BHUTAN BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000300020003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 2, 1965
• Content Type: IS

Approued For Release 2003
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2 April 1965
OCI No, 1105/65
Copy No,
INTEL' IGENCE STUDY
BHUTAN BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
11GROUP I
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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FOREWORD
Bhutan between India and China is another paper
in OCP s series of Intelligence Studies. These research
papers are aimed at situations where study and analysis
in some depth seems likely to clarify the nature of a
long-standing US security problem, to give timely
warning about an emerging problem, or to assist the
policy maker in considering ways of coping with such
problems. OCI Intelligence Studies appear on no definite
schedule but rather as a suitable subject happens to
coincide with the availability of the special manpower
resources required. Because OCPs production
capabilities are very limited, these papers are never
expected to be numerous.
Comments should be directed to the Office of
Current Intelligence.
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CONTENTS
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Page
FOREWORD
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
I. Bhutan Between India and China 1
II. Land and People 3
III. Economic Problems 7
IV. Internal Problems 11
V. Indian Relationship and Influence 15
VI. Chinese Relationship and Influence.. 19
VII. Nepalese and Pakistani Relationship
and Influence 25
VIII. Possibilities of a Sino-Indian Con-
frontation 27
Annex
I. The Geography of Bhutan 29
Graphics
1. Photo Traditional Bhutanese Militia-
man 4
2. Map Bhutan Land Use (following page) 7
3. Photo Section of Motorable Road 8
4. Photo Royal Family 12
5. Photo Lhendup Dorji 13
6. Photo Great Himalayan Terrain Along
Tibet Border 29
7. Photo Paro Valley 30
8. Photo Duars Plain Near Indian Bor-
der 31
9. Map Bhutan population (following page) 31
10. Map Bhutan (following page) 32
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The situation in Bhutan, an isolated, semi-
independent Himalayan border state pressed between
the Tibetan plateau and India's Brahmaputra plain,
offers a potential threat to Indian security. In-
dia's efforts tomaintain a predominant influence in
the country and thus to block any Chinese Communist
efforts at penetration are complicated by antifor-
eign sentiment and internal instability in Bhutan.
Geography not only makes Bhutan a strategic
buffer state but it also is in large part responsi-
ble for Bhutan's unusually primitive conditions.
Mountain ranges of over 20,000 feet fragment the
country into separate valleys, each ruled by a par-
ticular clam or clans. There are no towns or indus-
try, and the authority of King Wangchuck is narrowly
circumscribed by the powers of local lords and Bud-
dhist lamas.
During the past year or two, Bhutan's politi-
cal stability has been increasingly threatened by
local intrigue, and recent efforts to modernize
the country have contributed to the problem. Exter-
nal assistance in road building and other develop-
ment efforts has come almost entirely from India,
but these efforts have aroused anti-Indian feeling
among the Bhutanese. One branch of the powerful
Dorji family provided the royal prime minister for
some years and led the modernization effort, but
in November 1964 apparently lost out--at least tem-
porarily--to a more conservative group of royal
advisers.
The limited intelligence available on the area
includes no indications that Peiping is attempting
to establish a strong Chinese position in Bhutan,
but there are many exploitable opportunities. Should
China gain such a position, India, which now leaves
its border with Bhutan almost totally unmanned, might
face the problem of Chinese agents--and possibly mil-
itary personnel--within 25 miles of the principal ac-
cess routes to the disputed North East Frontier Agency,
which was the scene of a major Indian defeat during
the 1962 Chinese invasion.
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I. BHUTAN BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA
The Bhutanese political crises of 1964 were
a matter of special interest to New Delhi because
this Indian-oriented mountain state is a vulnerable
part of India's frontier with Communist China; the
Indian-Bhutanese border would be hard to defend and
has long been virtually unmanned. Indian concern
over a possbile increase in Chinese influence in
semi-independent Bhutan arises not from any known
Chinese intention to upset the status quo, but
rather from certain inherent vulnerabilities of
this backward area to Chinese subversion, accom-
panied by the recent increases in internal politi-
cal tensions. Various topographical, ethnic, and
political factors make Bhutan not only a backward
but also a divided country, where the king must com-
pete for influence with a number of local feudal
Lords and where such modernization as has occurred
seems to have heightened political antagonisms with-
out having significantly strengthened central polit-
ical controls.
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II. LAND AND PEOPLE
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Occupying some 240 miles of the Sino-Indian
borderland, mostly at altitudes ranging from 5,000
to 24,000 feet, the Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan is
one of the more remote countries of the world. Its
location and terrain make Bhutan potentially dif-
ficult for either India or China to control effec-
tively; the rugged mountainous terrain divides and
compartmentalizes the country, creating great com-
munication problems and helping to perpetuate local
ethnic and political differences. The most impor-
tant fact governing the life and activities of
most Bhutanese--religious and lay, noble and com-
mon--is the valley from which they come, each val-
ley being distinct in its history and character.
