THE NEW INDONESIAN CABINET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000400020005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 30, 1966
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Relp,
NO FOREIGN 2000/08/29 :CIA-'~ygT6~827A0A~400020005-7
EIGN DISSEM
30 July 1966
No. 1685/66
Copy No. 106
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE NEW INDONESIAN CABINET
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
SE CRE T
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000400020005-7
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
 A
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000400020 05-7
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000400020005-7
 Approved For Rase
200010 GRJ&T008270400020005-7
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
30 July 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
The New Indonesian Cabinet
Summary
The new Indonesian cabinet installed on 23 July
is a further victory for army chief General Suharto
over President Sukarno. Though Sukarno had strongly
objected, Suharto heads the cabinet, and the other
two members of the triumvirate which directed the
previous government--Adam Malik'and the Sultan of
Jogjakarta--have also been retained. The cabinet
represents a compromise between the army and the po-
litical parties, and to some extent with,Sukarno,
It is perhaps weak in the economic sphere, but it is
nonetheless better than. any other Indonesian govern-
ment of the past several years.
The triumvirate presumably will continue to pur-
sue the policy objectives established by the preced-
ing cabinet. These include the suppression of Com-
munism, economic stabilization, and, through a "free
and active" foreign policy, the re-establishment of
friendly relations with the West and the,search for
economic assistance from both V.&estern and bloc
countries.
With the domestic political situation now
largely responsive to army control, non-Communist
civilian elements will expect the cabinet to take
*This memorandum has been prepared by the Office of
Current Intelligence and the Office of_Central Ref-
erence/Biographic Register, and has been coordinated
with the Office of National Estimates, the Office
of Research and Reports, and the Deputy Director
,of Plans.
Approved For Release 2000/02 ffiftD/ 27A000400020065-7
 Approved For RLease 2000/QS,~~ P19T00827 400020005-7
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
effective measures to reverse Indonesia's severe
economic deterioration.. Apparently this is equally
the hope of the government. Though economic con-
ditions seem likely to get worse before they can.
start to improve, the In.don.esian.s will probably be
able to scrape by for at least several months on,
their new limited foreign. credits and with some
in.tragovern.ment manipulation of funds. Their hope
is that creditor nations will agree to ease the
schedule of payments on Indonesia's large interna-
tional debt and that arrangements can soon. be made
for large-scale foreign. economic assistance.
Approved For Release 200008/;
 Approved For Release 2000/(S;i-. i 19T00827Ab10400020005-7
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
1. The 27-member Indonesian. cabinet which was
installed on. 28 July is, as had been anticipated, a
victory for army chief General Suharto in the pro-
longed effort to reduce President Sukarno's authority
and prestige. Not only does Suharto head the cabinet,
but the other two members of the triumvirate which
directed the preceding government--Adam Malik and
the Sultan of Jogjakarta--have also been. retained.
Though much opposed by Sukarno, this triumvirate is
a team that works well together and is a combination.
uniquely acceptable to the army and to much of the
nation..
Presidium
2. Suharto is both chairman and member of the
cabinet "presidium" of five "first ministers." Each
of the first ministers presides over a group of port-
folios. Suharto supervises the defense and security
sector of the cabinet, and, as army commander, holds
the army portfolio. Adam Malik, who aside from Su-
harto is probably the ablest man in the cabinet, pre-
sides over the political affairs sector and also
holds the post of foreign minister. The Sultan of
Jogjakarta holds no portfolio, but as first minister
for economics and finance he will supervise six min-
istries. The other two first ministers, neither of
whom holds a portfolio, are representatives of Indo-
n.esia's two largest parties--Chalid of the Nahdatul
Ulama (NU) and San.usi of the National Party (PNI).
Chalid has under him the ministries associated with
people's welfare. Sanusi will supervise the minis-
tries of industry and development.
Triumvirate
3. The triumvirate remains the core of the
cabinet. Suharto and the Sultan, both Javanese,
bring to the government the strength of the army
on the one hand and the prestige of an enlightened
aristocrat on the other. Both also contribute a
fine understanding of the complexities of Javanese
life. Adam Malik, a Sumatran., represents the outer
islands and brings to the cabinet a courageous and
clearsighted statesmanship.
Q& U
Approved For Release 2000/6V2
827A000400020005-7
 Approved For R se 2000/08E G J7TT00827A'e 400020005-7
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
4. Each triumvirate member has his roots in
the Indonesian struggle for independence. Malik,
who was politically active before World War II, has
the longest record of sustained effort. Suharto had
an excellent military record in the war against the
Dutch, and he participated in the suppression. of the
1948 Communist revolt at Madiun in East Java. The
Sultan strongly supported the independence revolution
and it was he who, as acting prime Minister in. 1949,
accepted the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch
in Djakarta.
