CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001700320002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 15, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Yop secret
No No Forei n Dissem
aiii
15ffITT HOUE
Chinese Affairs
Top Se~c.Tret
1
Handle via Talent- Keyi ole Channels
September 15, 1975
TCS No. 782/75
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Background Use Only/Controlled Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence and from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Comments
and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the
individual articles.
CONTENTS
September 15, 1975
The MAC Meeting Revisited. . . . . . . . . . . 1
Appearances and Disappearances . . . . . . . . 4
Vietnam: A Quiet Anniversary. . . . . . . . . . 6
Sayonara, Sihanouk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Bourgeois Rights: Right or Wrong? . . . . . . . 12
Location of Industrial Plants. . . . . . . . . . 14
Minority Problems in the Provinces . . . . . . . 16
Gleanings from the Special Session . . . . . . . 18
Provincial Leadership Notes. ... . . . . . . . . 20
CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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The MAC Meeting Revisited
The political fortunes of certain regional
military commanders seem to have taken a turn for
the better recently, but there still may be much
foreboding within their ranks. At first blush
the reappearances of Li Te-sheng, Hsu Shih-yu and
Han Hsien-chu in the wake of the enlarged meeting
of the Military Affairs Commission (MAC) this
summer suggests that Mao fared poorly in this
latest round with the commanders. There are
many indications that the Chairman has fought long
to have at least some of these men removed from
their posts. At the same time there are signs
that the commanders may have taken quite a few
knocks themselves at the MAC meeting.
The most important decision the commission
made was to streamline the army through a net
reduction in troop strength and an upgrading of
its capacity for technological warfare. This
decision per se does not necessarily cut against
the interests of regional military leaders. In
principle, some may have even favored such a shift.
The decision, however, may have been taken in
response to a broadside attack against the military
by Mao and Teng Hsiao-ping.
Although the Chairman may not have attended
the meeting personally, he reportedly sent a mes-
SI-sage which acrimoniously chastised the PLA for
being oversized, inefficient, corrupt and
militarily unprepared. Indeed, senior cadres in
China have been told that Mao ordered the rehabil-
itation of Lo Jui-ching and wants to give military
training clear priority over political studies. .
Teng Hsiao-ping and Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying
weighed in with similar criticism of the military.
September 15, 1975
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Teng charged that the army was "obese, arrogant,
3 insubordinate, lazy, wasteful" and generally un-
prepared for battle.
y
Since they were probably not criticizing members
of their own general staff, these attacks can easily
be read as an indictment of the regional military
commanders who are responsible. for implementing
policy and keeping the army combat ready. The
commanders may also sense a potential threat in
the MAC order to retire a number of older officers.
Peking would presumably pass judgment on high-rank-
ing military region officers and could use the
order to erode the power base of selected commanders.
In light of the earbeating administered by Mao and
Teng, the favorable decision made in the cases of
Li, Hsu and Han may have looked more like a reprieve
than a victory.
Even though Mao and Teng are singing the
same anti-military tune, their objectives may be
quite different. The Chairman, continuing his
long-standing struggle with certain commanders,
may well have his sights fixed on a purge. Only
a couple of weeks before the opening of the meet-
ings, a People's Daily article seemed to argue that
Mao should exercise real rather than titular control
over the PLA. Using historical allusion, the
article claimed that political. and military power
must be concentrated in the hands of the "supreme
representative of the central political organs"
who is a specific individual. Mao may have seized
on Teng and Yeh's discontent with the PLA in an
effort to carry on his offensive against the com-
manders. Teng, however, may look at reform of the
army in an entirely different light. While keenly
aware of the military's shortcomings and convinced
that a major overhaul is necessary, he probably does
not see a purge--however limited--of regional military
leaders as part of this process. In fact, he styles
himself as conciliator. In his January speech before
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the Party plenum, Teng remarked that changes in the
leadership create uneasiness among the populace, and
at the MAC meeting, he sought to dampen factionalism
within the PLA. He put his stamp of approval on a
pardon for those soldiers cited as "516 elements"
and on a requirement for lenient treatment of
3 those who have caused political disorder within
the army. In all probability the commanders see
Teng's broadsides as much less threatening than
Mao's.
