(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000400020002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 2, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79T09627A000400020002-0
NAW
.auo _ oa3x
oaax(
NATIONAL sr-CURITY COUNCIL
V SHiN3TON, D.C. 2O G3
5 CR ~T
August 2, 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
The enclosed State Department paper on Indonesia will. be
considered by the National Security Council on Thursday,
August 4, 1966.
Bromley Smith
Executive Secretary
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000400020002-0
 Approved ii6r Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79T0iE7A000400020002-0
Od X
SECRET
:'; 4; Faro+.md
1. On October 1, 1965, the Indo;.colon Communist Party joined with
elements of the armed forces Ui an ooffoul: to stage a coup by assassi--
nation. Six of Indonesia's ;:ao;;t prominent generals were killed. Loyal
Army elements under General Suh.crto rallied and crushed the coup attempt
within 48 hours. This was the beginning of one of the most dramatic
political reversals in recent history. A major nation, which was moving
rapidly toward a domestic Communist takeover and was intimately associated
with Communist China, within three months destroyed the Communist threat
and altered significantly its domestic and foreign orientation.
2. The first element in this political. change was the destruction of
the Indonesian Communist Party, the fourth largest in the world. The
Army hunted down and executed the principal Communist leaders. In the
small cities, towns and villages groups of youths, encour e.d by the
Army and motivated by religion, historic local grievances, and fear of
their own fate had the Communists taken power, embarked on a systematic
campaign of extermination of Communist Party cadres. While the exact
figure will never be kno~?m, an estimated 300,000 were killed.
3. The second aspect of this political revolution was a systematic re-
duction of the powers of President Sukarno with the object of retaining
Sukarno as the historic revolutionary figure and symbol of Indonesian
unity, but depriving him of the power to govern. This process proceeded
in stages. In March, Sukarno was forced to delegate extraordinary powers
to Suharto, and Subandrio, Saleh, and others of the coterie of Palace
followers who in the past have done Sukarno's bidding were removed from
pow.,,er and imprisoned. This was followed in July by a meeting of the
Peoples Consultative Council in which General Suharto's mandate was
confirmed and Sukarno was stripped of his position as lifetime President.
On July 25 a new cabinet, led by General Suharto and purged of remaining
pro-Sukarno figures, was formed. Sukarno remains on the scene, has a
capability to obstruct and delay, but has lost the power to initiate or
act.
4. Working with General Suharto and the Army were two key leaders: Adam
Malik, a former newspaper man whose service as Ambassador to Moscow has
modified and rationalized his Marxist orientation; and the Sultan of
Djogjakarta - the only public figure with a charismatic appeal to the
people of Java comparable to Sukarno's own. In addition, a new and
powerful force has emerged on the Indonesian political scene associated
with the Army, but apart from it. It is composed of students who have
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000400020002-0
 Approved fiat Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79T07A000400020002-0
odJx a:ax
STC:1ZIaT
Came of age in the post-revo1uta..onar.y p(-ri.od and are fed up with Sukarno,
his empty slogans, and the economic chaos enc. bankruptcy which he has
brought on the nation, These students, moving in huge public demonstrations,
haave been the cutting edge of political. c.l~art