THE USSR REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 27, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NOTICE
The Historical Review Program (HRP), Office of Information
Management (OIM), completed the review of this file for selective
declassification of Soviet-related finished intelligence in April 1999. For a
record of those documents declassified and selected for eventual release
to the National Archives, please call the HRP Senior Reviewer for the
Soviet project.
NOTICE
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The USSR
AND
NALYSJS
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? THE USSR
27 January 1977
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Stuck but Continuing
Brezhnev's Maneuvers Against the
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THE USSR will be published and distributed on Thursdays.
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Sino-Soviet Border Talks: Stuck but Continuing
The current phase of the Sino-Soviet border talks is
nearing the end of its second month in Peking. Most in-
formation so far indicates that it is as unproductive as
the previous phases of the talks, which have continued
periodically since October 1969. The Chinese, in fact,
are taking great pains to stress to foreign officials,
probably in response to Western speculation that Sino-
Soviet relations may improve now that Mao is dead, that
their position versus the Soviets remains every bit as
unyielding as before.
As of January 7, only four plenary sessions of the
talks had apparently been held since chief Soviet negoti-
ator Ilichev arrived in Peking on November 27 to end an
18-month stand-down in the negotiations. Three of these
sessions had taken place by December 18 and the fourth,
according to Chinese delegation head Yu Chan, was held
three weeks later on January 7. Yu Chan, in fact, spent
10 days away from the talks escorting a visiting Romanian
government delegation around China from 15 to 24 December.
Information on how the talks have traditionally been
conducted is sparse, but presumably the pace varies ac-
cording to whether new initiatives are being discussed
or whether both sides are just marking time. One Soviet
participant remarked in 1971 that at the inception of the
talks daily sessions lasted 6 to 7 hours. A few comments
from both sides since that time indicate that the talks
have varied from monthly to weekly meetings--not all of
which are plenary sessions.
The basic stumbling block in the talks has been Pe-
king's insistence that Moscow pull back its troops from
all disputed areas before a new border can be demarcated,
and Moscow's unwillingness to do so. The disputed areas,
according to the Chinese, involve real estate other than
what was taken from China by the "unjust" border treaties
of the 17th through the 19th centuries. This includes
primarily islands in the eastern border rivers and a
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section of land in the Pamirs at the western end of the
border. The Soviets have presented a variety of negoti-
ating packages over the years to get around the basic
Chinese demand for a troop withdrawal, but have been un-
willing to concede in principle any unjust Russian occu-
pation of Chinese land. Most of the Soviets' efforts have
been aimed at negotiating the issues on a case by case
basis, an approach which Peking has so far refused to
accept.
Ilichev presumably returned to Peking with a new
package of proposals, but Chinese officials in Peking
and elsewhere have been quick to stress that the Soviets
have made no changes in principle, and that the talks are
again stalled.
In the past, the
Soviets have proposed mutual troop withdrawals in some
limited sectors along the border, only to be rebuffed
by the Chinese who apparently deemed such limited with-
drawals inadequate. In any case, China considers only
Soviet held territory to be in dispute and only Soviet
troop pullbacks as appropriate. Ilichev may indeed have
presented some variation on this former proposal.
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The talks in Peking have not been limited solely to
discussions of border areas. After the issue was origi-
nally raised by the Chinese in 1969, the Soviets presented
a variety of proposals advocating nonuse of force, none
of which have been acceptable to Peking.
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Although no progress apparently is being made on any
of the issues, the Soviets may well wish to keep Ilichev
in Peking for some time. The border talks provide the
most intensive forum for Soviet-Chinese exchanges, and
Moscow certainly initiated this round to probe for any 25X1
sign of change in Chinese attitudes following Mao's
viets will almost certainly want to main ain is unique
listening post for as long as possible to look for hints
of the direction the current fluid situation in Peking
may take and to search for any signs of change in attitude
toward the USSR. If Peking is being as unyielding as
its diplomats indicate, Moscow probably at least hopes
that there will be some change in attitude if the Chinese
leaders are disappointed by the new US administration.
It would be useful for Ilichev to be in Peking to pick
up any such signals. In addition, a hasty withdrawal by
Ilichev would be an acknowledgment to the world that
Moscow had been unable to break its impasse with Peking--
an admission that the Soviets presumably will be reluctant
to make. F
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Brezhnev's Maneuvers Against the Belorussian Faction
Over the last year, a number of signs have suggested
that a shift may be quietly occurring in the balance of
power within the Soviet leadership as a result of a no-
ticeable decline in the political strength of the Belo-
russian faction. The senior member of this faction,
Politburo member K. T. Mazurov, has lost his status as
the only first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of
Ministers and has simultaneously suffered a marked down-
grading in protocol status. To a lesser degree the po-
litical position of Mazurov's former Minsk subordinate
and protege, Pear Masherov, first secretary of Belo-
russia and a candidate Politburo member, appears to
have slipped as well. Whether this decline represents
an irreversible trend is uncertain. Nevertheless, the
decline in Mazurov's status weakens the likelihood of
his succeeding Kosygin as the next chairman of the
Council of Ministers. Given Mazurov's difficulties,
Masherov may have problems in maintaining his strong
and seemingly secure position in the Belorussian ap-
paratus.
