THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A002200050005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 7, 1970
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DDCI BRIEFING FOR
PFIAB 9 October 1970
THE MIDDLE EAST
7 October 1970
I. You gentlemen were briefed extensively yesterday
on the current situation in the Middle East, and
I do not think that there is any more detail I
should add at this point, but there are two per-
spectives I would like to discuss with you.
A.
First, in the aftermath of the U.S. peace
initiative, the Jordanian fighting, and
Nasir's death, it would appear to be worth-
while to examine how the Middle East must
look, not to us, but to the Russians.
B. And secondly, I want to discuss with a
little more perspective the probable impact
of Nasir's death on the principal problems
and issues within the Middle East.
The Soviet Union in the Middle East
I. Let me start by summarizing briefly our basic
assessment of what the Russians are up to in
the Eastern Mediterranean, and then we can
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determine whether anything in recent events
suggests that the evaluation needs to be re-
vised. Kremlin policy in the area has under-
gone two strong tests in the past month, first
in the clear Soviet concern that the Jordanian
developments might evoke Western intervention,
and then in the loss of Nasir, Moscow's most
effective point of influence with the Arabs.
The evidence, however, indicates that while
the Russians might have to make some tactical
policy adjustments, their fundamental strategy
remains unchanged.
II. Since 1955, the USSR has concentrated on expanding
its political influence and military power through-
out the Middle East--wherever and whenever possible
at the expense of the West. It has pursued this
goal with considerable success, chiefly by exploit-
ing the bitter Arab-Israeli dispute to its own
advantage.
A. The Soviets probably recognize that their
interests will be best suited by conditions of
endemic high tension, as opposed to all-out
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conflict on the one hand or a settlement on
the other.
B. Full-scale war could destroy the client
regimes Moscow works with in the area, and
risk a larger conflict with the attendant
danger of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation.
1. The Russians have accordingly worked--
despite an occasional miscalculation, to
reduce the possibilities that the more
radical Arabs could initiate or provoke
a new war.
2. They have in some degree limited the
number and the quality of the offensive
weaponry delivered to the Arabs, in an
attempt to prevent them from overestimat-
ing their strength.
3. As an example of Moscow's desire to keep
tension short of complete chaos, the
Soviets interceded with Syria last year
to restrain the fedayeen units which--with
support from Damascus--were trying to top-
ple the Lebanese government.
C. At the same time, while the USSR has made good
virtually all of the Arab equipment losses in
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the 1967 war, Soviet propaganda has drummed
on the necessity of "eliminating the con-
sequences of Israeli aggression." Arab
emotions are whipped up by allegations of
imminent Israeli or U.S. attack--a ploy
dangerously similar to the miscalculated
Soviet maneuvering which led to the 1967
war.
1. Moscow from time to time has induced
some flexibility on Arab political tac-
tics when this suited Soviet purposes,
but we have no indication that Moscow
has ever brought any serious pressure
to bear in Cairo or elsewhere in the
Middle East for substantive concessions
that could facilitate some progress
toward a settlement.
III. To measure recent events against this assess-
ment, take the Soviet response to the U.S.
peace initiative early this summer.
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A. Moscow seems to have appreciated that
the situation along the Suez Canal was
growing steadily more dangerous.
1. Soviet pilots had engaged--and been
shot down by--Israeli pilots.
2. The Israelis were showing determin-
ation to maintain their superiority
over the west bank of the Canal what-
ever the risk of a direct clash with
Soviet forces.
3. There were also signs of growing con-
cern in Washington.
B. The U.S. peace initiative therefore came
at a propitious time for the Russians. It
offered a breathing spell along the Canal.
1.
The Soviets may also have calculated
that the Israelis would not agree to a
cease-fire, so that ostensible Arab ac-
ceptance would score diplomatic and propa-
ganda points for Moscow and Cairo.
C. As far as long-range Soviet goals were con-
cerned, however, subsequent developments
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have indeed made it clear that acceptance
of the U.S. peace initiative was no reflec-
tion of any change. Far from pressing the
Egyptians to enter into serious negotia-
tions, the Russians virtually guaranteed
an impasse by their apparent decision that
the advantages of completing the Air de-
fense system along the Canal outweighed
the consequences of their duplicity in
violating the agreement.