5. Neither Suharto nor the Sultan has ever been
affiliated with a political party, but both lean to-
ward secular nationalism. Malik has almost no or-
ganized political following--a fact which endears
him to Suharto and at the same time relieves him of
the need to accommodate factions loyal to him. Malik
is strongly oriented toward pragmatic socialism and,
in his capacity as supervisor of political affairs,
is currently encouraging a movement called "Pantjasila
Socialism." The Moslem parties dislike Malik, fearing
that his presence in the cabinet presidium may pre- 25X6
judice their own political future. All of the tri-
Cabinet Composition
6. The composition of the cabinet is a com-
promise among the army, the political parties, and
Sukarno. The only major army accommodation Of SU-
karDO, however, is the inclusion. of Chalid,
The
cabinet is a disappointment to some Indonesians,
including Adam Malik, who had hoped for a govern-
ment of well-qualified technicians. These critics
complain. that the lack of expertise in certain cab-
inet posts is the result of concessions to Sukarno.
7. Political parties play a secondary role to
that of the army in the cabinet, but they still have
a stronger position. in the government than they have
had for several years. Five parties hold eight port-
folios. The NU, the PNI, and the small Catholic
Party have two each; the Christian (Protestant) Party
and the pro-Army Association of Supporters for Indo-
nesian Independence (IPKI) have one each.
Approved For Release 2000/ /2L"fr7A000400020005-7
 Approved For R * p s e 2000/0 G3I II 7.6T00827A1 400020005-7
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
8. Suharto claims that political participation
in the government is based on. the main. currents of
Indonesian. society. He has characterized these cur-
rents as con.sistin.g of nationalists, religious group-
ings, and "Pan.tjasila Socialists," thus preserving
the NASASOS variation of Sukarno's rallying cry
NASAKOM. (NASAKOM is an. acronym formed from the In.do-
nesian words for nationalism, religion, and Communism;
NASASOS is a similar acronym for which socialism is
substituted for Communism.)
9. Military officers--including representatives
of the army, the navy, the air force, and the police--
hold 12 portfolios. Six of these--army, veterans'
affairs, home affairs, trade, agriculture, and basic
and light industries--are held by army officers.
10. The economic and finance sector under the
Sultan of Jogjakarta appears to be the weakest area
of the cabinet and has been. the chief target of
Malik's complaints. Malik fears that the people
given. economic portfolios--some military officers
and some so-called technicians--are not equal to
their tasks. Other sources have questioned the tech-
the cabinet but no economic training. The possi-
bility remains, however, that trained economists
will fill high-ranking civil service positions im-
mediately below the ministerial level. Suharto is
reliably reported to have refused Sukarno's demand
for a role in the selection of those who will fill
these civil service posts.
11. In.don.esia's economy inevitably will become
a political problem, since the pace of economic re-
covery is bound to be slow and will be regarded as
unsatisfactory by many Indonesian elements. The
Sultan's prestige may prove of considerable political
value as economic difficulties continue. Although
the inclusion of economic ministers who lack the
normal requirements for such posts may be in. part
the result of concessions to Sukarno, the appoint-
ments may also indicate a decision. by Suharto to
seek unorthodox means to continue the government's
hand-to-mouth existence. Several of the ministers
are reported to have proved themselves adept at
The Sultan himself brings integrity and prestige
nical competence of several of these ministers
Approved For Release 2000/I%$027A000400020005-7
 Approved For Release 2000/ G" T00827Aet400020005-7
l NO FOREIGN DISSEM
coming up with operating funds for the government
in. the period of near chaos following the oupeatcan.
tempt of last October, and Suharto may hope
repeat this performance in the immediate future.
Cabinet Policy
12. The nation.'s highest policy-making body,
the Provisional Consultative People's Assembly (MPRS),
in June laid down a broad four-point program for the
next government. This program, which followed
adipolicy
lines already established by the preceding cabinet,
called for solving the economic situation., for fol-
lowing an. independent and active foreign policy,
for holding general elections. It also gave lip
service to the continued struggle against "colonialism,
imperialism, and neocolonialism."
13. The triumvirate presumably will continuehas
its established policies. Domestically,
worked for a partial return to con.stitutiona,l govern-
ment, the maintenance of some restrictive political
controls, an. accommodation--within the framework of
army policies--of the wishes of the various non-
Communist groups, the gradual reduction, of Sukarno's
power and prestige, and the continued suppression of
the Communists. Elections are to be held sometime
before July 1968; indications are that the earliest
possible date is late 1967.
14. In foreign policy, Indonesia is resuming
friendly relations with the West and has sharpFyr-
disengaged from Sukarno's pro-Peking policy.
eign. Minister Malik hopes Indonesia can. resume ac-
tive membership in the United Nations this September.
