THE USSR REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 3, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-
The USSR
ZONAL AND
TICAL ANALYS
0.0912A000100010006-2
Secret
Secret
RP ASU 77-004
3 March 1977
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
SECRET
25X1
THE USSR
3 March 1977
Soviet Commercial visitors for
1976--An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ANNEX: Moscow, Berlin, and East-West
Detente . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
25X1
RP ASU 77-004
3 March 1977
Approved For Release 2004/07/1?E&IARDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Release 2004/07/1 f 5(IA.RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
Soviet Commercial Visitors for 1976--an Overview
Soviet commercial contacts in the US in 1976 held
steady at about the 1975 level. The number of VIP
business visitors (deputy minister level or higher),
however, rose from 14 in 1975 to 24 in 1976. Approxi-
mately 1,150 bureaucrats, scientists, technicians, and
skilled workers visited US companies and institutions
for commercial purposes during the year. Representatives
of the Soviet automotive industry were again the most
numerous with the petroleum and petrochemical industries
moving up to second place. Two important facilities still
under construction in the Soviet Union--the Kama Motor
Vehicle Plant and the International Trade Center spon-
sored by the Occidental Petroleum Corporation--accounted
for many of the visits in these categories.
An analysis of bilateral commercial contacts during
the last three years suggests that there is a pattern
to them. Once a problem has been identified by Soviet
bureaucrats (e.g., an area where technology or equipment
is substandard), high level officials in the appropriate
industry (deputy ministers, plant directors, institute
heads) come to the US to see what solution their American
counterparts have found for it. If a recommendation is
made that funds be committed to a particular purchase,
the number of such visitors decreases, and an upswing
in American visits to the USSR ensues to complete the
negotiations. When agreement is reached, the third
phase begins--the dispatch to the US of lower ranking
personnel to obtain equipment and training on how to
use it.
The establishment in the US of Soviet economic
agencies, such as Morflot and the Kama Purchasing Com-
mission, might have been expected to reduce the number
of business visitors on the theory that negotiations
would increasingly be carried out by these organizations.
But their existence does not seem to have lessened the
need for American businessmen to meet with the end-users
RP ASU 77-004
3 March 1977
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/1i~co RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Release 20Q6t77J6 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
of the technology or equipment in question or for the
end-users actually to see the product before a purchase
is agreed upon.
Some Trends
The figures presented in the table below together
with other information suggest a number of trends:
--Direct Soviet attempts to acquire sensitive
US technology seemed less persistent in 1976
than in the preceding year. Licensing arrange-
ments involving third countries as well as
the Soviet and US participants, however,
became increasingly common.
--i'iost 1976 Soviet business visits were made
in connection with relatively routine Soviet
projects, suggesting that financing is not
available to undertake more sophisticated
ones. This assumption is supported by the
arrival last year of several Soviet bankers
seeking credit.
--Many commercial delegations were again ac-
companied by representatives of the party
apparatus who identified themselves as "em-
ployees," "senior experts," or "consultants"
of various ministries. In some cases these
party "apparatchiks" outranked the nominal
head of the delegations they came with.
--The upswing in delegations concerned with
mining and construction under extreme
climatic conditions suggests a renewed
Soviet interest in involving the US in
developing resources in Siberia and the
Far East.
--The continuing decrease in visits con-
cerned with aviation reflected the uncertain
state of US-Soviet relations in the field.
Some negotiations have bogged down due to
questions of Soviet intent and unwilling-
ness to grant US industry access to plants
to observe quality control procedures.
RP ASU 77-004
3 March 1977
Approved For Release 2 107/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : S IA RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
--Continuing problems with Soviet pipelines
and other petroleum-related equipment
appeared to contribute to the consistently
high number of petroleum industry visitors
to this country.
--Expansion of Soviet shipping activities
in North America continued into 1976 with
the establishment in New Jersey of Morflot
America, Inc. Because the Soviets are
under constraints by the US to reduce
their official presence in the US, Morflot
may represent a way of avoiding direct US
control over Soviet personnel.