There is limited evidence that Teng wants to
put some distance between his position and the
Chairman's. If our account of Central Directive
18 is complete, the vice premier did not choose to
invoke Mao's authority in announcing the overhaul
9' of the PLA. The Chairman in fact sent two messages
to the MAC meeting, but neither were acknowledged
in Directive 18.
The outcome of the Military Affairs Commission
meeting appears to have been short of decisive
and may have left a number of military region
commanders with a deep sense of foreboding about
Mao's next move. This political context lends
some credibility to the view that Mao and elements
of the military are deeply involved in the current
criticism of the Chinese novel "Water Margin." Such
involvement was evident in an August 30 Kuangming
Daily article which appeared to utilize a historical
analogy to defend Lin Piao and, by implication,
attack Mao. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM
ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
September 15, 1975
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Appearances and Disappearances
The festivities surrounding Sihanouk's return
to Cambodia brought out most members of the Chinese
leadership, plus a heavy representation from the
distaff side. The appearances, however, served to
highlight several notable absentees.
Most prominent among the missing were party
vice chairmen Wang Hung-wen, who may still be in
Chekiang Province overseeing the return to normality,
and Yeh Chien-ying, who has not appeared since
Army Day. There seems to be no political reason
for Yeh's non-appearance, but there have been
occasional rumors that he is not in the best of
health.
Chiang Ching made her first public appearance
k
f
Sih
anou
.
or
in three months at the Chinese banquet
i
on,
She apparently made the most of the occas
wearing makeup for the first time in recent memory,
downing considerable quantities of Maotai, and in
general letting everyone know she was there. She
was the only major leader attending the Chinese
banquet, however, who did not attend Sihanouk's
reciprocal dinner two days later.
Madame Mao, of course, has not had a good year
politically since her failure to win a government
position at last January's National People's
Congress. The Chinese people,, apparently sensitive
o that failure, have circulated numerous rumors
since then about Mao's displeasure with her. The
latest, and perhaps most devastating rumors have it
that the Politburo voted earlier this year to
reactivate its decision of the, 1940s to keep her
out of politics, and that Mao wrote her a letter in
which he suggested that they go their separate ways
from now on since they had been going in opposite.
(presumably political) directions anyway.
September 15, 1975
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Chiang Ching's one-day reappearance, plus
public appearances by the wives of Chu Te, Chou
En-lai, Li Hsien-nien and even Hsu Hsiang-chien
seemed to underscore the surprising absence of
it Cho Lin, wife of Sihanouk's official host, Teng
I Hsiao-ping. Cho Lin does not appear on every
occasion at which her busy husband is top man,
but the presence of so many other wives made her
(absence all the more conspicuous. There is no
ready explanation for her non-appearance, but it
is at least possible that it has some connection
with the current attacks on "Water Margin." If
the novel's leading figure, who is attacked for
accepting a royal amnesty and seeking official
positions for his wife and son, is intended by
some to represent the rehabilitated Teng Hsiao-ping,
Madame Teng may prefer for the time being to
maintain a low profile. She currently holds an
unspecified position in the government. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
September 15, 1975
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Vietnam: A Quiet Anniversary
Peking's subdued treatment of Hanoi's National
Day early this month reflects continuing friction
between the two countries, whale clearly pointing
up Chinese concern that Hanoi is falling under Mos-
cow's domination.
The celebrations in Hanoi, marking the 30th
panniversary of the communist government's founding,
called for high-level Chinese attention, but Peking
appears to have played down the importance of the
event as well as the current status of China's re-
lations with North Vietnam.
Neither the message from Chinese leaders nor
the People's Daily editorial marking the occasion
included the enthusiastic expressions of Sino-
Vietnamese solidarity that were features of Chinese
statements during the war. Thus, there was no men-
tion of Peking's "proletarian internationalist duty"
to support Hanoi; no depiction of the Sino-Vietna-
mese relationship as being "as close as lips and
teeth"; no references to "sharing weal and woe";
no mention of the application of Marxist-Leninist
principles in Vietnam.
by at least three politbureau members and Chou En-
lai delivered speeches on both occasions. This year,
there was no rally and politbureau member Wu Te was
the speaker at the embassy reception.
