PEKING ASSESSES THE WORLD SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010050-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: March 11, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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11 March 1966
OCI No. 1175/66
Copy No. 1? _5
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
PEKING ASSESSES THE WORLD SITUATION
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CONFIDENTIAL
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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OCI No. 1175/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
11 March 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Peking Assesses the World Situation
Summary
Articles published in People's Daily on 1, 7,
and 9 March take a sober view of the current "revo-
lutionary situation" in the world. They appear to
reflect high-level reviews of international events
which probably began last October. The three state-
ments are cast in a long-range historical framework.
They admit that there have been setbacks to the
revolutionary cause--that victory is "frequently
intermingled with reverses, and advance in movements
with retreat"--but argue that ultimate Communist
victory is certain despite ebbs and flows in the
"wavelike" course of the struggle. Peking's primary
purpose in publishing these articles is probably to
give the party rank and file a "correct" understand-
ing of China's reverses around the world during the
past year and perhaps also to prepare for a possible
shift in the tactics but not the overall strategy of
China's foreign policy.
The Chinese make no effort in these articles
to offset admissions of some short-run defeats by
claims of Communist success in the Vietnam war, and
in fact do not mention the situation there. This
subject is treated separately in broadcasts and
articles which continue to assert that the US is
suffering repeated defeats at the hands of the Viet-
namese people despite continuous efforts to increase
the strength of "imperialist" forces and to launch
new "large-scale offensives." The Chinese have prom-
ised to back Hanoi "no matter what the cost" and
there have been no indications that Peking is slack-
ening its support for the North Vietnamese. In the
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context of the Vietnam war, Peking's overall analysis
of the world situation appears to take new evidence
of US determination into account and warn that the
Communist side must buckle in for a protracted test
of strength.
In short, the three articles in question are
in the maim stream of Chinese Communist rhetoric.
They appear to reflect an attempt to cope with a
problem of long standing--not a sudden realization
of the need to correct a line or change a policy,
1. The recent propaganda statements on the
world situation echo the line taken by Foreign Min-
ister Chen Yi in an interview on 30 December--during
which he frankly admitted that there had been trouble
in "certain areas of Africa and Asia" and called for
vigilance to cope with "new difficulties and set-
backs" which might arise during 1966.
2, Chinese foreign policy has met with serious
reverses during the past twelve months. Peking's
position in Africa has deteriorated sharply. Chinese
interests in South Asia suffered heavy blows in con-
nection with the Kashmir crisis. The Indonesian
coup attempt and its aftermath inflicted still fur-
ther damage on Peking's position in the Far East,
Chinese relations with Cuba, Peking's only important
base for operations in Latin America, have reached
a new low point. Moscow's post-Khrushchev tactics
in the Sino-Soviet conflict have scored gains which
have increased the degree of Chinese isolation in
the World Communist Movement.
3, Indications of Chinese sensitivity to re-
verses abroad began to appear last fall. Chen Yi's
violent press conference statements on 29 September
appeared in part to be a truculent reaction to frus-
trations encountered in Peking's efforts to gain
greater international influence and to promote "peo-
ple's war" all over the world. Speeches at the
National Day celebrations on 1 October concentrated
on alleged successes achieved on the domestic scene,
but pointedly gave little attention to foreign affairs.
4? An unannounced high-level party meeting
apparently took place in Peking during late Septem-
ber and early October. The entire range of Peking's
policy problems wasp probably discussed ;but the recall
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about two months later of some twenty Chinese ambas-
sadors--most of them from posts in the Afro-Asian
countries--suggests that the,international outlook
was a major topic at this meeting.
5. From Peking's point of view, the world
situation continued to deteriorate during the period
between the meeting in October and the gathering
of Chinese diplomatic representatives who finally
assembled in Peking in mid-December. Chen Yi's
sober remarks on 30 December suggest the meeting
must have been a gloomy one.
6. Peking's fortunes have continued to decline
since then--the most recent blow fell about two weeks
ago when Nkrumah's left-wing regime in Ghana was over-
thrown. The People's Daily articles published on 1,
7, and 9 Marc appear eelned primarily to put this
and earlier adverse developments in proper perspective
for the party rank and file--as temporary setbacks on
the long road to ultimate Communist victory.
7. The articles may also be the first tentative
hint that the Chinese are considering'a shift in some
foreign policy tactics, perhaps toward a more flexible
and pragmatic approach in areas where Peking's doc-
trinaire line has been unsuccessful. This possibility
is.suggested by an ambiguous passage which declares
that when "twists and turns" appear in the course of
revolution true Marxists "work out correct strategy
and tactics to persevere.." Liu Shao-chi and Chen
Yi are planning visits to Pakistan and Afghanistan
in late March and Chou En-lai may go to Rumania and
Albania about the same time. These trips would pro-
vide an opportunity to explore the possibility of new
courses of action.
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