IV. In reaction to the Jordanian fighting, Moscow
appears to have been concerned primarily with the
possibility that the Syrian intervention could
bring in either Israeli or U.S. forces, to the
general detriment of Arab interests and thereby
Soviet interests.
rerwipatA.u.at. e4avt-ct
A. The evidence- i-s- very -0-1-e-at?t-hat- the Soviet
made a demarche in Beirut warnin of thi
We de yLo$ 4.40-1.4,14,r,v 5
possibility
ot syrtan-TET-ertuntiala.
1. We do not believe that the Soviet de-
marche was decisive in bringing about
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the Syrian withdrawal, but it shows that
the Russians were willing to put some
strain on their relations with their
more radical Arab clients to maintain
a measure of stability in the Middle
East.
V. Nasir's death no doubt was a shock to the So-
viets,
entire
on the
who must have been concerned that their
stake in Egypt had suddenly been put
line. Nevertheless, Kosygin's extended
talks with the Egyptian leaders
an occasion to express Moscow's
the same
time to sound them out
provided him
desires and at
on sensitive
issues. All in all, Kosygin probably returned
home from the funeral with some confidence
that the new leadership will at least initially
continue Nasir's policies, recognize the neces-
sity of and the price for Soviet aid, and there-
fore not jeopardize Soviet interests.
VI. Moscow probably views its prospects in the Mid-
dle East generally with considerable hope,
despite Nasir's death, the prospect of continued
Arab feuding and fedayeen terrorism, and the
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USSR's own exaggerated fears of Communist Chinese
inroads in the area.
A. The Arab-Israeli dispute, which gives Moscow
its main leverage, shows no sign of abating.
Soviet military power both in Egypt and in
the Mediterranean has been demonstrated to
all and has thoroughly ensconced Moscow as a
principal power in the Middle East.
B. Anti-western, "progressive" Arabs have re-
cently seized power in the Sudan and Libya,
and have shown at least some interest in
expanding ties with the USSR. And the polari-
zation of the area continues to the disadvan-
tage of the United States.
C. While Moscow is probably aware that there
will be short-term setbacks to its efforts,
it surely views its prospects as a growing
military and political force in the Middle
East as very bright.
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The Arab World After Nasir's Death
I. To turn to my other point, the passing of
President Nasir from the scene is bound to have
considerably more effect, in both the short
term and the long run, on a number of loose
ends in the Arab world then it does on Soviet
long-range strategy.
A. Egypt, which Nasir had made the focal point
of Pan-Arabism and'resistance to Israel,
will be preoccupied with establishing the
domestic viability of a successor regime.
The United States must look for some new
leader with the strength to speak for the
Arabs in peace talks. King Husayn has lost
a patron in his struggle against Arab radi-
cals and Palestinian extremists. Even the
Israelis will have to make a new assessment
of what new faces and forces may take con-
trol on the Arab side of the Middle Eastern
conflict.
II. Within Egypt, the choice of Anwar Sadat to re-
place Nasir appears to be an attempt to offend
as few people as possible.
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A. Sadat carries a certain degree of legitimacy
to his new position by virtue of the fact
that he was one of Nasir's close associates
in the revolution of 1952, and was named as
Vice President in late 1969.
B. Since there was no obvious successor to Nasir,
those in his inner cricie who
of the power in Egypt avoided
by choosing a familiar face.
C. Unlike Nasir, whose ?authority
now hold much
controversy
was virtually
complete, Sadat must share his power with
those around him, including Minister of the
Interior Sharawi Jumah, Minister of State
.Sami Sharaf, Minister of War Muhammad Fawzi,
and others of lesser ilk.
D. Sadat may have been a compromise candidate,
chosen for his weakness, and it is not yet
clear how long he will fill the post of
presidency.
1. Nasir's death was a thorough shock to
Egypt and it will be some time before
a system of leadership to replace his
style of one-man rule evolves in final
form.
