REPLY TO SENATOR PERCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R002000060075-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 75
• Content Type: MEMORANDUM FOR

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Legislative Counsel
Washin ton D. C. 20 505
Telephone
1 February 19 8
TO: Mr. Alan Platt
D'd S. Arms Control., & I7isa_r;nia.m. ent Agency
in line with our conversation,
attached is the material you. requested.
Acting Legislative Counsel
IORI/CDF Pages
3-22
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CE'N'TRAL N NTTELI_LIGENC E AGENCY
c Office of Legislative Counsel
Washin teary D. C. 20505
"~ ~q ,~ .reJephcrrtie
;..U .,' January 1978
Ta. onoral.e Cnarles = rct
United States ,Senate
4321 Dirksen Senate Office Bu.ildixig
Dear Senator Percy.
In response to your request, I hope
this is .helpful.
Sirtcer oly'
STU-
Deputy Legislative Counsel.
FORM I833 OBSOLETE
6-68 PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
~r-; )- J- I-;,-)
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1 8 January 197s,'
MEMORANDUM FOR,: Office of Legislative Counsel
.Attu
THROUGH Director, National. Foreign Assessment
Center
FROM Chief, Congressional Support Staff, NFAC
SUBJECT Reply to Senator Percy
1. Attached is a classified response to Senator
Percy Y s 6 January 'letter requesting, CIA comments on a
1975 article by Melvin Laird. Percy apparently wants this
as a background for discussions with a group of Soviet par-
liamentarians..
2? I believe it does what the Senator wants without
taking head-on issue with Laird.
Attachment: a./s
CC: D/NFAC
OLC
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JIM SASY(H. TENN.
HICNAHD A. WEGMA>
CHIVW COUN. . AID STAVE 0IHII6:f0,1
January 6, 1978
Office of,Legislat.ve Liaison
Central Intelligence Agency
Washirngton, D. C.
Dead
When I was in the Soviet Union in 1975 for the U.S. Senate
delegation meetings with the Supreme Soviet, Georgi Arbatov
and Georgi Zhukov were incensed by the article "Is This
Detente" by Mel Laird in the July 1975 issue of Reader's
Digest. They were so concerned that they wrote a response
w is they handed to me 6
Enclosed is a copy of the Laird article and the Arba.tov-
Zhukov response.. Before we meet with the Supreme Soviet
delegation here on January 22, I would like to have for my
information an objective evaluation from the Agency of the
six numbered points made by Laird in his article. It could
be done on plain paper and I would not attribute any of the
information to the Agency.
I would very much appreciate it if I could have this analysis
by January 19 when I will be back from Panama. When it is
ready, please call Scott Cohen.
All best wishes for the New Year.
Sincerely,
Charles H. Percy
United States Senator
CHP:scp
coMMarrE[ ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFt-AM5
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A
Leaders Digest
J jN
All over the world, the Soviet Union is
callously and consistently ignoring agreements
with the United States that were designed
to reduce tensions. Here is
the sobering scorecard
IS THIS D~TENTE?
VER THE past several years,
the United States has made
major concessions and nu-
merous gestures of goodwill to in-
duce the Soviet Union to help
.defuse world powder kegs that
could explode into war. We still
hope that such efforts will eventual-
ly succeed. Certainly, everyone hopes
to avoid renewal of Cold War con-
frontations. But it would be danger-
ously foolish to confuse hope with
reality. Therefore, I am now per-
suaded that the American people
ought to be told some unpleasant
facts about the true status of detente,
so that they can intelligently judge
the Kremlin's current intentions.
The facts are that, in recent
months, the U.S.S.R.- secretly and
openly-has repeatedly committed
deliberate acts that mock detente
and threaten the free world. Let's
look at six deeply troubling actions:
1. The U.S.S.R. has violated agree-
ments to limit strategic weapons.
On May 26, 1972, the United
States and the Soviet Union con-
cluded two important arms agree-
ments. One treaty strictly limits both
countries in their future develop-
rnent of anti-ballistic-missile systems.
