from Louisiana the benefit of
my reason for the treaty with respect to
his problem.
My real question was not the reason of
the Senator from Montana for being In
favor of the treaty, but the reasons why
he felt that if this reservation were
adopted the treaty would not be ratified
by the Soviet Union. The Senator ex-
pressed his opinion on that, Many Sen-
ators feel that way. I am not sure I feel
that way.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator
mean to say that he is not in favor of pro-
tecting Americans in a closed society?
Mr. MILLER. No. The Senate Is not
sure he shares the opinion of the Senator
from Montana that the mere adoption of
the reservation would be the end of the
treaty. The Senator from Montana so
sta fed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Lair. MILLER, I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. As far as I am con-
cerned, if any citizen of the State of Mon-
tana travels in the Soviet Union for any
purpose whatever, I want him to be given
every possible protection that this con-
vention calls for; and not only citizens
of Montana, but every citizen of the
United States. That is what this con-
vention basically would do,
It does not call for the creation bf con-
sulates because consulates can be created
now by the President. Basically this
treaty calls for the protection of Ameri-
can citizens traveling in the Soviet
Union, in that closed society.
The Senator does not want our people
to be subject to Soviet law, to be held in-
communicado for 9 months or more,
and not to have access to our diplomatic
personnel. Of course he does not, and
neither do I.
Returning to the question raised by my
distinguished friend from Iowa [Mr.
MILLER] I wish to read, with the per-
mission of the Senator from South
Dakota, a letter which I received today
from the Secretary of State relative to
this particular reservation.
THE SECEETASY OF STATE,
Washington, March 14, 1967.
Han. MICHAEL J. MANSFIELD,
U.S. Senate.
DEAR SENATOR MANSFIELD; In response to
your inquiry, I am pleased to give my views
regarding a reservation proposed to the US-
USSR Consular Convention now before the
Senate.
This reservation would provide that Ameri-
can consular officers in the Soviet Union
should have the "same right to free ex-
pression" In Russia as a Soviet consular
officer would have in the United States. In
addition, it would stipulate that there would
be "no- limit on the number of American
newsmen" in Russia.
The Consular Convention is an instrument
regulating the status and functions of con-
sular personnel, It would destroy its use-
fulness for that important purpose if we at-
tempted to use it as a vehicle for re-making
So-Aet society, however desirable it seems to
us that steps should be taken in the USSR
to make it a free society. I share the con-
cern for reducing and eliminating barriers
to the free expression and circulation of
ideas. However, it is my strongly held judg-
ment that this cannot be done by means of
reservations to the Consular Convention.
The immediate consequence of an effort to
do so in this way would be to kill the
Convention.
Piea;;e do not hesitate to call on me if I
can provide any further information or
assistance.
Sincerely,
DEAN RUSK.
I wsh to point out that today, in the
Soviet, Union, there are 21 accredited
American correspondents, and I under-
stand that there will soon be a 22d.
Conversely, in the United States today,
there are 22 accredited Soviet cor-
respondents. Are we going to tell the
Soviet Union how many American cor-
respondents they must take into their
country, and, in return, is the Soviet
Unlor going to tell us? Of course not.
Mr. MUNDT. I wish to comment a
little bit in response to this latest letter
from the Secretary of State.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I have more, too.
Mr. MUNDT, I would not doubt it.
We have had a blizzard of them lately.
I live in blizzard country, as does the
Senator from Montana, and we know
how to operate in a blizzard. One must
move early so as not to get smothered
by a blizzard. I believe the letters are
now four in number.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Speaking of letters,
this is not the first blizzard of letters en-
countered during this treaty's considera-
tion.
Mr MUNDT. No, but It is one of the
biggest. I must say that.
I s:zall comment on what the Secre-
tary of State said. I admire him greatly.
The record will show that I have done
a better job in supporting his policies
from this side of the aisle than have
some of the colleagues of the distin-
guished majority leader from his side of
the aisle. I speak about tam as one who
listened to his logic and who has sup-
ported him when I thought he was
correct.
The first statement he makes is that
there should not be incorporated any
reservations in this treaty which would
tend to direct activities of consular offi-
cials or tend to make a free society from
a closed society. We have already in-
corpc.rated something that is significant
and unprecedented in that connection
when we incorporated the immunity
provision. That has never been there be-
fore, and if we are going to go that far
and acquiesce and appease the Russians,
I see not reason why we should not get
a little bit of something incorporated in
the treaty which will protect the rights,
the authority, and the fur:ctioning of our
consular officers who go there not to com-
mit murder, but to try to show the
American picture to the Soviet populace.
We are asked to give them this un-
precedented freedom with immunity
which includes espionage, rape, murder,
and sabotage. Our consular officers
should have the right to express them-
selves publicly just as the Soviet am-
bass'tdorlal people in consular offices
have the right to express themselves in
this country.
Tl-e second phase of the Secretary's
letter-and I do not blame the Secretary
of State for this, and probably letter No.
5 will correct It-but he dealt with the
wrong copy of the reservation. I sus-
pect that is not his fault, but mine.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3743
Mr. MANSFIELD, It is probably
mine, but-
Mr. MUNDT. No, it is in his letter,
but I plead guilty, I think he has been
so busy writing letters that he has not
had time to read the RECORD.
Mr. MANSFIELD, Not at all. This
was in response to an inquiry from me.
I was under the impression that the
Senator was offering his free press reser-
vation, or whatever he calls it.
Mr. MUNDT. That is correct, but let
me say it was an error on my part. The
first printed version of my reservation
did not contain the final clause. The
Senate now has before it the corrected
and complete version, to which the Sec-
retary's letter did not relate.
The first clause of the reservation is
now before us, and reads as follows:
. not to impose or enforce any limita-
tion on the number of United States citi-
zens permitted to be in the Soviet Union at
any time as representatives of the United
States press which would effectively reduce
it below the number of Soviet press repre-
sentatives entering the United States.
He ignored, however, the second
clause-and I do not criticize him for
that because, as I say, there was an error
in the language in the first reservation.
However, he avoided entirely the most
significant part of the reservation now
before us which reads as follows:
Or to impose upon them any conditions of
travel or objective reporting which do not
prevail for Soviet press representatives with-
in the United States. '
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator from South Dakota yield
right there?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr, BAYH
in the chair). Does the Senator from
South Dakota yield to the Senator from
Montana?
Mr. MUNDT. I think the Senator will
agree that the Secretary's letter does not
respond to that clause in the reservation,
Of course I am now happy to yield to
the Senator from Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Am I to under-
stand from what the Senator seems to
imply, that representatives of the Soviet
press in this country have "carte
blanche" to travel to any part of this
country?
Mr. MUNDT. I did not say that. I
said that we should have the same right
to travel over there that they have to
travel here. While it is not "carte
blanche," there is a whale of a lot of lati-
tude as to what Russian journalists en-
joy here.
Mr. MANSFIELD. It seems to me I
recall that some of our press representa-
tives have traveled to various parts of
Asiatic Russia. They have traveled to
places such as Alma-Ata. They have
traveled in the maritime provinces, al-
though not, in recent years, to Vladivos.
tok, They have traveled in the areas
which used to be known as Russian
Turkestan, They have gone down into
some of the Asiatic emirates such as
Bukhara and Samarkand, along the
southern rim of Asiatic Russia.
Mr. MUNDT. So far as I know-and
I desire to be corrected by the majority
leader if I am wrong-if he has the facts
to correct me, the Soviet press has the
complete right to go anywhere in this
country which does not involve areas
connected with our national security.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I have a statement
here which I should like to read, with
the Senator's permission.
Mr. MUNDT. Surely. I would be
happy to listen to it.
Mr. MANSFIELD. We impose travel
restrictions and controls on Soviet press
representatives which are comparable to
those placed on our press representatives
in the Soviet Union.
Mr. MUNDT. Yes, we put them on as
a quid pro quo, as a protest, but not be-
cause we originated them here.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Does not the Sen-
ator think that we should operate on a
quid pro quo basis?
Mr. MUNDT. Yes, and it should be in-
corporated in the reservation, so that it
will be determined not by the Russian
formula, but by the American formula.
Mr. MANSFIELD, Does not the Sen-
ator think that the formula is being de-
termined by the Department of State in
this respect?
Mr. MUNDT, I do not. I think that
the Russians have moved in and said
that certain areas over there are off-
bounds, and then, as a belated protest,
we make some manifestation of the same
kind over here.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not think that
it is always so one-sided. I think there
are occasions when we have undertaken
the initiative and the Russians have re-
acted in kind. I think, although I can-
not state this accurately, that the Rus-
sians have done so more often than we
have.
Mr. MUNDT. I think that is right.
Mr. President, I invite the attention of
my Republican colleagues in the Senate
to the fact that a curious phenomenon
presents itself to me, as I am sure it must
to them. I allude to the fact that when-
ever the present administration has a
real, sticky problem where it is not quite
sure of itself and feels it is running con-
trary to the cross-currents of American
public opinion, this administration as-
serts, "This thing originated under the
Eisenhower administration."
Mr. MANSFIELD. It did.
Mr. MUNDT. For a long time they
tried to say that our war in Vietnam
originated under the Eisenhower admin-
istration. Finally, Mr. Eisenhower spoke
out and said, that at the time he left
office, that there were less than 500
Americans in Vietnam, that none of them
was engaged in any belligerent activi-
ties, that there were only two casualties
in Vietnam during the entire Eisenhower
administration, and both were caused by
traffic accidents.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Will the Senator
from South Dakota yield?
Mr. MUNDT. In just a second. Thus,
I point out that, rightfully or wrong-'
fully-and I have supported President
Johnson in his war efforts-I think it is
a little bit unfortunate that whenever,
the administration gets itself into a real,
tough situation, they try to put the blame
on Eisenhower.
As I pointed out earlier, when we did
initiate these consular conversations,
they were initiated under Eisenhower.
They were initiated during the time we
were not at war, we were not involved in
fighting in Vietnam. Certainly, our boys
were not being killed then by weapons
being supplied by the Soviet Union,
whom we are now asked to embrace in
this treaty. I think these are undis-
putable facts which should be'placed in
the record.
Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, the
Senator does not mean to imply that the
Senator from Montana, who now is ad-
dressing him, ever made any such re-
mark about President Eisenhower, impli-
cating him in our present difficulties-
Mr. MUNDT. No sir, I do not, but I
point out that it has been made by mem-
bers of the administration, of which the
distinguished Senator from Montana is
an important member. However, he can-
not be held responsible for every state-
ment made by every member of his ad-
ministration.
Mr. MANSFIELD. But the Senator
from Montana does say and does reiter-
ate, and the Senator from South Dakota
agrees with the statement, that Presi-
dent Eisenhower and his Vice President,
Richard Nixon, were both responsible for
the initiation of this convention now be-
fore us. I think that is a matter of fact
and I believe they should be given credit.
Mr. MUNDT. There is no argument
about that, but let us put the whole story
in the record. That was done before
the war-a war which we are now fight-
ing and in which we are deeply involved,
and the ramifications of which, in rela-
tionship to this treaty, comprise the main
reason why the Senator from South
Dakota is opposting the treaty so vig-
orously.
it should also be, said-and the Sen-
ator from Montana will not dispute this
because I think he was in the commit-
tee room when the Secretary of State
testified to this effect-that the im-
munity provisions were not included in
the Eisenhower proposal. They came at
the insistence of the Soviets, long after
the conversations had been negotiated
and when they were moving toward
finality.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I would not deny
that. As a matter of fact, we agreed to
do what the Soviets requested. They
did not insist. So far as the immunity
provisions are concerned, we agreed be-
cause we thought it was in our interest,
too; but may I now get back to some-
thing else, so long as President Eisen-
hower's name has been brought in. If
the Senator will turn to page 134 of the
hearings on the Consular Convention
with the Soviet Union, he will find there
a statement made by President Eisen-
hower, dated February 2, 1967, which
reads as follows:
Replying to questions concerning my opin-
ion as to the value of a Consular Convention
with the U.S.S.R., I cite these items from the
record:
At the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955
I pointed out to the Soviet Leaders that there
existed unnecessary restrictions on the flow
between us of ideas and I suggest that the
barriers which now impede opportunities of
people to travel anywhere in the world for
peaceful, friendly purposes, be lowered.