--Preparations for the 1980 Olympics in
Moscow may have generated the interest
in selected consumer goods areas (fast
food equipment, prefabricated housing,
etc.)
--The Kama Purchasing Commission, which
was established in 1972 to purchase equip-
ment for the Kama Motor Vehicle Plant,
continued to expand beyond its original
charter by negotiating in areas unrelated
to the automotive industry. For example,
the Kama Purchasing Commission has been
given permission to purchase for the
Irkutsk natural gas project.
The chart shows a tally of commercial visitors in
selected categories over the past three years, along
with the ranking of each category from year to year.
We recognize that numbers of visitors alone cannot
accurately reflect Soviet priorities in the acquisition
of technology and equipment. Often they reflect the
status of a particular undertaking or identify topics
of interest during various negotiating stages.
I I
RP ASU 77-004
3 March 1977
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 $ RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
SECRET
Soviet Commercial Visitors
1974-1975-1976
Visitors
Rank
76
75
74
Automotive Industry
145
194
92
1
1
1
Petroleum and Petro-
chemical Industries
107
93
40
2
4
5
Chemical Industry
85
76
32
3
5
9
Agriculture
68
114
28
4
2
10
Metallurgy (both ferrous
and non-ferrous)
55
45
54
5
9
2
Maritime Affairs
54
28
39
6
11
7
Construction
52
64
53
7
6
3
Mining
45
21
*
8
14
Machinebuilding
39
39
32
9
10
8
Electronics
26
48
*
10
8
*
Computers
22
54
*
11
7
*
Food Industry
21
28
40
12
11
6
Gas Industry
19
21
*
13
14
*
Foundry Technology
18
98
*
14
3
Aviation
14
24
45
15
13
4
Banking and Finance
12
11
*
16
19
*
Electrical Equipment
10
20
23
17
17
12
Radio, TV, Cinematography
4
21
22
18
14
13
Geology
0
16
16
* No data available for 1974
RP ASU 77-004
3 March 1977
Approved For Release 2064IMt6 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Release 2004/07/1C RR-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
Moscow, Berlin, and East-West Detente
25X1
East German actions in Berlin since the turn of the
year have given rise to a wave of rumors and speculation
and have raised the specter of another East-West con-
frontation over the divided city. The two key questions
are why the Soviet Union, which retains veto power over
GDR actions, has chosen to permit the East Germans to
act at this time, and whether the Soviets will permit
further steps of a kind that could precipitate an East-
West c.,llision.
Background: The East German Actions
Over the course of the last two months, the Soviets
have permitted the East Germans to accelerate their
long-standing effort to assert their sovereignty over
the eastern sector of the divided city. The East Germans
removed border control points between East Berlin and
East Germany on the weekend of January 1-2, and, as
finally confirmed by party boss Honecker on February 17,
gave notice of the discontinuation of a legal gazette,
the Verordnungsblatt, which had served as a vehicle for
applying East German legislation to East Berlin. (The
publication actually appears to have been discontinued
in September, some three months after steps had been
taken to erase some of the remaining distinctions be-
tween East Berlin and East German delegates in the East
German legislature.) The purpose of these changes was
to eliminate some of the last visible reminders of East
Berlin's status as an area formally under Four-Power
occupation.
In addition, there are now reports that the East
Germans intend to create a new district in East Berlin,
and that, rumors say, it will include some territory
from the neighboring Frankfurt District. This boundary
alteration would reinforce East Germany's claim to
sovereignty over East Berlin, but it would be a direct
violation of the original Four Power occupation agree-
ment of 1944, which barred any changes in the borders
of Greater Berlin.
RP ASU 77-004
3 March 1977
Approved For Release 2004/07HReIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Release ?~ MIPT/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
25X1
All these actions gain in significance because they
coincide with efforts to restrict foreign and West German
travel into East Berlin. In a move apparently intended
to choke off the heavy flow of pleasure- and bargain-
seeking foreign laborers going from West Berlin into
East Berlin, the GDR in January imposed visa requireme;-,ts
on foreign (non-German and non-Allied) visitors to East
Berlin. At the same time, the East Germans have begun
quietly to deny entry to selected West Berlin visitors,
apparently focusing on former East Germans whose per-
sonal examples might inspire imitators.