A vital component- of any such sys-
tem is powerful, sophisticated radar
that tracks incoming missiles. Arti-
cle VI of that treaty explicitly forbids
testing any radar for Aimt use. Yet
our government now possesses
evidence that the Russians have con-
ducted radar tests specifically for-
bidden by the treaty. The Russians
MELV N R. LAIRD, former Congressman
from Wisconsin (1953-1969) and Secretary
of Defense (x969'1973), is The Reader's Di-
gest's Counsellor for National and interna-
tional Affairs.
have not disputed our intelligence,
but have insisted that the tests were
for "safety or instrumentation" pur-
poses only. The disingenuousness
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THE READER'S DIGEST
or this reply cannot conceal the fact
that the Russians have cheated on
the treaty and may be developing
an ABM system that would endow.
them with a significant strategic
advantage.
The second accord limits the
United States and the Soviet Union
to approximately the same number
.of nuclear delivery systems. Critical
to this SALT I agreement was the
clear American understanding that
neither side would appreciably in-
crease the size of its intercontinental
ballistic missiles-for larger missiles
could carry more warheads and ren-
der the limitation on numbers
meaningless. Now reconnaissance
and other reliable sources have pro-
vided incontrovertible proof that the
Soviets have cheated in this under.
standing. In some 50 silos, they have
installed new missiles called the
SS19, 5o-percent bigger than most
of their previous rockets. De-
ployed in large numbers, the SS19
will give the Soviet Union the ca-
pability to destroy our land-based
missiles and bombers in a surprise
attack. Six years ago, we and
the Russians could deliver nuclear
warheads of about the same destruc-
tive force. Today the Soviets can
outfire us in destructive power by
two-to-one.
2. The Soviet Union actively as-
sisted North Vietnam in making a
shambles of the Paris peace accords
and overrunning South Vietnam.
At Paris in January 1973, the
North Vietnamese pledged to re-
spect South Vietnam's right to deter-
mine its own political future. They
pledged not to send more troops and
arms into South Vietnam. Both
pledges were promptly broken. The
Russians, by continuing to supply
North Vietnam with offensive war
materiel beyond prescribed limita-
tions, played a direct role in the
treaty's sabotage. (We sent less ma-
teriel to South Vietnam than the
treaty allowed, and all of it was de-
monstrably for defense.)
After the ceasefire, the Russians
and Chinese poured into North
Vietnam aid conservatively valued
at $a.5 billion. Among Soviet ship.
ments: 115 modern tanks and ar-
mored vehicles, 300 tactical missiles,
ttoo big military trucks. Such equip,
ment was for one purpose only: re-
newed military attacks in violation
of the Paris accords. And when the
North's offensive began in the spring
of 1974, Soviet tanks spearheaded it.
3. The Soviet Union has reneged
on its promise to guarantee unim-
peded civilian access to West Berlin.
Ever since the Cold War began
with the Berlin blockade in 1948, the
Russians have employed stratagem
after stratagem to strangle West Ber-
lin economically, isolate it politically
and capture it for themselves. In
June 1972, we signed a pact with the
Russians to ease the situation there.
With Britain and France, we agreed
to allow the Russians to establish a
consulate in West Berlin and, at
about the same time, to support
United Nations membership for
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THE REA DER'S DIGEST
East Germany. The Soviets in turn Through this strait pass 17 million
pledged to ensure that the flow of barrels of petroleum daily, bound
people and goods through East Ger-
many to West.Berlin would not be.
obstructed.
However, ? once the consulate
opened and East Germany was in
for Japan and Western Europe. At
camps maintained in neighboring
South' Yemen, Russians supervise.
guerrilla training of Omani tribes-
men. Armed with Soviet weapons,
the U.N., the Russians broke: their the tribesmen raid the countryside-,
.word. From July to October, last -their avowed aim (despite almost
year, the communists deliberately
-and repeatedly-stalled cars and
trucks en route through East Ger-
many. The latest treaty notwith-
standing, the Russians still seem to
look upon West Berlin as a hostage.
