DISSIDENCE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR RESISTANCE IN COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000300020006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 7, 1965
• Content Type: IS

SECRET / i c cc,
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7 December 1965
OCI No. 3088/65
Copy No.
f
DISSIDENCE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR
RESISTANCE IN COMMUNIST CHINA
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
INTELLIGENCE STUDY
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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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WARNING
ofinformation
This
the a
the United States
Nationall Defense contains
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
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II. RESISTANCE 1957-1962 .................. 3
Resistance of Intellectuals and
Students, May-June 1957 ............. 3
Peasant Resistance in Honan Prov-
ince, 1960 .......................... 4
The Exodus of Young Industrial and
Farm Workers from Kwangtung Prov-
ince to Hong Kong, May 1962 ......... 5
Basic Factors of Resistance ........... 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS .....................
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................
III. DISSIDENCE 1962-1965 9
Youth ................................
Intellectuals ..
9
17
21
IV, IMPLICATIONS .......................... 27
Map
Eastern Communist China..follows page..
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SUMMARY AND, CONCLUSIONS
Excluding troubles in the ethnic minority
regions of China, the Communist regime has been
confronted with major outbreaks of resistance on
three occasions during the past decade. These out-
breaks--during the "Hundred Flowers" campaign of
May 1957, in Honan Province during the severe
food shartage of 1960, and across the Kwangtung--
Hong Kong border in May 1962--at no time seriously
threatened the regime's strong and pervasive secu-
rity controls, On each occasion the dissident ele-
ments of the population demonstrated a strong sen-
sitivity to the threat of suppression by force.
These same examples, however, show that large
unorganized groups of intellectuals, youth, and
peasants in China have a somewhat unique capability
of acting in a coordinated way to take advantage
of basic weakness in the regime?s control appara-
tus.
In mid-1962 Peking showed its recognition of
this capability and the presence of control weak-
ness when it began the extensive reindoctrination
effort that continues today. The mass campaigns
of the past three years have focused on the above
groups with particular emphasis upon basic-level
peasant cadres.
There is strong evidence that Peking's effort
has failed to reduce the general level of dissidence
throughout China. Top level leaders have been un-
usually frank about the great amount of dissidence
that continues, and the tempo and content of the
campaigns of the past three years have reflected
a sense of frustration among the leaders.
In view of the earlier outbreaks of resist-
ance, perhaps the most important development of
the past three years has been the over-extension
and straining of the control apparatus that the
regime's reindoctrination efforts have involved.
This has brought top-level changes in the party's
organizations for control of youth and intellec-
tuals and the revival of peasant associations to
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supplement the basic-level rural cadres, but it is
probable that fundamental weakness remains.
If control weakness continues, it may again
combine with food shortages or inadequate leader-
ship to cause dissident elements to resist openly.
When this occurs, though, it is probable that lack
of organization for resistance and the innate
self-limitation of Chinese acting in groups will
prevent a Hungarian-style revolt, so long as over-
whelming force is still available to the Communist
regime.
While the regime at present can command com-
pliance and obedience, it is unable to arouse the
population from its political apathy. Since the
failure of the Great Leap Forward and the economic
disasters of 1959-1961, the gap between the revolu-
tionary goals of the leadership and the individual
materialistic goals of the people has widened.
The regime would like to recover some measure of the
revolutionary elan that the populace and the lower
level cadres once had and has been conducting per-
sistent and intense political indoctrination pro-
grams for this purpose. It is clear, however, that
these programs have been largely ineffective and
that dissidence remains high,
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DISSIDENCE
RESIS I TANCE
ORGANIZED
RESISTANCE
UNOR. ANIZ ED
RESIS ANCE
ACTIVE
RESISTANCE
a state of mind involving discontent
or disaffection with the regime.
dissidence translated into action,.
resistance which is carried out by a
group of individuals who have accepted
a common purpose, agreed upon leader-
ship, and worked out a communications
system.
resistance carried out by individual
or loosely associated groups which may
have been formed spontaneously for
certain limited objectives, without
over-all plan or strategy.
resistance, organized or unorganized,
which is conducted within the frame-
work of the resister's normal life and
duties, and involves deliberate non-
performance or malperformance of acts
which would benefit the regime, or de-
liberate nonconformity with standards
of conduct established by the regime.
resistance, organized or unorganiz'ed,
which expresses itself in positiiive
acts against the regime. It may or
may not: involve violence, and may be
conducted openly or clandestinely.