In July of 1969 Vice President Nixon
touched on this subject with Mr, Kozloz,
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S 3744 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE March 14, 1967
Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, and Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr, President, will The first reservation which we will vote
suggested that the United States establish a the Senator yield?
consulate in Leningrad wtih the Soviets es- on gees, as the Secretary of State stated
tablishing one In New York. Mr' '? I3ield? In his letter to the distinguished majority
When Chairman Khrushchev visited me at Mr. MANSFIELD. I started to make leader, to a subject which is beyond the
Camp David In September 1959, Secretary of a statement, but it looks as though I scope of the Consular Convention and
State Herter renewed this proposal to For- am giving It bit by bit. Part of the opens up an entirely new field for nego-
eign Minister Gromyko and also suggested statement was that we already distrib- tiation.
that a Consular Convention be negotiated. ute to the Soviet press, through our em- We approve the proposition that the
Such a convention was complete and signed bassy in that country, press releases United States 'representatives of the
In 1964. which contain announcements of U.S. press in the Soviet Union be equal In
I have not changed my belief that such a
convention Is In our national interest; that policy. We distribute such announce- number to the Soviet press representa-
it will not impair our national security; that ments in Moscow, and the Soviet Em- tion in the United States. We desire
it should enlarge our opoprtunities to learn bassy distributes such announcements that they shall have as free access to
more about the Soviet people, and that It Is in Washington. Distribution, of course, areas of the parts of the Soviet Union as
necessary to assure better protection for the does not guarantee publication, but the Sovie, representatives have here. But
many thousands of Americans who visit the reservation proposed by the distin- the reservation deals with the question
Soviet Union each year. r uished Senator from South Dakota does of information which would be properly
I believe that the distinguished Sena- not represent its publication but only its the subject of new negotiations with the
tor from Kentucky [Mr. COOPERI was the distribution, Soviet Union. The reservation simply
one who raised the question and brought Is that a correct statement? sidesteps the subject matter and the
it to the attention of the committee. I Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is correct. merit,'i of the convention before us-a
do not know whether the distinguished If that Is the right of the embassy, it convention which I believe is beneficial
Senator from South Dakota was in the should be the same right for consular of- to our country-and Is an Indirect way
room at that time or not. I was not firers. How in the world does the Sena- of striking down the convention,
there, because I had to be elsewhere. tor logically argue that what we are I may not have an opportunity to
Mr. MUNDT. I was not present at asking for, which is something which is speak again on the second reservation
the time either, but I read the hearings, provided in the diplomatic relations, proposed by the senior Senator from
One of the witnesses I could bring Into would kill the treaty if extended to the South Dakota, but the same principle is
this Chamber-if I could-would be Mr, consular officers? involved.
Dwight Eisenhower, who said he believed Mr. MANSFIELD, Because this Is The second reservation proposes that
it was necessary to remove some restric- only part of the reservation offered by the Consular Convention will not come
tions on the flow of ideas. My free- the distinguished Senator, and he knows into effect until the war in Vietnam is
press, free-movement good-faith reser- it. over. Now every one of us wants an end
vation, as it is involved in executive res- Mr. MUNDT, That is correct, and the to the war-
ervation No. 1, is a step which moves in other part is more significant. Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, if the
that direction. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator will yield, because he is speak-
Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? ing about my reservation, it says until
Senator yield? Mr. MUNDT. I yield, the war there is over or until the Com-
Mr. MUNDT. I yield. Mr. COOPER. I must return to a wander in Chief, President Johnson, can
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The committee which has been meeting all advise the Senate that it is not being
time of the Senator from South Dakota day. prolonged solely because the Soviets are
has expired. Mr. MUNDT. Does the Senator rise to supplying arms.
Mr MUNDT. I yield myself 5 min- ask a question or to make a statement? Mr. COOPER. I accept the correction:
utes. I want to know whether he Is for or either that the war is over or that the
Mr. PROUTY. I am a little uncertain against the reservation, so I can know Soviet Union has ceased to supply arms.
as to the meaning or effectiveness of the who should yield the Senator time. I was speaking to the purp)se of his res-
first provision in the Senator's proposal. Mr. COOPER. I am against the res- ervatic.n.
It states, "To permit the distribution to ervation. That the war may be trought to an
the Soviet press," and so on and so forth. Mr. MUNDT. Without losing the honori.ble end is the hope o-' all of us, and
We recognized that the Soviet Union is floor, I yield so the Senator from Mon- the hope of the American people. But
a closed society. It also has a censored tans may yield time to the Senator from the real question Is whether the adoption
press. It will accept press releases which Kentucky. of the reservation would have any effect
it wishes to accept, and It will ignore Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield 5 minutes at all upon bringing the war to a close or
others, It seems to me that there Is no or such additional time as the Senator shortening it. I do not think so, and I
requirement in this first provision that may need. do not believe that the Senate thinks so.
this must be carried out. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I want- Neither do I believe that the ratifica-
Mr. MUNDT. That is correct. There ed an opportunity to speak against the tion of the convention will lessen Soviet
are no guarantees that any of these pro- proposed reservations before i return to assistance. Then shall we say from emo-
visions will be complied with. That is a committee which Is sitting, and of tion, that we will forever foreclose agree-
why I say it is a good-faith reservation, which I am a member, ments with the Soviet Union of value to
If the Soviets comply with them, well First, I should like to say to the Sena- the United States and not affecting our
and good. If they do not, if they insist tor from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT] security? Or shall we undertake steps
on having one set of rules for us and that the adoption of either of his reser- which in time may help avoid the kind of
another for them, and Insist on a dou- vations would change the contractual confrontation that we have now in Viet-
ble standard of morality, we can. If we relationship which has been established nam'
consider the provocation serious enough, by this convention and would require its I would not be so optimi:;tic as to say
take action to abrogate the treaty. renegotiation. that this convention will have any im-
This certainly should be Inherent in Before these reservations were pro- mediae: influence on the .soviet Union.
any :good-faith treaty involving consul- posed, the debate thus far has been di- emotions, the second reservation, asserted agbased
ainst on
ar officers. We think they should have rected to the merits of the convention kind could be against any
l y,
the same right of access to Information before us. Objections to the convention, Union. kind Union. A function ions with the Soviet
and the same right of expression In one such as the fear of espionage, the immu- he fnc initiated by the fxecign pansy,
country as in another. The Senator nity dl the Executive or provision, the most-favored-nation the a &dvice of the Senate, is to explore,
e,
from South Dakota is just plumb tired clause, are upon the merits of the con- to find out if steps can be taken to lessen
of further appeasement, and of just giv- vention. I have spoken on these issues tension;, which inexorably, over the
ing in to the Russians every time on the in support of the convention. years, have brought us
basis.that, if we do not do this, they will But the Senator's reservations Intro- ion with the Soviet Union er confronta-
not go along, duce new propositions, which have This Consular Conventions is a small
Mr. PROUTY. I wanted to clarify the nothing to do with the substance or pur- step, but it Is a step helpful to the United
matter. poses of the Consular Convention. States.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
I simply wish to state again the rea-
sons which lead me to oppose the reser-
vations: First, because they have nothing
at all to do with the merits of the con-
vention; second, because I believe they
are a method of indirectly killing this
convention; and, third, because I think
they appeal solely to emotion and have
no possible effect on ending the war.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, could we
have an accounting from the chronicler
as to how the time has elapsed so far?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from South Dakota has 79 min-
utes, and the Senator from Arkansas has
73 minutes.
Mr. MUNDT. Remaining, or ex-
h,,msted?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Re-
maining.
Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I have promised. to yield
to some of the others who support the
reservation and oppose the treaty, but
I do wish to wrap up one phase of this
argument before yielding.
As I said at the beginning, on the mat-
ter of these reservations we have two
issues before us. The first is, Does the
Senate really believe that it should have
the constitutional power today, so fre-
quently exercised by our great predeces-
sors in the past, to advise before we con-
sent to a treaty?
The second issue is, Do these particular
reservations have merit? Do they ex-
press the sentiment of the Senate? Do
they comport with the convictions of a
majority of Senators, or do they not?
I have not started to discuss the sec-
ond aspect, the merits of the reservation,
because I should like to establish, at
least from the standpoint and position
of the Senator from South Dakota, that
the Senate has altogether too frequently
in recent years neglected its power of
advice; and that if we accept the state-
ments on pages 53580 and S3581, con-
tained in the first flurry of letters which
we have received from the Department
of State on the subject-three of them,
all nestled there together-then we ac-
cept the doctrine of this administration,
that they do not believe that Senators
should ever tinker with a treaty. They
can talk about it, they can write letters,
they can give advice, but may not in-
corporate their advice in a reservation or
an amendment.
Every. Senator, and I believe every
schoolchild, for that matter, knows that
this is the only kind of advice we can
give which is meaningful, which is sig-
nificant, which is effective. I submit
that we should consider that fact long
and hard, as this generation of Senators,
with responsibility for maintaining the
constitutional prerogatives of this august
body, before we knuckle under to the
argument that-
In treaty making, all the Senate can do is
consent or dissent; that advice constitu-
tional provision was for the historians.
They just put that in as sort of extra
verbiage at the writing of the Constitution
in Philadelphia.
Mr. President, many, many times in
our history the Senate has exercised this
prerogative of meaningful advice fear-
lessly, unaffected by arm twisting or im-
portunity, or blizzards of letters. Sen-
ators have stood on their own rights, in
their constitutional capacity, and have
said, "We have the right to advise, and
we will write our advice in the treaty,
where it counts."
Think of the Connally reservation, and
the reservation involving the World
Court. Those seven little words that
Tom Connally of Texas insisted that we
put into that reservation remain there
today. It must have served America
well, because it has never been removed.
It was written by a Senate that had the
stamina to act on its own constitutional
rights, instead of yielding to the seduc-
tive call:
You can say anything you want to, you
can pass advice resolutions, you can have
expressions of the sense of the Senate, but
don't put your advice where it counts--in
the treaty as a reservation or as an amend-
ment.
I submit that the Senate ought to de-
cide whether we have some advice func-
tion in connection with treatymaking, or
whether we do not. Either we are going
to timidly and weakly foresake our con-
stitutional prerogative, or we are going
to stand up and exercise. it.
Whether specific reservations are wise
or unwise is a matter of debate. There,
certainly, we have a right to disagree;
but we should not disagree about our
right to offer them, and to have a vote
on them, and to have them adopted, and
we should not be frightened away from
our responsibility by people whose
guess-no better than ours-is that if' we
make a reservation, we kill the treaty.
That is one man's individual specula-
tion, Mr. President, and it seems to me
it is a great confession of failure. on the
part of the State Department to say:
Look, if you put a reservation in, we cannot
argue very well; we go in half beaten when
we start. We have been playing the part of
appeasers so long we cannot now function as
successful advocates. Do not charge us with
another job; we know in advance we are go-
ing to fail.
I wish we had a State Department that
had more confidence in its advocacy and
its abilities than that. I submit that :it is
unconscionable to say that we should not
consider reservations because the State
Department indicates that they have not
the ability or the aptitude to carry out
the wishes of the Senate and the people
of America, in trying to bring about a
new meeting of minds on treaty issues
which are in controversy.
Mr. President, I understand that the
Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HANSEN]
would like to have me yield him some
time, or is it the Senator from Nebraska
[Mr. HRUSKA] ?
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me?
Mr. MUNDT. The Senator from
South Dakota yields 10 minutes to the
distinguished Senator from Iowa.
Mr. MILLER. I thank the Senator
from South Dakota..
Mr. President, the pending reservation
to the counselor treaty with the Soviet
Union provides that there will be no
exchange of instruments-in other
S 3745
words, that the treaty will not take ef-
fect-until the Soviet Union has agreed
to two conditions, namely:
First, that the United States be al-
lowed to distribute to the Soviet press
announcements of U.S. public policy,
both foreign and domestic, and answers
to any criticism of such policy contained
in the Soviet press; and,
Second, that the Soviet Union remove
restrictions on the number of U.S. press
representatives permitted in that count
try so long as that number does not ex-
ceed the number of Soviet press
representatives entering the United
States; further, that there shall be no
restriction of expression or movement
imposed upon our American press corps
representatives in Russia which do not
prevail for Russian press representatives
in the United States.
