DRAFT - ARMY, NAVY, AIR AND JIG CONTRIBUTION NIE-27

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000700010004-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 15, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

PREPARED & COORDINATED BY NAV/
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SECRET
15 Feb 1951
PROBLEM
To estimate Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions with respect
to securing control over Taiwan and the place of Taiwan in over-all Com-
munist strategic planning for 1951.
QUEST/COS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
I. WHAT ARE CORM= CHINA'S CAPABILITIES FORUM= CONTROL OVER TAIWAN?
A. What Chinese Communist Resources are Available for an Assault on
Taiwan?,
1. Strancth and Disposition of Forces
(a) Ground Forces. Chinese Communist Field Forces presentZy
number 200690030. Of this total, it is reported that some 325,000 are current-
ly deployed along the eass coast of China from the Iangtse to Canton. A alga-
ficant portion of the Third Field Army troops which were deployed in positions
opposite Taiwan in 1950 are now engaged in the Korean theater of operations.
A large percentage of the Third Field Army was trained fa, and conducted
amphibious operations against Hainan and other islands formerly held by the
Chinese Nationalists. Reports continue to be received of small scale amphib-
ious training in the Hingwa coastal area opposite the nozthern end of Taiwan.
The number of Chinese troops who have received amphibious; training is not known.
(b) Air Forces. The Chinese Commnzist Air Force is estimated
to have available approximately 650 aircraft, Of fighter3 ground attack, light
bomber, And transport types, of which 200-250 are believed to be Under control
of the Soviet Air Force, The serviceability rate of these aircraft is esti-
mated to be 50%.
It is estimated that currently the bulk of the aircraft available to the
Chinese Communists are located in Northeastern China, and in Manchuria.
Accordingly, a major redeployment of aircraft by the Chimes Communists *toed
be necessary before a maximum air offensive could be lauxihed againet Taiwan.
Maximum COIF sortie capabilities, bated on three miosions during the
initial 24-hour periods are estimated to be 624 for fighters, 358 for ground
attack aircraft, 284 for light bombers, and 213 for transports. It is esti-
mated, however, that combat and maintenance attrition would reduce the combat
effectiveness of the CCAF substantially in less than a week cf sustained oper-
ations, in the absence of substantkal,?oviet aid.
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Adequate air facilities are available to the CCAF an the China Mainland
within light bomber radius of Taiwan (660 nautical miles). Airfields within
170 n.m. radius, suitable for attack type plane, are located principally in
the Fuchow and Lungchi areas in Fukien Province. A second group of fields
are within jet fighter range (245 n.m.). Swatow is within this area. A third
group of airfields are those within light bother range of Taiwan. Prominent
in this group are airfields in the Hankow and Canton areas, and in the
Hmagchow-Shanghai-Nanking area.
There has been an intense airfield repair and facilities build-up pro-
gram underway in China during the past year, especially in the coastal belt
from Shanghai southerly to Canton, lixisting airfields are being improved, and
previous sites reactivated, bringing them to a standard required for the oper-
ation of jet and light bother type aircraft. This work has been principally
under Soviet supervision.
The over-all personnel strength of the CCAF is estimated to be at least
150000 of -which 1,200 are estimated to be active CCAF pilots. In addition,
about 3,000 pilots are reported to be in training schools located in China
and Manchuria. The training of CCAF personnel is believed greatly increased
in recent months and the quality of training improved. Morale of the CCAF is
believed to be high.
(c) Naval Forces. The Chinese Communist Navy, though untried
and untested consists of the following units:
1 - CL
9 - PF
2 - PO
3 - OPO
1 - PC
12 - FR
5 ? OPR
6 - PT
3 ^ SC
? AMC
4 - LST
35 ? LSI
13 ISM
2 - LSU
6 ... Auxiliaries
There is no firm indication concerning location of these ships, although
all are believed to be in Chinese coastal waters. There are indications that
the USSR has turned over to the Chinese Communists 6 to 10 submarines.
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4.1*.P.M.,15,01F
nile it is believed that there are yet no Chinese Communist personnel pro-
ficient in submarine operations, the possibility that they maybe manned by
t'volunteere most net be ruled out. Personnel strength of the Chinese Come
munist Navy is estimated at 15,000.
