INTELLIGENCE REPORT PREPARED WEEKLY FOR THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000900340001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1966
• Content Type: IR

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OCI No. 1205/66
Copy No.
44
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Prepared Weekly
for the
SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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declassification
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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C O N T E N T S
Page
1. Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2. Cyprus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3. Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
4. Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
5. Arab States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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27 June 1966
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1. ALGERIA
Rumors of an early coup attempt are again cur-
rent in Algiers.
Though these rumors may be premature, and in
fact may be related to a long-expected government
,shake-up in which several rival groups in and out-
side the government hope to profit, they do reflect
the Boumediene regime's basic instability and the
very real and widespread discontent with it.
In the year since the military overthrow , of 'Ben
Bella, the collegial government headed by Boumediene
has done little but mark time, particularly regard-
ing Algeria's enormous problems of employment and
food production. There is also some unhappiness in
leftist circles that Boumediene seems to heed the
moderates around him who have urged continued coop-
eration with France and a liberal economic policy.
The latest plotters reportedly are pro-Arab neutral-
ists, including followers of the imprisoned Ben
Bella, in the army and gendarmerie.
There is no good evidence that the opposition
to Boumediene is sufficiently organized or has suf-
ficient military backing to mount a successful coup.
The army, though not without its factions and fric-
tions, is believed still basically loyal to Boumediene.
Continued lack of progress toward solving Algeria's
problems nevertheless will encourage rumors and anti-
government plotting. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEEM)
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2. CYPRUS
Incidents provoked by both the Greek and Turkish
Cypriots have once again increased tensions on the
island and raised the threat of Turkish military in-
tervention.
Twice this month Greek Cypriot authorities have
clamped blockades on the Turkish sector of Nicosia,
alleging Turkish Cypriot complicity in bombings in
the Greek sector. The first ban resulted in the
withdrawal of Turkish Cypriot judges from courts in
the Greek sector. These courts were one of the few
remaining areas of official cooperation between the
two communities. The second blockade, imposed on
21 June, evoked a sharp Turkish demand for removal
of the restrictions within 24 hours. The blockade
was lifted shortly after the deadline, but Ankara's
failure to act during the period of Greek Cypriot
defiance may reduce local Turkish confidence in the
mainland.
Tension has also resulted from a yet unresolved
confrontation over Greek Cypriot road construction
northeast of Nicosia. Completion of the road would
divide an area normally dominated by the Turkish
Cypriots. The UN is seeking to negotiate a compro-
mise solution.
Kidnapings and other incidents provoked by both
communities have added to the increased nervousness.
On several recent occasions only the timely inter-
vention of officials of the UN force kept tempers
below the boiling point. The mandate of the UN
force was recently extended by the UN Security Coun-
cil to 26 December.
Although Greek and Turkish government represen-
tatives met in Brussels in early June to discuss
Cyprus and are to meet again soon, there is still
no sign that either Greece or Turkey is prepared to
offer significant concessions. Even if Athens and
Ankara could reach agreement, Cyprus President Maka-
rios, who remains the key to any real settlement, is
almost certain to repudiate any agreement in which
he has not participated. (SECRET)
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Castro's absence from the center of Cuban politi-
cal activities since 1 May and his lackluster bearing
during his last public appearance on 4 June have
stimulated rumors and speculation that he is either
in political trouble or seriously ill. Hard infor-
mation is lacking.
Some rumors hold that Castro has become physi-
cally or mentally incapacitated. Others say the Cu-
ban Communist political bureau removed him from power
on 7 June because he intended to send military forces
a ainst the US naval base at Guantanamo.
has reported "there is evidence" of '.'high-;
est tensions" within the Castro regime.
has reportedly remarked that "we
appear to be ea ing with Dorticos, not Castro." On
the other hand, Castro did meet with the director
general of UNESCO on 13 June.
Cuban press coverage of Castro's activities has
been notably scanty in the past three weeks. It is
also unusual that neither Castro nor any other re-
gime official has seen fit to rebut the rumors, as
has happened in similar situations in the past.