he Chinese held rallies marking the 20th and 25th
nniversaries of the DRV. Moreover, receptions at
he North Vietnamese embassy those years were attended
Although China sent a fairly high-level dele-
gation led by politbureau member Chen Hsi-lien to
Hanoi, the Chinese in Peking displayed a clear lack
of enthusiasm for the anniversary. in 1965 and 1970,
September 15, 1975
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Chen Hsi-lien, in a speech delivered at a Viet-
namese iron and steel complex, did pull out most of
he stops in describing Peking's ties with Hanoi,
eferring to China's "internationalist obligation"
to support the Vietnamese and to the Vietnamese as
"close comrades-in-arms and brothers." Still, Chen's
remarks in Hanoi are almost certainly not as authori-
tative as the People's Daily editorial and the message
that was signed by both Mao Tse-tung and Chou.
More important, however, Chen took the oppor-
tunity to lecture the Vietnamese on the dangers of
Soviet machinations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.
Without mentioning the Soviets by name, Chen warned
D the Vietnamese that "the superpowers" were attempt-
ing to dominate other countries, especially in the
Third World. Chen asserted that China, itself a
Third World country, would never attempt to estab-
lish hegemony over other countries, obviously con-
trasting China's allegedly benevolent view of South-
east Asia with what Peking considers to be Moscow's
dark designs on the area. He said China stood by
other developing countries in opposition to "super-
power aggression, intervention, control, subversion
and plundering."
The Chinese have in several recent private con-
versations expressed a conviction that Hanoi has
ilted toward Moscow. They obviously hope, however,
to increase their own leverage with the Vietnamese
and to continue to draw Hanoi's attention to the
darker side of Soviet intentions. That clearly was
O Chen's objective in asserting that Peking does not
interfere in the internal affairs of other countries,
as well as his comment that China had supported
Hanoi "to the best of our ability," thus reminding
the Vietnamese that they still owe China for past
favors.
How much confidence Peking actually has in its
bility to improve ties with Hanoi, to say nothing
September 15, 1975
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of effectively countering Soviet influence in Viet-
nam, is another question. have
reported recently that Chinese o icia s e ieve
their relations with North Vietnam are "worsening."
25X1C \`7 As examples, cited "published" Vietnamese
claims of Chinese aggression against Vietnam and
assertions that Kwan si Province was Vietnamese
25X1C territory, reported that the Chi-
nese had twice returned boundary markers on the
25X1A
der has been clearly demarcated since the 19th cen-
tury and has not been a contentious issue in the
past.
f the Paracel Islands last year--but the land bor-
after they were moved by the Vietnamese,.-
Differences of opinion over territorial claims
in the South China Sea have been clear for some
time--especially since Peking assumed full control
Vientam-Kwangsi border to their original locations
If issues such as these continue to surface, the
possibility of any significant improvement in rela-
tions between the two countries will remain remote.
In internal briefings, the Chinese have often por-
trayed problems with Hanoi as resulting from Soviet
"meddling," probably in order to disguise the
seriousness of Peking's difficulties with Hanoi.
Over the long run, however, the Chinese view of
Hanoi as a challenger to Peking's own influence in
Southeast Asia--especially one that has Soviet
backing--could mean that relations between the two
countries will deteriorate even further. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
September 15, 1975
25X1 C
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Sayonara, Sihanouk
After five tumultuous years, Prince Sihanouk
ended his..exile in Peking last week and returned to
Phnom Penh. The Chinese gave every indication that
they were pleased with the arrangements.
Peking's endorsement of Sihanouk's return was
evident in the turnout at farewell banquets in Peking
and at his airport sendoff. More top-level Chinese
/~ officials attended these affairs than any event
01 01 honoring a foreign visitor since Kim I1-song was in
Peking last April. Moreover, the Chinese heaped
praise on Sihanouk for his past role in Cambodia's
"liberation" and expressed the hope that he "will
make still greater contributions" after returning to
the Cambodian capital. Sihanouk also had final
meetings with both Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.