Historically, the major rivals for power have been
the barons of the Paro and Ha valleys of western
Bhutan and those, like the present King, who were
barons of the Tongsa Valley in central Bhutan. King
Wangchuck currently rules from Thimbu. (See annex
I: The Geography of Bhutan.)
Bhutan's culture and form of government are
derived from Tibet, just as the ruling Bhotias
themselves are descended from Tibetan invaders of
the 9th Century A.D. The Tibetan dialect of Den-
jong-ke is commonly spoken and Tibetan ways of liv-
ing are widely followed, but Tibetan authority was
never effectively established in Bhutan and the
Bhotias have a clear sense of separateness from
their former suzerains. It was fear of domination
from the north which made the Bhotias willing to
allow first Britain and then India to exercise a
protective control over their foreign relations.
There are three main ethnic groups in Bhutan.
The ruling Bhotias make up about 60 percent of
the country's 850,000 population and occupy the
fertile valleys of the western Inner Himalayas.
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Another 15 percent of the popula-
tion, found principally in the east-
ern Inner Himalayas, are of aborig-
ine stock. These aborigines have a
less developed culture than the
Bhotias and are considered inferior
by them. Although slavery has been
abolished, they have traditionally
been the Bhotias' slaves or menial
servants. Unlike the Bhotias, the
aborigines have a castelike divi-
sion. Their religion is a Druk-pa
Buddhism strongly influenced by
primitive spirit worship. The east-
-tern aborigines are politically
sUbservient to the Bhotias, but the
area's poor communications, as well
aS the ineffectiveness of the gov-
ernment bureaucracy and army has
permitted the overwhelming majority
of the aborigines to be relatively
unaffected by Bhotia culture or
government. There probably is some degree of hos-
tility between the two groups.
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TRADITIONAL BHUTANESE
MILITIAMAN
The remaining 25 percent of Bhutan's population
are ethnic Nepalese in the duars, the southern part
of the country bordering the Indian plain. This
group has most of its social and economic ties with
India, Sikkim, and Nepal.
Bhutan is further divided by religious differ-
ences, though nearly allits inhabitants profess some
variety of Buddhism. Druk-pa (Red Hat) Buddhism is
the state religion, and the King is its head; nearly
a quarter of the state's revenue goes to support some
4,000 Red Hat lamas--or Buddhist monks--living in
eight major lamaseries, principally in the more pop-
ulous western part of the country. The reformed (Yel-
low Hat) Dalai Lama sect, which is the preponderant re-
ligious group in Tibet and is less influenced than the
Druk-pa sect by the native animism of the area, also
has some adherents in Bhutan; these are viewed by the
monarch and his Red Hat supporters with reserve, if
not hostility. Also under royal disfavor is the small
owang Movement, consisting of a few influential lamas
Who recognize as their religious leader not King
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Wangchuck but the head of the Towang Monastery in
India. The Indian Government, however, has ap-
parently not supported the Towang Lama as a po-
litical rival to the King.
Bhutan's lamas exercise considerable politi-
cal influence, partly because of their general
prestige and partly because of family ties with
the feudal aristocracy. Although Druk-pa Bud-
dhism is a barely institutionalized religion,
Bhutan's numerous dzongs (monastery-forts)
serve as centers of religiousas well as of mil-
itary and social activity. The lamas are drawn
from both the feudal aristocracy and the ordinary
farmers, but there is a stong tendency for the
lamas closely related to the lay aristocracy to
become most influential. The division between the
ruling feudal-lama group and the peasant farmers
is more important in Bhutanese society than any
division between religious and lay leaders.
Probably the most important line of divi-
sion in Bhutan is that between clans. In gen-
eral, each valley is dominated by a particular
clan or clans, and in important political dis-
putes the line-up between opposing sides is most
frequently by clan. There is a strong tendency
for individual lamas, as well as homogeneous lama-
series, to ally themselves with specific clans
rather than form independent political organiza-
tions.
The clans vary in influence. Broadly speak-
ing, they are divided into two group. Those clans
which claim descent from Bhutan's first Bhotia
ruler (the first Dharma Raja) are called Chu-je
or Chos-rje (of which King Wangchuck is a member)
and have the greatest influence; certain of these
clans traditionally hold the highest secular and
religious posts. There is also a larger, but
slightly less influential, group of clans--the Wa
or Wang--which are descendants of the first Dharma
Raja's followers. The number, functions, and re-
lations of these two major clan groups are not
clear; there appear to be various internal fac-
tions and rivalries.
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III. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Bhutan is almost wholly undeveloped. It has
no towns, no industry, no public electricity, and
no currency of its own. (It uses Indian finan-
cial facilities to the extent it requires them.)