It will thus be seen that adoption of
this reservation will not require renegoti-
ation of the treaty with the Soviet Union,
as would be the case of an amendment
to the treaty, and that the only thing
affected would be the time the treaty
would become operative. Once the So-
viet Union agrees to the two actions
specified, the treaty would go into effect.
The net effect of such an agreement-
by the Soviet Union would be that the
open skies policy advanced by Presi-
dent Eisenhower would be substantially
achieved. It is true that the agreement
to merely permit distribution of press
announcements to the Soviet press would
not necessarily mean that they would be
printed for the peoples of the Soviet
Union to read or hear. However, if there
were a calculated effort by the Soviet
Union to suppress such press announce-
ments, there would be ways and means
found to let the peoples of the Soviet
Union know that the announcements had
been furnished the Soviet press and that
these announcements had been sup-
pressed. Naturally this would cause the
peoples to become suspicious of the Soviet
press-as some of them already are-
and, in the long run, the government
would find itself losing support of the
peoples who want to read these an-
nouncements. It is, therefore, more
likely that a substantial number of these
press announcements would, in fact, be
published.
I do not know of anyone in the Senate
who does not wish to see better relations
between the United States and the Soviet
Union, At the same time, the tensions
which have existed between our two gov-
ernments have been perpetuated because
of the failure of the government of the
Soviet Union to open its skies so that its
peoples may know the facts-all of the
facts, and not just those facts or distor-
tions which some government censor sees
fit to have printed. It was this realiza-
tion which prompted advancement of the
open-skies.policy.
Implementation of that policy has
been too long delayed. Now, with the
proposal for the United States and the
Soviet Union to enter for the first time
in recent history into a bilateral treaty,
it would seem that now is the time to
obtain some action in pursuance of that
policy. The Consular Treaty, as now
drafted, does not even scratch the sur-
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S3746 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 14, 1967
fare as far as this policy is concerned. I thank my colleague for yielding. The result of our firm stand is evident.
IL has been heralded as a step in easing Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Senator We heard this story spelled out by the
tensions between our two Governments, from Iowa for his very Informative and valiant President of the Philippines
bur, even assuming that it is In fact such persuasive contribution, when he was in this country. He
a step, the step is so minute as to make I now yield 5 minutes to the distin- pointed out to us that when the people
it questionable when one considers the guished Senator from California [Mr. of southeast Asia realized that America
negative aspects of the treaty. The llm- MURPHY I. was serious about protecting the small
ited nuclear test ban treaty was her- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The nations from aggression, from being
aided as a step in easing tensions, but Senator from California is recognized overrun, and from having this atheistic
the record, since Its ratification, hndl- fcr 5 minutes,
ideology imed upon ,
rates that the tensions have increased, Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I con- began to takehearrt, to have them
new hope.ey
rather than decreased. Moreover, the gratulate the distinguished Senator from If you look deeply enough into our in-
test ban treaty was multilateral, not bi- Iowa for pointing out the effect that ternational problem in France, you will
lateral. this measure would have an the open find that one of the basic reasons for
The leaders of the Soviet Union are skies policy. this quite aware that their agreement to the I have listened to the debate for many Gaulle ermany was stated by Charles de
two points of this reservation would ease days. t years ago:
tensions between our Governnnnents. Ac- . It seems from time to time that Mir valiant friends the Americans have
tnsi b f they our vernd ente Ac- we get far afield from the actual facts suggested a knife with which I may defend involv in easing tensions, there should be no dif- free pre' when we talk in terms of a blaerdf, that has neither a handle nor a
ficulty in their msuch an agree- free press. blade.
meant. In smaking this reservation an agree- It is within the . ecolle~tion of this Why? Because he felt left out of the
inset. do short, ho would be to what
really tout the on Senator that was one of the original control of the use of atomic weapons;
would do of the Soviet really test ee If the conditions agreed to by President Roose- and he did not believe that, if the neces-
unU, ion. I velt when he first recognized the Soviet sity arose, we would come to the protec-
SavSrocet U Unioton t the hets the treaty test, he n wf as can a Government. That condition, along tion of France. He doubted our pledge.
meaningful
meaningful step in the easing of ten- with other conditions-most of which This was the basis of the problem, going
If the test is not met, then we were never carried out-were agreed to. back some years.
should not delude ourselves Into thinking We are now talking in terms of how thee The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
that the treaty will serve to ease tensions. the the people press Is In Russia and how how much time of the Senator has expired.
If anything, It could promote more ten- I can tthere
the Senator e permitted to know.
lions by causing the leaders of the Soviet tell that I know M. MUNDT. I yield 2 additional
stuns yo conclude tthe of something about the original cultural minutes to the Senator from California.
Union
riot to conclude that a United d States exchange Mn MURPHY. The Senator from
for an particular) interested the policy. pressing We sent to Russia a motion picture Kentucky has said that the ratification
In other words, Mr. President, let which they selected. It was called of this treaty will have no effect on the
those who vote rd pending reserve- Grapcs of Wrath." That picture de- war. On the contrary. Many fail to
tion be ho under e on this this pendi n. A "}Ia picted, as we know, the unfortunate comprehend why we are contracting
tote e misimpr" stories of people in the Dust Bowl. The with Russia when at this very moment,
repudiation of our open-
vote will lb be a It
interpreted by Russians selected this picture as one of the Russians supply North Vietnam will be the epdecs of the Soviet Union. My col- the first that they would like to show, with the tools of war used against
leagues who are thinking of voting They then wrote their own forward our forces. I am afraid that the gains
le agues this reservation may Console In which they said that the Grapes of and advances that have been made in
themselves anst this s saying they have no such Weather depicted the highest scale in the last year and a half or two years
but their they love not not the social system In America. This was will be for naught. The, tensions that
intention: but the tof the lead- ri t obviously an attempt to propagandize we speak of in the Senate will be noth-
grs g to o govern t the thinking
h - dishonestly. I recognize that happened ling as compared with the tensions that
of the Soviet Union, nor If the this reser- a number of years ago. will build up through southeast Asia-
era
vanda which
rhich will ch will POUT out I am told from time to Lime that the in Pakistan, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand,
is .
C say to my colleagues: "Are you for character. and conditions have changed. Indonesia, and clear across to the
an open to my policy? If you are, then However, every time I look for concrete Philippines, if our commitment is not
you,- aye vote is cy essential. It you are solid ground to convince myself that clear. That is why the President o; the
you, tay vote is and again you there has been change, I do not find it. Philippines came to this country. He is
h If ot, the the vote no, and do of not the r United be I wonder really how much change concerned.
ri
States finds its positions distorted or there has been? We are the beacon and defender of
misrepresented In the Soviet press." A few moments ago the distinguished freedom, We are in a position now to
Many people who have visited the So- Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] deal not from the standpoint of appease-
viet Union report that the average per- said: -What result will this have on the ment. We have done so, In my memory,
son living in the Soviet Union is not a war in Vietnam? for 30 years, and It seems that our
hardworking, peaceloving, and inclined will have on the war in Vietnam, The modate, the more the opposition de-
to be friendly toward the people of the United States made It crystal clear at mancts and asks for.
United States, These people in the So- the very outset that we were going to I say that this is the !ime--I believe
viet Union Crave accurate, factual War- pursue a firm policy designed to preserve this truly, and I agree completely with
neat on about the United States. If a policy of self-determination as laid the Senator from South Dakota-when
their Government would agree to the down by President Truman, President America should say that for once we will
points in this reservation, the opportu- Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and now make the conditions. We will say that
nitle?s for Improved relations with the President Johnson. I think that pos- this agreement will be a completely two-
people themselves would be immcasur_ sibly the war in Vietnam might never way street-and please aid that it does
ably enhanced. Most of us in the Sen- ha"e occurred if it had not been for the turn out to be a two-way street. But
ate have from time to time approved Russians. The nations in southeast it mast be on quid pro quo; it must be
people-to-people programs which bring Asia were afraid. They are weak na- on as even basis. And we must not
our people into contact with these Lions. They stood alone, and until we
people, and it would seem to follow that came in in force, we had been adver- under any circumstances allow our
those who have approved such a policy tisc?d by China as a "paper tiger." valiant allies in southeast Asia to sus-
wou:d support this reservation, so that The countries of southeast Asia were poet for one moment that we have
such a policy would be given an even told, "America will not answer aggres- changed our determination, as expressed
pn'eater opportunity to become effective. slur; they will not defend you." Many time and time again by the President of
I hope that this reservation will be doubted whether we would. And our the United States, to resist aggression
supported, and I shall most certainly counterpropaganda, for some reason or and to preserve the right of self-deter-
vote for it. other never seemed to get our story over. mination.
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March 14, 1967
-CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3747
This is a poker game, you might say,
but it is a very important one, and at the
present time we should stand pat.
The suggestion of the distinguished
Senator from South Dakota is a good
one. It will strengthen this treaty and
make it more palatable, and certainly
will continue to give hope to our valiant
allies that America has not changed its
policy, that we are still determined that
the free nations of the world shall have
the right to determine their own policy
for the future.
I thank the distinguished Senator from
South Dakota.
Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Senator
from California for his very helpful re-
marks, for his valiant support, and espe-
cially for moving this debate back on tar-
get, which was essential because of the
colloquy engaged in by the Senator from
Kentucky, who spoke about espionage,
immunities, and the number of coil-
sulates.
As anyone who has followed this de-
bate in the RECORD or in the newspapers
must by now realize, the main focus of
opposition on the part of those of us
opposing ratification of the treaty has
to do with the protection of Americans.
But we believe that we should give more
heed to the protection of 500,000 Ameri-
cans in South Vietnam than to the 9
Americans, on the average, who get into
trouble while visiting Russia, It is a
rather startling comparison.
If 18,000 people are fortunate enough
to have the wherewithal, the means, and
the time to travel in Russia-and I am
glad they can do so-and if 9 of them
get in trouble, we should try to protect
them. You can read the letters from
the State Department in the RECORD and
you can see that that is all that is con-
templated-to try to protect those who
get in trouble. The fellow who does not
get in trouble does not have to be pro-
tected. Nine of them get in trouble an-
nually, so we are going to protect them-
a curious kind of protection by the way
which provides that they can notify their
relatives and the State Department that
they are in the hoosegow, and the con-
sular officer can come in for a visit.
However, when it can be demonstrated,
as I for one believe, that by doing that
you lessen the protection of 500,000
young Americans who are not traveling
in Vietnam for pleasure or profit-who
do not have the good fortune to visit
Russia but have the misfortune to be up
to their navels in the slime and the mud
of the boondocks of Vietnam, fighting
for freedom-you have to balance in your
own mind, before you vote, just which
group of Americans you are interested
in protecting, because there is a contra.
diction there. When you enhance this
protection for the one group, you reduce
it for the other.
We had better examine the relation-
ship of this treaty to East-West trade
and the rest of the program, before we
finally vote.
Mr. President, I am happy to yield
such time as he may desire to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Wyoming.
Mr. HANSEN. I appreciate the cour-
tesy of the Senator from South Dakota
in permitting me the opportunity to
speak briefly on this subject.
I am deeply concerned about the con-
sular treaty, because, in my judgment, it
represents one of the most important
votes that I will cast in he Senate. I
hope that I may arrive at the correct de-
cision. It will be a difficult decision to
come to, because I realize that on both
sides 6f the aisle are Senators equally
as sincere as am I, who are examining
their consciences and attempting to de-
termine how best to advance the inter-
ests of our great country and to protect
its citizens.
Much has been said about our con-
cern for the 18,000 Americans in the
Soviet Union and our interest in at-
tempting to protect them. The Senator
from South Dakota has pointed out that
all of the 18,000 Americans who were in
Russia last year were there of their own
volition. Undoubtedly, a number were
members of the business community,
who were attempting to advance their
own personal economic interests. Nev-
ertheless, I subscribe to the opinion, held
almost universally in this country, that
we should protect our citizens wherever
they may be. However, I do not believe
that we can separate, on the one hand,
a consideration of the ratification of the
consular treaty with, on the other hand,
the overall impact such ratification may
have on the war in Vietnam.