Most importantly, in December and January, the East
Germans attempted to go beyond symbolic actions to deal
directly with their most pressing problem, the mounting
wave of interest in legal emigration. First they moni-
tored and harassed East German visitors to the West
German mission in East Berlin (beginning in December),
then they barred entry to the mission (on January 11),
and then, abandoning this tactic, assigned plainclothes-
men to patrol the area and make spot-checks of visitors
leaving the mission. These steps were more directly rel-
evant than anything else the GDR has done to the central
East German problem of controlling their restive popula-
tion. They were in direct violation, however, of inner-
German agreements linked to the Quadripartite Agreement
of 1971, as well as the Helsinki accord.
The East Germans have long wished to take some of
these actions, but evidently acted only after they had
obtained the support and approval of the Soviets.
The East German motives in promoting such actions
are easy to assess. The GDR remains in many ways an
artificial creation. The loyalties of many of its cit-
izens are questionable, and the recent wave of emigra-
tion has evidently alarmed the regime. Any actions that
RP ASU 77-004
3 March 197'1
25X1
Approved For Release *d7/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
SECRET
might widen the gulf between East Germany and West Ger-
many, bolster GDR claims to legitimacy, and slow down
East German emigration, are obviously to the GDR's ad-
vantage.
Moscow's motives are more complex. On the one hand,
the Soviets not only share the GDR's nervousness over
its vulnerability to ideological "subversion" from the
West, but also see the rise of intellectual dissidence
and popular unrest in East Germany as part of a general
phenomenon that threatens to weaken their position
throughout Eastern Europe. Moreover, Moscow is con-
cerned about the latent appeal of German nationalism in
the GDR. These multiple concerns were undoubtedly
behind the Soviet decision to support the East Germans
in their most recent efforts to buttress their position
in Berlin and to restrict the flow of travel across their
borders.
On the other hand, the Soviets also have a political
and economic stake in the preservation of good relations
with the West. It is not likely that the Soviet leaders
have forgotten how central the Berlin agreement was to
the other achievements of Moscow's detente diplomacy.
Moscow's interest in supporting the East Germans in their
current efforts is therefore likely to be balanced by
a comparable interest in avoiding any direct confronta-
tion with the West over Berlin.
In fact, the latest East German initiatives appear
to have been launched with an eye to avoiding a direct
conflict with the Western Allies. In contrast to past
flare-ups over Berlin, this time there has been no ef-
fort to interfere with land or air access to the city,
or with Allied (as distinct from West German) rights
there. The actions initiated by the East German regime,
presumably under Soviet guidance, have instead probed
at the gray areas of the existing agreements and made
only changes that do not directly involve the Western
Allies. The Soviets themselves have done their best to
play down the significance of the East German moves,
treating them and Allied protests of them as "technical"
questions, and passing assurances that they have no in-
terest in a dispute over Berlin.
RP ASU 77-004
3 March 1977
Approved For Release 2004/07/1grCQIRDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Release 2qR ff j16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
There are other signs of caution in the East German
approach, which again presumably reflect the guiding hand
of the Soviets. The East Germans in some cases like the
Verordnungsblatt carefully left themselves a line of re-
treat. In other instances they have not followed up on
provocative actions, notably the blockade of the West
German mission. It would appear that this move in
particular provoked second thoughts in East Berlin or--
more likely--Moscow, because of the attention it drew
in the West. Indeed, one Soviet diplomat in East Berlin
claimed tnaL the Soviets had been "surprised" by the
blockade of the mission.
The Soviets, meanwhile, have stayed discreetly in
the background, although they have staunchly defended
East Germany's claims to sovereignty over East Berlin.
