LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002200240002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 26, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON
13
(5WIFT HODUrN,
Latin American Trends
Secret
130
November 26, 1975
No. 0537/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractorsor
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652. exemption category:
? 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
November 26, 1975
Peru: A New Ministry in the Works . . . . . . 1
Panama-Cuba: Strains at the Working
Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Guyana: Arms Purchases . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paraguay: Democracy in the Stroessner
Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Cuba: "Plan Boomerang" Boomerangs . . . . . . 9
The Bahamas: Settling on the Rent
for US Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Uruguay: Book Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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Peru: A New Ministry in the Works
President Morales Bermudez reportedly is consider-
ing establishing a ministry of defense, among other
things, to enable the current prime minister, Army
General Vargas Prieto, to remain influential in the
government after his mandatory retirement next February.
Vargas is a long-time associate of the President and
is politically more moderate than Army Chief of Staff
Fernandez Maldonado, who is scheduled to succeed him.
A defense ministry would dilute to some extent
the powers now exercised by the prime minister, who
also serves as minister of war and commanding general
of the army. At least one of these three positions,
the War Ministry, might be abolished if a defense minis-
try is formed. The argument that a defense ministry
would bring a greater degree of rationality and cohesive-
ness to national defense planning, while plausible, is
almost certain to engender opposition from cabinet-level
officers and important troop commanders who may fear
their authority will be diminished.
Opposition by the officer corps in late 1974 to a
scheme by former President Velasco to create the post
of vice president forced him to abandon the plan.
President Morales Bermudez is in a better position to
defend this latest scheme, should he go ahead with it.
In the first place, the formal requirements for creating
a new cabinet post--as opposed to a vice presidency which
arguably is not a "ministry"--are minimal: under the
terms of the Revolutionary Statue and the 1933 Constitu-
tion, the President of the Republic has effective power
to determine the number of ministries and who will staff
them.
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Although the President would need the concurrence
of the three service chiefs, who collectively constitute
the Revolutionary Junta, the fact that a defense minis-
try would be a useful bureaucratic tool and not be an
obvious move to further the ambitions of a particular
general, adds to the proposal's attractiveness. The
failure of Velasco's ploy to create a vice presidency
was assured when it became apparent that it would be
used to boost General Graham Hurtado, who was recently
ousted by Morales Bermudez. There is no evidence to
suggest that Morales Bermudez intends to use a defense
ministry for similar purposes; the duties of a defense
minister would not lend themselves to political activity
as would those of a vice president.
Morales Bermudez and some of his associates probably
believe that a defense ministry would fit into an overall
plan to reduce radical influence in the government,
bring order to the regime's stifling bureaucracy, and
generally place the President's imprimatur on the revo-
lutionary process. The precise changes that may result.
from these ambitious goals remain unclear, but continued
maneuvering by Morales Bermudez is certain. (CONFIDENTIAL/
NOFORN)
November 26, 1975
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Panama-Cuba: Strains at the Working Level
Panamanian government officials are concerned
over the reported activities and sometimes high-
handed manner of Cuban diplomats. Their concern is
not so great as to affect planning for Torrijos'
trip to Havana in January or damage overall relations,
but the Cuban examples may give Torrijos further
pause before he decides on establishing relations
with the USSR and China--two diplomatic projects that
have been on the back burner for some time.
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There has been no discernible impact on general
relations between the two countries. Torrijos has ac-
cepted an invitation to send a Guard delegation to
observe Cuban military maneuvers at the end of this
month and a high-level Cuban delegation will be in
Panama this week to coordinate Torrijos' trip to Havana
on January 10. Nonetheless, Torrijos' concern may
be one more factor prompting him to mull over the
advisability of allowing the Soviets or China to establish
an embassy in Panama and perhaps add to his domestic con-
cerns. (SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
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Guyana: Arms Purchases
Two unusually large shipments of automatic rifles
and ammunition have arrived in Georgetown on personal
consignment to Prime Minister Burnham's office.
Another shipment is anticipated soon by sea freight.
The shipments reportedly include 7000 rifles,
1500 submachine guns and two millions rounds of ammuni-
tion. The unusual circumstances surrounding the
secretive purchases, including an unpublicized trip to
Europe by a high-ranking government official,lends an
air of mystery about the intended use for the arms.