In this context, I should like to read
from the January 16, 1967, issue of Bar-
ron's magazine:
Last October the President held out the
prospect of a whole network of bridges to
the Red countries, including the Soviet
Union: "Our task is to achieve a reconcilia-
tion with the East-a shift from coexist-
ence to peaceful engagement. We seek
healthy economic and cultural relations with
the Communist states." Specifically, he an-
nounced: 1) clearance for the Export-Import
Bank to guarantee commercial credits for
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bul-
garia; 2) the Bank's readiness to finance ex-
port of American equipment to a large So-
viet auto plant which Italian Fiat will build;
3) imminent decontrol of certain commodi-
ties for sale to East Europe.
Six days later some 400 items previously
barred from export to the Soviet bloc with-
out special license-including metal manu-
factures, machinery and chemical products-
were expunged from the Commerce Depart-
ment's Commodity Control List.
We all know that only a few years ago,
47 percent of the labor force of Soviet
Russia was tied down on the farms of
that country to provide the food and
fiber required by the Soviet people.
Compare that with the situation in our
country. At that same time, only 8 per-
cent of our labor force was involved in
providing what we required in this
country. Eight percent of our American
labor force not only did this job; they
produced more than we could consume,
adding to our surpluses.
I contend that if we assign the proper
priorities to this treaty consideration,
which I think is our first responsibility
as Senators, it must be to consider it in
the light of our overall world Involve-
ment at the present time. To my mind,
there can be no question that the early
conclusion of the war in Vietnam is our
number one concern.
I submit that anything we do which
will strengthen Soviet Russia will make
that country better able to supply war
materiel to the Vietcong and to the
North Vietnamese people, and will mili-
tate against the best interests of this
country.
I believe we cannot ignore the fact
that if we make it safer and make it
more easy for Americans to travel in the
Soviet Union, we may reasonably expect
more businessmen from the United
States to go to Soviet Russia, and to other
satellite countries, as well, to enter into
business contracts with those nations to
provide the people behind the Iron Cur-
tain with goods and services and prod-
ucts that will relieve them of the re-
sponsibility.they presently have, and en-
able them, thereby, to make a greater
contribution to our enemy in Vietnam.
I am concerned about the 18,000 Amer-
icans in Soviet Russia. I am concerned,
despite the fact that they have gone
there of their own choice. But I am more
concerned with the fact that we have be-
tween 415,000 and 500,000 Americans in
Vietnam who, for the most part, are not
there of their own volition, but are there
to protect our country and to support our
flag.
That we should consider the care and
better protection of 18,000 American
tourists, when that effort runs counter to
more complete protection of our service-
men in Vietnam, goes against my grain,
Mr. President, I do not know yet how I
shall vote on all of the reservations, on
all of the understandings, or on the con-
sular treaty itself, but I must say that if
I can judge the temper of the people of
my State correctly-and I came through
a campaign there'only last fall-I am
certain of one thing: The people of
Wyoming are more interested in bring-
ing the war in Vietnam to a satisfactory
conclusion as quickly as possible than
they are in anything else. I hope that
the time will soon come when that con-
flict has been resolved satisfactorily in
the interests of this country; that we
may then further display our good inten-
tions to all of the world, including Soviet
Russia, to say to them, "We will build
these bridges, we will demonstrate our
concern for humanity wherever it may
be; we will try to contribute to the rea-
sonable realization of the aspirations of
peace everywhere, and we will work for
peace." But I cannot believe on the
basis of what I now know that the ratifi-
cation of this treaty by the Senate, and
the attendant acts that are sure to fol-
low will advance the interests of this
country. Rather, I think they will make
more difficult our task in Vietnam.
I thank-the Senator.
(At this point Mr. HOLLINGS took the
chair.)
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. HANSON. I yield.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, first I
wish to congratulate the Senator on a
powerful presentation of the basic issues
involved in this discussion.
Certainly the Senator's argument is
sound and persuasive with respect to the
18,000 Americans traveling annually in
Russia voluntarily, because of their good
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S 3748 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
fortune or ample means, so that seeking
pleasure or seeking profit they are privi-
leged to be there; and to compare them
in this fifth year of the war, as he has
done, with the 500,000 Americans in
Vietnam, who are there not because they
prefer to be there, who are not there be-
cause of pleasure or profit, and who are
not there because they have the where-
withal to be there, but because it is their
responsibility as men in uniform to go
where the Commander In Chief sends
them. I would hope that we might com-
pare another statistic.
If we accept the word of he State De-
partment, between 81z and 9 percent of
those who go to Russia annually get in
trouble. Let us say that the figure is
nine out of 18.000. The figure speaks
well for the good behavior of Americans,
and it does not speak too badly for the
attitude of the Russians in arresting
people unnecessarily. I suspect that a
larger proportion of American tourists
traveling in the States would get In
trouble, Let us, however, use the figure
of nine.
We are asked to take this venture into
the deep blue yonder with an unprece-
dented treaty to give the nine people
what some believe to be protection,
which to me is not protection at all since
it does not go to the cause of release or
freedom, but simply goes to the right of
notification and consultation.
We should be aware of the fact that
against those nine who get in trouble
in Russia every year, more than nine
American boys are dying In Vietnam
every day solely because of the arms sup-
plied by Soviet Russia. Perhaps we do
not think enough about that statistic.
Perhaps we do not think about that com-
parison. Maybe we should now be
thinking about those servicemen we
should be trying to protect instead of
spending weeks, and almost months, de-
bating a treaty which, at best, cannot do
much for many. We might be better off,
in my opinion, debating various alterna-
tives confronting us and trying to bring
this war to a quicker end successfully, in-
stead of doing something which in his
heart every Senator knows is but to give
encouragement and a greater opportu-
nity to the Soviets to send their torrents
of arms, as they are now doing, to Viet-
nam to prolong the war.
I salute the Senator from Wyoming
for bringing this point to our attention
so graphically.
I now yield to the distinguished Sena-
tor from Nebraska, a coauthor of the
pending reservation.
,Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, it was
with much interest that I listened to the
majority leader advance his position re-
garding the scope of the powers and du-
ties of the Senate with respect to treaty-
making.
advice and consent, according to the
Macomber letter, is, apparently, "Yes" or
"No." That does not comport with the
history of the Senate in its consideration
of treaties. Nor was this limited area
for action ever contemplated to be the
Senate role. In fact, until the last few
days before the Constitution was agreed
upon, it was proposed that the Senate
would enter into treaties; the President
was to have carried them out.
That is borne out by the history of the
tr'eatymaking power, section 2, clause 2,
of article II of the Constitution, dealing
with the executive department. I refer
to volume 39 of the Constitution of the
United States of America annotated.
Clause 2 reads:
'r shall have power, by and with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, to make
treaties, provide twu-thirds of the Senators
pr"sent COnCUr.
No one disputes the fact that it is for
the President to negotiate treaties. The
negotiation of treaties is an Executive
monopoly.
But the Senate has several options
mailable in performing the functions
delegated it by the Constitution. It
may consent unconditionally to a pro-
posed treaty, it may refuse its consent,
or it may stipulate the conditions in the
form of amendments to the treaty or of
re.;ervations to the act of ratification.
The distinction between these last two
alternatives is simply that an amend-
ment, if accepted by the President and
the other party or parties to the treaty,
change it for all parties, while reserva-
tions limit only the obligations of the
United States thereunder.
The act of ratification for the United
States is the President's act, but he may
not ratify unless the Senate has con-
rented to it by the required two-thirds of
the Senators present, which signifies two-
thirds of a quorum. Otherwise the con-
sent rendered would not be that of the
Senate as organized under the Constitu-
ticn to do business.
Conversely, the President may decide
to abandon the negotiation, if dissatisfied
with amendments affixed by the Senate
to a proposed treaty or with the reserva-
tions stipulated by it to ratification. He
is entirely free to do so.
Most of what I have just said is set
forth in Volume 39 of the Constitution
of the United States annotated. A num-
ber of authorities are cited there to
support that Interpretation and descrip-
tion of the practice.
The statement of any member of the
Department of State that the adoption
of any particular reservation would re-
sult in killing the convention is a specu-
lation to which he is entitled, if he so
chooses, However, it Is an area for his
speculation only. It is not his province
to advise or consent. We can also
imagine that Members of this body
should be somewhat constrained regard-
ing the wisdom of entering into a treaty
which, in their solemn judgment, they
think would be harmful and detrimental
to the position of this country and to
the safety and freedom of its citizens.
The Senator from South Dakota has
stated the premise very well. When we
get, emotional about 18,000 people travel-
ing, in the Soviet Union and say that we
want to extend them every protection
possible, we should also have some con-
sideration for the 500,000 boys who will
shortly, or before the end of this war,
very likely be engaged In battle in Viet-
nam, the continuance of which is made
passible by the other party, on the enemy
?Aare,, 14, 1967
side contributing weapons to the war;
namely, the U.S.S.R.
Accordingly, I believe that in that con-
text, what we are doing here is proper.
Certainly, the reservation is good.
It is quite an observation to make, in
the letter from Mr. Macomber, that this
reservation would destroy the Consular
Convention. His letter parallels the let-
ter signed by the Secretary of State
which was read on the floor this after-
noon for the first time, that-
The Consular Convention is an instrument
regulating the status and functions of con-
sular nersonnel. It would destroy its useful-
ness for that important purpose if we at-
tempted to use it as a veh cle for remaking
Soviet society, however desirable It seems to
us tt.at steps should be ta'cen in the USSR
to m:eke it a free society.
So, what are we to do" Must we cast
the treaty in such a fash;on that the So-
viet Union will want it? We are charged
with making concessions. We are told
that we are supposed tc accommodate.
We must refrain from provocative ac-
tion:. and give a monopoly on all of these
actions to the other side.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Nebraska yield at that
poin :?
Mr. HRUSKA. I do not believe in it.
I do not believe that we should let this
opportunity go by without speaking up
for the substance of the reservation
which the Senator from South Dakota
has drafted and which he now advocates.
I am happy to yield to the Senator
from South Dakota.
Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is a distin-
guished lawyer and a constitutional stu-
dent He is also a member of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary. I am, therefore,
happy indeed to listen to his analysis of
the constitutional function of the Senate
as intended by our constitutional fathers
in connection with treatymaking.
If we accept the doctrine contained in
the three State Department letters, it
would be applicable to any treaty, at any
time, and would mean that from here on
in, ticatymaking would be exclusively an
executive function, that the Senate could
assent or dissent but, from the stand-
point of providing meaningful advice,
that constitutional right would be denied
to us.
I tiinkthat the Senator has read into
the ItECORD some important documenta-
tion -.n that connection, and I thank him
for ii.
Let me ask this ques,ion about the
point to which he alluded at the end,
when he quoted from the Macomber let-
ter, to the effect that the treaty deals
with the functioning of consular offices.
What; could deal more directly with the
functioning of consular offices than the
proposed reservation in which the dis-
tinguished Senator from Nebraska and I
have joined. which would guarantee on
both sides of the water the same rights
of action, movement, contact, and re-
porting, and which would guarantee to
their press attaches and other represen-
tatives of the press the same freedom of
movement, the same freedom of expres-
sion, the same freedom from being ban-
ished from the country if they said some-
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16rch 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
thing which the government .did not like, grant them, to the Russians over here.
on both sides of the water? We simply cannot see why the Depart-
It seems to me that if we are going to ment of State insists on having it dif-
extend the unprecedented function of the ferent standard of morality for our peo-
right to murder, steal, and sabotage with pie over there, when we- can put that
complete immunity, it certainly is not provision in this treaty, where it will fit
novel or startling that we should also ask like a glove fits a hand. This is par-
for these normal procedures incorporated ticularly so when we are cranking into
in our reservation to be incorporated in other parts of the treaty, for the first
the treaty which would guarantee recip- time in American history, complete; im-
rocal action on both sides of the water.
Mr. HRUSKA. If it is true, as has
been said, that there is reciprocity as to
the number of press representatives we
have in the Soviet Union as compared
with those who are here, and if it is
true that there are no greater restric-
tions on travel on the part of our press
representatives there than there is on
their press representatives here; if this is
all true, would not adoption of this reser-
vation be a reasonable ground for the
Soviet Union to say, "We want no part of
it. It is true that we are granting reci-
procity in numbers and travel but you
have put it in the reservation and, there-
fore, we do not want any part oi; the
Consular Treaty"?