Their most authoritative public pronouncement appeared
in a lei article in Pravda on February 12, in which
they backed East German steps to defend their "legiti-
mate" rights. This, of course, is a position of long
standing--one the Soviets maintained throughout the nego-
tiations on the Quadripartite Agreement--and it would be
surprising indeed if they were to give it up now.
Insofar as the Soviets themselves have played an
active role in Berlin, it has been to oppose West
German efforts to strengthen their ties with West Ber-
lin. Thus, the Soviets have protested virtually all
visible West German activities in the city, including
Bundestag committee meetings, the establishment of
Federal German offices, and visits by West German govern-
ment officials. In November, they also protested plans
to permit West Berlin to participate in elections to
the European Parliament on the grounds that this would
be a violation of Berlin's special Four-Power status.
These protests have been coupled with a persistent ef-
fort to assert a larger role for themselves in West Ber-
lin, both through legalistic arguments and through quiet
efforts to expand the overall level of Soviet activity
in West Berlin.
Prospects
The apparent care the Soviets have taken to control
the East Germans and to bar dramatic or unduly provoca-
tive actions suggests that it is unlikely that there will
RP ASU 77-004
3 March 1977
Approved For Release 21 4AWT16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 $P~&-~DP79T00912A000100010006-2
be any sharp escalation of East German actions in and
around Berlin. Certainly the prospect of military ac-
tion directed against West Berlin or the access routes
to it is remote under the present circumstances. The
Soviets today want to achieve a new SALT agreement with
the US, and to maintain and expand Soviet access to the
technology and goods of the West. A major crisis over
Berlin would threaten both objectives, and could bring
about other untoward results, such as the strengthening
of West European interest in the NATO alliance.
For the same reasons, we are not likely to see any
open challenge soon to Allied prerogatives in Berlin,
despite suggestions made by Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov
in East Berlin on January 19 that Allied military patrols
in East Berlin were provocative and should be scaled
25X1 down. The relatively tough tone taken b
Abrasimov
may reflec
apparatchik with a well-deserved reputation as a hard
liner--and. a desire to probe for differences in the re-
solve of the Western Allies. In responding to Allied
protests against East German actions on January 11,
Soviet officials in Moscow took a notably tougher line
with the British and French than they did with the
Americans. To the former they asserted that Greater
Berlin was no longer in existence, a claim they did
not advance to US diplomats. But while there is no
reason to doubt that the Soviets would be delighted
if they could bluff the Allies, or some of them, into
scaling down their activity in East Berlin, this is
very different from an attempt to bar entry to military
patrols.
[
t
both the personality of the man--a former party
Another reason to doubt that the Soviets would
deliberately choose to precipitate a major crisis over
Berlin is at least modest success of the "nibbling"
tactics they have permitted the East Germans to under-
take. In the absence of an Allied decision to make
a major issue out of the East German moves, we are
likely to see further such nibbling. A likely move in
the near future would be a unilateral revision of the
borders of East Berlin. Like the other small steps so
far taken, this would not directly impinge on Allied
rights and the Soviets might see it as an acceptably
low-risk gamble. This year the Soviets have made no
RP ASU 77-004
3 March 1977
Approved For Release 2004/07/16EoIAT-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
SECRET
effort to deny that such a move is in the offing, in
contrast to their posture two years ago when rumors of
similar possible action first surfaced.
The Continuing Problem
Despite Moscow's caution and evident unwillingness
to risk a major crisis, the Berlin situation is still
potentially explosive. This is because the relatively
low-risk actions Moscow has been willing to approve of
do little to solve the real problem in East Germany--
the lack of legitimacy of the East German state and the
failure of the regime to make its citizens more Communist
than German. If the present discontent in East Germany
should continue to grow--and with it the pressure for
East German emigration--the possibility cannot be ex-
cluded that the Soviets would eventually support an
East German move drastically to reduce contact with the
West, despite the fact that such actions would violate
existing agreements. They might, for example, reimpose
their blockade of the West German missions. In an ex-
tremity, they might even seal off the border to all East-
West travel. If the East German regime were to appear
seriously threatened, it is almost certain that the
Soviets would support such action, as they did in 1961,
when they endorsed the building of the Berlin Wall.