Moreover, the size of the purchase suggests that these
weapons may not be primarily intended to resupply the
British-trained Guyanese Defense Force (GDF). In pre-
viously negotiated agreements, resupplying the GDF is
normally handled through the Crown Agent of the British
government. This time negotiations were conducted with
dealer at a higher cost
an international commercial arms
than would have been the case had the government used
normal channels.
Since the GDF strength is only about 2000, and the
size of the police force numbers only slightly more, it
would appear that many of these weapons are destined
for the Para-military Guyana National Service Corps (NS).
There is no evidence that the weapons are intended for
transfer to neighboring Surinam or French Guiana.
Early this year, the director general of the
reported that he was directed
ice Corps
S
,
erv
National
by Burnham to increase military training for the Corps.
uct his men in the use and mainte-
t
i
r
ns
He was told to
ance of weapons and hand-to-hand combat.
there are reactionary e emen
the De ense d Burnham is convinced that a well-
trained and disciplined NS force is a necessary counter-
weight to the GDF in the event that it becomes "misdirected.
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While there is no present indication that GDF is
an obstacle on Burnham's road to socialism, he ap-
parently is taking no chances. Top officials of the
GDF have been chosen for their loyalty to Burnham and
several hundred of its members are now receiving ideo-
logical instruction at one of the major National
Service Corps training centers. Burnham has already
indicated that the NS will play an increasingly important
role in Guyana's transformation to socialism. It would
seem that supplying the NS with modern weapons is a
logical next step for Burnham to take. (SECRET/NOFORN/
ORCON)
November 26, 1975
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Paraguay: Democracy in the Stroessner Tradition
Last month's municipal elections produced no
surprises for veteran viewers of Paraguayan politics.
1 As predicted, (see Latin American Trends, September
24, 1975) the ruling Colorado party garnered 87 per-
cent of the vote, and the largest legal opposition
group, the Radicals Liberals, netted. 10 percent.
As usually happens in these contests, there were
scattered reports of fraud and intimidation. Radical
Liberal party chief Domingo Laino--who has previously
been accused by the administration of having Marxist
sympathies--complains that he was denied a ballot when
he entered the polling booth. It is generally believed
that President Stroessner has enough popular support
to ensure a landslide for Colorado candidates in a
completely honest contest, but the government has never
been willing to test this. On the contrary, there is
fresh evidence of official paranoia with regard to the
Radical Liberals, whom Stroessner apparently sees as
succumbing to leftist influences.
The government apparently once again favored the
minuscule "Levi" Liberal party in a calculated effort
to weaken the Radical Liberals. The Levi faction--the
only legal liberal group from 1962-1967-.-reportedly
received covert funding prior to the recent election.
Although it attracted only three percent of the vote,
its showing was surprisingly strong for an organization
that, according to its own leaders, receives the bulk
of its overt financial backing from only seven members.
The other legal party, the Febreristas, after de-
bating whether to participate at all, fielded candidates
in three of the country's 16 electoral districts and
got 156 votes.
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In sum, opposition parties are still unable to
show that participation in politics is especially
useful. There has actually been a decline in the
number of citizens who take the trouble to vote. In
1973 there were 1,052,000 registered voters and in
1975 only 870,000. So long as Stroessner continues
to exercise such a tight rein--and after 21 years in
office the prospects for more significant liberali-
zation are dim--the electoral process will continue
to be an essentially irrelevent exercise in Paraguay.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
November 26, 1975
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Cuba: "Plan Boomerang" Boomerangs
The Chilean government has been somewhat less
than successful in substantiating its recent exposure
of a "plot" to flood the country with foreign guer-
rillas and bring down the Pinochet regime by assassi-
nation.
According to the government, the alleged scheme,
~1 known as "Plan Boomerang," involved infiltrating some
0' 1200 terrorists, representing a variety of Latin
American guerrilla groups, into Chile from Argentina.
