MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000600270002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 27, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600270002 Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
No. 0454/75
March 27, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600270002-6
 Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600270002-6
No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad
Background Use OnZy/ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. O. 11652, exemption category:
y 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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 Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : 'qr ff T00865A000600270002-6
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
Somalia: Power Struggle Underway. . . . . . . 1
Angola: Neto Looks For Help From Lisbon. . . 3
Pakistan: Bhutto Talks Tough on External
Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Mar 27, 1975
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Somalia
Power Struggle Underway
A power struggle is apparently going on within
the Somali hierarchy.
According to the US embassy in Mogadiscio, re-
ports are circulating in the capital that President
Siad has confined his longtime rival, Defense Minister
Samantar, to a military hospital and has arrested a
number of the more radical members of the government
for plotting to oust him. Samantar and the others
were said to be responsible for the distribution in
recent weeks of tracts demanding that Siad step
down because of irregularities in the distribution
of aid to Somali drought victims. There are also
reports that some members of the Supreme Revolu-
tionary Council, including Vice President Culmie,
are "ill and resting at home."
Meanwhile, anti-Siad wall slogans and propa-
ganda tracts continue to appear in Mogadiscio;
some of the tracts have been distributed in the
army compound where Siad resides.
claim that the kidnaping
o renc m assa or uery on March 23 was engineered
by Siad's opponents to embarrass him by creating
the impression he has little control over domestic
security.
Recent reporting suggests that Siad has
recently sought--with some success--to consolidate
power in his own hands. Some of the president's
associates in the council and government may have
felt that there would be a permanent diminution of
their own roles unless they acted either to remove
or block him.
Siad could be faced with a dilemma in deciding
what further actions to take against Samantar and
the other alleged plotters. Although Samantar has no
strong tribal base, he is said to have substantial
support in the Somali military.
(Continued)
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Samantar and some of the other plotters also have
strong links to the Soviet embassy, but it is not
clear what role if any the Soviets played in the anti-
Siad activity. The US embassy speculates that the
plotters acted on their own initiative and were
relying on Soviet support if they succeeded, or pro-
tection if they failed.
Although the Soviets were probably in contact with
the plotters, Moscow would have had little reason to
cause trouble for Siad. In the last few years, the
Somali President has granted the Soviets military
facilities at the port of Ber_bera,and last summer the
two sides signed a formal treaty of friendship.
In any event, the Samantar affair is likely to
be a setback to Soviet interests in Somalia. Siad
probably will not take any strong action against the
Soviets that could end their military assistance, but
the affair will reinforce widespread Somali suspicions
of Soviet intentions in the country. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED
DISSEM)
SECRET
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1 V
Angola
Neto Looks For HeZp From Lisbon
Agostinho Neto, the leftist president of the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, one
of the three liberation groups that share power with
the Portuguese in the transitional government, re-
cently sent his military commander to Lisbon to seek
moral and material support from the Armed Forces
Movement. Neto apparently had been encouraged by
leftist gains in Portugal since the abortive coup
there earlier this month.
Neto believes the Armed Forces Movement, the
guiding force in Portuguese politics since the
Lisbon coup last April, would like to see the
Popular Movement hold the dominant political'posi-
tion in Angola. He especially wants Portuguese sup-
port in the event civil war breaks out between his
group and the militarily superior National Front for
the Liberation of Angola, a possibility brought closer
by clashes in Luanda this week between the two groups.
N.eto also hopes that any Portuguese support will help
him exert greater discipline over the Popular Movement,
which has been plagued by severe factionalism for the
past several years.
The Portuguese military commander in Angola
believes that Lisbon can do little for Neto. He
believes also that most Angolans want the territory
to have as few links with Portugal as possible and
that Neto would seriously undermine his political
campaign by seeking to enlist Portuguese support.
Moreover, even if the Armed Forces Movement wanted
to help Neto, Portuguese troops stationed in the
territory are anxious to return home and might not
respond to orders that embroiled them in supporting
any of the liberation groups or in putting down all-
out civil war in Angola.
In the fighting this week in Luanda, there is no
evidence to suggest that the Portuguese authorities
have sided with either liberation group. The actions of
the Portuguese thus far have been aimed solely at try-
ing to quell the violence and restoring calm. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Mar 27, 1975 3
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Pakistan
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Bhutto TaZk8 Tough on External Threats
Prime Minister Bhutto's vehement attack against
India and Afghanistan on March 21 is the strongest
denunciation of those countries in recent weeks. The
diatribe came in a speech delivered in Lyallpur, the
latest stop on the prime minister's intermittent
grand tour of the Punjab that began last November.
Bhutto's remarks echoed old themes and seemed clearly
designed to build up domestic support, despite his
lingering obsession with foreign threats. The prime
minister probably viewed a speech to the
Punjabis--Pakistan's most receptive audience to emo-
tional appeals--as a good way to shore up his tour
that is being increasingly termed lackluster.
Bhutto lashed out at New Delhi and Kabul for
supporting Pakistani separatists. He cited Afghanistan
President Daud's recent trap to India and Bangladesh
as evidence of conspiracies being hatched against
Pakistan. He also accused Afghanistan of abetting
those who assassinated Northwest Frontier Province
Home Minister Sherpao last February. The Prime
Minister told the cheering crowd that Pakistan would
counter any aggression by its "enemies" with a fight
to the last man.
Despite Bhutto's rhetoric, the process of recon-
ciliation between Islamabad and New Delhi is continu-
ing. Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's public reaction
was notably mild. She took the "we told you so" line,
Ilinking Bhutto's tough remarks to the recent US policy
decision that will permit arms sales to Pakisan.
Indeed, a Pakistani shipping delegation left for New
Delhi on March 25, and negotiations aimed at restor-
ing civil aviation links are expected to begin soon.
Pakistan's already poor relations with Afghanistan
also seem to have been unaffected by the speech.
Despite mutual distrust and lingering fears in both
Kabul and Islamabad, neither side will let the situa-
tion deteriorate past verbal attacks. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Mar 27, 1975
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adurux
Secret
Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600270002-6