Mr. MUNDT. The Senator states the
issue very well. It is incomprehensible
to me how the State Department can
have it both ways, arguing in the one in-
stance that we are going to get this now
and the Soviet Union has just got to op-
erate on that basis; and arguing on the
other hand that if we put this reserva-
tion in the treaty, if it is insisted upon,
it will be a device for killing the treaty
and that the Soviet Union will then re-
ject the whole treaty. The Department
of State is perfectly proper in arguing
one point or the other, but when it con-
stantly contradicts itself in its view-
points, it seems to me it simply demon-
strates the flimsiness of the whole at-
tack upon our. reservation. Obviously
the State Department cannot have it
both ways.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the
Senator from South Dakota yield?
Mr. MUNDT. I yield.
Mr. LAUSCHE. I have not been able
to listen to all the arguments made on
behalf of the reservation. Do I correctly
understand that the purpose of the res-
ervation is to establish an agreement
under which the freedom of the press
that will be allowed Russian newsmen
and diplomatic attaches in the United
States must also be given to our
newsmen and our attaches in our con-
sular offices in the Soviet Union?
Mr. MUNDT. Precisely. No more and
no less; just as the provisions of the con-
sular treaty provide an exact quid pro
quo in the consular offices under both
flags. We see no reason to treat news-
men any differently from the rest of our
Americans over there.
Mr. LAUSCHE. The rest of the res-
ervation provides that while the United
States will allow Russian newsmen and
attaches in consular offices all the free-
dom allowed in the United States as to
written and oral expressions, the United
States should also be given that same
right within Russia; is that not correct?
Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is exactly
correct. We have granted those permis-
sions, and I am sure will continue to
munity.
Mr. LAUSCHE, In other words, un-
less the reservation is adopted, we are
saying to Russia, "You can come to the
United States with your consular officers
and enjoy all the freedoms of the press
and speech," while we will be yielding
to restrictions in the exercise of those
qualities of speaking and writing.
Mr. MUNDT. Not only that, but the
Senate is now being called upon, in a
roll call vote, to extend this advice, and
the State Department will also be saying
that we are advising that no reciprocity
be created on these matters between the
two countries. So we will be accessories
to an agreement of appeasement if we
accept this Consular Convention without
reservation.
Mr. LAUSCHE. The next is a simple
question, and it may answer itself as I
put the question. What is the justice
and propriety of allowing the attaches
and publicity agents of the Russian con-
sular offices in the United States to ex-
ercise full freedom of speech and writing
while we agree to be restricted by the
practices of the Communist dictatorship
in Russia in what our consular attaches
and publicity men might say to the Rus-
sian people?
Mr. MUNDT. Certainly, I can see no
justice in it. I do not know how it oc-
curred. I suspect that our negotiators
at the treaty negotiating table simply
did not have the determination and, the
drive and the positive convictions to in-
sist upon this quid pro quo, on the basis,
as the writing in the letters which have
been referred to has shown, that we do
not have the capacity or persuasive power
to get the Soviet Union to agree. I
gather this is what must have occurred
at the conference table earlier, from
what they send us in their letter writing
now.
Mr. LAUSCHE. The reservation of-
fered by Senators MUNDT, DOMINICK, and
HRUSKA provides that the treaty shall be
approved subject to the understanding
that the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics shall agree:
(1) to permit the distribution to the
Soviet press or any segment thereof by
United States diplomatic and consular offi-
cers of announcements of United States pub-
lie policy, both foreign and domestic, and
answers to any criticism of such policy con-
tained in the Soviet press.
Is that the first condition?
Mr. MUNDT. That is exactly the.
first clause of our reservation.
Mr. LAUSCHE. In other words, the
authors of the reservation ask that the
U.S. officers be permitted to tell the
Russian people our position at the same
time that the Russians are permitted to
us the privilege of free speech and free
press in the United States to either con-
demn our policies or attempt to destroy
them?
S 3749
Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is exactly
right. It calls for complete reciprocity
on both sides of the water.
Mr. LAUSCHE. It is more than rec-
iprocity. It is equality of the applica-
tion of the right of free speech.
Mr. MUNDT. I think that is a better
word-equality of rights and privileges
on both sides of the water.
Mr. LAUSCHE. The second condition
of the reservation is that the Russians
shall agree "not to impose or enforce
any limitation on the number of U.S.
citizens permitted to be in the Soviet
Union at any time as representatives of
the U.S. press which would effectively
reduce them below the number of Soviet
press representatives entering the United
States."
Is it the purpose of this second con-
dition to establish an equality in the
right of sending press representatives to
Russia by, the United States and by Rus-
sia to the United States?
Mr. MUNDT. Yes. Of course, the
Senator did not conclude the clause,
which also contains the words "or to
impose upon them any conditions of
travel or objective reporting which do
not prevail for Soviet press representa-
tives within the United States."
Mr. LAUSCHE. That is the last
clause.
Mr. MUNDT. Yes.
Mr. LAUSCHE. That it shall also
agree to objective reporting, and not
impose on them conditions which do not
prevail for Soviet press representatives
within the United States.
Mr. MUNDT. That is correct.
Mr. LAUSCHE. The substance of
what the three Senators whose names I
have mentioned are trying to do is give
the United States the same opportunity,
through free press and free speech, to
reach the Russian people, in telling them
of our economy and our social progress,
as we give to the Russians, through our
constitutional rights, the right to tell
our people what they have done and allow
them to tell what is wrong with our sys-
tem of government,
Mr. MUNDT. The Senator summa-
rizes the purpose of our reservation with
complete and total cogency. He is totally
right.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Free speech has been
the primary argument in most of the
cases that have gone to the Supreme
Court. Free speech is blessed above every
other right in the United States.
Mr. MUNDT.. That is correct.
Mr. LAUSCHE. The reservation of-
fered by Senators MUNDT, DoMINICK, and
HRUSKA deals with free speech, and noth-
ing else. Am I correct?
Mr. MUNDT. That is correct-free
speech and free movement.
Mr. LAUSCHE. It is anomalous that
we talk about the right of free speech as
being the primary right under our Con-
stitution, and yet when we attempt to ask
the Russians to give our attaches and
diplomats the right of free speech, just as
we give it to their representatives, in
this country a howl is raised against the
proposal.
Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Senator
very much for a significant and helpful
cbntribution.
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83750 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Mr. President, I should like first to in-
quire how much time remains, and then
ask for the attention of the majority
leader to see whether we are nearing the
end of the debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from South Dakota has 22 min-
utes remaining; the Senator from Ar-
kansas has 63 minutes.
Mr. MUNDT. I reserve the remainder
of my time, because we have consumed
most of our time. I shall wait until
we hear what the other side has to say.
Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. President. I
yield 10 minutes to the Senator from
Oregon [Mr. MoRsEl.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. will
the Senator yield, first?
Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, how
much time does the Senator have left?
Mr. MUNDT. Twenty-two minutes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator
intend to use all his time?
Mr. MUNDT. Depending on what the
other side says, we are prepared to sum-
marize in 10 or 15 minutes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. After we hear
from the Senator from Oregon and the
Senator from Pennsylvania, I think we
shall be prepared to yield back the time.
Mr. SPARKMAN. That is a possi-
bility.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, as we
consider reservations to the Consular
Convention, I would like to call the at-
tention of Members of the Senate to an
editorial in the March 10 New York
Times and point particularly to three
points made in the editorial.
The first point made by the Times
editorial is that-
When the Senate adds amendments or
re;ervatlons to a treaty, It is unilaterally
changing the terms of a settled bargain.
The practical effect of such action is really
to reopen the negotiations and force the
e h?!r party or parties to re-examine their
pie- iously offered approval.
Throughoutthis debate there has been
the implication that Russia Is very anx-
ious for the consummation of this treaty,
That is not the case. This treaty is the
result of U.S. initiatives. Russia will
take the position that she entered into
a bargain with our negotiators, and she
is willing to go through with that bar-
Pain, but If we want to attempt to re-
write the treaty, that is the end of the
bargain; we will be the losers, and not
Russia.
The second point, made succinctly and
directly in the Times, is that-
'the reservations proposed by the treaty's
foes are irrelevant and unquestionably of-
fered in hopes of making that agreement
unacceptable to the Soviet Union.
Finally, the Times editorial observes
that-
The Consular Convention, which would
benefit this country much more than It
would Russia, deserves approval or defeat
on its own merits. It should not be sand-
bagged by parliamentary trickery.
I think the use of the word "trickery"
in the editorial is most unfortunate. I
think the statement would have been
true if they had said "parliamentary tac-
ties," But, Mr. President, one never
knows what motivations are, you have to
be clairvoyant to know motivations.
However, the editorial is correct with
respect to the fact that there is a great
deal of parliamentary tactic involved in
the offering of these reservations.
I ask unanimous consent to have the
full text of the Times editorial, entitled
"Treatrles and the Senate." Inserted in
the RECORD at this point,
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
TREATIES AND THE SENATE
Proposals in the Senate this week that
rev.ervations be attached to both the space
treaty and the Soviet-American consular
convention resurrect an old, recurrent and
de tructive constitutional problem.
It was George Washington who first had
to wrestle with the dilemma created for a
President when the Senate approves a treaty
conditionally. Amendments and reserva-
tions added during Senate consideration of
the Treaty of Versailles in 1919-20 played a
key role In Woodrow Wilson's great defeat on
the League of Nations.
A treaty is a contract negotiated by the
executive branch with the government of
oue or more other countries. In the process
there is normally hard bargaining and the
final result usually represents a compromise
in which everyone has made concessions.
Ttus when the Senate adds amendments or
reservations to a treaty, it is unilaterally
changing the terms of a settled bargain. The
practical effect of such action is really to
reopen the negotiations and force the other
party or parties to re-examine their previ-
ously offered approval.
Every time the Senate exercises this priv-
ilege, it necessarily casts doubt upon the
credibility of the President and his repre-
sentatives, and weakens the bargaining power
of the United States In the international
arena. The Senate's power to do this is
ur_quesdoned, but It is equally unquestion-
able that this power is best used only to
express the gravest of concerns, especially in
a period of crisis such as is posed by the
Vietnam war and efforts to end It.
Senator Gore's complaints about the fuzzi-
ness of some of the space treaty's language
have considerable warrant, but the problems
Involved are scarcely weighty enough to en-
danger the treaty Itself-and the historic
benefits it promises-through the adoption
of formal Senate reservations.
On the consular convention, the reserva-
tions proposed by the treaty's foes are ir-
relevant and unquestionably offered in hopes
of making that agreement unacceptable to
the Soviet Union. The tactics Senator
Mundt and his allies are adopting amount
to confession that they cannot halt two-
thirds approval of the convention as It
spends, and must therefore resort to sub-
terfuges.
A victory for this maneuver would give
Moscow an opportunity to accuse the United
states of bad faith and thus cast a dark
shadow over the negotiations now In prog-
ress on other Imperative Issues. The con-
sular convention, which would benefit this
rcuntry much more than it would Russia,
deserves approval or defeat on Its own merits.
It should not be sandbagged by parliamen-
tary trickery. Yesterday's initial votes on
the treaty provided basis for optimism that
It will not be.
Mr. MORSE. I shall also ask unani-
mous consent to have printed in the
RECORD three other stories from the
Washington Post.
The first is a column by Marquis
Childs which appeared in the March 13
issue of the newspaper, entitled "Treaty
Fight Threatens Detente." Mr. Childs
observes that-
M1ar?ch 14, 1967
Implied In the Mundt reservation. if the
Intent Is sincere and not merely a maneu-
ver to kill the treaty, is the belief that it
can be a lever to compel tIe Soviets to stop
their aid to North Vietnam and get the
North Vietnamese to the peace table. It
cook under no circumstances have that re-
sult,
The second Washington Post story to
be included in the RECORD appeared In
the March 12 issue under the headline:
"United States, Russian Moves Show
'Mutual Restraint'." The article is by
Murrey Marder. He notes that by al-
lowing Buel Ray Wortham to leave the
Soviet Union the Sovie .s have broken
a precedent and have thus shown a wil-
lingness to follow a policy of what might
be called mutual example, mutual pru-
dence or mutual restraint designed, as
is tee consular convention we are con-
sidering, to dispose of unnecessary irri-
taticns and to avoid confrontation on
minor disputes.
