AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002400430001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 18, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved lease 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP79T04602400430001-2
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
AN APPRAISAL
OF THE
BOMBING
OF
NORTH VIETNAMu)
(THROUGH 18 JULY 1961)
JULY 1967
S?2408/AP4A
Prepared Jointly by
The Central Intelligence Agency
and
The Defense Intelligence Agency
DIA?
CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING, DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02400430001-2
 Approved Fore 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP79T008200430001-2
This document contains information affeettng the national
defense of the United States within the meaning of the
Espionage Laws, Title 18, S C, Sections 793 and 794.
The transmission or revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02400430001-2
 Approves Tsp-*pog7$Qo(RSPCWNTq"m4"0430001-2
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THROUGH 18 JULY 1967)
FOREWORD
This report is prepared on a monthly
basis at the request of the Secretary of
Defense for an evaluation of certain
effects of the ROLLING THUNDER program.
The report covers three general areas of
concern: .Effects on Military Targets;
Leadership and Public Reactions; and
Effects on the NVN Economy. The dis-
cussion of political effects is limited
to those developments within North Vietnam
which relate to Hanoi's attitude toward
continuing the war and the effects the
ROLLING THUNDER attack has on civilian
morale in North Vietnam.
Approve EcC &klsr2bO.7/F(O k&NTODI SifiE2M0430001-2
 Approved For to 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP79T008200430001-2
THAILAND
SECRET
NORTH VIETNAM
BOMBING APPRAISAL OF
NORTH VIETNAM
18 JULY 1961
DUAL GAGE
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02400430001-2
 Approve% {~~S_24j571o C fflgW0 p, M430001-2
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THROUGH 18 JULY 19 7
SUMMARY
1. (S/NFD) The sustained high intensity of air strikes that
began in April. continued through June and the first half of July.
The preponderance of strikes were against the transportation
system with emphasis on the key lines of communication (LOC's) in
the northeast. Damage inflicted on vehicles and railroad rolling
stock increased to one of the highest monthly totals since the
beginning of the ROLLING THUNDER program. Recent analysis of compre-
hensive photo coverage, however, indicates that the inventory of
operational rolling stock is still adequate.
2. (S/NFD) Air attacks were conducted against numerous targets
on all of the northern railroad lines. Extensive interdictions along
the Hanoi-Dong Dang line delayed rail movement temporarily and may
have caused the North Vietnamese to shift some cargoes to the less
efficient highway system. Attacks against the road system increased,
with the bulk of the effort concentrated south of the 20th parallel.
Widespread attacks were also conducted along several important
routes to the northwest. Strikes and damage inflicted against the
waterborne transportation system declined from the previous period.
3. (S/NFD) North Vietnamese Air Force reactions diminished
and air engagements decreased as a result of heavy aircraft losses
and damage to airfields. Firing of surface-to-air missiles (SAM'S)
ApproveEce%Eetse.2 ID7/ i iGNTODf"f2fW430001-2
 Approv3?I4tase~D~2/0f?p9TDG' NM00430001-2
declined from the high level of recent months. However, SAM coverage
has been expanded westward from the Hanoi area and another attempt was
made to establish a SAM defense in the DMZ.
4+. (S/NFD) With the exception of restrikes on the Thai Nguyen
Iron and Steel Combine, electric power plants were the only signifi-
cant targets struck within North Vietnam's modern industrial sector
during the reporting period. Restrikes on seven power plants
effectively negated extensive reconstruction efforts that had been
under way for the past several months.
5. (S/NFD) Since April, there has been a major increase in the
level of damage inflicted by air strikes. The stepped-up air campaign
has caused major changes in the air defense system and widespread
disruption of economic activities in North Vietnam. However, the
North Vietnamese still retain the capability to support activities
in South Vietnam and Laos at present or increased combat levels and
force structures.
Appro$ ORSTEaceNO/0F/O -Gf 9Ot f M00430001-2
 Approuad easy 2Q,Q2/47/~ORCJ~IJ~QP.79~O Q02400430001 -2
Effects on Military Targets
1. (S/NFD) The sustained high intensity of air strikes that
began in April continued through June and the first half of July.
