CUBA: A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE CURRENT SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000800020012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 31, 2001
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: MEMO

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M E110RA NDUNI
SUBJECT: Cuba : A Brief Survey of the Current Situattion
Conclusions
Fidel Castro is firmly in control of Cuba and their,
is almost no possibility that he will be overthrown in
the near future. Now that Cuba is again concentrating
on the production of sugar, the economy is making some
headway; however, this probably will not be reflected in
improved living standards for several years. Castro's
economic dependence on the USSR has caused him to move
closer to Soviet positions in Cuba's foreign policy,
with a resultant cooling in relations with Communist
China. Both Cuba and the USSR seem unwilling to force
the direct Cuban-US confrontation that would result from
the destruction of a US overhead reconnaissance flight.
Castro still hopes to see regimes similar to his in other
parts of Latin America; however, he no longer sees revo-
lution in the hemisphere as imminent and he seems to be
concentrating his clandestine support in those areas
where he believes it will be most immediately effective -
particularly Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru.
The Cuban Economy
Estimates of
Selected Economic Indicators
(in Millions of Dollars)
(1965 figures are preliminary estimates)
1957 1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Communist Economic
Aid to Cuba* None 35
240
370
260
225
Cuban Imports 895 705
750
835
995
950
Availability of
Goods and Services
(1957 prices) 2,885 2,915
2,860
3,000
3,220
3,220
Gross Domestic
Product (1957
prices) 2,835 3,045
2,820
2,645
2,845
3.050
* Estimate on the basis of annual trade deficits with the
Communist countries. Does not include technical assistance
or the sugar subsidy.
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1. After several years of decline, the Cuban
economy apparently leveled off in the second half of
1963 and now seems to be making some gains, pri-
marily because of increased sugar production. The
total availability of goods and services has moved
somewhat above the level reached before Castro but
this has been offset by the increase in population.
Cuba remains a client economy, heavily dependent on
economic assistance from the Communist camp, par-
ticularly the USSR. Shortages of spare parts and re-
placements still affect the industry and basic services
2. As the government has moved toward socialist
models of central direction and administration,the
distribution of goods and services has undergone a
sharp change. The government's share has climbed
to more than 20 percent, almost double pre-Castro
figures. Much of this increase is devoted to the ex-
panded military establishment, an extensive education
program, improved social services, and increased ex-
penditures for investment. The redistribution of
economic resources has helped certain groups -
scholarship students, party members, some of the
military, and those formerly very poor - and consid-
erably worsened the condition of others, especially
among the urban middle class. Private consumption
per capita is now about 20 percent lower than in
1957.
3. Having rejected overly ambitious plans for
industrialization and diversification, Cuba is now
concentrating on expanding its agricultural produc-
tion with the emphasis on sugar. Sugar annually pro-
vides about 85 percent of the value of Cuban exports
and about 25 percent of gross national product.
Thus the over-all health of the economy is dependent
on the amount of sugar produced, as well as the price
obtained in any given year. The economy's vulner-
ability to low world sugar prices has been reduced,
though by no means eliminated, by the agreement of
the USSR and certain other Communist countries to
pay about six cents per pound for large and in-
creasing amounts of sugar.
4. The production of over six million tons of
sugar in 1965 was a significant achievement. However,
it required the diversion of land and labor from
other production. Ironically, the sharp drop in world
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sugar prices meant that the earning power of the
1965 harvest was no more than that of the smaller
1964 crop and the important hard-currency earnings
from Free World purchasers was considerably lower.
Thus, although the over-all economic performance im-
proved in 1965, the total supply of goods and serv-
ices probably will not increase this year. As a re-
sult, the regime will be able to do little to reduce
consumer dissatisfaction.
1. Castro remains firmly in control of Cuba
and there is no person with sufficient standing and
support to challenge him. Raul Castro and President
Osvaldo Dorticos have gained in power during the past
year. Raul Castro is second to Fidel in both the
party and the government, and is Minister of the Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces. Dorticos has taken over as
Minister of Economy and head of the Central Planning
Board (JUCEPLAN). Che Guevara has been removed from
his party and government positions and, according to
a letter he purportedly wrote in April, he has left
Cuba to take part in the revolutionary struggle in
another country.
2. Castro is continuing the institutionaliza-
tion of his regime with the establishment of the 100-
man Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party.