The third story I would like to insert
In the RECORD is from the March 13 is-
sue of the Washington Post. It needs
no explanation, for the headline tells
the whole story in one sentence: "Right-
wing Triggers Paper Blizzard To
Smother Consular Pact."
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD, at
the conclusion of my remarks, the three
stories from the March 12 and 13, 1967,
issues of the Washington Post to which
I have referred.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibits 1, 2, and 3.)
Mr. MORSE. The articles I have just
asked to have printed In the RECORD,
constitute, in broad outline, the frame-
work of my opposition to the reserva-
tions and my support of the treaty.
Throughout this debate there has run,
on the part of the proponents of the
reservations, and particularly of the one
now pending, an irrelevant argument;
namely, the argument that "We ought to
adopt this reservation because Russia is
aiding the North Vietnamese in South
Vietnam."
If there was ever an irrelevancy, that
is it. Does anyone really think that our
turning down this treaty, or adopting a
reservation that will assure its non-
acceptability, will save the life of one
single American boy in Vietnam?
Mr. President, I thougat that what we
were trying to do, in par,, outside of any
connection with this treaty, was to try
to work out a basis for negotiation,
ever.tually, with the Russians and other
countries, so that we can finally reach
a negotiated settlement of the shocking,
unjustifiable war into which we have
sent, without the slightest justification,
these American boys to be killed.
They would not be killed if we did not
have them over there. If we are really
Interested in saving those boys-and I
am--I say, "Bring them home." But it
Is inaccurate to assume, or imply, that
the negotiation of this treaty is going to
kill more of them. I submit there is no
cause-to-effect relationship for that
argument whatsoever.
Mr. President, we are following a
course of American occupation in south-
east Asia, and continuing to follow a
course of American escalation of the
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March 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
war, although the President is trying to
tell us he is not escalating it. We are
escalating it today; and every day and
every hour of the escalation, we are kill-
ing increasing numbers of American
boys, on the theory, I suppose, that we
will continue to do that until we kill
enough of the enemy so that finally we
may force a surrender, if China and
Russia do not come in.
I thought, Mr. President, that what we
were sincerely trying to do was to explore
all the possibilities of finding a basis for
negotiation, in order to bring to an end
this war. But if we think we are going
to do it, and have peace, on the basis of
American bilateral negotiations, we
could not be more mistaken. For when
peace is established over there, it will be
a peace established through multilateral
intervention, not unilateral dictation by
the United States to the enemy. Truce,
yes. Surrender, yes. I think we can
force those two things. But that will
not give us any peace. It will only mean
that we are going to kill American boys
in Asia, in my judgment on a much
larger scale, when it breaks out again in
10, 15, or 25 years.
So I say that if we are really inter-
ested in trying to establish a world order
where we shall have some chance of
working out negotiable arrangements
with Russia in the future, we should not
vote to add a provision to a treaty with
Russia on a consular matter, which has
nothing to do with the war, making it
inoperative until Russia stops giving any
aid to North Vietnam and the Vietcong.
Anyone who thinks that is going to stop
the aid could not be more mistaken. In
fact, as we drive ourselves further from
Russia, and isolate ourselves further, we
shall increase the tensions and misun-
derstandings, and we will end up killing
more American boys rather than saving
them, as we continue ' to defend the in-
excusable war activity of the United
States in an area of the world where we
never should have been involved in the
first place.
So, Mr. President, in the interest of our
trying to improve the chances of reach-
ing a negotiable relationship with Rus-
sia, I shall vote against the reservation
of the Senator from South Dakota. The
main argument that is used over and
over again, which he has tried to bring
into this debate-the argument that if
we approve of this treaty on the basis
that it is being presented, we are letting
down the boys in South Vietnam, is
completely irrelevant.
I again say most respectfully, respect-
ing the sincere views of those who hold
views contrary to mine, that the Amer-
ican boys are being killed because we are
furnishing the money to the President
and supporting a wrong foreign policy.
That is what kills them.
If we stop giving the money to the
President, he will have to stop the
killing.
EXHIBIT 1
[From the Washington Post, Mar. 13, 1967]
TREATY FIGHT THREATENS DETENTE
(By Marquis Childs)
It is entirely possible that the first small
steps toward a slackening of the cold war can
be blocked. Powerful forces motivated by
fear, suspicion, the built-in interests of the
arms makers and a genuine concern that
any move toward closer relations with the
Communist bloc can help to undermine
American forces in Vietnam are hard at work.
One of these steps is the Consular Treaty
with the Soviet Union. That a step so small
can raise even the slightest doubt and
suspicion, however generated by the profes-
sional cold-war warriors, is an indicator of
the trouble ahead for more meaningful steps
in the future, For the treaty which provides
a framework for enlarging at some future
date the diplomatic exchange between the
two powers has a symbolic rather than a real
value.
That is the point Sen. Thruston Morton
(R-Ky.) has consistently hammered away
at in his determined effort to line up at least
two thirds of the 36 Republicans in the
Senate. He has been confident of perhaps 26
or 28 votes for ratification, which would
have provided the necessary margin. The
prediction was for a comfortable total of 67
or 66, which with some absentees would have
been enough.
But there are more ways than one to
skin a cat and kill a treaty. Sensing defeat
on an outright vote, the diehards are trying
to gain their end by the amendment and
reservation route.
Sen. Karl Mundt (R.-S.D.) calls for a
reservation providing that the treaty shall
not come into effect until one or both of
two conditions are met; first, that the Presi-
dent advise Congress that there is no longer
a need for United States forces in Vietnam;
second, that the Senate be assured that
furnishing war materiel to North Vietnam
is not delaying or preventing the return of
American troops from Vietnam.
This ties the treaty to the deeply emotional
issue of a half-million Americans pinned
down in Vietnam and the fact that Red
China and the Soviet Union provides the
sinews of war. It was designed to look like
an out for those who might want to vote for
ratification and yet get in the clear on
Vietnam.
But again Morton has been unequivocal.
A vote for such a reservation-really for any
substantive reservation or amendment--is
a vote to kill the treaty. It would have to
be renegotiated and this the Soviets would
refuse to do. The United States had de-
layed action.for nearly three years since the
treaty was first agreed to.
In this first small effort at bridge-building
with Eastern Europe there are many contra-
dictions. Implied in the Mundt reservation,
if the intent is sincere and not merely a
maneuver to kill the treaty, is the belief that
it can be a lever to compel the Soviets to
stop their aid to North Vietnam and get the
North Vietnamese to the peace table. It
could under no circumstances have that re-
sult.
Morton and others who have worked so
hard for ratification see this as putting the
cart before the horse. If small steps such
as the Consular Treaty can be taken, in com-
ing months Moscow will be more willing to
help bring about a settlement in Vietnam.
There is no guarantee of this, yet it is at
least a probability.
Much of the opposition to the treaty in
the debate in the Senate has been a rehash
of past frictions and old quarrels. Sen.
Thomas J. Dodd (D-Conn.) went back to the
coldest days of the cold war in 1948 to retell
the case of Madame Oksana Kosenkina who
defected from the Soviet consulate in New
York and was gravely injured when she
leaped from a window to escape her captors.
While Dodd's office insists that only his own
staffers helped prepare the speech, it has the
stamp of Julien Sourwine of the Internal
Security subcommittee, which is Dodd's pri-
vate preserve.
As with all such international obligations
self-interest must be the primary consider.
ation. The hope of stopping yet another and
53751
fantastically costly round In the nuclear
arms race is the self-interest in this instance.
And time is running out. For the Soviet
Union the obvious self-interest is to
strengthen ties with the West as the threat
of conflict with Red China grows.
The blame if failure overwhelms this first
step will be widely disputed. Morton and
other Republicans who have worked hard
for ratification believe the Johnson Admin-
istration has not done nearly enough to
bring around the waverers on the Demo-
cratic side. But, however murky the areas
of blame, the consequences will be clear
enough. Doom for this symbolic action will
spell doom for the other and larger meas-
ures that can abate the spiraling arms race.
EXHIBIT 2
[From the Washington Post, Mar. 12, 19671
UNITED STATES, RUSSIAN MOVES SHOW
"MUTUAL RESTRAINT"
(By Murrey Marder)
Within 24 hours the United States and the
Soviet Union have displayed the dual policy
of restraint that cushions their tensions in
the Vietnamese war.
Washington passed up an opportunity it
would have leaped upon with zest just a
few years back:
To parade the defecting daughter of.dic-
tator Josef Stalin in the citadel of capi-
talism as a prize acquisition of the Cold War.
Instead, with diplomatic delicacy, Svetlana
Stalina has been turned over to the most
discreet hosts for political asylum, neutral
Switzerland.
Unless the Soviet Union for reasons not
now discernible to American officials chooses
to make a major international incident of
.her case, the United States intends to treat it
with discretion.
Moscow has demonstrated its own restraint
in a lesser affair that had its own quotient
of international irritability. By alowing Buel
Ray Wortham of North Little Rock, Ark., to
go free with a $5555 fine instead of a three-
year labor camp sentence, the Soviet Union
broke a precedent too.
Speculation abroad that there was a direct
cause-and-effect relationship between the
two cases was totally dismissed by American
officials. They pointed out that Wortham's
release has been "in the cards" for weeks, if
not months before Miss Stalina's appearance.
But what does tie together these two cases
and others like them, is that they do repre-
sent a very significant, but unwritten, policy
being carried out on an ad hoc basis by the
two nations.
The Russians, back in the day of Premier
Nikita S. Khrushchev, named it "a policy of
mutual example." Secretary of State Dean
Rusk sometimes calls it a policy of "mutual
prudence," or "mutual restraint."
No one, In Moscow or Washington, knows
what the actual limits are on this imprecise
policy, nor how long it will last-or even
exactly when it will work and when it will
not work,
It could blow apart tomorrow. In fact,
just as the United States and the Soviet
Union were each showing unusual courtesy
to each other's interests in the Svetlana and
Wortham cases, each probably had a wary
eye on what was happening just then in
Vietnam.
The United States was engaged in a round
of air attacks on North Vietnam's biggest
steel fabricating plant. North Vietnam,
highly dependent on the Soviet Union for
its sophisticated war equipment, is likely to
invoke those attacks as greater justification
for the Kremlin to supply it with more
powerful weapons of defense,
The Soviet Union, as the most powerful
Communist nation in the world, cannot, even
if it wanted to do so, easily shrug off such
demands from a fellow Marxist nation and
still maintain its claim to Communist leader-
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S 3752 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
ship. At its heels, Communist China is con-
stantly challenging that claim.
At any stage of the upward spiral of war
in Vietnam, there is the danger, despite the
most exceptional restraint on either aide, of
a rriscalculation. United States experts can
never be absolutely certain just what acts
of military Intensification on their side may
precipitate more direct Soviet involvement
in the war. The Russians can never be sure
what the United States may do next to en-
tangle Soviet prestige Inextricably in the
consequences, Intentionally or accidentally.
In groping through this dilemnma, some-
what like two blind men trying to find their
way across an unmarked minefield, Washing-
ton and Moscow have each eased into an
unprecedented, although Irregular, level of
restraint In their non-Vietnamese relation-
ships.
It is not a matter of total trust, or the end
of suspicion, or anything of that sort, but
simply self-interest on both sides. As one
ranking American official put It symbolically
last week, "We know that If the Russians
see any gold nuggets lying around, they're
going to pick them up."
What he meant was that the Russians, In
continuing East-West competition, will take
any golden targets of opportunity It finds.
So. undoubtedly, will the United States, he
might have added,
But what Moscow and Washington are
doing 1s disposing of unnecessary irritations,
avoiding confrontations on minor disputes.
Eac3 nation is making Its International
points, where it chooses, but without extra
Inflammation. The United States, did so
just last week when it arrested and prose-
cuted the skipper of a Soviet fishing vessel
for entering U.S. territorial waters off Alaska,
but let him off with a $6,000 fine.