It may take such forms as intelligence
collection, psychological warfare,
sabotage, guerrilla warfare, assist-
ance in escape and evasion, open de-
fiance of authority, or preparatory
activity for any of the above.
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Past examples of resistance to Chinese Com-
munist rule provide a useful background for analy-
sis of the dissidence and potential resistance
that currently appears to be of major concern to
Peking,* On three occasions in the past 10 years
--during the period of "blooming and contending"
in May 1957; in the fall of 1960 in Honan province;
and in May 1962 on the Kwangtung - lon;; Long; border--
dissident groups actively resisted authority with
some effectiveness for significant periods of tine.**
In each case control was restored without great
difficulty, but not before fundamental weakness
had been revealed in the Communist regime's control
apparatus. The three dissident groups of the past
are the same ones toward which the regime is
directing its greatest indoctrination effort today--
the intellectuals, the youth, and the peasants.
The task of identifying resistance in China,
particularly at the time it is happening, is a dif-
ficult one. Many months passed before refugee re-
ports revealed the extent of student resistance in
May-June 19570 A full year passed after the large-
scale open resistance in Honan in the fall of 1960
had been qunnressed before word of it reached the
outside
The exo us
from Kwangtung Province to Hong ADVIIII as, of course,
closely observed from the beginning, but early in-
formation about possible reverberations elsewhere
in China was not available. In order better to
foresee and identify resistance in Communist China
existing definitions need to be filled out through
analysis of actual resistance.
*See facing page for definitions of key terns.
**.This study does not address the problem of dissidence and
resistance among ethnic minority groups in Tibet, Sinkiang,
and other ;carts of China .
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The three cases analyzed here have been studied
in some detail with the benefit of hindsight. The
following resumds attempt to bring out in a few
words the extent to which Peking was untuned to
the amount of dissidence in the groups concerned
and initially unclear on the amount of resistance
being generated. From these case studies certain
conclusions are drawn about basic factors of re-
s~istance in Communist China.
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II. RESISTANCE 1957-1962
Resistance of Intellectuals and Students, May-June 1957
At the beginning of May 1957 Peking launched
a major "rectification" campaign with an invitation
to intellectuals to criticize the working style of
party cadres. The resultant criticism got badly
out of hand and led students to resist authority
with violence. The first step in the campaign was
to convene forums among leaders of the non--Communist
"opposition" parties, outstanding professional
people, and academicians. These gatherings were
kept small and it was probably assumed by the regime
that only such evils as bureaucratism, subjectivism,
and party sectarianism would be criticized and not
basic Communist policies and programs. Criticism
did begin cautiously, but it remained within the
usual limits only for a few days. By the middle of
May it had become a torrent of outspoken criticism
by a large number of intellectuals aimed at the
regime's basic policies and programs as well as
the working style of its officials. The worst of
the criticism was confined to the discussion groups,
but enough of it appeared in newspapers throughout
China to make it clear to all that Peking had badly
misjudged the tractability of the country's intel-
lectuals.
Student criticism caused Palzing the greatest
embarrassment and trouble, for it was entirely
spontaneous and soon led to violence which spread
rapidly from Peking University to widely scattered
colleges and middle schools. Students had not been
encouraged to engage in the criticism of party
cadres and no special forums had been organized
for them. Nevertheless, students at Peking Univer-
sity began on May 19 to peat up posters voicing their
objections to school. administration. This quickly
led to open criticism of the same basic policies
and programs being attacked by the country's in-
tellectuals. Disciplinary actions within the schools
brought student demonstrations and these led to
violence, which was ultimately suppressed by force
in several places. Subsequently, three student
leaders at a middle school in the Wuhan area were
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ublicly executed in a show of the regime's concern
or preventing any revival of the traditional role
f Chinese students in resistance.