Following Soviet models, it has a secretariat and
political branch, and separate committees to oversee
foreign affairs, education
,economics, constitutional
studies, and Armed Forces and state security. The
secretariat, which will probably be responsible for
the day-to-day workings of the party, includes
representatives of both the "old Communist" and the
"Fidelista" supporters of Castro. The political
branch contains a large military representation,
as does the Central Committee as a whole. The
Committee.has members drawn from all spheres of the
Cuban government and is apparently intended to
exercise increasing control overall aspects of
Cuban life. This will tend to,reinforce, rather
than diminish, Castro's power, although the formal-
ization of the party structure is probably designed
to ensure that the Cuban regime will out-live Castro.
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SECRET
3. Internally-based antiregime elements have
never posed a major threat to the Castro regime and
their power has been substantially lessened in re-
cent years. The regime has an effective intelli-
gence service and anti-insurgency program. Govern-
ment propaganda and mass. mobilization programs have
also played a part in reducing manifestations of -
if not the presence of - opposition. Although a level
of popular discontent continues, it does not appear to
pose an immediate orlong-term threat to the regime.
There'is no evidence of significant antiregime senti-
ment in the military.
The Military
1. The Cuban military is the best equipped in
Latin America and, except for Brazil's, the largest.
It is believed capable of combating internal or ex-
ternal threats, barring large-scale US assistance.
Most Cuban military equipment is Soviet-supplied.
Military shipments which periodically arrive from
the USSR are believed to consist mainly of replace-
ment items, spare parts, and ammunition. Training
programs, both in Cuba and in the Bloc, have prob-
ably contributed to their over-all effectiveness.
Aside from field exercises and occasional counter-
insurgent operations, the forces lack combat exper-
ience. Approximately 2,000 Soviet military per-
sonnel remain in Cuba, primarily as a military aid
and advisory group.
2. The surface-to-air missile (SAM) system is
now effectively under Cuban control. Since the last
major departure of Soviets in the summer of 1964,
the Cubans have redeployed their missiles to provide
for a concentrated defense of large cities and major
military installations, rather than the previous
area defense pattern which attempted to cover the
entire island. The Cubans now have 22 SAM sites,
and sufficient equipment to establish several more.
Procedures designed to prevent accidental or un-
instructed firings are not completely effective:
in June, a Cuban SAM site accidentally destroyed
a Cuban plane.
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Estimated Cuban Military Personnel Strengths
Army
175,000
Active duty
90,000
Reserve
85,000
Navy
7,000
Air
Force
4,000
Air
Defense
8,000
TOTAL
X00
Estimated Cuban Holdings of Major Military Equipment
Tanks and self-propelled guns 785
Other Armored Vehicles 260
Field Artillery and Antitank Guns 1,230
AAA Guns 935
FROG Rocket Launchers 6-8
Truck-mounted multiple rocket launchers 80
SAM sites (with enough equipment for at
least an additional 2 sites) 22
SAM (SA-2 Guideline) Missiles (about) 600
Cruise Missile Sites 4
Cruise Missiles:
Coastal Defense (SS-CD-1/Kennel) 50
Ground-to-Ground Variant of
Kennel AS-1) 100
Air Defense Radars 270
Coastal Defense Radars 22
Jet Fighters:
MIG-15/17 (FAGOT/FRESCO) 85
MIG-19 (FARMER) 11
MIG-21 (FISHBED) 40
IL-14 transport aircraft assigned to
the Air Force 10
Helicopters 95
KOMAR Cruise Missile Boats 12
Kronstadt and SO-1 Subchasers 12
Motor Torpedo Boats (P-4/P-6) 24
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THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
1. Castro is first and foremost a revolutionary.
He is equally an(egotist who enjoys flaunting Cuba's
and his own importance in the international arena.
He probably views the "nuclear stalemate" between
the two major nuclear powers as an unparalleled
opportunity to assume a world position out of all
proportion to Cuba's size. In effect, Castro tries
to wear three hats at the same time: that of a
comradely member; of the Communist world; of a re-
spected figure among the nonaligned countries; and
of a friend-indeed of revolutionary movements--Commu-
nist or non-Communist--which are fighting against
"imperialist exploitation."
Cuban-Soviet Relations
2. Cuba's reliance on the USSR for sizable.
economic assistance gives Moscow an opportunity to
exert considerable leverage on Havana. The new
Kremlin leadership seems more inclined than Khru-
shchev to make it clear to Castro that his very
existence depends to a great extent on aid from the
USSR, and that Cuba must expect to give the Soviets
some return on their investment. Moscow would prob-
ably not,-however, go to the point of actually with-
holding aid from Cuba in an outright showdown. Mos-
cow undoubtedly has been upset with the administra-
tive bungling of the Castro regime and has "advised"
the Cubans to get their economic house in order.