If the United States had chosen to parade
Stalin's daughter as an East-West prize, for
example, it might easily have risked freezing
up the international atmosphere. The U.S.-
Soviet Consular Treaty Is pending on the
Senate floor; the Outer Space Treaty is just
behind it; a treaty to ban the spread of nu-
clear weapons is dangling in Geneva, and
possible U.S.-Soviet negotiations to limit the
arms race are at stake.
By American diplomatic reckoning, the re-
quired course of action pointed unmistak-
ably toward restraint. President Johnson
readily agreed.
EXHIIIrr 3
(From the Washington Post, Mar. 13, 19871
RIGHTWINO TRIGGERS PAPER BLIZZARD To
SMOTHER CONSULAR PACT
(By J. Y. Smith)
If the Senate ratifies the U.S.-Soviet con-
sular treaty this week, It will do so despite
one of the largest and most vehement right-
wing mail campaigns in recent years.
A defeat of the pact would mark virtually
the only major success of the lobbyists of the
far right in blocking efforts to Improve So-
viet-American relations.
The treaty's proponents are cautiously op-
timistic. Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.),
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, said in a telephone interview
that "it is unconceivable to me that we
would be so petty as to turn this treaty
down."
'[The crunch may come by Wednesday, when
a "reservation" to the treaty proposed by
Sen. Karl E. Mundt (R-S.D.) 1s expected to
come up for a vote, The reservation says
that the treaty would go Into effect only
when the President advises Congress that
American troops are no longer needed In
Vietnam, or that their return to the United
States no longer is being hindered by Soviet
aid :o the Vietnamese Communists.
WOULD KILL THE TREATY
If passed, the Mundt proposal would ef-
fectively kill the pact. It is almost Incon-
ceivable that the Soviets would ratify it with
that proviso.
Opposition to the treaty in the Senate de-
rives from the traditionally conservative and
isolationist South and Midwest. It also
comes from Southern California and cities
such as Detroit and Chicago which have
large populations with close ties to the so-
called "captive" nations of Eastern Europe.
Sen. Thruaton B. Morton of Kentucky has
been one of the principal movers and shakers
In rounding up Republican support for the
treaty. Other backers include Sen. Everett
MCKinley Dirksen, the Senate Minority
Leader, and Sen. Charles Percy (R-Ili.).
Thus the foes of the pact Include Sen.
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), Sen. George
Miurphy (R-Calif.), Sen. Frank J. Lausche
(U-Ohio) and Sen. Herman Talmadge (D-
Ga.).
Despite the appeal of the Mundt reserva-
tion, though, observers noted that a similar
blocking rider offered last week by Talmadge
was defeated 53 to 28.
The campaign against the treaty has been
led by the Washington-based Liberty Lobby,
an organization set up in 1955 "for the pur-
pose of reversing the dangerous trend toward
socialization internally and to defeat the
insidious effort to weaken our resistance to
international communism."
Others are the Manion Forum, the Dan
Smoot Report, the United Republicans of
America, the National Review and the
Mothers of American Servicemen of South
Pasadena, Calif.
The Liberty Lobby's techniques for gen-
erating mail to Congress are direct In the
way a T-54 tank Is direct, but some of the
most obvious forms of propaganda are
avoided. For example, the Lobby eschews
mimeographed form letters on the ground
they lack credibility.
HOOVER IN A WHITE SUIT
On the other hand, it has made progress
in the anti-consular campaign with a 18-
panel comic strip entitled "The Communists
Next Door." J. Edgar Hoover, a critic of the
pa;-t. Is depicted in a white suit. A mus-
tachioed State Department supporter of the
treaty wears his hair plastered down with
greasy kid stuff.
An earnest young legislative assistant In
the cartoon tells it to his Senator this way:
"The most obvious danger from the treaty
Is provision for 'diplomatic immunity.'
Treaty opponents point out that to give
Soviet personnel complete immunity from
arrest is to invite an Increase in Red es-
pionage ... even sabotage . . . since the
treaty forbids inspection of any baggage or
equipment brought in as 'diplomatic
pouch.' '
The impact of this on Liberty Lobby's
mailing list-the organization claims 170,000
members--can be seen in the following letter
to a Senator who is one of the treaty's main
su.)porters:
"The most obvious danger from the treaty
Is provision for 'diplomatic immunity.'
Treaty opponents point out that to give
So-net personnel complete immunity from
arrest is to invite an Increase In Red
espionage . . , even sabotage
The writer is identified by his letterhead
as the president of a machinery company in
Green Bay. Wis.
The comic strip tries to make a sabotage
case by saying that "atomic demolition mu-
nitions" could be smuggled into American
cities in Soviet diplomatic pouches. It does
no mention the fact that the almost 500
Soviet diplomats already stationed In the
United States theoretically could do the same
thing.
Neither does it touch on the fact that U.S.
consular personnel in the Soviet Union also
would have diplomatic immunity and also
would be immune from arrest.
Despite all this, according to one leading
Senate Democratic supporter of the pact,
March 14, 1967
the mail campaign has had almost no meas-
urable effect except among those lawmakers
who were opposed to the treaty anyway.
Morton has been threatened by one writer
with the delivery of one live rattlesnake if he
vote u for the consular pact. Another writer
said: "If we are ten to one against the
treaty, then we-not you -are at fault if
you vote against it."
Morton's mail has been running 100 to 1
against the agreement. The Senator says
he'll Ignore the mail and vote for it anyway.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I
yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
Pennsylvania.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Pennsylvania :s recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from Alabama.
While I agree with the analysis of the
reservation just made by the Senator
from Oregon and enjoyed what he said,
I should like to confine my comments to
the subject matter of the reservation
which has a certain tone of plausibility
about it. It is that we should not ratify
this treaty until the Soviet Union per-
mits the distribution to the Soviet press
of announcements cone, 'rning the U.S.
public policy and the answer to any criti-
cism of such policy contained in the
Soviet press, and it would further require
the Soviet Union to refrain from limiting
the number of representatives of the U.S.
press who go to Russia to write about
conditions there.
The purpose of the reservation, in
other words, is to impose freedom of the
press upon the Soviet Union. This seems
to Ire to be somewhat silly. We are not
going to have the slightest impact on es-
tablishing in the Soviet Union the Bill
of Rights contained in the first 10 amend-
ments of the Constitution of the United
States, and it is ridiculous to think that
we ever could.
We are dealing with &. closed society.
We do not like a closed society merely
because it is closed. However, we live in
a world of reality and not in a dream
world.
It is difficult for me to believe that
groan and mature men with some under-
standing of the facts of international life
today would be so naive a:; to suggest that
we can persuade the Soviet Union to
establish freedom of the press within the
bour.daries of their own country by pro-
posing such a matter in this treaty.
This is so naive that one is almost im-
pelled to speculate on the motivation of
those who propose thi; unduly naive
amendment,
I ?+m not hl the business of speculating
on the motivation of my colleagues, and
I do not intend to do so this afternoon.
AL I will say is that the inevitable ef-
fect of passing this reservation would be
to kill the treaty and perhaps, just per-
haps, that is what the proponents of the
reservation would like to see done.
Mi'. President, I yield back the re-
mair.der of my time.
M-'. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I
yield 8 minutes to the Ser ator from Utah
[Mr. Moss].
The PRESIDING O'FICER. The Sen-
ator from Utah is recognized for 8 min-
utes.
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, it is un-
questionably in our national interest to
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 March 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ---r SENATE
53753
ratify the Consular Treaty. The U.S. The convention itself Is not needed to sible adverse effect to our national in-
Senate should take this action, and we provide for the opening of new consul- terest has been thoroughly explored and
should take it without reservations or ates. That can already be done. This, aired. The benefits far outweigh any
understandings. treaty contemplates possibly one addi- dangers, We should ratify it now with-
What is at issue is a more stable world. tional consulate to be established in each out further delay and put it into effect
The treaty presents an opportunity to country, and some 10 or 15 additionaaf immediately.
improve the machinery through which Soviet personnel to be admitted in addi-. The proposed reservations or even the
we handle certain official business with tion to the 400 already in this country understanding would, in my opinion, kill
the Soviet Union. We can grasp this op- with diplomatic immunity, but it does the treaty. Therefore, I will vote against
portunity without endangering our own guarantee rights for Americans in the reservations or understandings, and I
future or our own security. It would be U.S.S.R. Some of the mail I have re?? will vote for the treaty.
foolish to pass It by. It could help propel ceived has insisted this would make it Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I re-
us toward peace.
Primarily, we need the treaty to give
greater protection to Americans travel-
ing in the Soviet Union. At the present
time, an American can be held incommu-
nicado up to 9 months during an inves-
tigation of criminal charges lodged
against him, and the Soviet Union does
not have to notify U.S. authorities. If
the treaty were in effect, the Soviet
Union would have to notify U.S. author-
ities immediately, and these officials
would have the right to visit the Amer-
ican citizen being held within 4 days of
his arrest, and on a continuing basis
thereafter. The small number of Soviet
citizens now traveling in the United
States already have such protection un-
der our democratic system, but the more
than 18,000 Americans who now go to the
Soviet Union annually have no such pro-
tection.
We learned recently what the absence
of a Consular Treaty between the Soviet
Union and the United States meant when
two young Americans, Craddock M. Gil-
more, of Salt Lake City, Utah, and Buel
Ray Wortham, of Little Rock, Ark., were
arrested on charges of currency black
marketing, with the additional charge
of the theft of a souvenir bear from a
Russian hotel against Wortham.
The men were arrested on October 1
of last year. It was 6 days before the
U.S. Embassy in Moscow was notified
that the Americans were being detained,
possible for Soviet consular officials to quest the yeas and nays,
bring small atomic weapons in the United The yeas and nays were ordered.
States-that, to use the exact phrase in Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I
one of my letters, "atomic bombs up to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
one-half kiloton in size" could be smug- Maine [Mr. MUSKIE].
gled in through "diplomatic pouch." I Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, in a
can only point out that Soviet diplomatic newsletter to my constituents dated
officials in this country have had the March 4, 1967, I stated the reasons why
privilege of diplomatic immunity since I will support ratification of the Consu-
the opening of the Soviet Embassy in Jar Treaty.
Washington in 1934, and there is no I ask unanimous consent that the text
evidence that they have ever misused of that newsletter be printed in the REC-
these privileges to bring into this coun- ORD at this point.
try weapons detrimental to the national There being no objection, the news-
security of the United States, f letter was ordered to be printed in the
Now, I am not presuming to say that RECORD, as follows:
no Soviet consular official brought into DEAR FRisN~os: While we wrestle with the
this country under this treaty, or under problem of Vietnam, we should try to avoid
any other agreement with the Soviet becoming so involved in the debate over the
Union, will never become a security prob- conflict that we ignore or distort the oppor-
lem to us. But we can cancel the Con- tunities for more peaceful forms of competi-
sular Treaty any time.on a month's no- tion with Communist countries. Nowhere
tice. And we can expel any Soviet ern- has this danger been more apparent than in
ployee who is guilty of offensive conduct. the debate over the consular Treaty between
the United States and Russia.
And we have in the Federal Bureau of In the past few weeks, what should have
Investigation the best internal security been a relatively innocuous policy decision-
agency in the world, Surely, a handful initiated, incidentally, by President Eisen-
of additional Soviet citizens would not hower-has become a major issue in the
strain too greatly the vast and well o:r- Senate.
ganized facilities of the FBI. Judging from my mail,.many Americans
I have been chagrined, as I know many misunderstand the Treaty. Their major ob-
jection seems to be a fear of increased esplon-
of my colleagues have, by the blitz Of age by members of Russian consulates in this
frenzied mail against this treaty ill- country.
spired by several of our rightwing lob- The fact is that the Treaty would not re-
bies. I regret that some of our sincere quire the opening of a single consulate here
and patriotic citizens have been led to or in Russia.