2. Water1iEL920.21.a. By utilizing the maximum water craft avail-
able to them, totaling approximately 610,000 tons, the Chinese Communists
could undertake an initial lift accommodating 200,000 troops, of etich Only
about 60,000 could be carried in vessels other than junks. This would mean
coordination of an operation of at least 7 embarkation areas spread over
about 1,000 miles of coast line. It would also mean that forces from the
Shanghai-Rangchow area and Canton area probably would have to sail 24 to 48
nrs in advance of forces departing from the Amoy and Foochow staging areas
in order to bring about a preponderance of force to bear against Nationalist
positions. Although the extent of new construction is not known, reports
continue to be received of the construction of landing craft In the area.
3. 2-,rbo_nEELLA4 Reports continue to be received that
the Chinese Communists have from 3,000 to 6,000 troops under training for
airborne operations, although their state of training is unknown. It is
estimated that the Chinese Communists have the capability of airlifting a
total of 22825 troops during an initial 24-hour period based on an estimated
capability of 113 transport sorties with each plane carrying 25 troops.
B. What are the Demands on Chinese Communist Resources Made by Other
Major Commitments?
1. Needs of Domestic Reconstruction. Although the Chineee Com-
munists have gained a decisive military decision on the mainland, they are
now confronted with the multiple tasks of: (1) reconstructing and maintain-
ing a rail and main highway system totaling over 19,000 miles which has been
In a state of continuous disrepair since 1937; (2) installing and repairing
flood control systems in the critical food production areas of Central and
North Chime,' and (3) enforcing new economic policies such as requisitioning
seasonal food stocks in lieu of taxes. The demands imposed upon the Chinese
military establishment to implement or enforce these reconstruction measures
vill probably serve to divert a portion of the Communist field forces fro
undertaking external operations.
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2. Anti-guerrillamtilanEJILLA22a2m. Those dissident elements
at present opposing Chinese Cosammdst rule or actively resisting Chinese Com-
munist forces on the mainland are estimated to fall in the categories of
(1) guerrilla groups, made up of Nationalist remnants, opportunists, or ideal-
ists; (2) traditional bandit or war lord groups such as have been operating
in certain regions since time immemorial; and (3) those groups who participate
In spontaneous local uprisings against oppression and confiscation of local
Communist officials. It is estimated that there are probably 700,000 organ-
ized or semi-organised dissidents on the Chinese mainland. Dissidents have
been a constant annoyanceto the Chinese Communist regime and in recent
months this activity has assumed the proportions of a serious problem in cer-
tain areas in Southwest and Central China. There has been no known commit-
ment of Chinese Communist Air Forces for use in these operations.
3. The Korean Operation. To date the Chinese Communist regime has
committed approximately 275,000 troops to the Korean theater of operations
and is maintaining a force of 450,000 troops in reserve in Manchuria. Redent
reports emanating from Peiping indicate that Chinese Communist casualties in
Korea have been excessively heavy and that certain Chinese Communist leadere
are becoming resigned to the Korean operation continuing over a lone period
of time without any early favorable development.
Communist air activities in Korea have been limited thus far to relative-
ly small fighter operations which could be Maintained without materially
limiting Chinese Communist air capabilities respecting Taiwan.
The Korean campaign makes no demand on the Chinese Communist Navy,
4. Other Possible Campaigns (esg. Indochina). The Chinese Cemmunists
have deployed in the South China area adjacent to Indochina at least 185,000
field force troops which are actively engaged in consolidating control of the
area and would be ,available for an attack on Tonkin in case of open Chinese
Communist intervention in Indochina,
C. Is Soviet Covert Assistance for an Assault an Taiwan Possible?
Recent experience with Sino-Soviet relations indicates that Soviet
aid to the Chinese Communists would not be United to planning, technical
advice and logistic support, but maybe expanded to substantially increase
Chinese Communist capabilities in submarine, air and mine warfare.
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The use of Nvolunteee air crews to operate a limited number of Soviet supplied
aircraft must be considered as a possible device to avoid the appearance of
overt action while providing substantial direct assistance to the Chinese Com-
munists.
It is considered that neither of the Soviet surface fleets could operate
effectively- in the Taiwan area from present bases in the USSR. Naval vessels
as well as aircraft would require the use of facilities in China. Of mud)
more practical value to the Communists would be Soviet submarine forces, par-
ticularly for purposes of reconnaissance and the landing of special personnel.
E. What are Nationalist Capabilities to Repel an Assaults
(1) Ground Forces. The strength of the Nationalist ground forces is
estimated to be 39 divisions, 8 brigades, and 6 independent regiments, come-
prising an over-all force of 437,000 troops. The majority of these, 305,000,
are on Taiwan, while there are 31,000 in the Pescadores, 47,000 at Chinmsn And
9,000 at Matsu. Taiwan is divided into four defense seaters; northern, central,
southern and eastern. These sectors have been subdivided into separate Army
and Division subsectors. The Nationalist defense concept Calls for a static
perimeter defense by the infantry forces, with armored fOS4cie centrally located
as a mobile reiserve. Unaided, the Nationalist forces, with their present
numbers, equipment, and morale could not continue to defend Taiwan Successfully
against a major assault.