Similarly, if serious disturbances should erupt else-
where in Eastern Europe, the Soviets might conclude that
they had no alternative but to take preventive actions
in East Germany.
RP ASU 77-004
3 March 1977
25X1
Approved For Release X97/16 : CIA-RDP79TOO912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Relelse 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2 I 25X1
Moscow's Initial Probe for Changes in Post-Mao Attitudes
Is Foundering
The first major Soviet probe for any change in Pe-
king's attitude toward the USSR since Mao's death appears
to be drawing to a close with very little to show for the
effort. Cracks are beginning to appear in the propaganda
standdown Moscow has maintained since Mao's death over
five months ago, Soviet diplomats are beginning to leak
word to their associates of the "reasonable" proposals
spurned by the Chinese at the current round of border
talks in Peking, and Soviet media are again citing earlier
Soviet proposals on non-use of force and nonaggression
that Peking turned down in the past. The Soviets, in
short, seem to be preparing for the cessation of this
round of border talks.
It is unlikely that Moscow expected any quick change
in Chinese attitudes after Mao and, indeed, most Soviet
officials indicated just that. Nevertheless, the Soviets
were clearly ped to take some new initiatives after
Mao departed . rear
The quick action o
the new inese ea ers ip again the "gang of four,"
whom the Soviets clearly believed to be Mao's spiritual
heirs, apparently encouraged the Soviets to begin to
probe for changes. Their initiative to start the new
round of border talks probably should be seen in this
light. With no Chinese ambassador in Moscow (since
March 1976) and with the Soviet embassy in Peking en-
joying little access to Chinese officials, the border
talks conducted at the deputy foreign minister level pro-
vided the highest possible direct level of contact. After
Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev arrived in Peking on
November 30 to reconvene the talks, various Soviet of-
ficials expressed optimism, claiming that the Chinese
did not seem as intransigent as before. The Chinese
for their part have sought to discredit this line, viewing
it as a Soviet effort to worry the US. They apparently
have not yielded an inch in their basic positions.
24 February
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Rel4ase 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP19T00912A000100010006-2
The first break in the Soviet propaganda standdown
came about two weeks after Ilichev was received by For-
eign Minister Huang Hua on January 22, indicating that
the meeting only confirmed China's unwillingness to move
ahead. In a domestic broadcast on February 4, Izvestia
commentator Bovin, who is known to have ties with General
Secretary Brezhnev, accused the new Chinese leadership of
carrying on "the old anti-Soviet line," even though he
commended it for changing Mao's domestic policies.
The Ilichev - Huang Hua meeting took place without
publicity or official announcements, apparently at Chi-
nese insistence because of concern over the propaganda
use Moscow would make of it. By February 7, however,
the Soviets began leaking the word in Peking that the
meeting had taken place,
The highest level Soviet polemical statement to
date was a Pravda "Observer" article on February 10.
In addition to criticizing "anti-Soviet attacks" on China,
it recounted Soviet non-use-of-force and non-agression
proposals of 1971 and 1973, and Soviet proposals for
high-level or summit meetings made in 1969, 1970, and
1973. It also cited an unspecified "initiative to im-
prove relations" advanced in recent months. This "ini-
tiative" has also been mentioned in subsequent Soviet
propaganda,
ternative y, the Soviets may
simply be re erring to t eir initiative to reconvene the
border talks, or to the gestures they have made since Mao's
death, including the propaganda standdown.