3. The Castro regime has clearly moved closer
to the Soviet position in the Sino-Soviet dispute
during the last year. One of the results of the
conference of Latin American Communist parties in
Havana in November 1964 was an agreement by Castro
to better relations and increase cooperation with
the Moscow-oriented parties in Latin America. China
viewed this as evidence that Cuba had joined the
ranks of the "revisionists." Havana-Peking rela-
tions have deteriorated badly since that time. The
Cuban shift toward Moscow undoubtedly reflects in
part Soviet pressures, but it also reflects Castro's
own assessment of the situation. He probably is con-
vinced now that China is the main culprit responsible
for the schism in the Communist world. He also
probably sees Peking as a likely competitor in Latin
America for the loyalties of leftist-extremist revo-
lutionary groups.
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Cuban Efforts to "Export the Revolution"
4. Cuba continues to extend considerable
propaganda backing, some guerrilla warfare training,
and small sums of money to selected Communist and
other Latin American leftist-extremist groups. How-
ever, Castro appears to have become convinced that
now more than ever the main responsibility for
carrying out revolution rests with the local ele-
ments. He seems to be concentrating Cuba's support
in those countries where revolutionaries are active
--Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru--rather
than indiscriminately assisting all revolutionary
groups who request aid. Along with this shift,
Castro has begun to cooperate more closely with
the pro-Moscow Communist parties in Latin America.
In returi, these parties have promised to give "ac-
tive aid" to revolutionary groups in the six coun-
tries listed at the Havana Conference (Venezuela,
Guatemala, Colombia, Haiti, Honduras, and Paraguay).
5. The Dominican crisis probably was viewed
by Havana as both a plus and a minus. The US mili-
tary presence in Santo Domingo provided an unparal-
leled opportunity to propagandize against the US.
Moreover, Castro probably believes the US interven-
tion and the-example of what a few well-trained
subversives can accomplish will inspire other Latin
American extremists to take bolder action when the
opportunity presents itself. However, the speed
and scale of the US intervention undoubtedly sug-
gested to Castro that the US might undertake similar
action if extremist insurrection threatened existing
governments in Latin America. Castro also probably
saw the US action as a warning of US retaliation if
his regime should become clearly implicated in such
an attempted revolution.
6. In light of the disappointing revolutionary
results in Latin America and in order to refurbish
his revolutionary image, Castro is assisting several
revolutionary movements in Africa. The over-all
effort is small, however, and it was probably hurt
by the overthrow of Castro's close ally Ben Bella in
Algeria. An undetermined number of Cubans are con-
ducting guerrilla warfare training in Tanzania, the
Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, and perhaps Guinea. Some
military equipment has been sent to Algeria and Tan-
zania. A few Cubans are engaged in military opera=tions alongside the rebels in the Congo.
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Relations With Free World Countries
7. Havana has realized a margin of success in
improving Cuba's image among the nonaligned na-
tions, largely through the regime's support for
various revolutionary forces and consistent anti-
imperialist position. Cuba has cultivated closer
economic ties with several non-Communist countries,
mainly to increase Cuba's exports and to blunt the
US economic denial program. Cuba's success in this
venture has depended largely on its ability to sell
sugar at good prices. Cuba received some small but
important credits from European traders in 1963-1964.
This trend reversed itself, however, when it became
apparent that Cuba's convertible exchange holdings
had nose-dived, Most traders who have goods Cuba
needs now deal with Havana only on a cash basis.
8. The regime continues to castigate the US
as "enemy number one" of all world progressive forces
and countries, but ithas avoided major confrontations
with the US for over a year. The Cubans, for example,
have not initiated propaganda offenses against the
US to end reconnaissance flights, nor have they
agitated for the removal of the US presence at the
Guantanamo naval base. It is possible that Castro
looks upon the recent negotiations for the sending
of Cuban refugees to the US as the first step toward
some kind of limited improvement in CubantiUS relations.