The Rise of the Belorussian Faction
The prominence of the Belorussian faction dates
back to a major political breakthrough achieved in the
months following Khrushchev's 1964 removal. It was at
this point that Mazurov, then first secretary of the
republic, was moved to Moscow, promoted to full Polit-
buro status, and made a first deputy to Kosygin. These
assignments represented the highest government and party
positions ever reached by a Belorussian in the Soviet
leadership. As a result of Mazurov's transfer to Mos-
cow, Second Secretary Masherov was made Belorussian
first secretary and given the candidate Politburo rank
that normally attaches to the post. The effect of these
developments was to give the Belorussian faction greater
political weight within national party councils than its
size or previous political importance would merit.
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After their initial success in 1965, however, Mazurov
and Masherov have been unable to climb further. There is
some reason to believe that this has been due to continu-
ing friction with General Secretary Brezhnev. Mazurov
and Masherov appear to have been both politically and per-
sonally cool to Brezhnev, and neither has participated in
the development of the Brezhnev cult to any significant
degree. In fact, Masherov has in the past been notably
unenthusiastic about detente, heavily stressing the dan-
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~j gers of ideological infiltration from the West at a time
when Brezhnev was becoming increasingly committed to ex-
panding relations with the West. Both Mazurov and
Masherov may also have had an early career association
with Aleksandr Shelepin, a rival of Brezhnev during much
of his tenure as general secretary. Shelepin was a sec-
retary of the All-Union Komsomol when Mazurov was picked
to head the Belorussian Komsomol in 1946 and when Masherov
took over Mazurov's position a year later. More recently,
Mazurov is-reported to have participated with Shelepin
and Suslov in an attack on Brezhnev's leadership in 1970.
Despite these reasons for Brezhnev to feel animus
toward him, Mazurov's career did not suffer immediately.
Although Shelepin's status in the leadership declined
dramatically in Brezhnev's ranking of Politburo members
7 at the 24th party congress in 1971, Mazurov's position
improved slightly, ranking seventh in the leadership and
above all his generational peers.
The security of Mazurov's political position was
seemingly confirmed in 1972 and 1973. He was chosen to
give the October anniversary speech in 1972, although it
was not his turn to do so. He had previously given the
address in 1968, and both Kosygin and Polyansky among
government officials should have been due for a second
appearance before Mazurov. Moreover, at the Supreme
Soviet sessions in 1973 Mazurov delivered a major re-
port on education, even though such visibility for Pol-
itburo members at these sessions had become infrequent
during the Brezhnev era. Finally, Mazurov's main rival
to succeed Kosygin, Dmitry Polyansky, was demoted in
1973 to minister of agriculture, leaving Mazurov as
Kosygin's sole first deputy.
These developments appeared at the time to improve
6 the likelihood that Mazurov would eventually replace
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Kosygin as chairman of the Council of Ministers. He had
in effect become the logical bureaucratic choice. More-
over, he was well qualified for the job. He has held
leadership positions for almost 30 years in the party and
government at the national, republic, and oblast levels.
He has been directly concerned with management of the in-
dustrial sector of the economy since coming to Moscow,
and he has also acquired some foreign policy experience
from his frequent contacts with foreign leaders in Moscow
and occasional visits abroad. Compared to the rather
narrow career experience of other potential Soviet lead-
ers, the breadth of Mazurov's experience is impressive.
Political Decline
But despite Mazurov's increased status in the leader-
ship, there were indications as early as May 1973 that his
position as the only first deputy chairman was being chal-
lenged, and it is probable that Brezhnev was behind this
development.
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In spite of these efforts
tirely successful.
IIt would appear that
opposition persists within the leadership to Brezhnev's
desire to make personnel changes that would tend to alter
the political balance within the Politburo. Kosygin and
Mazurov seem likely to have led this opposition, with the
probable support of Suslov. It appears that even Brezh-
nev's limited success occurred only
when Kosygin was physically incapaci a e .
Notwithstanding these apparent limitations on
Brezhnev's power, Mazurov's position in the leadership
has declined noticeably in 1976. He was out of public
view for prolonged periods of time--the longest from
early June until early September. He was also the only
Moscow-based Politburo member not out of the country on
official assignments who missed any of the preliminary
birthday award ceremonies for Brezhnev in December 1976.