An advance party of 40 Cuban-trained terrorists was
reported by the Chileans to have arrived in Panama by
air from Cuba on August 21 on its way to Argentina
where it would link up with 900 other guerrillas. A
Chilean press service released the names of the 40
individuals. Our investigation reveals that included
in the list were:
--15 Cuban entertainers, including the artistic
director of the Cuban National Dance Group, enroute to
cultural performances in Panama and Costa Rica;
--The Panamanian ambassador to Cuba, and three of
his relatives;
--The Cuban consul general in Panama;
--A high official of the Cuban foreign ministry;
--The Cuban ambassador to several African countries;
--An official of the Cuban National Institute of
Agrarian reform;
--A Cuban radio commentator traveling with her son,
presumably to visit her brother- in-law, a Panamanian
citizen.
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Whatever the Cubans have done in the past by way
of subverting governments in the hemisphere, they would
seem to be free of blame in this case. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 26, 1975
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The Bahamas: Settling on the Rent for US Bases
The much-divided Bahamian cabinet only last month
settled on a basis for determining the rent to be
charged the United States in exchange for continued
military base rights in the islands. Months of personal
tension and division between Prime Minister Pindling and
Minister of External Affairs Adderley failed to produce
even a ballpark rental figure, but now a simple formula
has been found which has the solid support of the entire
cabinet: Each minister is to prepare a developmental
aid request for his department, and the combined costs
for these aid programs will become the basis for con-
structing the total rental package which Adderley will
negotiate with the United States.
Last week, however, the prime minister admitted in a radio
interview that negotiations with the US may not be com-
The Bahamians now have great expectations of capital
development money coming from the US, and want to budget
$50 million worth of developmental projects next year
which will have to come out of a new rental agreement.
pleted by the end of the year, forcing yet another extension
J of the existing agreement at the old rental figure.
Al The government appears to be hanging much of its
a political and economic fortunes on a successful agreement.
Financially, the government
slump in the Caribbean has not hit the Bahamas as hard as
most of the other islands, things could be better.
Pindling has recently proposed the creation of a Common-
wealth self-defense force, an extremely expensive budget
November 26, 1975
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November 26, 1975
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Uruguay: Book Review
Martin Weinstein's recent book Uruguay: The
Politics of Failure is a scholarly attempt to put
,4J -)Uruguay's political, economic, and social decline into
analytical perspective. The influence of the well-
known Latin American political theorist Kalman Silvert,
who is also Weinstein's mentor, is obvious throughout.
The book's major thesis is that Uruguay's most
famous political reformer, Jose Batlle y Ordonez, in
his haste to create a modern welfare state, focused
Id ''attention on the capital Montevideo, which contains
almost half the nation's population, and neglected
rural interests. Weinstein argues persuasively that
instead of forging a strong nation, Batlle and his fol-
lowers created a highly institutionalized urban society
that was not democratic but highly exclusivist, in-
creasingly authoritarian, and lacking in national scope.
Weinstein's way of organizing his book grows out
of his ideological concerns. The chapters in order of
presentation are: The theoretical framework; Batllismo
wand its opponents; Coparticipation--the development of
political institutions; Class and nation; and Uruguay
in the 1960s and 1970s--a requiem for democratic
nationalism.
If there is a major flaw in the book, it is that
;,
Veinstein tries to cover too much ground in 139 pages.
bile he obviously did not intend to write a reference
work, he may be accused of being overly selective in
his choice of details. He devotes only six pages to
the Tupamaros guerrilla organization and mentions the
ongoing civilian-military leadership conflict in passing.
November 26, 1975
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Nevertheless, some of his details provide valua-
ble insight into current affairs. For example, he
notes that President Bordaberry's father was the major
organizer of rural oppositionist sentiment to Battle
during the early decades of this century and gives
background information that is helpful in understanding
Bordaberry's present position on agricultural issues.
He also mentions Bordaberry's affinity for the govern-
ment in Brazil and his desire to promote binational
economic integration by becoming an agricultural client
of Brazil.
The main thrust of the work, however, is a criticism
of what Weinstein and Kalman Silvert describe as modern
"corporatist state politics." Weinstein's concluding
paragraph makes it clear that he has intended his work to
be a case study: "Politics should be desired for its
effective and instrumental value to the individual and
society. Neither a purely utilitarian calculus nor a
coldly corporate technocracy are capable of sustaining
political systems in which men enjoy full citizenship
.....yet these are the routes that are increasingly
chosen. The events of recent years make it painfully
obvious that the choice Uruguay has faced equally con-
fronts the modern and emerging nations of this world."
(UNCLASSIFIED)
November 26, 1975
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