Nearly 11,000 attack sorties were flown in June, and the same high
rate has been maintained in July. The preponderance of strikes con-
tinued to be against the transportation system with emphasis on the
key lines of communication (LOC's) in the northeast. Damage inflicted
on vehicles and railroad rolling stock increased to one of the highest
monthly totals since the beginning of the ROLLING THUNDER program.
Jet-supporting airfields, military barracks, electric power facilities,
the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine, storage sites, and ammunition
depots were also hit.
2. (S/NFD) Air attacks were conducted against numerous targets
on all of the northern railroad lines. These attacks, conducted
against multiple targets on each line, probably disrupted operations,
undoubtedly created formidable repair problems and required a sub-
stantial increase in the expenditure of labor and materials.
3. (S/NFD) The most important rail targets struck were along the
Hanoi-Dong Dang line, North Vietnam's princip,d_1 rail connection with
Communist China. Intensified attacks against yards, sidings, and
bridges resulted in extensive interdictions that delayed rail movement.
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 Approve yase_ZO/O~J
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Traffic was limited to shuttling for about 10 days during the
reporting period. This may have caused the North Vietnamese to
shift some cargoes to the less efficient highway system.
Li. (S/NFD) The Hanoi-Lao Cai line, also subjected to concentrated
attacks, was operational for most of the period except for shuttling
at the destroyed Viet Tri Rail and Highway Bridge. This line, which
runs northwest to Yunnan Province in Southwest China, has been little
used since 1965. The discovery of six new. bypass bridges at vulnerable
points may, however, portend a more important role for this link.
There are now 10 bypass bridges on this line.
5. (S/NFD) The Hanoi-Haiphong line was struck repeatedly, and
shuttling operations have been required since 20 June to bypass the
two interdicted railroad-highway bridges at Hai Duong. This compli-
cates the movement of supplies from Haiphong to the Hanoi area.
However, adequate vehicle and water transport is available to maintain
movement of supplies out of Haiphong.
6. (S/NFD) In addition to the intensive attacks against the
rail system in Northern Vietnam, a high level of strikes was maintained
against the Hanoi-Vinh line. This line was closed to through traffic
during the entire period, but shuttling, utilizing the adjacent high-
way, permitted rail operations to continue, although at a reduced
rate. The tramway south of Duc Tho was closed to traffic except for
4
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 Approv? M,f a ig6oZ 36. k V PN9TV r t M00430001-2
light shuttling operations on the )+5-mile section south of Xom Hoai
which was extended two miles during this period.
7. (S/NFD) The high level of strikes against the rail system
resulted in extensive damage to railroad rolling stock that was
higher than for any reporting period during 1967 and only slightly
lower than the record total achieved during late summer, 1966. Recent
analysis of comprehensive photo coverage, however, indicates that the
inventory of operational rolling stock is still adequate.
8. (S/NFD) New construction intended to improve the capability
of the rail system continues. Conversion of the Hanoi-Thai Nguyen
line to dual-gauge may be completed and two new seven-track yards
have been built north of Hanoi. The Hanoi-Haiphong line is possibly
being converted to dual-gauge, completion of which will significantly
increase North Vietnam's capability to move supplies from the port
of Haiphong. Construction continues on the railroad bypass and
ferry crossings which will connect the Hanoi-Haiphong and Hanoi-Vinh
lines and provide an alternate to North Vietnam's longest bridge --
the Hanoi Railroad and Highway Bridge over the Red River.
9. (S/NFD) Attacks against the road system increased, with the
bulk of the effort concentrated south of the 20th parallel --
primarily against Routes IA, 15, 101, and 7. Widespread attacks
were conducted along several important routes in the northwest.
Monthly vehicle losses have increased steadily since December 1966,
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 Appro91deas@ .b2/?7&R iIQFj7QTq~q~M400430001-2
.9p-
and the number reported destroyed and damaged in June was one of the
highest monthly totals since the beginning of the ROLLING THUNDER
program.