(2) Naval Forces. The operational units of the Nationalist Navy
are as listed below:
1 - DC 2 . pc 9
6-DE 2-AMS 2 AGM
14 -PF 5 - SC 1-ARL
4 - PCF 50 - rp 10 ? LST
3 4- OPG 1 - AR 8 - tam
1 . am 2 - AOL 6 LSI
12 - AN 5 APC 7 .0 Mc
3 . PQM 1 - TO 6 - AT
Of these units 35 to 50% maybe inoperational at any one time for over-
haul or repairs. Unless materially augmented by the U.S. Seventh Fleet, the
Nationalist naval capabilities are extremely limited.
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The Navy consists of about 42,000 men, of which 11,000 are Marines. The
personnel are fairly well trained, but the inefficiency and political activi-
ties of many senior officers detracts from the Navy's capabilities. Recent
reports indicate that Navy morale, never too high, is becoming worse.
(3) Air Forces. The Nationalist Air Force consists of 845 aircraft,
of which 345 are in tactical units and have an operational factor of 60%.
The over-all personnel strength of the ova totals 57,403, consisting of
34,459 assigned to air units and 22,944 assigned to ground units. There are
currently 1,700 trained active pilots in the CNAF. While most personnel are
fairly well trained, the Air Force lacks adequate maintenance facilities and
spare parts. The morale of the Air Force, is according to recent reports,
decreasing with enforced inactivity.
In its present status the CNAF has a very low relative combat capability
to intercept effectively and destroy enemy aircraft and is not considered to
be prepared to provide adequate air defense for Taiwan against the type of
attack the Chinese Communists are deemed capable of mounting. However, the
CNAF is believed to have the organizational structure and necessary personnel
to absorb and utilize additional equipment needed to make it an effective
force for the defense of Taiwan,
F. What are the Deficiences of the Nationalists Which iiould Have to
12ejLetlrnd in CnEIloti_tpel an Assault?
The Nationalist forces suffer from poor command structure, lack of
inter-service coordination, shortages of some types of ammunition, eqUipment,
fuel and a lowered morale. Without direct Soviet participation in an attack,
however, and given material and moral aid by the United States, the probability
of a successftl defense of Taiwan would be greatly enhanced. The report of
the Far East Command Survey Mission lists in detail the needed materiel. The
presence of the United States Seventh Fleet and its active cooperation would
be a decisive factor in such a successful defense.
II. WHAT IS THE IMPORTANCE0F TAIWAN TC COMMUNIST CHINA AND TO THE USSR?
B. F...E2rwitami and strqellsioint of view what is the relevance
mYsal
or importance of various factorv?
From a military and strategic point of view the loss of Taiwan to the
Chinese Communists would deny to the U.S. a base, which while not presently
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employed, could, in the event of further houtilitiee with CommunistChina,
be *portant as an air and submarine base fac. both offensive and defensive
,
operations. It would also enable the COmanniste to imperil the present U.S.
Far East island defense chain, MhiOh aktands fromliekkaido to the Philippines,
and to that extent weaken the chain. It would provide the Communists with
an air and naval base which could be uted not oily in the interdietion of
U.S. lines of communication, but could also be employed es a base for
aggressive attacks on Okinawa,? the. Philippings ami other areas to the south.
The possession of bases =Taiwan would place the Chinese Communist Air Force
nearly 400 miles closer to the PhiliPPinea than at present, thereby in-
creasing penetration potential and the element of surprive. It nmst be re-
mothered that the Japaneete planet which attacked the Phllippines in December
1941 staged from Taiwan.
WHAT EXTERNAL FACTORS WILL AFFECT CO %WRIST CHINA'S INTENTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO TAIWAN IN 1951?
A. Sey.....A..?2.1....................usideratonsover-411Sevietr_alt.
Over-all Soviet policy Undoubtedly takes into consideration such
factors as the so-called "new Spirit's in Western Europe arising from the
appointment of a Supreme Allied ComManaer? the possibility of Fimench revival
in Indochina, the present 0.S. 'rearmament program, and a potsiblo Chinese de-
feat in Korea. Consideration of such factors will influence any Soviet policy
aimed at the invasion of TaiWan in 1951. If the Soviets were asaured of a
reasonable Chance of suocees, or for reasons unknown to the U.S., felt that
Taiwan must be taken in 1951, offensive action might be taken without regard
to the above factors. The Soviets mai also consider that such action night
split the Western Powers and institute another Mar of attrition fcr the U.S
with slight effect on Soviet war potential. At the present time it is impossi-
ble to determine Soviet policy with regard to Taiwan excePt to state that
Soviet policy does undoubtedly envisage eventual Chinese Communist control of
Taiwan.