Less than one percent of its population is lit-
erate. Most of the population are farmers, the
remainder being shepherds. Living standards are
primitive, although the average citizen is ade-
quately fed and clothed.
Although little of Bhutan's land can be cul-
tivated, there is no land shortage. Peasants fre-
quently move fromoneareatoanother if they believe
their original home to be unproductive or, as is
frequently the reason, if they believe it to be
unlucky. All land theoretically belongs to the
King and the peasants must pay rent, in kind or
Tabor, which serves the same function as taxes.
The level of taxation is probably not onerous,
though it is a source of dissatisfaction. The
local lord, or dzongpen, has a group of retain-
ers who collect from the peasants, usually
through the clan, joint family, or valley head-
man. Royal revenue is apparently derived from
the area which the ?King directly rules, espe-
cially his family barony of Tongsa Dzong, as well
as from Indian subsidies. He probably receives
some tribute from the nobility. Most of the
revenue goes to support the ruling class and the
lamas. In return, the rulers are expected to
maintain order and to protect the peasants.
New taxes and labor levies have occasioned
substantial dissatisfaction. Bhutan, however, is
one country not affected by the "revolution of
rising expectations" and the government has been
under no pressure to encourage economic develop-
ment. Potential for development exists in the
country's considerable natural resources--coal
deposits, rivers suitable for hydroelectric proj-
ects, and extensive forests. These resources
are largely unexploited because of primitive com-
munications.
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In 1960, King Wangchuck decided that his coun-
try's ability to resist foreign influence as well
as the long-term stability of the monarchy required
that he modernize Bhutan's social and economic
structure. A network of roads was considered a
necessary first step. Bhutan was then virtually
roadless and its rivers are not navigable. At pres-
ent the only significant link between the Brahma-
putra-Gangetic plains and the Inner Himalaya iS the
poorly maintained road from Phuntsholing to the Paro
Valley in western Bhutan. The Indians have built
another road from the eastern Bhutanese valley of
Tashi Gang Dzong to the Indian city of Dew-angri;
this road, however, is designed as part of an
al-
ternative route to the Indian city of Tawang from
the Indian plains rather than as a link to Bhutan.
There are no roads to Communist-dominated Tibet,
nor are any planned, but there is an extensive net-
work of trails.
SECTION OF MOTORABLE ROAD
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The source of external aid for economic develop-
ment in Bhutan is almost exclusively India, and al-
most all the funds to date have been earmarked for
roadbuilding or other forms of communication re-
lated to India's defense such as bridges and air-
fields. Between 1947 and the Chinese invasion of
India in 1962, Indian aid to Bhutan came to about
$3.7 million. India is now committed to spend $36.7
million on Bhutanese development over the period
1961-66. This is in addition to the $105,000 yearly
grant which new Delhi is obligated by treaty to give
to the monarchy.
Apart from strategic considerations, India also
has purely economic motives in seeking to improve
Bhutanese transportation. It would like to draw on
the modest rice surplus which, along with certain
Tibetan-style art work, has long been Bhutan's chief
export. Previously the rice went north to Tibet,
but since the Tibetan revolt of 1959 this market
has been partially closed to Bhutanese trade. In
addition, India is planning an 18,000-kw. hydro-
electric power project on the Jaldhaka River that
will require construction work along the Bhutanese
border. Work on this project appears to be sus-
pended at the present time, however.
So far, however, Indian aid has not improved
the Bhutanese standard of living nor improved the
Indian image in Bhutan. For the most part, Indian
aid has had an unsettling effect. Many Bhutanese
resent the forced labor levies required by road
building and dislike the arrogant attitude of the
Indian supervisors. Recent Indian statements that
Bhutan will not be able to absorb the amount of
aid earmarked for it, and indications that India
may not try to defend any of Bhutan except the
southern border area suggest that India's aid will
continue to be modest.
On the whole, the Bhutanese Government has
been displeased with the level of Indian aid and
has been casting about, with India's reluctant
consent, for help from other countries. Through
its membership in the Colombo Plan for mutual aid
among countries with interests in South and Southeast
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Asia, Bhutan has received some small amounts of aid
from fellow members and hopes to gain more. In ad-
dition, negotiations have long been under way with
a Swedish firm for a paper mill, and Japan has
tentatively agreed to set up a rayon mill. A few
French nuns reportedly have been admitted to help
modernize Bhutan's primitive medical facilitie$; a
few English schoolteachers reportedly have been
hired for Bhutan's 70 government-run schools. For
the foreseeable future, however, Bhutan will have
to rely on India for most of its aid.
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IV. INTERNAL PROBLEMS
The composition and policy of the the govern-
ment of Bhutan are determined essentially by the
clan alliances of local feudal lords and politi-
cally influential lamas, and by the relation of
these leaders to royal authority and to the Indian
presence. Little is probably known outside the
country, however, about the composition and dy-
namics of these alliances at any given moment.