10. (S/NFD) Vehicle traffic continued at a high rate,?with the
majority of trucks detected at night. Large convoys in the northeast
were seen moving south toward Hanoi, possibly representing the delivery of
new trucks from China to North Vietnam. These trucks may have been used
also to deliver some freight from Ping Hsiang, China, possibly to over-
come delays imposed by interdictions on the key Hanoi-Dong Dang rail
line. Traffic in the Mu Gia Pass area was not significantly affected
by air operations during the month and construction and repair con-
tinued during most of the period. The principal alternate crossing
into Laos, Route 137, was observed to be in relatively fair condition
but only lightly used
11. (S/NFD) The over-all condition of the road network continues
to be adequate to meet essential transportation requirements. Repeated
interdictions, increased traffic, and heavy rains require more
maintenance to keep the roads in serviceable condition. Sections of
key roads in the Panhandle were closed for short periods.
12. (S/NFD) Strikes and damage inflicted against the waterborne
transportation system declined from the previous period. Attacks
were concentrated on the intracoastal'and inland waterways in the
southern portion of the Panhandle. Photographs during June showed
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 Appro j2asNO2/0F/O ,-9-DOW100430001-2
heavy concentrations of craft on the inland routes in this region.
Small craft are still being sighted near mined areas, but no large,
self-propelled, metal-hulled craft have been observed in waterways
to which access is only possible through mined areas. The importance
of waterways to the North Vietnamese is documented by reports of
compulsory labor details performing dredging and maintenance opera-
tions on the intracoastal route and the hasty work noted on previously
unnavigable segments.
13. (S/NFD) Attacks against watercraft have probably reduced
North Vietnam's inventory, although the actual cargo-carrying capacity
may have increased. Watercraft that have been destroyed were mainly
small wooden types used in the southern provinces. Replacement
vessels being built domestically and imported, although fewer in
number, are larger and have many times the lift capability of those
destroyed.
14. (S/NFD) Strikes against coastal transshipment points and
naval bases decreased from the previous period. Damage was inflicted
on piers, warehouse areas, cargo-handling facilities, and storage
sites, and many fires were reported. No strikes were conducted against
maritime port facilities during June. However, a strike on the Hon
Gai rail yard may hamper port operations and further retard North
Vietnam's already sagging coal exports.
15. (S/NFD) Pilots have reported a marked increase in the number
Appro& ?dR EeTeas14?2/d7G R EA 7901&STD6*00430001-2
 Appro ! e*W!s &/y,6 RCA 5IWq- ?y4*W00430001-2
of secondary explosions during air strikes over North Vietnam during
May and June, particularly in the Panhandle area. These explosions
represent substantial losses of ammunition and material and probably
indicate the more widespread use of small dispersed supply points.
16. (S/NFD) The intensified attacks in the northeast have caused
some deterioration of the air defense system. North Vietnamese Air
Force reactions have diminished and air engagements decreased as a
result of heavy aircraft losses and damage to airfields. The North
Vietnamese fighter force lost almost 50 per cent of its in-country
MIG-17's during the April-June period and in the past month 4ad-seemingly
all but retired-from the scene of combat. While no long-term abatement
of SAM firings has been discerned, there are increasing reports of
the effectiveness of CBU munitions in silencing antiaircraft batteries.
17. (S/NFD) Firing of surface-to-air missiles (SAM's) declined
from the high level of recent months -- 178 were fired from 20 June
to 12 July. There were 11 SAM's fired in the eastern area of the
DMZ on 6 July, the first noted since 13 May. The three attempts to
establish a SAM defense system in the DMZ area since September 1966
demonstrate Hanoi's continuing concern with defending its military
assets in the southern Panhandle and its desire to preclude un-
restricted B-52 operations over the area. SAM coverage has also
been expanded westward from the Hanoi area. Photographs of 18 June
revealed an occupied SAM site 65 miles west of Hanoi. The site was
Appr(&ERE:l"02/F7 E N7 :VE 400430001-2
 Approv F l1ase iqd07 ktffi WTpQfJJJ0W0430001-2
heavily camouflaged and located in a barracks area which had been
previously bombed. Occupancy of this site extends the SAM envelope
32 miles to the northwest, which includes a portion of Laos. An un-
occupied site was later discovered five miles west of the one
mentioned above.