While the Chinese are clearly happy to have
Sihanouk out of their hair and back in Cambodia with
at least a nominal title--as "head-of-state"--Peking
almost certainly recognizes that the Prince is not
likely to have a significant voice in Cambodian af-
fairs. Peking, therefore, has been careful not to
jeopardize its equities with the ruling Cambodian
communists by arguing for a more important role for
Sihanouk. Since the end of the fighting in Cambodia
and Vietnam, the Chinese have concentrated their
attention on Cambodia and their ties with the new
communist regime appear to be closer than those with
ny other Indochinese country. The Chinese ambassador
to Cambodia arrived in Phnom Penh last Wednesday,
the first foreign envoy to take up his post since
the communists took over last April.
Expressions of support for Sihanouk seem aimed
rimarily at avoiding the impression that Peking has
September 15, 1975
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CA
dumped him, as well as being a gentle reminder to
the Prince that he has an obligation to the new
regime in Phnom Penh. Chinese leaders were almost
certainly concerned that Sihanouk, whose difficulties
with the communists have been well known since the
mid-1960s, might break with the new leaders and
relocate in another country, where he could criticize
them through his many contacts in the foreign press..
This development, which Sihanouk himself has hinted
at in the past, would force Peking to side with their
new ally in Phnom Penh against the Prince and might
seriously embarrass Peking.
Peking's treatment of Sihanouk's departure in
itself does not, of course, commit the Prince to a
long-term alliance with the communists. His current
stay in Phnom Penh will apparently be a brief one,
after which he plans to travel for several weeks,
probably as a "senior spokesman" for the new regime.
Reportedly included in his itinerary are trips to
Peking for the October 1 National Day celebrations
and for his birthday in late October. The Chinese
will probably use these occasions to reiterate their
hope that the Prince will continue to cooperate with
the communists. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
September 15, 1975
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Bourgeois Rights: Right or Wrong?
Local authorities still seem to be in a
quandary over how to implement the so-called
restriction of bourgeois rights--the various
ncentive measures including private plots, side-
ine production, and free markets. The restriction
of free markets, where farmers can sell produce
they have grown privately, seems to be especially
controversial.
The reaction in Canton to the alleged closure
F of free markets as of July 1 was not at all
7 favorable. It is still not certain whether the
markets were closed entirely, as they have report-
ntedly been in other areas, or whether the number
of days they were allowed to operate was severely
r^ restricted. In any case, Canton residents
eportedly lobbied for looser restrictions on the
arkets, and they have apparently been successful.
A Kwangtung provincial document reportedly
authorized the reopening of the free markets in
15attribute anton on August 1. The official explanation was
hat the closure of the markets had prevented the
easants from exchanging their products for other
eeded goods. Most Canton residents apparently
the reopening of the markets to popular
ressure.
The turnabout on the Canton free markets
I raphically illustrates not only the ability of
ordinary people to influence events when sufficient
pressure is applied but also the uncertainty among
local officials over how to handle such issues.
It is not at all clear that Kwangtung officials
had authorization from Peking to close the markets,
in the first place. In fact, recent propaganda,
especially an article written by the Ministry
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of Agriculture, seems to be taking a dim view of
cessive economic- restrictions. The Ministry
0 f Agriculture article as well as similar broad-
rovinces have once again attacked
from a few
t
p
cas
s
the "wind of communization," as did vice premier
Chang Chun-chiao last April.
The return of the "wind of communization"
theme suggests that some elements in the leader-
ship, mindful that popular discontent over economic
policy will. likely lead to further production
disruptions, do not want to make rash changes in
current policy and are not pleased with those who
have done so. As with so many other issues, how-
ever, the leadership in Peking is probably not of
one mind over how to proceed with "restricting"
bourgeois rights. It seems likely that some
h
people are arguing for tighter restric io ns , w+h-L c
may have accounted for the free market closures,
the reduction in the size of private plots and
in some cases confiscation of the plots. (SECRET
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September 15, 1975
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Location of Industrial Plants
China has apparently changed its policy for
siting industrial plants. For the past few years,
major new industrial installations have been built
on flat, accessible terrain rather than in remote
mountainous areas. This policy apparently recognizes
that the construction of facilities in more acces-
sible areas will cut the time and cost of construc-
tion, improve access to transportation facilities,
and, in many cases, eliminate the need to build new
housing and support facilities.
re-
cently admitted that the old policy was a costly
L,, error that slowed industrial development. They in-
dicated, for example, that the location of the Peking
petroleum complex--China's largest--in the mountains
southwest of the capital caused construction delays
and greatly reduced the efficLency of the plant.
