MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000700270002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 10, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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onfidential
No Forei, n Discern
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Confidential
No. 0653-75
April 10, 1975
116
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Egypt: Results of Arafat's Visit to Cairo . . . 1
Angola: Another Mediating Organization Set Up . 3
Angola-Namibia: Border Incident . . . . . . . . 4
Apr 10, 1975
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
Egypt
Results of Arafat's Visit to Cairo
5
Egypt's President Sadat apparently made few
concessions to Palestine Liberation Organization
chairman Yasir Arafat during his visit to Cairo
this week. According to sketchy accounts of their
meeting, the-president promised only that Egypt
would continue its efforts to "guarantee" PLO
participation at Geneva. It was also agreed that
the two would work toward an early meeting of the
"confrontation forces"--Egypt, Syria, and the PLO--
to coordinate their strategies. Such a meeting is
likely before the Arab summit in June.
In Cairo, Arafat may have given more than he
received. According to press reports, he insisted
that the PLO must attend the Geneva conference if
the substance of the Palestinian problem was to be
discussed, but conceded that the military secretariat
of the 20-member Arab League could speak on behalf
of the Palestinians if the conference were to con-
sider only another round of military disengagement
agreements. If confirmed, such a concession would
mark a significant shift in Arafat's position
toward that of Sadat, who recently suggested that
the Arab League could represent the Palestinians
at Geneva. Sadat considers this a possible way
around Israel's objections to negotiating with the
PLO.
Despite claims of a healing in the Egypt-PLO
rift, Sadat is probably not confident that he has
won lasting concessions from Arafat. Continued
strains are reflected in the Cairo media's treatment
of the Sadat-Arafat meeting. Although emphasizing
the positive, the press has said openly that complete
u
(Continued)
Apr 10, 1975 1
CONFIDENTIAL
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harmony on strategy and tactics is always "a
difficult matter" even among those with common
objectives.
Commentators have laid stress on Egypt's
importance to the Palestinian movement, acknowledg-
ing that the Palestinian issue is the crux of the
Middle East problem, but reminding readers that
the issue would not have risen to its current
importance without Egypt's action. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Angola
Another Mediating Organization Set Up
The military commanders of the three libera-
tion groups that share power in Ango?la's transi-
tional government issued a communique on-April 8 in
which they disavowed the further use of force to
settle disputes among their organizations. The
communique follows almost two weeks of intermittent
fighting in Luanda between two of the groups.
Fighting finally tapered off last week, but it
could flare up again at any time.
The communique notes that the three groups
will establish a "non-partisan" organization to be
called the "Preventive Force." The force will be
responsible for mediating disputes among the com-
peting liberation groups. The groups will each
contribute an equal number of personnel to the
force.
At this time there is no reason to believe
that the new force will live up to its responsi-
bility. It will join an already cumbersome network
of joint organizations--political, military, and
police--charged with maintaining order and resolv-
ing conflicts among the groups. None of these
joint organizations have succeeded. in rising above
the interests of the individual groups represented,
and the Preventive Force is unlikely-to prove the
exception. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Apr 10, 1975 3
CONFIDENTIAL
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Angola-Namibia
The South African defense minister publicized
on April 9 a recent minor shooting incident on the
Angola-Namibia (South-West Africa) border between
a South African patrol and unknown elements on the
Angolan side. According to the US consul general
in Luanda, the incident apparently took place late
last month and involved elements of the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA),
which is establishing a strong presence in southern
Angola.
The incident itself is of little importance,
and similar events can be expected from time to
time. The encounter may, however, draw inter-
national attention to separatist sentiment in
southern Angola that could be interpreted by some
observers as another obstacle in the territory's
transition to independence. In our view, this
separatist sentiment is weak and there is little
likelihood it will further complicate Angola's
move toward independence.
In some respects, southern Angola has long
been a world unto itself. The Portuguese did
not really establish their control over the area--
particularly that portion in the extreme south pop-
ulated by the Cuanhama tribe--until just before
World War I. During the war, the Portuguese were
forced to fall back because of German agitation
among the Cuanhama.
Lisbon virtually wrote off the area until the
early 1960s, when Portuguese development of the
territory had pushed southward. By this time, the
Cuanhama had become deeply involved in the nationalism
Apr 10, 1975 4
C?iFII)Ei4TIAE
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that was developing among the Ovambo, their
parent tribe in Namibia. This movement eventually
led to the formation of the South-West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO), which is leading the insurgency
against South Africa's control of Namibia.
Some nationalists on both sides of the border
have favored the establishment of a separate Ovambo
state made'up of a portion of southern Angola and
northern Namibia. The idea has not gained much
momentum over the years, and SWAPO has repeatedly
disavowed any support for a separate Ovambo state
while maintaining its goal of independence for all
of Namibia. Angola's forthcoming independence,
however, has probably sparked some renewed interest
in the idea of a separate Ovambo state.
the
recent incident along the border was provoked by
Ovambo elements within UNITA who favor a separate
state. The leader of these elements is believed
to be UNITA's director for southern Angola, who was
born in Namibia and has close ties with SWAPO.
In a press conference in southern Angola on
April 3, after the border incident had become known
in the territory, UNITA's director for southern
Angola defended his organization's right to engage
in political activity in the area, but failed to
give a satisfactory explanation for the incident.
The US consul in Luanda reports that a small band of
UNITA irregulars apparently seized a Portuguese border
post and expelled the Portuguese into Namibia, but no
definitive picture of the incident has emerged so far.
The South Africans who would probably like to
believe there is some movement for a separate Ovambo
state emerging in the area, might be tempted to play
(Continued)
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up the separatist issue as a psychological ploy
to disrupt SWAPO. The UN deadline for the end of
South Africa's occupation of the trust territory
is May 30, but Pretoria is unwilling to relinquish
control by that date. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Apr 10, 1975
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Confidential
Confidential
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