By the middle of June the criticism of intel-
ectuals and student:, had been silenced, but the
arsh antirightist campaign which followed served
o point up the fundamental gaps and weaknesses
hat had caused the rectification campaign to get
Out of hand. Peking's assessment of the amount of
nti-Communist feeling near the surface among in-
ellectuals had been completely wrong. In addition,
is reliance on cadres in many institutions, in-
cluding the schools, to keep the criticism within
pounds was misplaced. The leaders, themselves,
bowed initial confusion and disbelief in dealing
with the unexpected response to their invitation.
Finally, the transparent effort in the antiright-
st campaign to identify an organization and a
plot behind the resistance, and to blame certain
rominent non-Communist Party men for leading it,
bowed Peking's embarrassment over the fact that so
any dissidents had been able to act spontaneously
in the same way, at the same time.
Peasant Resistance in Honan Province, 1960
In the late summer and early fall of 1960
resistance took place in many parts of Honan Prov-
nce as a result of severe food shortages. Large
groups of people were involved, but their resistance
vas essentially unorganized and remained in pockets.
n some cases leadership was provided by disaffected
ilitia units, while in others militia men turned
andits provoked the resistance of peasants. In
ost cases the resistance involved raids on state
rain stocks and open defiance of authority. Henan
as but one of several provinces which had severe
ood shortages in 1959-60, but the Honan peasants
load suffered particularly under the national pattern
of extreme change in collectivization and experi
rientation in agriculture and industry. The hard-
hip in Honan was probably traceable, in part, to
ivalry at the top level of provincial authority.
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 In October 1960 the resistance in one county
of Honan reached a scale that brought forceful: sup-
pression throughout the province. The 19Hsin-yang
Incident" probably involved the killing of several
hundred peasants and it prompted Peking to make a
high-level investigation of the security situation
throughout Honan, and to dispatch army work units
to the "disaster areas." The investigation in
Honan and other provinces revea e i a state of.de-
terioration in the militia that shocked Peking
into dismantling the militia organization through-
out China. The process of restoring control in
Honan brought out the great demoralization that had
occurred in the ranks of the lower-level cadres.'
It also showed that it was the deterioration of
local authority that had emboldened the peasants
to express their dissident feelings in resistance
over a period of several months.
The Exodus of Young Industrial and Farm workers
From wang ung Province to Hong Kong, ay
In May 1962 the program for relieving urban
population pressure in Kwangtung Province got out
of hand and revelled that dissidence among young
industrial and farm workers was both widespread
and easily surfaced. T grin had ordered Kwangtung
officials to reduce urban population in the.province
by some 30 percent--without resorting to force.
Officials tried to meet this insoluble problem in
part by encouraging further emigration to Hong
Kong, mainly of unemployed relatives of Overseas
Chinese.
The granting of exit permits from Kwangtung
to a selected portion of the population had in-
creased steadily since the fall of 1961 as the
program for moving surplus urban residents to the
rural areas became bogged down in the face of their
resistance. The imposition of new high quotas for
urban depopulation in April 1962 caused Kwangtung
authorities to encourage further emigration. Heavy
issuance of exit permits by the cadres concerned
brought a clogging of the normal emigration route
through Canton by land to Macao and by sea to Hong
Kong. In an effort to facilitate the movement of
authorized emigrants, the holders of exit permits
were encouraged to cross the land border to Hong
Kong in numbers far exceeding the quasi-official
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,quota acceptable to the Hong Kong Government.
All normal restrictions on this exit route were
,lifted by the Communists on the first of May.
News of this change spread quickly through t
the counties adjacent to Hong Kong and within three
weeks some 100,000 people had surged toward the
'border. In the same period, the emigrant group';
came to be dominated by young people without exit
authorization leaving from the rural counties it
the border areas. A total of more than 50,000
people from Kwangtung made it through the weak
controls on the Hong Kong side before these were
greatly tightened and rumors of a clamp down by
kwangtung authorities caused the flow to slacken.