Lacking more substantial information, it is
reasonable to assume that Castro may be temporarily
ill or fatigued. If this is so, he may well return
to his normal role upon recovery.
Should Castro be deposed, be permanently inca
pacitated, or die, we would expect him to be re-
placed initially by a collective leadership, sup-
ported by the Communist Party, in which President
Dorticos and Raul Castro would play dominant roles.
For a short period at least, the security forces
probably would remain loyal to such a combination,
particularly if high Interior Ministry officials
were included in the consultations from the very
beginning. Dorticos, because of his acknowledged
competence, might be able to win predominance over
the long run, but it seems more likely that a mili-
tary group or individual, perhaps someone not now
prominent, would eventually emerge to succeed Castro.
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The national elections set for 3 July will prob-
ably be held in a tense atmosphere. There is even
some possibility of an eleventh-hour cancellation.
Political groups opposed to leading presidential
candidate Rene Barrientos are trying to create dis-
turbances to force a postponement of the elections.
Barrientos is virtually assured of winning the presi-
dency, and his opponents see a postponement or can-
cellation as the only way to stop him. Disunity
among them reduces the probability that they will
be able to muster enough support for the type of
demonstrations which would force the junta to can-
cel.
An abstentionist movement is growing among the
opposition groups. Although six parties now are in
the race, as many as four may drop out by the end
of this week. Abstention or the casting of blank
ballots by a significant number of voters would be
interpreted as a repudiation of Barrientos' candidacy
and a challenge to his claims of a popular mandate.
Opposition groups could later point to large-scale-
abstention as justification for toppling his regime.
The best assurance that the elections will take
place as scheduled is the attitude of military lead-
ers, most of whom want them to be held so the armed
forces will be removed from the political arena.
The president of the junta, General Alfredo Ovando,
who himself may be involved in a plot against; Bar-
rientos, has reiterated numerous times in the past
week that elections will be held regardless of how
violent demonstrations may become. To guard against
disorder, additional troops have been brought into
La Paz and the entire armed forces put on alert.
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5. ARAB STATES
The rift that.has been developing in the Arab
world between the conservative monarchies and radi-
cal nationalist leaders is deepening.
In a fiery speech two weeks ago, Jordan's King
Husayn virtually abandoned all pretense of concili-
ating Egypt, Syria, and radical spokesmen, and aligned
himself more closely with Saudi Arabia's King Faysal.
Husayn defended Faysal's proposal concerning Is-
lamic solidarity in the face of Nasir's claims that
the concept masks a Western-inspired plot to counter
Egyptian influence in the Middle East. In a clear
reference to Egypt and Syria, Husayn charged that
some countries . had '!thrown; _themselves': into, the
laps of the Communist camp." He accused the Soviet
Union and Communist China of trying to subvert the
Middle East, and said that all hope for cooperating
with the Cairo-supported Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation (PLO) had "vanished."
The speech has precipitated intense propaganda
warfare between Amman radio and the PLO, which broad-
casts from Cairo. The PLO has attempted to stir up
internal troubles for Husayn among Jordan's sizable
Palestinian population by urging Palestinian minis-
ters to resign from the King's cabinet and by alleg-
ing that a "Palestine National Revolutionary F'ront"
in Jordan is already calling for the liquidation of
Husayn's regime.
These polemics may well stimulate increased dis-
sident activity in Jordan, possibly including as-
sassination attempts against Husayn or other offi-
cials, even though Jordanian Palestinians as a whole
do not appear to be seriously aroused.
Amman has also been exchanging recriminations
with the Batthist regime in Syria.
Cairo's radio and press, meanwhile, have con-
tinued their campaign against Saudi King Faysal by
calling him an "enemy of Arabism" and by attempting
to portray him as an ally of "imperialism" in re-
ferring to his visit to Washington. Cairo has also
criticized Faysal for going to New York despite
Mayor'Lihdsa?y' s'llansolence"in denying the King a:ny
official attention because of the King's statement
that Jews who support Israel are enemies of-the Arabs.
(SECRET)
-5- 27 June 1966
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