Indonesia is reducing its diplomatic presence in
Africa, and for the present at least shows little
interest in. maintaining Sukarn.o's ambition for
leadership in. the Afro-Asian world.
15. The cabinet will probably continue its
moves toward ending the three-year confrontation.
with Malaysia and Singapore. Talks with Malaysia
in late May produced an agreement to end hostili-
ties, though Djakarta has so far failed to sign the
agreement, claiming that the Indonesian. domestic po-
litical situation does n.ot permit this. Djakarta
Approved For Release 2000/029
 Approved For Rq sse 20001
GfiB a9T00827A 400020005-7
0VAYi
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
recognized the government of Singapore in early June
and has sent a mission there to discuss the resump-'
tion. of trade. Indications are that Indonesia de-
sires the economic and diplomatic benefits that would
come from an. en.d of confrontation., but that it will
continue to support internal subversion in the Borneo
territories of Sabah and Sarawak with the expectation
of eventually separating them from Malaysia.
16. In the economic realm, Suharto and his col-
leagues have curtailed injudicious domestic spending
and have negotiated limited credits from several
Western nations. Indonesia has applied for readmis-
sion to the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank. It has agreed to the demand of Western creditor
nations that any rescheduling of Indonesia's interna-
tional debt payments be decided on a multilateral
basis. A meeting to discuss this debt problem is
scheduled for mid-September in Tokyo, and nine or
more nations probably will participate--the United
States, Japan, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Germany, Italy, France, Australia, and New Zealand,
and perhaps Canada and Pakistan.
17. Suharto and those around him, both military
and civilian, base their hopes for economic progress
largely on an infusion. of foreign. aid as a boost to-
ward long-range stabilization and impi'ovemen.t of the
country's economic base. The Sultan of Jogjakarta
plans to visit several Western. European countries in
late August to discuss aid prospects and in mid-
September he may attend the Tokyo meeting of In.do-
n.esia's creditors. Later in September he expects to
visit the United States. Foreign. Minister Malik has
for some time been, plann.in.g a trip to the Soviet
Union to discuss the rescheduling of debt payments
(the USSR is Indonesia's largest single creditor)
and to explore the possibility of further Soviet
economic assistance. No definite date has yet been.
set.
Approved For Release 200fl/ W
 Approved For Rel$e 2000/0 G4tF f00827A0& 00020005-7
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
INDONESIAN CABINET
SUHARTO, General
Suharto, General
Muljadi, Admiral
Rusmin Nurjadin, Air
Marshal
Sutj ipto Judo6ihardjo,
Commissioner General
Sarbini, Major General
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM
FIRST MINISTER FOR DEFENSE
AND SECURITY
Minister for the Army/
Commander of the Army
Minister for the Navy/
Commander of the Navy
Minister for the Air Force/
Commander of the Air Force
Minister for Police/Chief
of Police
Minister for Demobilization
and Veterans Affairs
MALIK, ADAM FIRST MINISTER FOR POLITICAL
AFFAIRS
Malik, Adam Minister for Foreign Affairs
Basuki Rachmat, Minister for Home Affairs
Major General
Senoadji, Umar Minister for Justice
Diah, Burhanuddin Mohammed Minister for Information
SULTAN OF JOGJAKARTA, FIRST MINISTER FOR ECONOMICS
BUWONO IX AND FINANCE
Ashari Danudirdjo,
Major General
Minister for Trade
Seda, Frans
Minister
for
Finance
Sutopo, Air Commodore
Minister
for
Communications
Jatidjan., Rear Admiral
Minister
for
Maritime Affairs
Sutjipto, Brigadier General
Minister
for
Agriculture
Harjosudirjo
Minister
for
Estates
CHALID, IDHAM
Sarin.o Man.gunpranoto
Saifuddin. Zuhri
Tambunan
Siwabessy, Gerrit
Augustinus
Awaluddin Djamin.,
Brigadier General
FIRST MINISTER FOR PEOPLE'S
WELFARE
Minister for Education,
and Culture
Minister for Religion
Minister for Social Affairs
Minister for Public Health
Minister for Manpower
Mobilization
Approved For Release 2690/gI ~- 00827A000400020005-7
 Approved For Release 2000EC. *BT9T00827Q@60400020005-7
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SANUSI HARDJADINATA FIRST MINISTEREFOR INDUSTRY
Jusuf, Mohammad Minister for Basic and
Major General Light Industries and Energy
San.usi, Mohammad Minister for Textiles and
Handicraft Industries
Bratanata Minister for Oil and Mining
Sutami Minister for Public Works
Approved For Release 2000Y'08g~"gyp
627A000400020005-7
 25X1 B
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000400020005-7
Next 12 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000400020005-7
 Approved For ReleaGW 2000/08V9w. AMPT9T00827A000 020005-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000400020005-7
SECRET