THE PITFALL OF A LATIN QUIRK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01762A001000030004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79TO1762AO01000030004-1
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Approved For Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79TO1762AO01000030004-1
 ,W`616-t}010~38!'
I
SECRET 25X1A,
analyst who follows south-
of-the-border restlessness.
"H PITFALL OF A LATIN QUIRK
25XIA
A problem.6f,:h terpretation recurs from time to time in cur-,
rent rote tg zi on Latin America. The set-piece situation
is create d
spot reports of statem
t
er
s from a Lti n
_anational
"in a positOn to know" to the effect that events in his coup
try have wed, Into a critical stage. of unimpeachable au-
thenticity and aiaznmig content, these reports are immedi-
ately dissenninated in raw form at the cabinet or presidential
level. At the same time, fill-in and assessment are urgently
demanded of the area specialist. The analyst whose cxpertise
is primarily Latin Americas, is thus brought into contact with
the higher levels of current intelligence-men whose back-
ground tendo, to give them a particular familiarity
ropea,n and Sfno-Soviet problerls--anti It is of ten extwith Eu~
remely
difficult #or W:40 explain to them his grounds for recom
mending cati* rout accepting reports whose authenticity
he does not question,
During the mid-1950's
for exam
l
,
p
e, a series of cables: were
receive
r} fro Bolivia reporting crn v ersatiors among leaders
of the anti-Marxist opposition to the government,. The op-
position leaders declared that their plans for violent ,overthrow
of the government were well under way and told of the mili-
tary, police, and civilian elements making up their revo-
tionary forces. lu
The men quoted were in fact leaders of the mast important
opposition group. The conversatiol}s reported were authentic.
But no revolutionary attempt was made. Analysis of the
situation revealed what the piotier _11so knevv_-that they
i;adn'' a ghost of a chance. l'hrv ha i +'
ble daydreaming ! ri lndui gin in 3titli-
.
In Venezuela, some montiis after the overthrow of the
Perez Jimenez dictatorship, a new cabiinc was installed. Sev-
eral days later a report of undoubted authenticity was re-
ceived recording a conversation held between a member of the
Recurrent problem for the
Approved For Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79T01762A001000030004-1
 Venezuelan Communist Part 's b
citizen attached to y oss triumvirate and a Soviet
the Soviet emb
25X1X
,,Approved For Release 2001'103/22
SECRET
zuela had no Soviet efnbsLacv I T? 4.k asst' in Mexico. (Vene ____
--, -.. - a nurse of the conversa-
tion the Venezuelan ,Cnmm>?i~t r~A__ ..
Because of the strategic eruct door t
e new cabinet we :du ;
-77
re
paying Communist~_
bovlet
rep-
resentative that three it)
embers of th ~~~ "Ulu Me
admit the authenticity of the report, however, iitwas t had' tt
for him to explain his reservations about its truth. In fac
as it turned out, the Venezuelan Communist had been grossly
exaggerating his_ a boast before the Soviets.
M
o
exc ude the possibility that
available three cabinet made it seem members were sleepers, but the irformatdcsil
doubtf I
to is political importance
of Venezuelan petroleum, events after the overthrow of the
Perez Jimenez dictatorship had been followed in exceptional
detail. One could not of course 1
the source was statinv a ItAni.f oo if i4y~-_at 1lle Iact was that;;
The Latin American tendency to express the most nebulous
of ideas in an extremely positive fashion and describe dreams
as if they were reality makes it difficult for the analyst himself
to assess an unexpected report. He can never be sure im-
mediately whether he has in a particular instance an example
of this tendency.
The phenomenon would actually be easier to deal with in
respect of making one's doubts understood if it happened more
often. But the field reporters eliminate most occurrences by
checking for additional information wren there is time. This
very fact leaves the analyst to encounter the problem almost
exclusively under intense deadline pressure. He can only
]-.ope that those who have the last say in intelligence produc-
tion will retain his due caution in putting out the report.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79T01762A001000030004-1
. e recently, an authentic report was received