What the Treaty would do is enable mem-
believe that ratification of thi
tr
t
ea
y
s
and where. It was 5 days later before would admit a horde of Soviet spies with hers of our Moscow Embassy staff to give
the first U.S. consular officer was allowed suitcases filled with bombs. I regret comfort and encouragement to touring Amer-
to visit them. A second visit was not per- that these citizens have had an oppor- icans arrested or detained by Russian author-
ground and even then hies. It also would set protective ground
mitted representatives October o the 28, and even then tunity to read . and hear only one side rules for an exchange of consulates if at some
prlk with tither U.S. of the argument on the treaty-that time in the future, we decide it is to our
could not in talklit with either of the the two- they have had no way of getting perspec- advantage to do so,
they wnot charges s r confinement-about against them. tive on it. I wish we had a better system The Treaty would require the Russians, to
the lit of getting all the facts to our people. notify our Embassy personnel within three
It will take too much time to chronicle Mr. President, this treaty has actually days of the dEm etention of an American, and
would enable b to
each request for a visit to the boys, and been in the making for many years. It
American four Y Pysso of f the al a rest, and
the various denials. Nor will I go through was talked about in 1933, when we first visit with within him on a regular thereafter, and
the details of the trials of both, and of reestablished relations with Russia, and Presently under Sovietllaw, any tourst or
the release and fining of Gilmore fol- President Eisenhower proposed at the Russian citizen can be arrested and held for
lowing the December trial, and the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference that nine months, and sometimes longer, for in-
final release and fining of Wortham only "concrete steps" be taken to lower the vestigation. In the cases involving Ameri-
last week, barriers which now Impede the opportu- cans, our Embassy frequently is not notified
The point of the matter is that the nities for people to travel anywhere in of the detentions for weeks, if ever. Even
when
boys and their families and the commu- the world. Secretary of State Christian are notified, we have no rights of
visitation.
nities and States in which they live were Herter discussed the treaty in 1959 at What this means to a detained American
subject to great tensions and anxieties Camp David with Soviet Foreign Minis- Is prolonged isolation in a Russian prison
because of the uncertainty surrounding ter Gromyko. Formal negotiations with neither hope of seeing another Ameri-
the treatment of the American citizens began in Moscow in 1963, and after 8 can nor knowledge that his country knows
under Soviet law, and that some of this months of hard negotiations, the con- or care of his imprisonment,
could have been alleviated had the Con- vention was signed on June 1, 1964, and The Importance of the Treaty grows each
the number be visit Russia. From
sular Treaty been in effect. As more and submitted to the Senate by President 1962 to as more
more American citizens go to the Soviet Johnson on June 12, 1964. The Corm- eling in Russia increased 50 percent to 18,000.
Union in the years ahead to try to get mittee on Foreign Relations has twice Since 1964, more than 20 Americans have
a better understanding of the people and held hearings on it, and reported it to been arrested or detained in Russia. One,
their philosophy and to see how they this Congress by a favorable vote of 15 Newcomb Mott, died mysteriously at Russian
live, there are likely to be other Incidents, to 4. It has now been debated in hands under these circumstances.
and we must be sure that we have done the Senate for almost a week. Russian tourists in America, numbering
what we could to give our citizens all We have examined it carefully in all about 900 a year, already have the Treaty's
protections in our open society without the
the protection possible. of its aspects, I am sure that any pos- Treaty.
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S 3754 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 14, 1967
With the Treaty, Americans In the Soviet Commitments without reductions or COm- igreements or arrangements of mutual b?ne-
Union would have more rights than any Rus- pensating advantages to her? It to both sides and to the world.
sian citizen now possesses In his homeland. An affirmative answer would have to But a change in the atmosphere and in
The notification and visitation provisions be based upon an assumption that the t inphasia is not a reversal of purpose. 1M1r.
of the Treaty are Its most compelling fea- Rhrushchev himself he.s said that there can
tures. However, its ground rules for con- treaty, in its present form, holds greater be no coexistence in the field of Ideology. In
sular exchanges also are Important because advantages to the Soviet Union than for iuidition, there are still major areas of ten-
the opening of a single consulate in each us and the further assumption that she e.fon and conflict, from Berlin to Cuba to
country Is contemplated, even though no would concede the first assumption. :southeast Asia. The United States -end the
formal proposals have been made or are un- Neither assumption is valid. Soviet Union still have wholly different con-
der consideration. At best, therefore, we could expect not cepts of the world, its freedom, its future.
Under the Treaty, the exchange of con- acquiescence, but the opening up of an We still have wholly different views on the
sulates would be the subject of careful ne- so-called wars of liberation and the use of
gotiation on a strict quid-pro-quo basis. For enlarged area of disagreement, moving subversion. And so long as these basic dif-
Instance, if an American consulate in Russia us away from the limited agreement we ferences continue, the,., cannot and should
had a staff of 10 persons, the Soviets would are considering, and with pretty dim not be concealed. They set limits to the pos-
be limited to the same number for their prospects for an enlarged agreement. sibilities of agreement: ; and they will give
consulate here. The history of negotiations with the rise to further crises, large and small, in the
Normally, a consulate would have 10 to 15 Soviet Union since World War II is that months and years ahe?d, both in the areas
officers, and neither Attorney General agreements come slowly, that they are cf direct confrontation-Germany and the
Ramsey Clark nor FBI Director J. Edgar limited, and that progress, when it is our control ouuld In area.,; Involve us where e,;e areas such
Hoover regard this number as a problem
which the FBI could not deal with effectively achieved at all, conies with small steps, as Africa and Asia and the Middle East.
and efficiently. There are now 452 Russian not large ones. In times such as the: e, therefore, there is
diplomatic personnel In the United States. Mr. President, each of us can suggest nothing Inconsistent in signing an atmos-
The Treaty provides additional limitations other problems we would like to see re- pheric nuclear test ban, on the one hand,
rod safeguards: solved by the treaty. Each of us could and testing underground on the other; about
1. We would have the right to screen Rus- wish that this one document might wipe being willing to sell to the Soviets our sur-
;ian personnel before agreeing to their as- away all the tensions, the frustrations, plus wheat while refusing to sell strategic
.;ignment to our country; items; about probing their interest in a joint
2. We could prohibit Russian consular and the dangers of the cold war. Each lunar landing while making a major effort
officers from traveling to sensitive areas in of us, I am sure, knows that no such to master this new environment; or about
he United States; single step is possible. exploring the possibilities of disarmament
3. We could expel the Russian officers If And so, Mr. President, we have the while maintaining our stockpile of arms.
they proved undesirable: question whether, confronted by that F)r all of these moves, vnd all of these ele-
4. We could close a Soviet consulate when- reality, we should, in the words of Presi- meats of American policy and Allied policy
ever we wished; and dent Kennedy, "Take each step we can toward the Soviet Union, are directed at a
5. We could cancel the Treaty on six single, comprehensive goal-namely, con-
months' notice, safely take." vinclng the Soviet leaders that it is danger
Clearly. the Treaty represents concessions I think we should. I think this treaty ous for them to engage in direct or indirect
by the Russian Government which we have is such a step. I think that to insist on aggression, futile for them to attempt to
sought and which are regarded as being to a greater step as our price for agreement impose their will and their system on other
(,ur advantage. will endanger the prospect for the unwilling people, and beneficial to them, as
For these reasons. I have supported Senate limited agreement represented by this well as to the world, to join in the achieve-
approval of the Treaty. It is another step in treaty, meat of a genuine and enforceable peace.
cur search for a detente In the Cold War. It Historians report that in 1914. with most
Is one justifiable means of neutralizing the On October 19, 1963, Mr. President, in of the world already plunged in war, Prince
strains In American-Russian relations caused an address at the University of Maine, Billow, the former German Chancellor, said
by the hot war in Vietnam. It Is a small but President Kennedy spoke on "The mean- to the then Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg,
important step in search of a lasting peace, ing of the test ban treaty." His advice on "flow did it all happen?" And Bethman-
And when I think of these small but some. that occasion is appropriate to the de- Huliweg replied, "Ali, if cnly one knew." My
times difficult steps, I remember President cision before us. I ask unanimous con- fe:low Americans, if this planet is ever rav-
I_ennedy speaking at the Convocation at the aged by nuclear war, If 300 million Ameri-
Ke ersity_ of Maine in October, io sent that excerpts from that address be cans, Russians and Europeans are wiped out
printed in the RECORD at this point. by a sixty-minute nuclear exchange, if the
hard, Whi the road t ... peace 1thand
Is There being no objection, the excerpts pl'.iable survivors of that devastation can
take and each step pitfalls, tep that
no and
reason full full not of to traps
we can were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, then endure the ensunl; fire, poison, chaos
and catastrophe, I do not want one of those
asfolloWs. survivors to ask another, "How did it all
One year ago this coming week, the United happen?" and to receive he incredible reply,
EDMUND S. MUSKr . States and the world were gripped with a "Ali, if only one knew."
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the first somber prospect of a military confrontation Therefore, while maintaining our readiness
between the two great nuclear powers. The for war, let us exhaust every avenue for
question which confronts us is this: IS American people have good reason to recall
willing-
help, , clear
the treaty in its present form, as level- with pride their conduct throughout that peace. taLet us lk, if talk alk always
will make
and our otr sad -
aped in negotiations extending over Sev- harrowing week. For they neither dissolved nne:ssos to to fight, s re-
eral years, in our national interest? in panic nor rushed headlong Into reckless solve to be fi,hP fight we must. Let t u
own victims, odestiny
I believe it is, for the reasons stated oelitgerence. Well aware of the risks of re- ous history, the c , masters, controlling not our the
destiny
in my newsletter. slatance, they nevertheless refused to tolerate ' without giving way to blind suspicion and
l
l
ace nuc
ear weapons emotion....
I believe the proposed commitments the Soviets attempt to p
on our part are limited, acceptable, and -n this hemisphere, but recognized at the
same time that our preparations for the use
The PR
properly safeguarded. of force necessarily require a simultaneous
I believe the proposed commitments on search for fair and peaceful solutions.. , .
the part of the Soviet Union are advan- A year ago it would have been easy to as-
rages and protections of substance to mime that all-out war was inevitable, that
American citizens traveling in the Soviet any agreement with the Soviets was impos-
Union. [.ible, and that an unlimited arms race was
I believe that the treaty In its present unavoidable. Today it Is equally easy for
form is in the national Interest, notwith- some assume that the Co War is over,
that all l outstanding issues bet between the 50-
standing the fact that other differences viets and our country can be quickly and
and disputes between the United States satisfactorily settled, and that we shall now
algid the Soviet Union are not resolved have, in the words of the Psalmist, an "abun-
1)y it. dance of peace so long as the moon en-
The second question which confronts ciureth."
11, is this: Is it realistic to expect that The fact of the matter Is, of course, that
the Soviet Union would agree to adds- neither view Is correct. We have, It Is true,
roads some progress on a long journey. We
tional commitments on her part Involy- have achieved new opportunities which we
ing no additional commitments on our cannot afford to waste. We have concluded
part? Or to agree to a reduction in our with the Soviets a few limited, enforceable
ESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
MONTOYA in the chair). The time of the
Senator has expired.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield 2 additional
minutes to the Senator from Maine.
Mr. MUSKIE. I should like to read
the following excerpt from that address:
In times such as these, therefore, there
Is nothing inconsistent in signing an atmos-
pheric nuclear test ban, on the one hand,
and testing underground on the other; about
being willing to sell to the Soviets our sur-
plus wheat while refusing to sell strategic
Items; about probing their interest in a joint
lunar landing while making a major effort
to master this new environment; or about
exploring the possibilttie; of disarmament
while maintaining our stockpile of arms. For
all of these moves, and all of these elements
of American policy and A!Iied policy toward
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March 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3755
the Soviet Union, are directed at a single, to advise the State Department that we rope by the Russians during and after
comprehensive goal-namely, convincing the feel our consular officers and representa- World War II. By trade, tourism, and
Soviet leaders that it is dangerous for them tives of the press should have on the diplomacy, new bridges have been built
to engage in direct or indirect aggression, Russian side exactly the same rights, into the East. We have an opportunity
futile for them to attempt to impose their
will privileges and protections their people now to penetrate that curtain in still
their
and beneficial eneficial system on other unwilling to them, as well as to have on the American side? If we be- another way; namely, through the pen -
people, eople, and
the world, to join in the achievement of a lieve that, we should vote "yes," and if ing Consular Treaty.
genuine and enforceable peace. we do not believe that, we should vote It is in our national interest to ratify
Historians report that in 1914, with most of