Besides these long-standing determinants of
Bhutanese events, a new and important factor has
been the limited modernization Bhutan has been un-
dergoing for five years. Modernization will, of
course, benefit some members of the ruling group
and hurt others, but to the extent it affects weap-
ons and communications it clearly tends to
strengthen the royal authority at the expense of
local lords. Probably the great majority of the
ruling group, besides being influenced by charac-
teristic lamaistic convervatism, fear that major
changes in traditional Bhutanese isolation, customs,
and laws would endanger their authority. A small
but highly effective faction led by the Dorji family
of the Ha Valley, however, had, until the Dorjis
were ousted in late November 1964, managed to guide
the government's policies toward increased con-
tact abroad and, to a lesser extent, toward reform
at home. The Dorjis had been the pre-eminent feudal
family, second only to the royal dynasty, from the
early part of the century when the Wangchuck dynasty
came to power. The Dorjis' pre-eminence in southern
Bhutan and their position as Bhutan's principal rep-
resentative abroad encouraged them and their follow-
ers to advocate further foreign contact; at the same
time, this advocacy aroused the apprehensions of
their rivals.
Limited evidence suggests that the relative
influence of the modernizers and the traditionalists
at any particular time is dependent on King Wang-
chuck's attitude. Very little is known about the
character of the King, however, and his outward ac-
tions on modernization have vacillated. He ascended
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the throne in 1952 at the age of 25, his education
presumably having been confined to Bhutan. Upon as-
suming the throne, he probably came somewhat under
the influence of the older and somewhat cosmopolitan
prime minister, Jigme Dorji. In 1953, the Kin'
married Jigme's sister, Ashi Kesang, and in 19,0 he
supported the Dorji-inspired program of internal re-
form and increased contact with the outside world.
He also established in 1955, a 130-man national
assembly, or Tsongdu. Although a quarter of the mem-
bership is appointed by the King and some additional
seats are held by leading lamas, the majority Of as-
sembly members are village leaders elected by the
heads of families in each valley. The Tsongdu has
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met fairly regularly and debated government policy.
It does not, however, enjoy legislative power, its
influence being limited to criticism and advice.
The King is also advised by an appointed eight-man
royal council.
Apparently, as the King grew older he came in-
creasingly in conflict with his prime minister. All
those who opposed the Dorjis for various reasons,
including of course the traditionalists, came to see
an opportunity in the growing conflict between the
King and the Dorjis. In April of 1964, when the
King was in Europe under treatment for his heart
condition, a group of traditionalist army officers
aided by the King's high-born mistress, Yan-ki, as-
sassinated Jigme Dorji. The King was rushed home
from Geneva, and with Indian prompting, he arrested,
tried, and executed some of the leaders of the plot.
Many of those involved in the plot, however, includ-
ing Yan-ki, remained in the King's favor.
Six months after Jigme's
assassination, the King return-
ed to Switzerland, leaving the
country in the care of his per-
sonal assistant, who is known as
Derek; Jigme's brother, 30-year-
old Prime Minister Lhendup
Dorji; and the commander of the
Bhutanese Army, Brigadier Ugyen
Thangpi. Frictions grew between
those loyal to Derek and those
loyal to Lhendup; Derek claimed,
like the previous conspirators,
that the Dorjis were plotting to
increase their authority. The
Derek group intimidated the
Dorji faction, and Lhendup's
principal allies--including
Brigadier Thangpi--fled to Nepal
before the King's return. King
Wangchuck met Lhendup in Switzerland and directed him
to stay out of the country indefinitely.
LHENDUP DORM
Upon his return to Bhutan, the King assumed the
functions of prime minister and replaced the Dorji
allies with more conservative men. The principal
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change he made was the appointment of his half-
brother, Dasho Wangchuck, as commander of the
Bhutanese Army. In the event of the King's death,
absence, or prolonged incapacitation, Dasho would
also be acting head of the Bhutanese Government
during the minority of King Tangchuck's son, who
is now about 10 years old.
Apparently, this anti-Dorji group, consist-
ing of major Bhutanese traditionalists as well as
some anti-Dorji modernizers, enjoy the King's sup-
port. This group is probably also supported by the
Indian Government, which may anticipate that the
lessening of Dorji influence will give it broader
influence.
The future policies of this group, however,
are obscure. Although many of its members in the
past opposed modernization, the group may benefit
--through graft, control of modern weapons, and
commercial operations--from the Dorji-inspired
modernizing policies, and thus become more sym-
pathetic to those policies. Many of its members,
moreover, probably opposed the Dorjis for reasons
having nothing to do with modernization. Their
ability to work together for positive policies is
still largely untested. A further factor makin0
for instability is the possibility that the ousted
Dorjis will attempt some kind of political comeback.