18. (S/NFD) The sustained high intensity of air strikes against
significant North Vietnamese military and economic targets since
April, together with increased emphasis on attacking key LOC's and
transportation facilities in the northeast, has resulted in a
major increase in the level of damage inflicted. The intensity
of the air campaign has caused major changes in the air defense
system and widespread disruption of economic activities in
North Vietnam. In addition, the Communist countries are being forced
to assume an increased burden of providing military and economic aid..
The cumulative effects of the air strikes have degraded North Vietnam's
capability for sustained large scale conventional military operations
against South Vietnam. However, the North Vietnamese still retain
the capability to support activities in South Vietnam and Laos at
present or increased combat levels and force structures.
Leadership and Public Reactions
19. (S/NFD) In the past several weeks, the North Vietnamese
leadership in a series of authoritative statements has underscored
its determination to continue the war until a settlement on its terms
Approv??FCorll#a.Se pf?/0'f3o: ItLkIFGFN9TDFI,EUM00430001-2
 Approv se 0 /O7 3 I -R P79TO08OA002400430001-2
la QN DISSEM
can be achieved. In two separate interviews, Foreign Minister Nguyen
Duy Trinh restated Hanoi's demand that the bombing of the North be
stopped unconditionally before there can be any talk with the US
regarding the settlement of the war. Other North Vietnamese spokes-
men in recent public and private statements have adopted an equally
unyielding tone. There have been some reports, however, indicating
that the ability of the US to escalate the air offensive -- including
the ability to counter increased aid shipments -- has convinced some
Soviet and Eastern European representatives in Hanoi that the North
Vietnamese cannot win. Presumably this attitude applies to both the
air offensive in North Vietnam and the ground war in South Vietnam.
20. (S/NFD) Despite the difficulties incurred by the population
in both Hanoi and the countryside, there continue to be no signs of
open disaffection with the regime, nor has there been any indication
that the regime is modifying its policies in response to any popular
unrest. The little hostility and anger that has been observed in the
population is chiefly directed against the US.
Effects on the Economy
21. (S/NFD) With the exception of restrikes on the Thai Nguyen
Iron and Steel Combine, electric power plants were the only significant
targets struck within North Vietnam's modern industrial sector during
the reporting period. Approximately 80 per cent -- about 150,000 kw --
of the national capacity currently is out of service. Except for the
Hanoi power plant, which is believed to be operating at about one-
half of its installed capacity of 32,500 kw, all of the central
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 ApproletF ase Q 2/0 /V q- T9_Q1&M00430001-2
generating plants in the main Hanoi-Haiphong power network are out
of service.
22. (S/NFD) Activity during the period consisted of restrikes
on seven power plants which effectively negated extensive reconstruction
efforts that had been under way for the past several months. The
most significant strikes were against the Uong Bi Plant which, having
been restored to operating conditions, sustained heavy damage. The
Thai Nguyen and Thanh Hoa plants, also under repair, received
additional damage. At Nam Dinh the severity of damage was particularly
extensive. Each of the other plants will require a minimum of three
months to be restored to partial operation. Damage from attacks on
the Hanoi and Bac Giang plants was negligible. Aerial photography
of a restrike on the Ben Thuy plant is not yet available. Although
the plant was being repaired, it was not in operation at the time
of the strike. Much of modern industry continues to be seriously
hampered. by the power shortage. Both the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel
Combine and the Haiphong Cement Plant are inoperable as a result of
bomb damage and loss of power.
23. (S/NFD) Additional reports on evacuation from Hanoi indicate
that the program, which the regime has been promoting for well over
a year, has been more rigidly enforced lately. A report in mid-
June stated that about one-half of Hanoi's population, mostly
children and old people, has been evacuated to areas between 10
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 Approv JTse 49807t3b RIg T1q j%(r j*0430001-2
and 60 kilometers from the city. Only able-bodied people between
the ages of 20 and 40 are said to remain in the city, presumably to
carry on essential economic activities. The evacuation program,
however, does not appear to be operating any more smoothly now
25X1 C than a year ago.
25X1 C
25X1 C
25X1 C
and have not been assisted in any great measure by the regime.
with the responsibility of supplying and visiting their families in
the countryside. Evacuees have, for the most part, found it difficult
to obtain proper food, employment, shelter, and other necessities
the people remaining in the city are burdened
Haiphong, the evacuation program is believed to be creating similar
problems and dislocation of the population as is being experienced
in Hanoi. Haiphong is reported to be 75 per cent evacuated.