During the 1960s many industrial plants were
dispersed in rugged mountainous terrain away from
population centers, in accordance with a directive
from the Military Affairs Committee in Peking. Em-
phasis was placed on defense against air attack and
on preventing observation from rail and road net-
works.
The period when this policy was at its height
corresponds with the period Lain Piao was defense
2 minister (1959-1971) and defense spending was high
(1965-1971). Military procurement dropped off
sharply after the coup attempt by Lin in 1971.
China may now consider its growing nuclear .
arsenal a sufficient deterrent, so that an industrial
September 15, 1975
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ina continues to teel relatively secure,
we would expect that economic efficiency, rather
than defense, will be the prevailing consideration
for locating industrial plants. (TOP SECRET RUFF/
NO FOREIGN DISSEP4/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
September 15, 1975
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Minority Problems in the Provinces
Until recently it appeared that the leader-
ship's special efforts in the minority areas had
largely contained the problems evident in the
1950s and early 1960s. Part of this relative
success was due to the concessions made by the
center--exemption from the two child limit of
the national birth control policy, preservation
of minority languages, establishment of minority
publications, industries to produce special mi-
nority goods, and a privileged status in terms
of university entrance.
Another aspect of Peking's minority policy,
however, has been the leadership's effort to move
Han Chinese--especially demobilized servicemen
and youth--into minority regions. This approach
has the positive effect of diluting large con-
centrations of minorities but the negative effect
of alienating much of the native population, which
fears it will be swamped by an influx of Hans.
In fact, recent reports indicate that serious
problems have developed among the Huis in Yunnan
5 and Kweichou. Attempts by provincial leaders, the
ti majority of whom are Han Chinese, to curtail Huis
religious practices are responsible for these
7problems. The latest incidents in Yunnan were
triggered when the leadership tried to force the
Huis, who are Muslims, to work on Fridays. The
Huis retaliated by trying to raid a PLA armory.
Equally serious, dissident Huis in Kweichou
recently presented a visiting United Nations team
with a petition requesting an examination of the
right of self-determination.
September 15, 1975
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Other incidents, moreover, go well beyond
earlier protests, which were characterized by
poster campaigns and street demonstrations.
These new activities--cutting a railroad line,
production sabotage, and armed clashes--tend to
erode Peking's authority over these minorities.
The incidents in Yunnan have already triggered a
strong response--the ringleaders of the raid on
/ the armory have been arrested and intensive
ideological study is being carried out among the
Huis. The last attempts at "armed rebellion" by
q Huis in Ningsia in 1974 were quelled by PLA troops.
Given the strong response by Peking in the
Chekiang case, it is likely that any new outbreak
of dissidence will bring a strong response from
Peking. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
September 15, 1975
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Gleanings from the Special Session
Peking is keeping its own counsel on US and
~j European proposals to the recently concluded UN
Special Session. In his keynote address to the
special session on September 2--the day after the
US presentation--Chinese Foreign Trade Minister
Li Chiang hewed to Peking's canned line of blaming
the superpowers for Third World economic ills,
warning of continued superpower--primarily Soviet--
efforts at world economic domination, and expressing
Chinese support for general Third World aspirations.
There were, however, some suggestions in the
speech that the Chinese hope that the session will
result in an easing of tensions between developing
and developed countries. Li, for example, spoke
approvingly of a "positive attitude" on the part of
the "Second World," an apparent reference to the
Lome agreement to stabilize earnings of some products
exported by 46 developing countries associated with
the EC. The Chinese lauded the Lome agreement when
it was signed last spring, and for some time have
been apprehensive that Western Europe--which Peking
claims is the frontline in the struggle against
"Soviet hegemonism"--would be weakened the most by
continued world economic disorders.
At the same time, Li's speech appeared to signal
that China will continue to avoid an active role in
any mechanism or agreements designed to satisfy
Third World demands. In this regard, Li appeared
to rule out Chinese contributions to any world food
stocks by stressing China's example of "self-
reliance." Peking has declined invitations to join
such international bodies as the World Food Council
and the Food and Agricultural Organization largely
because membership entails the divulgence of economic
statistics the Chinese consider vital state secrets.