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V. INDIAN RELATIONSHIP AND INFLUENCE
India formally refers to Bhutan as a "pro-
tected area," indicates on official maps that the
Indo-Bhutanese boundary is not an international
one, and in public statements avoids characteriz-
ing Bhutan as a sovereign country. The Indo-
Bhutanese treaty of 1949 assures Bhutan's internal
autonomy but requires that it be guided in its
foreign policy by Indian advice. This is substan-
tially the same relationship as that established
with Great Britain in 1907.
Consequently, the Dorjis, presumably with the
King's support, had steadily attempted to downgrade
the foreign policy clause when they were in power.
Bhutan's leaders apparently recognize the
mutual dependence involved in India's need of their
country as a buffer state and Bhutan's need of In-
dian support to retain even its present limited in-
dependence. As late as the summer of 1962, the
government of India stated that it would "insure
the protection and inviolability of the territory
of Bhutan," but it has no obligation by treaty to
do so. Inde3d, Indian military planning suggests
that the Indian Army does not intend to defend the
Inner or Great Himalaya area in the event of a Chi-
nese move into these areas.
New Delhi would, however, probably use its
armed forces--stationed in Bhutan for road build-
ing and for training the Bhutanese--and its intel-
ligence service to attempt to counter a Chinese
subversive or paramilitary threat.
India's influence in Bhutan has increased over
the past few years. The period after Jigme's as-
sassination in April 1964 offered enhanced opportun-
ities for the expansion of Indian influence. Divided
on the issue of modernization as well as divided over
their personal relation to the Dorjis, Bhutan's rul-
ing circles were probably not able to present their
customary united front against the Indians. Moreover,
the key role played by the Indians in the restoration
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of the Dorjis at that time probably also warned
those Bhutanese--modernizers as well as tradi-
tionalists--who might have worked openly against
the Indians. Furthermore, the anti-Indian forces
have had difficulty in finding an appropriate
leader. The King's health was uncertain and in
the period just after his return to Bhutan follOw-
ing the assassination, he apparently followed In-
dian direction in most respects.
The new prime minister, Lhendup Dorji, was
young, inexperienced, and lacked political tact.
By late summer 1964, he appeared in his public
statements to be increasingly amenable to Indian
influence. After his ouster in the winter of that
year, however, Lhendup stated that he believed the
Indians were responsible for his removal. The In-
dian intention was, according to Lhendup, to re'-
place the Dorjis with officials, preferably Indians,
who would be controlled by New Delhi.
Those who have now replaced the Dorjis as the
King's principal advisers are probably no less anti-
Indian than the Dorjis--possibly more so--and many
of them have in the past opposed the modernizing
policies advanced by the Dorlis and supported bV
New Delhi.
The King,
moreover, will require at least some Westernized
officials for certain technical and representational
functions and may now--in the absence of the Dorjis
--have to rely on Indians for those posts. Pre-
viously, Bhutan's very limited foreign relationS
had been carried on by the Dorjis.
India provides Bhutan with military and
telligence training which is specifically aimed at
countering Chinese subversion. India has 200 t6
400 officers stationed near Thimbu for trainine
purposes and several times that number working On
Bhutan's roads. The Indians are now training part
of the Bhutanese militia, which numbers between
1,500 and 5,000. In addition, Indian officers are
scheduled to help train and equip more personnel
for Bhutan's inadequate northern border checkpoSts
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These checkpost personnel are at present ill
equipped, ill trained, and probably largely in-
effective in preventing infiltration from Tibet.
India also helps support checkposts to the south
at Phuntsholing, at Chucka at the junction of the
Wong Chu and Pa Chu rivers, and at the branching
of the road to Paro Dzong and Thimbu.
Currently without Indian aid, Bhutanese
security forces are probably competent to suppress
local and uncoordinated revolts, but probably would
25X1 be unable to counter a major Chinese subversive ef-
fort. /
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Ke ceF2 18% Tb
VI. CHINESE RELATIONSHIP AND INFLUENCE
Bhutan fell under formal Chinese suzerainty
about 1720 with China's conquest of Tibet, and
tribute was paid and annual messages were exchanged
sporadically throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.
In 1876-77 China supported Bhutanese resistance to
British suggestions for road building, in 1885 the
Chinese mediated an internal dispute, and in 1890
China selected the senior feudal lord in Bhutan.
During this period, the British Imperial Govern-
ment was not consistent in treating Bhutan as either
a subject or as an independent government.
In 1907, a treaty was signed between Great
Britain and the ruler of Bhutan which effectively
recognized Bhutan as a separate country under Brit-
ish protection and guidance. Chinese governments
have neither publicly accepted nor strongly pro-
tested this arrangement. Independent India has
substantially continued the policies established by
Great Britain.