On 24-25 May the flow of people toward the
land border was suddenly shut off altogether with
no great difficulty, but by then Peking's initial
miscalculation of the people's readiness to act,
and basic weakness in the provincial control ap-
paratus had been made clear. When the land bar-.
tiers were thrown up again on the Kwangtung side,
any of the would-be emigrants who held exit per-
its were siphoned off through the cleared-up Macao
route despite increased efforts of the Hong Kon$,
police to prevent illegal entry by water. The i"rus-
ration of tr, these who had hoped to leave with-
Out exit permits led to rioting in Canton during
the first week of June, but the actions of regular
security forces and the conspicuous presence of"'
regular army troops kept the situation there under
control. The rapid subsidence of the surge toward
the border from adjacent rural areas tended to con-
firm the basic tractability of the peasants that
had probably weighed heavily, along with the natural
difficulties of the overland route and the c;:-_C_
dation of effective Hong Kong deterrence, in the'
initial decision to open the Kwangtung border. The
4pontaneous rush for the border by so many young
eople had clearly not been anticipated, and it is
doubtful that a clear, picture of this development
in the exodus got through quickly to the top leaders
in Peking. They were apparently preoccupied with
Other problems at the time, but the major reindoc-
O't,rination effort initiated in the following Sep
t'ember showed that the Kwangtung exodus had been
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recognized by Peking as an important example of the
problem of dissidence and control in China.
Basic Factors of Resistance
The above cases of resistance have certain
aspects in common. In all three cases Peking's
leaders miscalculated the people's readiness to go
against the expectations of the regime and also
their alertness to the opportunities for doing so.,
which local circumstances offered. Delay in top-
level recognition of the extent of people's.ac-
tions in each case probably stemmed from reluct-.
ance to admit basic miscalculation of the amount
of dissidence being manifested, but it may also
have been due in part to misinformation.
In all three cases above, the same basic
factor caused the resistance to get going, to de-
velop its momentum, and to subside. This was the
propensity of the people involved to act in the
same way at the same time without plans, organiza-
tion, or more than word-of-mouth coordination.
During the period of "blooming and contending" in-
tellectuals and students sensed that the opportunity
had come for them to criticize the regitme"s basic
policies with relative impunity. Once the chain re-
action started the multiplication of participants
was very rapid. In the same way, though, group in-
stinct caused the atmosphere of resistance to
evaporate once the re;:;. ?._a' signal of counterat-
tack was sounded. This cycle can be seen also
in the Kwangtung exodus. A great many people hit
the road for the border on the assumption that many
others would be doing the same, at the same time,
and that local authorities would be temporarily
overwhelmed. Then, when rumors of a clamp-down
spread and time appeared to be running out, the
pressure behind the flow suddenly dropped. In
the case of peasant resistance in Ronan, the in-
stinct for survival probably had the effect of
limiting group action in many parts of the prov-
ince. At the same time, there undoubtedly were in-
stances other than the "Hsin-yang Incident" when
sheer hunger and the chain reaction of mutual en-
couragement among peasants simply went to completion
and brought forceful suppression. A mob, after all,
is a mob anywhere in the world. The examples above
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indicate, however, that group instinct for self-
limitation in the face of superior force may be
particularly well developed in China.
The amount of multiplication and limitation'
of resistance in the above examples indicates that
the terms "passive resistance" and "active resist-
~nce" may have special meaning as applied to Com-
munist China. In these examples, dissident in-
dividuals engaged in .alperfornance of required ac-
(ions or openly resisted authority, with limited
nmediate objectives, but their sensitivity as a
roup to weakness in the control apparatus con-
siderably magnified their resistance efforts. At
the first sign of strong suppressive action, how.
ever, contraction of the group's "active" resist-
ance was accelerated by the individual's basically
passive instincts.
The examples show that the Communist regime's
control apparatus had been effective in preventing
t e formation of significant resistance organiza-
tions in China, but that it was not able to pre
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v nt dissidence from 'becoming resistance under cer-
t in circumstances. In the three cases the cir-
c instances triggering the resistance ranged from
the regime's own misjudgment to severe food short-
akes. All the examples had one thing in common--
the presence of weakness among government and party
c dres at the basic level of direct contact with
the people.
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M. DISSIDENCE, 1.962-1965
' 'he najor developments in the control process over
th