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2. This process will see further changes in
the upper ranks of Egypt's leaders, and
there is also the possibility of a grab
for power by some disgruntled military
groups.
III. The instability of the successorship will probably
make Egypt's foreign policy even less flexible
now than it was under Nasir.
A. Nasir's strength and popularity allowed
him to make possibly unpopular decisions;
his more cautious heirs must take more pains
to ensure public support.
1. We already have some evidence of this
from the discussions in Cairo between
Egypt's new leaders and the U.S. delega-
tion to Nasir's funeral.
2. All of the Egyptians were adamant against
the unilateral removal of any missiles
from the standstill zone along the Suez
Canal, and one candidly admitted that
such a move would "provOke dangerous
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reactions within the country" which could
endanger the new leadership--an obvious
reference to the military.
3. On the other hand, they also indicated
their desire to see peace efforts con-
tinue. Sadat told Secretary Richardson
that Egyptian policy would continue to
be based on Nasir's acceptance of the U.S.
peace initiative, and that Cairo hoped
the talks under UN special representa-
tive Gunnar Jarring would be resumed
soon.
4. On October 6, Foreign Minister Riad ikc tc
ilari,lalEgypt was ready to extend the
cease-fire aox--another three month,
provided further peace efforts are
made under the UN Security Council
resolution of 1967 from which Jarring
derives his charter.
B. This decision provides some time for the
new leadership to settle down before facing
the hard decision on whether or not to pur-
sue the war of attrition against Israel.
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1. Many Egyptians are reluctant to resume
active hostilities, but if no political
settlement is forthcoming, pressures
will eventually mount for a try at re-
taking the Sinai Peninsula--particularly
in view of the improved defensive system
installed in Egypt by the Soviets.
C. Meanwhile, Cairo will probably continue to
coordinate peace efforts with Jordan, but
the Egyptians now have even less influence
with the Syrians than Nasir did. They may
have to decide--as Nasir came close to doing
at times--that when it comes to coordinating
peace negotiations, Damascus is a hopeless
case which might as well be ignored.
1. In dealings with other Arab states, Egypt
may still enjoy some momentum for a while
from Nasir's forceful bid for leadership,
but without him Cairo's voice in inter-
Arab affairs is bound to be weakened, and
may continue to diminish.
2. The new leadership, furthermore, will
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need some time to set its own house in
order, and in the interim its prospects
for pan-Arab leadership will be neglected.
D. What this all means is that the already un-
stable Middle East is in for further frag-
mentation and polarization without Nasir's
moderating influence.
IV. The death of Nasir has not changed the nature of
King Husayn's problems in Jordan, but he is now
thrown back on his own resources in dealing with
the Palestinian commandos and with other Arab
leaders--particularly in coping with his radical
neighbors, Syria and Iraq.
A. In the past, he could look to Nasir to
mollify or even to threaten Arab and Pales-
tinian leaders who objected to Jordan's
westward-leaning policies.
B. Husayn feels he must crack down on the feda-
yeen to retain the loyalty of his army and
the Jordanian East Bank population, and he IS
-*AL eihi:adab.,144.11
d hard-nosed opponent of the
Palestinians, Wasfi Tal, as prime minister.
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he
also feels that his principal external
threat now comes not from Israel but
from his so-called Arab "brothers" to
the north and east, Syria and Iraq.
2. Accordingly he plans to ask the Iraqis
00-t,
to remove their -man expedition-
ary force from Jordan, and he is going
to reposition the bulk of his military
forces to cover the northern border with
Syria and the western desert facing Iraq.
3. He will have to move very cautiously
with respect to the fedayeen. He by no
means won a complete victory in the re-
cent fighting, and he could be in deep
trouble if either Syria or Iraq gives
substantial help to the Palestinian com-
mandos in a renewed showdown.