September 15, 1975
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Similarly, Li's failure to make even an oblique
reference to the US proposal for a multinational
fund to aid developing countries most severely
affected by world market fluctuations--a concept
3 the Chinese support in the abstract--undoubtedly
reflects Peking's wariness of being drawn-into such
potentially expensive endeavors.
3
Despite any reservations Peking may have over
any particular stand taken by developing countries in
the special session, Peking can be expected to con-
tinue lending strong vocal support to their cause.
China continues to see a unified Third World as a
means of diffusing superpower--primarily Soviet--in-
fluence on the world scene and thereby create openings
that China can exploit to increase its own prestige
and influence as a world power. (CONFIDENTIAL)
September 15, 1975
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Provincial Leadership Notes
Revolution. All members of the new committee are
arty committee in the aftermath of the Cultural
Radio Shantung announced on September 6 that
Tsingtao--the second most important city in the
province--had formed a municipal party committee.
Tsingtao is the last major municipality to form a
veteran cadres that served in Shantung prior to the
RCultural Revolution. Tsingtao suffered severe
turbulence during that upheaval but, according to
infrequent travelers, has appeared relatively calm
recently. The formation of the committee may have
been delayed by factional maneuvering within the
provincial party committee, to which a number of
new faces have been added in the last year,
25X1A
officers remaining on the Tientsin committee,
which was dominated by soldiers when it was formed
in May 1971.
n August 16. Chao was the second secretary there
efore the Cultural Revolution. The current second
ecretary, Wu Tai, is one of the few career military
Wu-cheng was identified as a secretary in Tientsin
Significant additions have also recently been
ade to party committees in other provinces. Chao
Inner Mongolia has a second secretary, Hung
Chou-hsing, for the first time, but his background
is obscure and the significance of his appoint-
ment is unclear. The appointment of Ragde as a
secretary in Tibet in conjunction with celebrations
of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the
Tibetan Autonomous Region appears to represent a
nod to the sensitivities of ethnic Tibetans.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
September 15, 1975
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August 23 Criticism of "Water Margin" begins
in Kwangming DaiZy. (U)
August 31 - Chinese delegation led by Vice Premier
September 4 and politbureau member Chen Hsi-lien
in Hanoi for 30th anniversary of DRV
National Day. (U)
September 2 Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang ad-
dresses 7th UN Special Session. (U)
September Chinese trade delegation led by Chair-
3-11 man of the Council for the Promotion
of International Trade visits Sweden.
(U)
September 4 People's DaiZy editorial cites Mao
as originator of "Water Margin"
criticism. (U)
September 5 Kuo Yu-feng identified as head of
Central Committee Organization
Department. (U)
High-ranking Romanian delegation ar-
rives in Peking for five-day visit. (U)
West German industrial exhibition of-
ficially opened in Peking by Bonn's
Economic Minister Friderichs. (U)
Romanian delegation led by Defense
Minister Gheorghe Gomoiu arrives in
Peking. (U)
Chinese trade delegation led by Li
Chuan, vice-chairman of the Chinese
Council for the Promotion of Inter-
national Trade, departs for the US.
(U)
September 15, 1975
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September 6 Vice Premier Tend Hsiao-ping hosts
farewell banquet in Peking for
Cambodian "head-of-state" Norodom
Sihanouk; Sihanouk ends five-year
exile in China and departs for
Phnom Penh on September 9. (U)
September 8 Rwandan:. foreign minister arrives
in Peking. (U)
September 9 China and Mexico sign scientific
and technical cooperation agreement.
(U)
Celebrations in Lhasa marks the 10th
anniversary of the founding of the
Tibet Autonomous Region. Politburo
member Hua Kuo-feng heads delegation
from Peking for the occasion. (U)
Chinese ambassador to Cambodia Sun Hao
departs for Phnom Penh to take up his
post. (U)
September 12 Third National Games open in Peking.
The games were last held in 1965 on
the eve of the Cultural Revolution.
(U)
September 15, 1975
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