. 4. The Soviet Union is abetting
terrorism and guerrilla warfare in
.
the Middle East.
. In Syria, East Germany and the
Soviet Union itself, communist
agents are training hundreds of
young Arabs in the techniques of
terror. The Russians have supplied
to Libya's dictator, Muammar el
Qaddafi, deadly SA-7 heat-seeking
missiles that can home in on the jet
engines of commercial airliners. Pre-
dictably, Qaddafi has turned these
portable weapons over. to terrorists,
allowing some to be shipped in
diplomatic pouches. In September
1973, Italian police captured five ter-
rorists armed with SA-7s on in
apartment balcony near Rome's air-
port, poised to shoot down a Boeing
747. But the attempts go on.
And Russia continues to sustain a
little-noticed but sinister guerrilla
war on the strategic Arabian penin-.
sula. The immediate Soviet target is
the Sultanate of Oman, perched on
the narrow Strait of I-Iormuz,
.total lack of support among the pea
pie of Oman) being to win a "war
of national liberation" in support of
Soviet policy. Such control would
enable Russia to cut at will half of
Western Europe's supply of oil and
three fourths of Japan's.
5. In Portugal, the Soviet Union
'is sponsoring a massive campaign
to impose a communist regime sub-
servient to the Kremlin.
The strategic location of Portugal
makes it a key member of NATO. In
April 1914, a coup ousted Portugal's
right-wing dictator, ,Marcello Cac-
tano, and hope arose that the country
might peacefully transform itself
into a democracy. However, with
the coup, the communists sprang out
of hiding as the country's best-organ-
ized and richest political party, even
though the recent advisory election
indicated that they had the backing
of only about 13 percent of the peo-
ple. But they did have the backing
of the Soviet Union, which, in the
past 1a months, has clandestinely
provided them with at least $40 mil-
lion to pay party workers and hire
street demonstrators to intimidate
the opposition. With secret Soviet
aid, the communist minority has
gained control of the national labor
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IS THIS DETENTE?
federation and is exploiting the press Russians long-term unsecured loans
to spread virulent anti-American at interest rates below what the
propaganda. Opponents to' commu- American home buyer, farmer, busi-
nism are still being purged from key nessman or government must pay.
government and military posts, to be And the Soviets continue to seek.
replaced by communists and their further credit, technology and other
sympathizers. help from us. This adds up to a situ-
Absorption of Portugal into the ation in which we subsidize the
Soviet empire would expose Spain . U.S.S.R.'s faltering civilian economy
to subversion, cost NATO indispens. so that it can afford to mount an
able -bases in the Azores, open up enormous arms buildup. For exam-
the Atlantic to Soviet submarines, ple, American engineers and money
and fundamentally alter the world help construct in Russia the world's
balance of power. -? . largest truck factory -rand the Krcm-
6. The Soviet Union has engaged En ships trucks to North Vietnam to
in a relentless effort to attain r>Jili? help crush South Vietnam.
tary supremacy. 4 "< Clearly, we must shed any linger-
In the last six years, the United ing illusions we may have that
States has reduced its armed forces detente means the Russians have
by 54 million men and women, cut abandoned their determination to
the Army in. half and lowered the undermine Western democracy and
number of Navy combat ships to the impose their system upon the world.
level of the year 1939. In constant We must communicate to the Rus-
dollars, we have slashed our military sians that the only alternative to mu-
spending by 34 percent. This year, tual arms reduction is an American
the defense budget will consume rearmament that would doom them
only 5.8 percent of the gross national to permanent military inferiority..
product-the smallest percentage We must show them that we will no
since i95o. longer tolerate the use of detente as
Yet our disarmament overtures a Russian one-way street.
have brought an increase in Soviet military allocations. Although the In forthcoming issues, The Reader's
Russian economy has less than half Digest will examine strategic trouble
our productive capacity, the Soviets spots and discuss further how to deal
are currently outspending us by 20 with the Russian challenge.
to 25 percent in every significant
defense category. Their 4.2 million
[Dige~~t,, eprints of this article are available.
troops now outnumber our forces by es, postpaid to one address: 10-505;
52; 100-53.50; 500-512.50; 1000-
more than two-to one. . Address Reprint Editor, Reader's
Meanwhile, we have granted the Pleasantville, N.Y. 10570
REPRINTEO FRO.9 THE JUIIY 1975 ISSUE US READER'S DIGEST
? 1975 THE READER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION, INC., PLEASANTVILLE, N. Y. 10570 PRINTED IN U.S.A.