The Chinese Communists over the years have
published several maps showing portions of Bhutan
as Chinese territory. Peiping, however, dropped
some of these "map claims" in maps published in 1962
and apparently does not intend to make an issue of
them. Chinese unwillingness to acknowledge Indian
responsibility for Bhutan's foreign relations and
Bhutan's unwillingness--at least publicly--to deal
with the Chinese have prevented border negotiations
or any formal ties between the two.
Bhutan and China maintained fairly amiable
relations until the Chinese suppression of the 1959
Tibetan rebellion. At that time certain enclaves
in Tibet over which Bhutan had long exercised a
quasi-sovereignty were taken away. The loss of
these enclaves, combined with the disorder in Tibet,
the more than 4,000 Tibetan refugees who entered
Bhutan, and the subsequent deterioration of Sino-
Indian relations led Bhutan to attempt to close its
northern borders in 1959 or 1960. During the 1962
Chinese invasion of India, China stated that its
troops would not enter Bhutanese territory so long
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as Bhutan maintained its neutralityl
A major Chinese asset in Bhutan is the Bhutanese
fear and dislike of the Indians, and the unavaila-
bility of any power except China which could effec-
tively counterbalance India's influence. Potential
opportunities for China are also present in Bhutan's
long-standing ethnic and religious differences and in
the rivalries of the clans and feudal lords.
Although there is no hard evidence of any
Chinese effort to exploit the situation in Bhutan,
Bhutan's isolation is such that a substantial Chinese
influence in the countryside or at court could be
present without being authoritatively reported to
the West.
smuggling?rice from Bhutan, wool ana salt Irom
Tibet--continues across the border. It would not
be difficult for Chinese agents to make repeated
clandestine crossings of sections of the frontier
that are well provided with trails, although it is
unlikely that major units could move across the
border undetected at any one time.
The Chinese also have some means of exploiting
Bhutanese religious differences, particularly through
the use of friendly Tibetans. Although King Wangchuck
is formally head of the Druk-pa church, historically
there have been competing religious offices: the Deb
Raja, who was the king's religious equal until 1907,
and a shabdung, a very senior religious leader who
Was active until at least 1917. In the past two
ears, there have been reports of renewed activity
by shabdungs, some of whom, allegedly, have been
urdered at the king's direction. India may be in
ontact with a shabdung whom New Delhi may be planning
o support at some future time. There is, of course,
possibility that the Chinese may be doing the same.
Rumors have also circulated that the Chinese are
larboring a Deb Raja, who could serve as a rallying
rint for many dissatisfied elements.
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Presently, the lamas are not unified, but tend
to ally themselves with feudal lords of their own
clan. Nevertheless, a strong religious leader with
a pro-Chinese political orientation--possibly with
support from Tibet--would be a likely rallying point
for dissatisfied or ambitious Bhutanese, lay and
religious.
Outside the Bhotia community, the ethnic Nepalese
minority of the duars poses a minor subversive threat
which may be susceptible to Chinese exploitation.
Forbidden to enter the Inner Himalaya, the industrious
Nepalese have virtually made southern Bhutan an ethnic
extension of Nepal. They feel no loyalty toward the
King, and the monarchy considers them foreigners. The
Nepalese, however, have little interest in opposing
the already slight authority of the government and for
the most part are politically apathetic. It is highly
unlikely that this group could do more than embarrass
and strain the government security forces.
The Bhutan State Congress, an organization which
seeks to represent the Nepalese, is small and weak.
It calls for some type of separation for the duars'
area: autonomy, independence, or connection with a
"Great Nepal" consisting of Nepal and the Nepalese-
dominated areas of Sikkim, northern India, and Bhutan.
The leader of the Bhutan State Congress, D. B. Gurung,
is now in exile in Siliguri, West Bengal. A civil
disobedience campaign was undertaken in the Bhutanese
village of Sarbhang in 1954, and infrequent rumors of
Nepalese discontent have since been beard.
The Bhutanese State Congress could not effect
its separatist demands without the aid of an outside
power. The situation is capable of exploitation by
the Chinese, even though they have no direct access
to the duars, which are geographically contiguous to
India. One access would be through Sikkim, where
China is rumored to have agents. There are also
about 1,000 Communist Party of India members--most
of them Chinese-oriented--in the Darjeeling district
of West Bengal who could also be used to infiltrate
the duars and to encourage subversion.
Of all possibilities for subversion, however,
one involving the Nepalese would be most difficult
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for the Chinese, least likely to endanger the govern-
ment at Thimbu, and easiest for the Indian Government
to counter.
25X1
There are persistent reports--none of them con-
firmed, however--of Chinese attempts to form ailiances
with various feudal leaders. Indians with contacts
in Bhutan have at various times asserted that the Dorji
group, the anti-Dorji group or even the King himself
have been in regular contact with the Chinese. Reports
have also been received of clandestine radio messages
being broadcast from Bhutan by Chinese sympathizers
or agents. Some senior officials around the King are
said to be ethnic Chinese who have acquired Bhutanese
citizenship. One Bhutanese leader, Wang-di, is overtly
pro-Chinese and has lived in Tibet since he fled the
country in 1959.