The timing of the "Observer" article could have
been determined by an interview which Ilichev's counter-
part, Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chan, gave to the manag-
ing editor of the Japanese Mainichi Shimbun on February
5. Among other things, Yu Chan termed the recent Soviet
approach to China a fraud intended to deceive interna-
tional opinion. Concerning the situation at the border
talks, he accused Moscow of continuing to talk "nonsense"
while taking "practically no measures whatsoever." It
is likely that Moscow, which has had to endure a stream
25X1
25X1
RP ASU 77-003CX =
25X1
24 February 1977
Approved For Rele*se 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Releas
of Chinese polemics during the standdown, felt that this
sort of public attack by the chief Chinese negotiator
merited a riposte, and that there was little risk in
giving it. However, these scattered Soviet criticisms
of China still fall far short of a full-scale resumption
of Soviet polemics, and serve primarily as indicators
that Moscow has not been satisfied with the results of
its gestures to Peking.
25X1
Chinese Refuse To Back Off "Unjust Treaties" Issue
At the same time, the Soviets have claimed that the
Chinese continue to insist that Moscow admit the "injus-
tice" of the early treaties on which the Sino-Soviet
border is based before formal negotiations can begin.
RP ASU 77-003CX
24 February 1977
Approved For Release) 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79Tg0912A000100010006-2
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Rele
The Soviets claim that the negotiations stalled on this
point before they ever got started. An article in the
PRC-controlled Hong Kong press rebutting the Pravda
"Observer" article has also indicated that the Chinese
continue to demand this admission. This demand was one
of the difficulties on which the abortive border discus-
sions of 1964 foundered. Although the Chinese had never
explicitly renounced it., they apparently had placed much
less stress on it in recent years. If they are indeed
holding firm, it would seem that Soviet pessimism is
well-founded, particularly in light of the two other
tough Chinese proposals which have been raised at this
round--calling for Soviet withdrawal from Mon olia and
reduction of border forces to the 1964 level
If peking saw it in its interest to keep the talks
alive, it could presumably do so with very little effort.
Moscow is not anxious to concede to the world that re-
lations are at the same old impasse, and some modest
gesture by Peking would probably keep Ilichev there.
At the moment, however, the main impression is that of
two sides preparing their positions publicly and pri-
vately for Ilichev's return.
RP ASU 77-003CX
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Releasle 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79TQ0912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Releas
The Ustinov-Ryabov Conundrum
The responsibilities as party secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee assumed by Yakov Ryabov last October
are still not clearly discernible, despite several in-
triguing official appearances on his part. The ambig-
uities surrounding his role and that of Minister of
Defense Ustinov raise questions for which we have no
good answers.
At their center is the unknown of Kirilenko's cur-
rent stance in the leadership--loyal deputy to Brezhnev
or increasingly impatient "heir." Brezhnev and Kirilenko
have different personal styles and, to the extent that
these styles are reflected in policy areas, their rela-
tive political strengths are and will continue to be
significant. At the Central Committee plenum last
October, the fortunes of their respective clients pre-
sented a striking contrast. Kirilenko succeeded in
getting his protege, Ryabov, seated on the Secretariat.
Brezhnev failed to get his client--First Deputy Premier
Tikhonov--seated on the Politburo. Since then, however,
Ryabov's responsibilities as secretary and Kirilenko's
access through him to additional sectors of party work
have remained murky.
A "vacancy" on the Secretariat was created last
April when then party secretary Ustinov became minister
of defense. Ustinov has not been referred to in the
Soviet media as party secretary since that time. The
job is as demanding and time-consuming as that of minister
of defense, and few Western observers believe that he can
handle both positions indefinitely. Thus, it was widely
expected that Ustinov would be formally released from his
Secretariat duties at the Central Committee plenum in
October. The promotion of Ryabov to the Secretariat at
that time suggested that he might be slated as Ustinov's
replacement. In the event, however, the plenum failed
to announce Ustinov's release from the Secretariat.
RP ASU 77-003CX
24 February 1977
25X1
25X1
Approved For Releage 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP7gT00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Re
Defense Industry in the Secretariat
As party secretary, Ustinov's major responsibility
was the coordination of defense industry, a package that
seems to have been designed to match his special expertise.