4. The fact of the matter is that King Husayn
is a convenient and tempting target for
the Palestinians, the Syrians, and the
Iraqis to work off their frustrations,
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because none of them seriously intends
to take on Israel. Nevertheless, the
Syrians have now been burned once, the
Iraqis are no more likely to get em-
broiled in Jordanian fighting in the
future than they were in September, and
the fedayeen will, at the very least,
need some time to recover from the last
round. If they operate without outside
allies, Husayn can probably handle them.
C. For the fedayeen, the next few months will
be a time of regrouping, reorganizing and
perhaps redirecting their movement.
1. They will have to sort out their new
situation in Jordan and their relation-
ship with the government, which ulti-
mately may not be very different from
what it was before.
2. Some fedayeen leaders recognize that
they do not pose a real military threat
to Israel. They also recognize their
dependence on the Jordanian people and
government for at least a way station
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toward their eventual goal of a separate
and independent Palestine.
3. This should lead some of them to work
out a new living arrangement with the
King.
4. The more radical types, however, are
likely to remain hostile to Husayn and
the other Arab leaders who, they be-
lieve, have abandoned the Palestinian
cause. The extremists remain deter-
mined to radicalize the entire Arab
world against Israel.
5. Terrorist incidents, aircraft hijack-
ings and bombings, kidnapings and at-
tacks on property are thus likely to
continue, but now conservative Arab
interests may be among the targets.
V. As for the Israelis, their leaders continue to
believe that things can only be better in the
Middle East with Nasir gone.
A. At a recent Jewish New Year celebration in
Jerusalem attended by numerous high Israeli
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officials, an observer who polled the gathering
said that "to a man" the Israelis considered
that the devil they didn't know would be bet-
ter than the devil they did.
1. Mrs. Meir said that Nasir had not used
his strength "for good," and indicated
he would not be missed by Israel. When
asked how Israel could hope to do better
with a weaker man, Mrs. Meir countered
with a strong "Why not?--Why shouldn't
things get better sometimes?"
B. This Israeli View derives from three basic
factors:
1. Firstly, they looked on Nasir as their
Number One Enemy; he had been able--to
Tel Aviv's frustration--to stay in power
after two massive defeats at their hands.
They didn't trust him; they held him as
dedicated to the eventual extermination
of Israel. He was thus--as they saw
things--unwilling to make a peaceful
settlement; or, if he did, they didn't
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believe he would keep it. They expect
the new regime in Cairo--even if it be-
comes more radical--to be so preoccupied
with political infighting and maintain-
ing power that its diplomatic and mili-
tary punch will be much weaker. An added
advantage would be that a radical Egyptian
regime would further weaken Cairo's stand-
ing with the United States.
2. Second, the Israelis believe that Nasir's
death will set back Arab nationalism ten
years. Nasir provided what mortar there
was in Arab unity and cooperation. With
him gone, they expect more inter-Arab
fighting and greater independence of ac-
tion, or inaction. They think that more
and more, Cairo's sway over the Middle
East will be sharply reduced and the Arab
states will quit "checking it out with
Cairo." The Israelis clearly expect that
a leaderless, more divided Middle East can
be to their profit, if only for its in-
effectiveness.
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3. Third, another advantage Israel sees in
Nasir's death is that it probably pushes
pressure for peace negotiations further
into the future. The Israelis were dragged
into the peace talks; they didn't really
want to negotiate, primarily because they
don't believe they can get a settlement
now acceptable to them.
4. Their territorial requirements are at
such odds with positions of the Arabs,
the Soviets, and the United States that
a settlement on Israeli terms is impos-
sible. Israel was particularly fearful
that the territorial issue, if pressed,
would result in a break with the U.S.
5. Now, they reason, if a settlement is
postponed, so much the better. Israeli
officials figure that the Arabs will
come around "sometime," and until they
do it on Israeli terms, it's good to
have the defensive advantages involved
in retaining the occupied Arab territories.
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C. We can therefore expect that Tel Aviv 25X6
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will hold to its posi-
tion of "no talks without a rectification
of the Egyptian-Soviet missile deployment
along the Canal." Also, we may hear the
theme from Tel Aviv that with the moderate
Nasir gone, there is no Arab leader left
with enough authority to make dealing with
him worthwhile.
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