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WHAT IS DETME AFTER ALL?
Those in the Soviet Union who follow the American press are well
aware of discussion that has developed in the United States over the
concept of detente and its bai is problems. We also see differing motives
on the part of those who hAve "doubts , 'rho are puzzled by one or another
problem, who question this or that event or circumstance. But there are
no differing motives. Mr. Leigd'a recent article in the iteader'ss Digest
"Is This Detente?" is. confined to one_ mingle point of'v-iev in the sense that
its author does not like the relaxation of tensions 0hich marked the de-
velopment of Soviet American relations in recent years and he is quite:
frank about it.
We know that. Mr. Laird is not alone in taking this Stand, thou&,.
we know that Judging from recent public opinton polls, this negative
position is not shared by the majority of the American public.
This is vTW we felt we should respond to his article
We shall not enumerate the basic points of this article L. Let us
look into its general idea. The idea is that the U.S.A. allegedly made
major concessssio to the Soviet Union in the process of detente and
received nothing in return, Moreover, It alleges that detente is need.
by the Soviet :lJnion in a most dishonest wsy to the detriment of American
interests.
~-~ and we have all, grounds to. speak ,about the Soviet Government's
official point of view and of the unanisfsous conviction of Soviet public
opinion radically disagree with such an interpretation.
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We think that positive: changes which have taken place- were to the
benefit of both aides.
Firstly, they were to the benefit in the sense that we have stepped
away from the fatal brink beyond which the nuclear catastrophe could,
break out.
We have benefited also in the sense that both Americans and we can
now concentrate more efforts, attention and resources on the zol i.on
of our own internal problems, which exist in the Soviet Union and. -in the
United, States of America.
a-n-?-
And our main gain is in the cease that ye have embarked on an
couraging road rich we are sure may lead us to ever more radical changes
in inteexuational. relations capable of creating rel,.i.abic guarantees of
peace, to put an end to the arms race, to help tin use our influence for
improving the overalll international atmosphere `said move on to wide-scale,.
mutually advantageous bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all
spheres,- trade, science, technology, culture, ate.
Mr. Laird has formulated six points which in his opinion prove that
the Soviet Union has .allegedly' Girepeateedly committed deliberate acts that
:mock detente and throaten the free 'world..
With full responsibility vs state that all six points are wrung,
and are dangerous in that. they can mislead the American public.. Even if
the American side had some doubts about facts cited by 'Laird (he refers
to someone who detected "testing" of new types of radard subject to agree-
ments and the Yerepl_acement" of several dozen missiles), there exists a
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specially seat up body' for their clarification, the Permanent Consultative
Commission. But it wan an official Pentagon spokesman who publicly
declared recently that the United States had no claims whatsoever on the
Soviet Union's implementation of signed agreem its on the limitation of
strategic armaments. This Bras also confirmed recently by the President of
the United States at hie press conference. Mr. Laird's clam that the
Soviet Union had, in violation of agreements, attained "mi..li.taiy supremacy"
over the United States are in absolute disagreement. with reality", and
official American data.
the second pointt, of Laird's article accuses the Soviet Union of
actively assisting North Vietnare in breaking down the ''asris peace accords.
