LUNCHEON MEETING AND PHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH BOB ROGERS, NBC, CONCERNING POSSIBLE SHOW ON THE KGB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R001200070040-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: April 11, 1978
• Content Type: MFR

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11 April 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting and Phone Conversations with
Bob Rogers, NBC, Concerning Possible Show on
the KGB
1. Over the past week I have had several phone conversations
and one luncheon meeting (6 April) with Bob Rogers, a television
producer with NBC. A summary of what was discussed in these
conversations follows:
a. Mr. Rogers said that after producing, "Spying
for Uncle Sam," he talked to the officials at NBC News
about doing a story on "the other guys--the KGB." Rogers
said that while NBC liked the idea and approved in prin-
ciple, it was agreed that the success of such a show
would depend almost entirely on the degree of cooperation
they receive from CIA. Rogers also confided that since
NBC planned to produce the Olympics from Moscow, that
the decision to do an expose on the KGB would be a
"gutsy" decision by NBC management.
b. If they produce the show, it would be scheduled
for an open air date in early August, i.e., there isn't
.much time and he would have to get going very soon.
c. Rogers agreed that the basis for the story
would be John Barron's book, "KGB," but that he would
need stories to update the information in the book to
give the show some immediacy--what's happening now.
To produce new film and interviews, he would need our
assistance.
He specifically said he was most interested
in making it as personalized a story as possible, i.e.,
personal stories presumably with defectors or with
Americans who have been intimidated, threatened or
recruited by the KGB. He said what he really wanted
O I/C
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2.-
to portray if at all possible was how widespread and
insidious KGB activities were here in the United States
and elsewhere throughout the world. He would obviously
like to film any display of hardware, devices, photographs,
etc., we might be able to make available. He would also
welcome any information on the KGB's sister services.
He would be delighted to receive any details we would be
willing to provide (he said, for instance, that there
were indications that Agee had really been turned around
by a woman but that this had never been fully reported).
2. fir. Rogers has indicated that he would accept our assistance
on any terms we might wish to impose. He seems sincere in his objective
to present an honest if somewhat startling portrayal of the threat
posed by the KGB. I have known Rogers for several years and know him
to be well connected in the Intelligence Community from his many
activities overseas. I also know him to be honest and objective.
While he has not, perhaps, always presented information to our total
liking, he is an honorable man to the best of my knowledge and a
good reporter. I would hope that we could cooperate with him if at
all possible.
cc DCI
DDCI
DDO
DDA
DDS&T
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Herbert E. e u
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 By Arnaud de Borchgrave
Time and again, a Soviet Embassy
car stopped for a few moments
across the street from the Teheran
borne of Maj. Gen. Ahmed Mogha-
rebi, 51, a logistics-expert in the Iran-
ian Army-and a Russian spy of long
standing. On each occasion, Soviet
Consul Boris Kabanov would push a
button under the seat of his car, and a
remote-controlled, high-speed trans-
mitter hidden in the general's home
would broadcast twenty minutes'
worth of taped intelligence data to
.. Kabanov in the space of just twenty
seconds. The system worked for four
years, but Kabanov tried it once too
often. As he pushed the button one
day last year, agents of SAVAK, Iran's
secret police, closed in and arrested
the Soviet consul and the Irdiiian gen-
eral. The arrests broke one of the
Soviet KGB's top Iranian connec-
tions-and gave Western intelligence
a glimpse of the high-technology
world of Russian spies.
Mogharebi signed a long confes-
sion. "He told us about 90 per cent of
what he knew with the hope of a stay
of execution," an Iranian official in-
formed me. The general was executed
last January nonetheless, and his So-
viet contact, Kabanov, was expelled
from the country. Mogharebi was a
big catch-one of two by Iranian
agents in the last few rnonths-and
when I visited Teheran recently,
Iranian counterespionage agents
were showing off to their Western
counterparts the ingeiliolis intelli-
gence hardware they had confiscated,
all of it made in Mo?cuw.
Blinking Signals: To photograph doc-
uments, the Russians issued Mogha-
rebi a small, cylindrical camera that
doubled as a cigarette lighter. He
simply rubbed it across a page to
record the text. If anyone
walked in on him, all Mo-
gharebi had to do was put
the "lighter" down-or use
it to light a cigarette. To
receive his instructions,
Mogharebi hid a tiny re-
ceiver in his house that was
activated by a radio signal
from the Soviet Embassy.
Multicolored lights blinked
out the incoming message.
(Two orange lights fol-
lowed by a green and two
blues, for example, meant
that one of his transmis-
sions had been received,)
Using these devices and.
the transmitter activated by
Kabanov, the Iranian gen-
eral passed the Russians
valuable logistical information on
such matters as U.S. military equip-
ment in Iran and the availability of
spare parts and ammunition:
The Russians used even more
elaborate equipment to keep in touch
with another agent who was arrested
in Iran not long ago. Ali-Naghi Rab-
bani, 54, a high-ranking functionary
at the Ministry of Education, got his
instructions directly from the Soviet
Union via satellite-on a receiver
that looked like an electronic pocket
calculator. The device dis-
played his messages as
groups of digits, which could
be read as letters when the
calculator was turned upside
down (the number 7, for ex-
ample, would appear to be
an "L"). The letters, in turn,
were part of an encoded
message.
Gossip: Rabbani did his
spying in afterhours Tehe-
ran, to which he gained entry
with the help of his well-
connected wife. Rabbani be-
came friends with the air
force chief and other VIP's
and passed the Russians
what he learned from party
gossip until SAVAK caught
tip with him. Now he is in
prison, awaiting execution.
American agents have
gadgets similar to the ones
used by Rabbani and MIogha-
U.;'LJ !G
Cllt 1 IUf`
A satellite calculator: Orders from Moscow
rebi, a knowledgeable U.S. intelli-
gence source told NEWSWVEEK's Da-
vid C. Martin in Washington. But
because the KGB has more money to
spend on equipment, the official add-
ed, Russian spies use such devices
"much more widely than we have and
in many more areas." The KGB is
The mini-camera: It
lights cigarettes, too
ahead in using satellites to comhnuni-
cate with agents, again because of
money. "The satellite we have up
there is pretty well worn out," said
Martin's source. But when the CIA
requested funds for a new one last
year, the Administration and Con-
gress turned the agency down.
The Tudeh: Despite the arrests of
Mogharebi and Rabbani, Teheran's
counterintelligence agents must still
keep track of thousands of Russians -
and East Europeans in Iran, including
hundreds of workers building a new
steel mill. But the potential spies are
not all foreigners. As a young man,
Mogharebi joined the Tudeh, Iran's
.clandestine Communist Party, and
was recruited as a KGB spy; Rabbani
reluctantly turned spy when Russian
agents threatened to publicize the fact
that he, too, had briefly belonged to
the Tudeh. Other Iranians with simi-
lar backgrounds may be vulnerable to
blackmail by the KGB.
Information given to the KGB by
such agents is sometimes
fed to Iran's nearest enemy,
neighboring Iraq. Some
years ago, when tensions
between the two countries
were at a particularly high
point, Iran planned a series
of troop movements near
the Iraqi border. Each time
the Iranians started to
move, the Iraqis seemed to
know about it in advance
and quickly deployed a
blocking force. After his ar-
rest, Mogharebi admitted
that his own information
had traveled, via cigarette
lighter and high-speed
transmitter, from Teheran
to Moscow and back to the
Iraqis.
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