Mazurov missed all six. Finally, he was the only Mos-
cow-based Politburo member who did not participate in
the funeral rites for Marshal Yakubovsky, also in
December.
past
6
Mazurov has, however, had health problems in the
is ere ore possible that is pro onge
and unexplained absences in 1976 during the Brezhnev
celebrations, and during part of Kosygin's recuperation
from his accident and illness are at least partly at-
tributable to poor health. Nevertheless, Mazurov's
incapacity at critical times may have contributed to
weakening his position in the leadership and made the
elevation of Tikhonov to first deputy chairman impos-
sible to defeat.
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Mazurov has also been downgraded through the subtle
use of protocol arrangements on several occasions since
his return to activity in September. Although his formal
ranking in leadership name lists has declined only
slightly during the year, pictures of thy leadership ap-
pearing in Pravda on September 6 (Brezhnev's return to
Moscow from Alma-Ata), October 14 (Kirilenko's award
presentation), and November 2 (presentation of an award
to Brezhnev by Czechoslovak party leader Husak) suggest
a reduction in status. More important, the group pic-
ture of the leadership at the December 19 award ceremony
placed him at the far end of the group, next to candi-
date Politburo member Demichev, another leader thought
to be in political difficulty.
In addition, Tikhonov appears to have been given
responsibilities in the government formerly performed
by Mazurov. It is traditional for the second-ranking
governmental figure to sign decrees of the Council of
Ministers in Kosygin's absence. Mazurov performed this
function 21 times in the first half of 1976 when he was
the only first deputy. Since June 4, however, Mazurov
has performed this function only once, on November 25,
even though Kosygin was ill and absent from work from
August until late October. By comparison, Tikhonov has
deputized for Kosygin in this role on 20 occasions since
August 3. As Mazurov has been publicly active since
early September, his apparent loss of most of this re-
sponsibility to Tikhonov must be assumed to represent a
further downgrading of his position.
Political Prospects
Despite these indications of political difficulty
for Mazurov, he apparently has some support within the
leadership. In addition to the fact that Tikhonov has
not yet attained Politburo membership, Mazurov in No-
vember published his first major article in four years,
which appeared in the party's leading theoretical
journal, Kommunist. Also, Mazurov's political base in
Belorussia has at least until recently remained under
the secure control of his former subordinate, Masherov.
While Mazurov and Masherov appear to disagree on a few
policy questions, their careers are closely linked. In
the 12 years since Mazurov left the republic, Masherov
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has led a group of men whose careers originated and
flourished in Belorussia, most of whom were politically
powerful under Mazurov as well. Of the current 16 full
and candidate members of the Belorussian party bureau,
11 had held major republic apparatus or obkom assign-
ments under Mazurov. Only three individuals (the cur-
rent second secretary, the agriculture secretary, and
the head of the party organs department) have come to
prominence since Masherov took over in 1965.
While no apparent attempt has been made to under-
mine Mazurov's political connections in Belorussia,
such a move remains a possibility in the future. The
proceedings at the October 1976 plenum of the CPSU Cen-
tral Committee have already provided an indication
that Masherov may be in some political difficulty.
Only Masherov among the candidate and full members of
the Politburo with territorial responsibilities did not
speak at the plenum. His place was taken by Kiselev,
the chairman of the Belorussian Council of Ministers.
The degree of control still exercised by Masherov
and Mazurov over Belorussian affairs may be tested in
the near future. The accidental death of the president
of the Presidium of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet
has created a vacancy in a senior position within the
Belorussian hierarchy. This vacancy could be used by
Moscow to inject an "outsider" into the Belorussian
leadership in order to tighten central control. This
practice has been used frequently in non-Slavic repub-
lics, but Moscow has not interfered in major personnel
appointments in Belorussia in this way over the last 20
years. In view of the remarkable continuity in the
leadership of the republic during this time, such inter-
vention by Moscow in filling this vacancy would repre-
sent a serious political setback for the Mazurov-Masherov
faction.
Alternatively, Moscow could make a slightly less
threatening change by realigning the existing Belorus-
sian leadership. A Belorussian official more closely
associated with the Brezhnev faction could be promoted.
A. A. Smirnov, a Belorussian Central Committee secre-
tary with responsibility for industry, is the only
leader in the Belorussian party bureau who appears to
have such connections. If he is promoted to a senior
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position such as republic party second secretary as a
result of the reassignment of other leading cadres,
Mazurov's and Masherov's hold on the republic party
machine will be damaged.
It remains uncertain whether this vacancy will be
used as a political lever against Mazurov and Masherov's
position in Belorussia, or whether Tikhonov will finally
achieve Politburo status. Either development, however,
19 would appear to signal a further weakening of the Belo-
russian group and indicate that their long-term prospects
in a Brezhnev-directed transition are not good.
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