Specific mention is mac of 1.15 tanks, 1,100 trucks and oth.arr types of
Soviet equipment which, according to Laird, vero fshi.pped to Vietnam and
ensured the military success of the opponents to the Thieu 'regime. It is
our opinion that only the most naive people with.' xio kncwledg : of the matter
can believe that the reason for the defeat of the Thieu regime is these
tanks and trucks. ven if we take as correct the figures given by Mr. 1--d-rd,
then thy: volume of help give= to Vietnam by the Soviet Union and ether
countries i.r mast years will amount to 2.5 a" llioa tlbl_la rs, -awhile the
United Status spent all in all some, 130. billion dollars to help Thien
These are incomparable suzaas. The Thieu regime 'Ante- given the possibility
to create one of the best equipped armies in the world today. Never-
theless, it was impossible to preserve that regime. It was impossible
to save it because it had rotted to the core, and could rely only on.aa
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500,000--atrong1 yAnerieen ax-my and, as goon as the latter wens vithdrawn
from Vietnam, it was clear to every person with co=an cerise that its
days were numbered. A change in the political situationwithin South
Vietnam was envisaged in the Paris peace accords. And if this main
stipulation of the Paris agreements has not been carried out, .'the fault
certainly does not rest with the Soviet Union. We think that something
different has happened. Foleiwiiig the cease.-fire in Vietnam no efforts
had been exerted to. eliminate the root of the civil war connected
precisely with the existence in that country of a' corrupts terrorist
regime and it is precisely this that made this result so .s:nevitahle
Laird's assertion with regard to West Berlin is completely inconsis-
tYi. _ag
tent with rnal,i.ty. . It suffices to read a racent s . ;ateLuvent on
question by such a competent individual as former Chancellor of the
Federal. Republic of Germany and Chairman of the Social Democratic Party
of Germany, WIlly Bradt, to see this.
The same should be said about: the fourth point of the article about
the allegations that the Soviet Union supports terrorism In the Middle
least- We are against terrorism. Rvern. ifyyou admit than Poirse terrorists
had Soviet weapons, it is not the Soviet Union which is to be biRm,e_'de.
There are plenty of weapons of the most varied origi.n?, irg this area of the=
world,, including weapons supplied by the United States, France and other
countries. These weapons could just as easily have fallen into the hand,
of terrori?sta.. Laird obviously rends newspapers and he could acquaint
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himelf xith many authoritative statements by the Soviet Bide published
in them, shich resolutely condemn terror in all its m nifeatations
Mr. Lmird',s statement about Portugal is really surprising. What
Ims happened in Portugal is in no way the work of CCommunist conspirators."
This is a legitimate result of the situation in which the country found
itself following in the course df the policy of NATO. We haveiin mind
its poverty and economic bakkvardriessss, its terrorist fascist regime
.
which enjoyed the support of ""western democracies" for the sole reason
that it was anti.-Communist, as well. as hoperesss colonial wars which
Portugal had waged for so many years .o..., an, explosion there was inevit?ble
and neither the Soviet Union nor detente are the causes of it.. The
allegation that the Soviet Union fi_nences the activity of Portuguese
is unists is preposterous and, by the way, it is not original. Such
tales about "'Soviet gold" had been spread even in the 20's. But they
vanished like smoke even then when little was know about the Soviet
system. One can presume that they have even less chance now for ssucec r&.-
i nd, finally, the sixth point that, contrary to the principle of
equal security v r.?itten down in the agreements, the USSR allegedly tries
to attain "wilitary superiority" over the United States. This also.
does not correspond with reality and is .based on nothing. The mi..lltaa Ty
budget in the Soviet Union is not increaing. In recent years it has
been reduced; although on a small scale. We wanted it to be cut further,
but this to a great degree depends on the course of detente.
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We set aside Lairds apeculationo about trade and credits due
to its i.nsigfifi.cant volute and mainly because the development of
trade (and in all euuntries this is based on the proviision of credit)
is of equal. benefit to both aides. Our economy, despite Laird's
assertions, is developing quite successfu..3y and we wouldn't advise
him, contrary to the facts, to assert the opposite (having also in mind
the well known British proverb, which bays that "Those who live in,
glass houses shouldn't throw stones").
Our 'trade with the United States last year amounted to a modest
figure of 700 million rubles and the-United States was only in the.
seventh place in volume of trade among other Soviet trade partners of
the developed countries of the capitalistic world and was behind net
only West Germany and Japan but even Italy and FiLnk d.