PROSPECTS AND OUTLOOK
1. The over-all Cuban economy seems likely to
continue to expand at about the same rate as last
year for the rest of 1965 and perhaps the early part
of 1966. Several factors prevent drawing a more
optimistic picture. The regime's total preoccupation
with the growing of Sugar is limiting cultivation
of other important crops. Indeed, prospects for
improvement in the agricultural sector in 1966 and
1967 seem slight even though further improvement in
sugar production seems likely. Prospects for agri-
culture in 1966 are gloomy because of a sharp re-
duction in the supply of fertilizers. It appears
unlikely that the flow of raw materials and equip-
ment will..rise sufficiently over the next two
years to produce increased industrial output. A
few sectors will gain, but total industrial pro=
ductjbn probably will increase only marginally.
SECRET
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2. The economy could show marked improvement
by reducing mismanagement and improving labor morale.
These two problems are receiving considerable at-
tention, but will not be resolved in the short run.
It seems unlikely that the present slight economic
improvement will appreciably benefit the average
consumer within the next two years--even assuming
continued improvement. At any rate, the economy
will continue to be heavily dependent upon trade
and aid from the Communist countries. A large ex-
pansion of other trade seems unlikely.
3. Despite probably occasional frictions,
Cuban political and economic ties with the USSR
are almost certain to remain close, at least for
the next two years. Castro has no practical al-
ternative to Soviet assistance; Moscow in turn
reaps considerable political benefit from the fact
that the Castro regime is in power.. Castro will cer-
tainly try to increase his prestige among the non-
aligned nations, and will probably use the Tri-
Continent Conference scheduled to meet in Havana
in early January to further this goal. It seems
apparent that Cuba and the USSR will go slowly in
their attempts to undermine the US position in
Latin America. It is almost certain that the USSR
will not attempt to reintroduce strategic missiles
into Cuba. Moscow could do so clandestinely, but
seems unlikely to risk prec'ipitat'ing another con-
frontation with the US similar to that of autumn
1962. We doubt that a US reconnaissance plane will
be shot down otrer Cuba even though the Cubans have
this capability. The chances are better, however,
that the Cubans might take hostile action against
violations of Cuban air space by other types of air-
craft.
4. Castro almost certainly does not expect
any dramatic improvement in relations with the US.
He may, however, make overtures designed ultimately
to soften US policy toward Cuba.
5. "Export of the revolution" will remain a
key policy of Castro's regime. Castro will continue
to provide limited assistance and training to leftist-
extremist groups in several Latin American countries
and also to a few in Africa. These will be cautious
efforts, however, even though propaganda on behalf
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SE CRE T
of world'hational liberation movements' may expand.
It appears increasingly as if Castro is giving more
emphasis to more flexible, long range political
tactics. This is taking the form of greater co-
operation with pro-Moscow Communist parties and in
some countries with moderate leftist groups as well.
Castro undoubtedly still holds to the view that the
emergence of "new Cubas" in Latin America is his
best hope for breaking out of his diplomatic isolation
in the hemisphere and ensuring the continuance of his
regime.
6. Castro's regime will remain largely the pro-
duct of Castro's own personal direction, although
some political and economic decentralization is taking
place as Castro has taken steps to institutionalize
his revolution. His party, economic, social, and
security organizations--based on Soviet models--will
continue to develop and will play a larger role in decision
making over the long run. In the meantime, they will
continue to function according to Castro's dictates.
It also seems likely that Fidelismo will be more im-
portant than Marxism-Leninism in their ideology.
7. Castro's overriding predominance will remain
a major vulnerability of the regime. There would
seem to be little chance that he will be overthrown
during the next two years, but there is always a
chance that he will die from some illness of by assas-
sination. Raul Castro probably would assume the reins
of power upon his brother's death, perhaps in a col-
lectivearrangemerft including leaders "chosen" by the
party. A power struggle could hardly be avoided,
however, and the military-security apparatus could
well be the ultimate arbiter of such a struggle. If
these two organizations remained united in favor of
the regime's policies the struggle for ultimate au-
thority could well take place within the regime's in-
stitutional structure and result in little violence
or change. Should the military and security organ-
izations split, however, a violent power struggle
would be likely and might result in a drastic al-
teration of Cuba's present political system.
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FORM
12.62 2024
No.
SUBJECT
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Date
Cnb>I-: a >t BVZVVV o~ the Gu2T out
Situatift
REQUESTED BY ' VTA IM-1
PURPOSE
DESIRED LENGTH
STATINTL
STATINTL
STATIINIL
COORDINATION
OUTSIDE OCI
ASSIGNED TO
OAD REVIEW
I. O/DCI
2. O/DDI
3. O/ADCI
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DUE DATE:
4. CS/II
5. DAY/SIDO
6. WA
P/A
7. AA
P/A
8. SSBA
P/A
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