The King commands fairly reliable support through-
out the country and it would be difficult for the
Chinese to subvert his authority at this time. He has,
however, a history of severe heart attacks, most
recently in March 1963. Despite frequent statements
from the palace affirming the King's complete re-
covery, it is probable that both his vigor and life
expectancy have been reduced. A prolonged period of
royal incapacity--probably involving his absence from
the country--or the King's death would disturb Bhutan's
already unstable politics and strongly enhance Chinese
opportunities in the area. The King's authority would
probably be replaced by a regency, presumably headed
by his half-brother,Dasho, who is now commander of
Bhutan's army and who in the past has been associated
with traditionalist elements. His character and
sympathies are even more obscure than those of the
King. The death of the King could produce a sharp
conflict among rivals for power; the Queen Mother--a
trong opponent of the Dorjis--might be prominent in
such a struggle.
The danger of an unsophisticated Bhutanese
government inviting a strong Chinese presence, possi-
ly supported at some future time by military or
quasi-military forces, into the country out of pique
r fear of the Indians is an ever-present possibility,
nd would become greater in the event of the King's
death or incapacitation. The prospects for China's
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establishing its influence within Bhutan without a
formal invitation depend not so much on Bhutan's
ability to resist such an incursion, which is
marginal, but on Chinese intentions. It is unlikely
that the Chinese would make a move so provocatory to
both the Indians and Bhutanese as one involving
direct military force. Much more likely would be
a subversive or a paramilitary effort.
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VII. NEPALESE AND PAKISTANI
RELATIONSHIP AND INFLUENCE
Bhutan's internal politics may be further un-
settled--to Chinese advantage--by the activities
of Nepal and Pakistan, both of which feel threat-
ened by India, and both of which would like to see
India's influence in Bhutan lessened.
After the dismissal of Lhendup and his follow-
ers, five supporters of the deposed prime minister
fled to Nepal. There they were well received and
were permitted to make anti-Indian statements.
These refugees reaffirmed their loyalty to the King
but stated that their removal was part of an attempt
by India to secure control over Bhutan. It was
rumored that Lhendup Dorji would join his followers
by going to Nepal via Pakistan.
The existence of a group of exiled dissidents
who probably retain the support of substantial ad-
herents in Bhutan itself is a constant threat to
King Wangchuck's authority and to Indian influence.
Indian support of exiled Nepalese insurgents is "
still sharply recalled in Nepal, and Pakistan has
in the past given arms and training to dissident
Indian tribal elements.
Nepal, which feels itself in danger of being
absorbed by India, would like to see another Hima-
layan state achieve full independence. Prospects
for a Pan-Himalayan state, consisting of Nepal,
Bhutan, and Sikkim, capable of resisting Indian
influence would be enhanced by an independent
Bhutan. Pakistan, which also fears India, would
probably be willing to support such a scheme, if
for no other reason than to curry Nepal's favor.
Both Nepal and Pakistan, however, will be
chary of involving themselves very deeply in Bhu-
tan's murky politics, and both may indeed give
the dissidents only limited support in the hope
of gaining the cooperation of King Wangchuck him-
self.
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VIII. POSSIBILITIES OF A SINO- INDIAN CONFRONTATION
Although the governments of India, Communist
China, and Bhutan are probably seeking to avoid
hostilities within Bhutan, a move by either of
the large powers might precipitate a parallel action
by the other.
Indian fears of covert Chinese Communist ac-
tivity in Bhutan have already led New Delhi to press
King Wangchuck for greater Indian influence in
Bhutan, and this pressure itself may arouse Wang-
chuck's apprehensions, possibly leading him to look
toward Peiping as a counterweight to New Delhi.
Conversely, Indian moves to station troops near the
Sino-Bhutanese border or to carry on an aggressive
intelligence program in neighboring Tibet would
probably result in a sharp Chinese reaction. Such
domestic factors as a renewed outbreak of factional
conflict--particularly in the event of the king's
death or incapacitation--would be another major
stimulus to Sino-Indian competition.
A confrontation would not be in India's in-
terests. If Bhutan ceased to be a buffer state,
India would have to man the Indo-Bhutanese border
with forces sufficient to resist a Chinese attempt
to cut India's supply lines into the North East
Frontier Agency and Assam. This border has been
almost undefended, the Indians relying on Bhutan's
rugged terrain to give them time to counter a
Chinese thrust.
The performance of Chinese and Indian troops in
the border conflict of 1962 suggest that India would
be hard pressed to contain a determined military
thrust by China into Bhutan. The Indian Army would
probably move to occupy the duars and could possibly
hold this area in the south. India's ability to con-
trol the key central valleys is much more open to
question. China would probably occupy, with little
or no opposition, the most strategic areas of the
Great Himalayan area.