2!+.. (S/NFD) All of the North Vietnamese government ministries
except Foreign Affairs and National Defense have evacuated the city,
leaving only skeleton staffs in the city proper. Foreign embassies
and legations have been told they are welcome to evacuate to an
area about 60 kilometers northwest of Hanoi, though none have
accepted the invitation.
25. (S/NFD) Preliminary analysis of information on the spring
25X1 C
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 400430001-2
Appro#V C ~V7`~ asq~Q2/ kW fjRqQ79 V ' AM
crop indicates that the harvest -- normally about one-third of, the
annual harvest -- was mediocre to poor. Although the recently.
harvested crop will undoubtedly give some temporary respite.to the
tight food situation, the long-run outlook for any substantial
improvement in the domestic food supply remains bleak. The emphasis
of the North Vietnamese on planting subsidiary crops, particularly
sweet potatoes, at the expense of the spring rice crop does not
appear to have been particularly successful. Increased imports of
bulk foods in the first half of 1967 (about 238,000 metric tons or
about three times the amount imported in all of 1966) testify to
short-falls in domestic food production. Relatively large imports
of foodstuffs will continue to be needed to prevent serious food
shortages from developing. Recent information suggests that the
rice ration was being met with 60 per cent rice and 40 per cent
substitutes such as wheat.
26. (S/NFD) Identified seaborne imports amounted to 140,500
metric tons in June, only slightly less than the record volumes of
April and May. Imports of foodstuffs and miscellaneous and general
cargoes, 59,900 metric tons and 63,600 metric tons respectively,
were second only to the record volumes established during May.
Although the closure of the Suez Canal has increased transit time
from Black Sea ports to North Vietnam from an average of 21 to 36
days, the shipments during June were not affected. The continuing
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 Approveg &f-$i as 0
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high level of seaborne imports has substantially increased off-
loading problems in Haiphong. Dry cargo ships calling at Haiphong
were in port an average of 22 days during June, compared with 17
days in May. For larger dry cargo ships (over 7,000 metric tons),
the average time in port was 43 days.
27. (S/NFD) The estimated petroleum imports for June were only
11,000 metric tons but an additional 11,000 metric tons arrived in
Haiphong on 1 July. Although import levels have fluctuated greatly
in recent months, the average monthly volume of nearly 24,000 metric
tons, recorded during the first six months of 1967, exceeds estimated
current consumption levels. Increased transport activity and the
greater use of diesel driven generators have raised the rate of
consumption of petroleum to an estimated 18,000 to 20,000 metric
tons a month. Stocks of petroleum on hand as of 30 June are
estimated to have been equivalent to about 100 days of supply at
current rates of consumption.
28. (S/NFD) Seaborne exports from North Vietnam continued at
greatly reduced levels during June. Coal shipments from Cam Pha and
Hon Gai totaled 30,300 metric tons. In 1965, monthly shipments
averaged 95,800 metric tons and in 1966, 78,200 tons. There were
no seaborne exports of apatite or pig iron noted during June. There
were no exports of cement and imports were reported for the first
time arriving aboard a freighter from China on 18 July.
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 Appro
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29. (S/NFD) A re-evaluation of North Vietnam's unfulfilled 1965.
and 1966 export commitments to the other Communist countries has
been taking place since the beginning of 1967 The latest report --
negotiations with the USSR to stop shipment of veneer, plywood, and
bamboo -- is a further indication of how the North Vietnamese export
program has been reduced. In addition, North Vietnam is beginning
to plan for its 1968 import needs. Reports of several contracts for
vehicle spare parts valued at about $11 million have been received
during the current reporting period.
30. (S/NFD) Cumulative measurable damage attributable to the
ROLLING THUNDER program through June is estimated to be $291 million.
(See Tab B.) Of this total, $21l million resulted from air strikes
during June. In addition to the measurable losses, there continue
to be many other losses to the economy and to the military establish-
ment which cannot be assigned meaningful values.