There is no overriding precedent for a separate portfolio
in the Secretariat, and defense industries in the past
have been handled by the secretary for industry--one of
Kirilenko's current responsibilities. Since Ustinov's
appointment as minister of defense there have been only
infrequent reports of contacts between him and defense
industry principals, and we lack sufficient details con-
cerning these contacts to discern whether they were of
the type to be expected between defense industries and
their primary customer--the minister of defense--or
whether Ustinov has tailored his new job to fit his own
particular strengths and has taken coordination of de-
fense industry with him to his new assignment.
RP ASU 7 7-0 0 3CX
I 25X1
Approved For Relerase 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP719T00912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
Obituary signatures, sometimes useful in defining
responsibilities within the Secretariat, have also been
inconclusive. Ustinov, but not Ryabov, signed the obit-
uary in November of a retired defense industry official.
Obituary signature protocol is based in part on actual
official contacts, however, and since the deceased was
retired, Ryabov may have been too newly installed to
have had any contact with him. Both Ustinov and Ryabov
signed the obituary of a worker at the Baltic shipbuild-
ing plant in Leningrad, but the other signatories were
neither military nor defense industry, leaving the rea-
son for Ryabov's signature ambiguous. He attended the
funeral of an aircraft designer this month, but so did
Moscow party boss Grishin and Kirilenko, as well as
Ustinov and L. V. Smirnov, chairman of the Military-
Industrial Commission.
The Administrative Organs Function
If access through his protege to defense industry
decisions is important to Kirilenko, so is access to
another, less clearly defined responsibility of Ustinov's.
There is fragmentary evidence that as party secretary,
he had achieved some supervisory responsibility for the
Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department
which checks on the armed forces, the KGB, and the
Ministry of Internal Affairs (the uniformed police).
In 1972, he addressed a seminar o
regiona Administrative Organs officials convened to
discuss strengthening socialist legality, law and order,
and mass defense work. In 1974, accompanied by the head
of the Administrative Organs Department, who was making
a rare public appearance, he received the deputy chair-
man of the Hungarian Council of Ministers responsible for
the military and security police (but not defense in-
dustry). This is not to suggest that he had replaced
Brezhnev as "most responsible" secretary in this field,
or even that he had blocked the activities of other
secretaries, but that he seemed to be playing an ex-
panded role.
RP ASU 77-003CX
24 February 1_977
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79TQ0912A000100010006-2
 Approved For Rel
Control of the Administrative Organs Department is
an important political lever for a Soviet leader. It is
a measure of the sensitivity of this department that when
its head--a Brezhnev client--was killed in a plane crash
shortly after Khrushchev's ouster, it took the leader-
ship four years to agree on a replacement. During this
period Brezhnev moved quickly to retrieve his loss and
by 1966 was exercising effective control over the head-
less department. In the end, the leadership's solution
was as nearly apolitical as it could manage; the first
deputy head, a career apparatchik, was finally promoted
to head.
In his first solo public appearance following his
promotion to the Secretariat, Ryabov was the ranking
political figure to attend the Militia Day ceremonies
in November. Kapitonov alone in 1970 and with Polyansky
in 1971, Kirilenko and Shelest in 1972, Mazurov in 1973,
and Ustinov and Tikhonov in 1974 had successively repre-
sented the leadership on this occasion. In 1975, no
major leaders were listed as attending. Ryabov's sudden
emergence into the spotlight on Militia Day hinted at a
possible link with the Administrative Organs Department.
This hint was slightly strengthened in January when
Ryabov represented the leadership at the All-Union DOSAAF
Congress. At the last congress in 1971, the head of the
Administrative Organs Department had performed this
function.
Questions but No Answers
We are left, then, with some troubling questions.
Has Ustinov been left on the Secretariat at least in part
to block Kirilenko from further successes and to maintain
the balance among the seniors on the Secretariat? Or is
Ryabov simply too junior and too inexperienced at the
national level to allow him to do more than understudy
the overburdened Ustinov? How real is Kirilenko's access
through his protege to the sensitive areas of the defense
industry and the Administrative Organs Department?
Finally--to return to first causes--what sort of trade-
off was involved in Ryabov's promotion in the first place?
1 24 February
1977
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010006-2