'we will mention in passing that the defensive might of the Soviet
Union Mr?. Laird complains about was bni,lt up in the condition of almost
complete absence of trade with the West. We would like to add also
another point. -The trade with the Soviet Union is not some kind of
charity on the part of the United States. It develops only in areas
and to the extent where it is advantageous to Americans since it opens
up new jobs,. gives the United States a chance to obtain many kinds of.
essential. goods (including goods that the United States considers
strategic such as diar xynds, titanium, etc.) and also to improve the.
American balance of payments.
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But the concluding pact of LairdOs article evokes the greatest
objections; where he proposes to tell. the Russians that the United
States should give the U.S.S.R. an ultimatum: either, do as Washington
vents or the United States 'ill step up the arms race and in this way
do=ca the U.S.S.R. to "mi.litaxy inferiority'." We would like to tell
Mr. Laird that this is not a new proposal. This is just the road
which the United States had followed for xaany decades. Where it has
led is well known -~ of course, it brought nothing good. to the Soviet
Union but it a so seriously damaged the United States. It was precisely
after the United States began to roa`Lize the fruitlessness of the previous
course that the shit toward' detente began. In which direction does
Mrs Laird ?suxranon the United States again?
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January 1 9 7 8
1. Under Article VI(a) of the ABM Treaty, the parties
undertook "not to give missiles, launchers, or radars,
other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM
radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles
or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them
in an ABM mode."
During the negotiations, agreement could not be reached
on the definition of "tested in an ABM mode" for any ABM
component. The US on April 7, 1972, made a unilateral state-
ment which, inter alia, stated that we would consider a radar
to have been "tested in an ABM mode" if it makes measurements
on a cooperative target vehicle which has a flight trajectory
with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight
trajectory during the re-entry portion of the trajectory.
Radars used for purposes such as range safety or :instrumen-
tation would be exempt from application of these criteria.
In 1974 the Intelligence Community reported. that a
Soviet non-ABM radar, was being used to track strategic bal-
listic missiles in flight trajectory. The issue was raised
with the Soviets early in 1975, and subsequently this activ-
ity stopped and has not been resumed. The Soviets claimed
that this activity was for purposes of range safety and not
a violation of the Treaty.
Article II of the Interim Agreement states "The
parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for
light ICBMs or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to
1964, into land based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types
displayed after that time."
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While it was clear which existing Soviet missiles were
"light" and which were "heavy" at the time the Interim
Agreement was signed, the US was unable to obtain Soviet
agreement to criteria which clearly delineated a "light"
from a "heavy." Consequently, the US delegation made the
following unilateral statement on May 26, 1972: "The US
delegation regrets that the Soviet delegation has not been
willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile.
Under these circumstances, the US delegation believes it
necessary to state the following: The United States would
consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than
that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either
side to be a heavy ICBM. The US proceeds on the premise that
the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration."
At the time the agreement was signed, the principal
Soviet land-based ICBM systems were the SS-9 and the SS-ll.
The SS-9 was considered a heavy missile, while the SS-11
was the heaviest light missile on either side. Subsequently
the Soviets tested and began deploying the SS-19 which,
while less than 50 percent the volume of the SS-9, exceeds
the volume of the SS=-11 by some 50 percent. Deployment of
this system is continuing. The SS-19 does have a significant
capability against hardened targets, such as Minuteman silos-
2. The Soviets continued to deliver aid to the North
Vietnamese up to the fall of Saigon. They also were willing
to meet nearly all of Hanoi's demands with regard to military
assistance.
3. The USSR has not reneged on its promise to guarantee
unimpeded civilian access to West Berlin. The Soviets have
observed the 1971. Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and re-
cent Soviet commentaries have stressed the importance of
continued observance.
Civilian access is under the control of the East Germans
as provided under the transit agreement between East and West
Germany in 1972. Individual civilians are occasionally de-
tained for brief intervals at East German checkpoints and
East German guards have recently interfered with commercial
shipments in their search for exfiltrators.