ApproveffPCr R se N D071;() R M NTC / *40430001-2
 ApproveY gas+e f495O.7Pfjft faPff TQQ$ 11(rW 0430001-2
RESULTS OF STRIKES ON NVN TARGETS A/ THRU 15 JULY 67
Targets
Total Targets Struck e/
Fixed Targets National JCS _/ d/ 'NP. of
Capacity Targeted Attacks
(X 1000)
TABLE 360
b/ % of National
Strike Capacity
Sorties Destroyed or
inactive because
of air strikes
Barracks
443 men
65
41.08
54
32.3
361
2928
25.52
Ammo Depots
112.6 MT
18
100
18
100
98
1362
76.5
POL Storage *
133.5 MT
13
100
13
100
87
714
86.5
Supply Depots
10550 SgFt
29
42.48
23
44.4
81
832
17.84
Power Plants
187 KW
20
94.5
14
76.1
77
650
77.3
Maritime Ports
7.8 ST/Dy
8
95
6
44
27
235
12.1
RR Yards
33.7 ST/Dy
4
78
3
54
68
424
35.9
RR Shops
3
88
2
68
4
33
21.6
Industrial:
Explosive Plt
1 MT
1
100
1
100
10
47
100
Iron & Steel
300 MT (PIG)
1
100
1
100
23
273
100
Cement Plant
600 MT
1
100
1
100
1
57
90
Airfields
32
12**
7**
36
53
748
23
Naval Bases
9
5
3
42
26
232
19.5
Bridges
1,517
61
52
428
3389
55.8(of those tgtd)
Commo Install
50
5
2
2
15
20
Radar Sites
210
5
5
74
434
37.5
SAM Sites
164
58
112
388
Locks & Dams
94
8
2
10.6
2
10
5.3
Ferries
160
11
7
44
JCS targets only; does not
Total Sorties:
13,227
Results f/
include dispersed storage.
Armed Recce Sorties
Destroyed Damaged
** Includes non-JCS numbered
Hoa Lac Airfield.
143,595
Vehicles 4,131 4,031
RR Stock 1,443 2,126-
a/ Assessments are based on best information received; will be refined as more
b/
accurate information becomes available.
Strike plus flak suppression sorties. Some applied to multiple targets; in
c/
this summary assigned to principal target.
These columns are not additive, since the number of installations, both tar
d/
and struck in some cases, apply to more than one category of targets (i.e.,
barracks, supply and ammo depots).
Percentages of national capacity where appropriate.
e/
Also
numerous attacks during armed recce and other missions.
f/
Also
numerous installations, AA sites, bridges, etc., attacked and road and
rail
cuts made.
geted
Appro, f IGRe1Fas /OF/O -GN91MS( 00430001-2 TAB A
 Appro5 $asNb2/c/V I fflaw-W00430001-2
Value of Economic and Military Damage
Attributed to the ROLLING THUNDER Program
1965 Through June 1967
Economic
.Military
Direct Losses
Million US$
Direct Losses
Million US$
Railroad/Highway Bridges
27.1
b/
Barracks
28.1 a/
Transportation Equipment
53.9
Ammunition Depots
5.2 a/
Electric Power Plants
26.4
Supply Depots
6.0.-S/
Petroleum
7.4
Radar and Communications
Manufacturing Facilities
17.4
Sites
2.8
Railroad Yards
5.7
2/
Airfields
0.9 a/
Maritime Ports
1.4
a/
SAM Sites
4.4 a/
Miscellaneous Armed
Naval Bases
1.6 a/
Reconnaissance
Aircraft
30.2
Naval Craft
3.8
SUBTOTAL, Direct Losses
141.0
Miscellaneous Armed
Reconnaissance
8.9
Indirect Losses
TOTAL, Direct Losses
91.9
Exports
23.7
Agriculture c/
25.5
Fishing
8.3
TOTAL
Million US$
SUBTOTAL, Indirect Losses 57.5
Economic
199
TOTAL, Direct and
Military
92
Indirect
198.5
TOTAL
29'1
d/
a/ Estimate is incomplete because of inadequate post-strike photography.
b/ Of the total, $4.8 million is estimated to have been expended to date
on the repair of damaged and destroyed bridges and $22.3 million is
estimated for complete restoration in the future of bridges damaged or
destroyed. In addition, $1.3 million would be required to make temporary
repairs to presently unrepaired bridges.
c/ It should be noted that losses of agricultural crops are arbitrarily
attributed entirely to the indirect effects of the bombing. An unknown
part of these losses is in fact due to weather and other natural causes.
d/ Excluding the cost of trucks destroyed and damaged in Laos and economic
and military facilities and equipment destroyed and damaged by US naval
operations along the coast of southern North Vietnam.