Even a mere political reverse for India in
Bhutan would be a sharp blow to the Shastri government's
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prestige, and, indeed, to the prestige of the
ruling Congress Party itself. Such a blow,
coming not too long before the 1967 general
elections, would compound the continuing
difficulties the coalition has experienced over
food production and religious and linguistic
rivalries, and could be a significant factor in
undermining India's political stability. It could
also undermine India's influence in Nepal and
Sikkim.
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ANNEX I
THE GEOGRAPHY OF BHUTAN
The 240-mile Sino-Bhutan border is a sparsely
inhabited zone of the Great Himalayas ranging from
20,000 to 24,000 feet. Its northern slopes, as well
as the marginal mountains (19,000 to 20,000 feet in
elevation) of the Tibetan plateau have low precipita-
tion; the southern slopes of the Great Himalaya, how-
ever, are heavily glaciated and are subject to the
June-September monsoon. Only the alpine pastures--
ranging from 12,000 to 18,000 feet--are regularly in-
habited, and then only in the summer by shepherds.
The snow line varies in this area, but in general
follows a height of 17,000 feet.
There are only two major breaks in these
mountains; one near the entry of the Lhobrak River
GREAT HIMALAYAN TERRAIN ALONG TIBET BORDER
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in eastern Bhutan and another near the entry of the
Torsa (Amo) River from the Chumbi Valley of Tibet.
The best passes for access to Bhutan from Tibet
are the Kyu La and Ha La at about 14,000 feet in the
Amo River region of the west. This route has 'pot
only been traditionally the favored one into BhUtan
from Tibet but, despite the necessity to transit
Tibet, has also long been considered the best natural
route between India and Bhutan. There are several
more difficult (10,000 to 16,000 feet) passes from
Tibet into Bhutan: Kar Chunga, Sergong La, TreMo La,
Lingshi La, Me La, and Bod La are the most important.
There are no roads in this area, and travel by foot
or pack animal is slow.
Winter in the Sino-Bhutanese border region is
extremely cold and windy, and makes travel in rugged
and snowy terrain very difficult. Travel is haMpered
in early spring by the rampant streams of melted ice
nd snow, and in summer by the heavy rains.
PARO VALLEY
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Three quarters of Bhutan's ruling Bhotia popu-
lation live in the mile-wide central valleys (about
5,000 to 9,000 feet in elevation) of the Inner Hima-
layas. Among the Inner Himalayan valleys, those west
of the Black Mountains of central Bhutan--most notably
the Torsa (Amo), Ha, Paro Wong, and Sankosh--are of
greatest political importance. As well as being sepa-
rated from the eastern valleys by the Black Mountains,
the major western valleys are separated from one an-
other by a series of high and complex interconnecting
hills and ridges. Physical communication between these
valleys is difficult. There are a few radio facili-
ties at major points, but they are unreliable.
South of the Inner Himalaya, in an unhealth-
ful strip approximately 10 miles wide, are the low,
damp, and rugged foothills of the Himalayas and part
of the bordering Indian plain. This area is called
the duars. The vegetation of the southernmost sec-
tion of the duars is characterized by heavy savannah
grass and bill-476a: Portions of the northern duars
are more rugged than the southern duars are and are
DUARS PLAIN NEAR INDIAN BORDER
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often broken by spurs of the Inner Himalaya. There
are 18 passes to India along the duars: 11 into
West Bengal and 7 to Assam.
Even with the recent construction of roads from
India to Bhutan, it would be difficult to tranS-
port Indian military aid to the major populated
valleys of central Bhutan. A 110-mile single-lane
road originating at Phuntsholing, India, is capable
under optimum conditions of taking four-wheel-drive
3-ton trucks to Paro Dzong or Thimbu in 10 hours.
Washouts, however, are common, and the journey--by
jeep--generally takes about three days. Both Thimbu,
the new capital, and Paro rzong are approximately
six days of hard trekking along this road from ,the
Indian border. There are helipads at Paro Dzong and
Thimbu, and probably a few light plane landing strips
in the major valleys.
Bhutan has no cities, but centers of population
are spread through the country's major valleys. The
main centers are at Paro Dzong in the Paro Valley;
Thimbu (Tashi Cho Dzong) in the upper Wong Valley;
Ha Dzong in the Ha Valley; Punakha and Wangdu
Phodrang in the Sankosh (Punakha), or Mo Chu Valley;
and Tongsa Dzong in the Tongsa Valley; all but Tongsa
are in western Bhutan. Tashi Gang Dzong, Lhuntsi
Dzong and Mongar Dzong are the principal populated
points in lower lying areas of the eastern Inner
Himalayan region.
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