No major East German move that affects the Berlin issue
could be undertaken without Soviet permission, but it cannot
be assumed that specific individual acts by East German
authorities have had Soviet endorsement. It is clear, how-
ever, that Moscow does set limits to East German provocations
against Allied interests.
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4. The Soviet attitude toward terrorism and guerrilla
warfare in the Middle East is ambivalent. On the one hand,
they disavow terror as a technique and criticize it as an
ineffective and counterproductive tool of revolutionary
struggle. On the other hand, they indirectly provide sup-
port to terror.i.s t groups.
The Soviets have offered military training in the USSR
to Arabs belonging to so-called national liberation groups,
some of whom subsequently became involved in terrorist organi-
zations. Training on Soviet weapons has been given to members
of terrorist groups in Libya, and the Libyans themselves have
provided direct assistance to terrorists.
The Soviets have channeled aid to the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) through South Yemen since the
late 1960s. This assistance reached its peak several years
ago and included military and financial assistance as well as
training for guerrilla groups. The PFLO's efforts in south-
ern Oman were ended in 1975 and the group has been quiet since
that time. Soviet assistance probably sustains the PFLO camp
in South Yemen, and another effort to subvert Oman cannot be
excluded in the future.
5 In 1975 the sLrongl.y pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist
Party did make a determined effort to impose its rule on
Portugal. Soviet support was expressed in covert financial
aid but-C--given the modest needs of a communist party operat-
ing in a small country--it is doubtful that Soviet aid was
as high as $40 million. The evidence suggests, however, that
Moscow was in fact torn between the urge to support an ideo
logically-?kindred party and the conviction that a Communist
regime in Portugal could not survive the hostility of its
neighbors and NATO allies. The Soviets were also sensitive
to the damage that a communist coup d'etat in West Europe
would do to Soviet relations with the US and major European
states without any assurance of compensatory gain. Moscow's
reservations were revealed in its repeated attempts to urge
a policy of caution on the reckless Portuguese communists, and
in its ultimate acquiescence in their defeat in 1976.
6. In recent statements Brezhnev and Soviet commentators
have denied that the Soviets are seeking military superiority.
The Soviets, however, have steadily improved their war-fighting
and ware-survival capabilities in recent years.
Detailed information on defense expenditures is not
publicly released by the Soviet Union. A single-line entry
for "defense" in the published state budget is uninformative
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because its scope is not clearly defined and its size appears
to be manipulated to suit Soviet political purposes. (Changes
in the announced defense figure do not appear to reflect the
changes we have observed in the level of military activities.)
Our estimate of Soviet ruble expenditures for defense activ-
ities is almost three times the announced 1970 figure, grows
at an average annual rate of 4 to 5 percent, and accounts for
11 to 1.3 percent of Soviet. GNP.
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 Approved For ReleA0?dbf6?i6VD @Pr11 84 1; 0Rbb2b '96Oi975P2
TO: Honor: ble " ar les 1i. _ - rcy FROM: Office of Legislative Counsel
United States Senate Central Intelligence Agency
4321 Dirksen Senate Office Building Room 7 D 35
Washington, D. C. Z0510 Washington, D.C. 20505
THE DOCUMENTS LISTED HEREON ARE FORWARDED FOR:
INFORMATION
ACTION
xRETENTION
7_7 LOAN
CONTROL NUMBER
DOC. DATE
;_
SUBJECT (Unclassified preferred)
CLASS.
Janua:
Response to Senator Percy's 6 January Letter
1978
requesting CL comments on a 1975 article
by Melvin Laird "la This L eten :e t1 (Mer;,or.=dum.
SE`: R
31,/2 pages)
-..o.~
RECEIPT
----
SIGNATURE (acknowledging receipt of above documents) RETURN T
p
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
-- - - -
DATE OF RECEIPT ROOM 7 D 35
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
FORS, 3772B I L- WHITE, RETURN COPY
10-70
2 - PINK, ADDRESSEE HOLD BACK
3 - CANARY, OLC HOLD BACK
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