ApproWER RE ess 2?2/ &R(5tQN79jDDbS3&40043000t B
 Approved Fdelease 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP79T0080002400430001-2
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR DIA-CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THE WHITE HOUSE:
Vice President 1 Cy
Gen Maxwell Taylor 1 Cy
Mr. Bromley Smith 5 Cys
DEFENSE:
SECDEF 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (ISA) 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (Systems Analysis) 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (PA) 1 Cy
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET 1 Cy
TREASURY (Secretary) icy
USIA 1 Cy
AID 1 Cy
NASA 1 Cy
NSA 5 Cys
STATE 20 Cys
AEC 1 Cy
FBI 1 Cy
NIC 1 Cy
ACDA 1 Cy
CHAIRMAN, JCS 1 Cy
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF 1 Cy
J-1 1 Cy
J-3 2 Cys
j-4 1 Cy
J-5 1 Cy
J-6 1 Cy
SACSA 1 Cy
NMCC 3 Cys
ARMY:
CHIEF OF STAFF 2 Cys
DCSOPS 1 Cy
ACSFOR 1 Cy
ACSI 1 Cy
ACSI-CI 1 Cy
ACSI-Eastern 1 Cy
STAG 1 Cy
Approves Foc rceleas-e IDQ07F3P CIL f9TWMCM00430001-2
 Approved Fdoelease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T008 002400430001-2
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NAVY:
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2. Cys
DNI
1 Cy
OP-921E
1 Cy
OP-922Y1
1 Cy
OP-922Y2
1 Cy
OP-92B1
1 Cy
AIR FORCE:
CHIEF OF STAFF
2 Cys
ACS,I/USAF
1 Cy
AFNINDE
6 Cys
AFNIEBB
1 Cy
AFISI (Spec Investigation)
1 Cy
AUL (Air Univ Library)
1 Cy
MARINE CORPS:
COMMANDANT
1 Cy
G-2
1 Cy
CINCPAC
2 Cys
CINCPACAF
1 Cy
CINCUSARPAC
1 Cy
CINCPACFLT
1 Cy
COMUSMACV
2 Cys
7AF
2 Cys
COMSEVENTHFLT
1 Cy
COMATKCARSTRIKEF'ORSEVENTHFLT (CTF 77)
1 Cy
CINCLANT
1 Cy
CINCSTRIKE
1 Cy
CINCSAC
1 Cy
SAC 544
1 Cy
CINCTAC
1 Cy
AFSTRIKE
1 Cy
CONTIC
1 Cy
CINCALCOM
1 Cy
CINCEUR
1 Cy
CINCUSAREUR
1 Cy
CINCUSAFE
1 Cy
CINCNAVEUR
1 Cy
CINCCONAD
1 Cy
CIA
125 Cys
Approved For Release12002/0/30 RCIA-PDP79T00822~OO 400430001-2
 Approved Fcelease 2002/07/30: CIA-RDP79T008 002400430001-2
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
DIADR 1, Cy
DIADD 1 Cy
DIASC-1 1 Cy
JS 1 Cy
CO-2C 1 Cy
AP 1 Cy
AP-2 1 Cy
AP-2C2 2 Cys
AP-2D1 1 Cy
AP-2D2 1 Cy.,
AP-3 1 Cy
AP-4 1 Cy
AP-1+A 1 Cy
AP-!+A2 (Pent) 6 Cys
AP-4A2 (AHS) 4 Cys
AP-4B1 2 Cys
AP-2+C 3 Cys
AP-7 2 Cys
AP-8 2 Cys
xx 1 Cy
JT 1 Cy
Approv&FF6j-R &aee N O/0f1O:R GN'9DI&6fiM400430001-2