B. .Consideration of U.S. counterection.
U.S. Far East Naval forces were committed by the President to the
defense of Taiwan for the duration of the Korean hostilities. Of al the
foreign naval forces committed to the Par Eget, only the H.S. form are
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considered available for the defense of Taiwan. Naval forces based at Okinawa
mould require at least one day to reaCh Taiwan. Naval forces engaged in the
Korean operation would require at least two days to reach the area between
Taiwan and the China coast. Availability of fleet units at the time, however,
is impossible to predict. Presumably, the Chinese Communists are generally
aware of fleet dispositions in the area. They might well seise an opportunity
to attack Taiwan while U.S. naval tomes were engaged in Korea.
Additional factors mach could affect or influence Chinese Communist
planning with respect to Taiwan could ba l (1) Possible U.S. bathing of Com-
munist Chinese urban areais and lime of communication; (2) naval blockade by
the U.S.; and (3) greatly increased U.S. aid to Nationalist China.
IV, WHAT AKA COMMUNIST CHINA'S APPARENT INTENTIONS WITH RrSPECT TO TAIWAN?
B. militaz
prakarations?
The fact that reports continue to be received of amphibious training,
landing craft construction, increased troop strength and improvement and re-
activation of Chinese Communist airfields on the China mainland opposite Taiwan
is an indication that the Chinese Communists have not abandoned nlans for an
invasion of Taiwan.
'RAT IS THE PROBABLE PLACE OF TAIWAN IN CHINESE COMMUNIST OVER-ALL
PLANNING DURING 1941?
A. Lhalisth.eabler.........rcboriofTaiweearelativetoottierCser_tuniat
S!-
It is apparent that Moscow and Peiping are in agreement that the Far
East and Southeast Asia present a situation which can or must be mastered
while exceptional opportunities prevail. It is probable that the Communists
intend in the first instance to control Korea, take over Taiwan, Hong Kong
and Macao, and bring about the fall of Indochina. The impact of the fall of
Indochina would undoubtedly cause radiations of a, critical nature in the
political structure of Burma, Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia. The most
important objective in the entire area is without doubt Japan, in regard to
which the first Communist aim is undoubtedly that of eliminating U.S. influ-
ence and prestige. In 'short, the Soviet and Chinese ComMuniate plan to ex-
terminate Western influence in all of Asia. Exactly shore Taiwan fits into
this plan, as to timing, is impossible to estimate.
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.110/04.14141,401.1111.10
B. ghat course of action are the Communisteeemeteita& to aleeteedeAq.
!meet to Taiwan in 1.921
Any action aimed by the Communists at the control by them of Taiwan
will prdbably involve it the first instance, political maneuver and nego-
tiationt, and in the eecond, direct military assault. It can be expected that
whatever action may be taken by the Chinese Communists, dubversive action
mill be present to the greatest extent possible. In vie* of the success of
the ruthless Nationalist security system, it is not considered that subver-
sive action alone could result in Communist control of Taiwan.
The Chinese Communist regime has firmly stated its intention to
"liberate" Taiwan and has indicated that it hopes to effect the withdrawal
of U.S. protection of that island by political means if possible, primarily
through Wing the Korean situation as a powerful lever. There is little
reason to believe, however, that it mould not attempt to invade Taiwan if it
deemed that political negotiations would be of no avail and that it were pre-
pared to undertake an invasion and were reaionah2,y assured of gaining its
objective.
Since the international political implications of Chinese interven-
tion in Korea differ fundamentally from those that mould obtain concerning
Taiwan, it is unlikely that the Chinese Communists wad give prior warning
of a plan to invade Taiwan at a particular time. In the eyes of the Peiping
government, Taiwan is the last major portion of unredeemed Chinese territory,
Aeide from Oriental considerations of prestige, it probably looms
large in Chinese Communist eyes from the standpoint of short-term defensive
and long-term offensive strategy. Viewed in the light of Communist intentions
regarding Asia as a whole, the "liberation" of Tatman would mean further re-
moval of U.S. influence from that area.
In this respect, the timing of the Chinese Communist attenpt to
possess Taiwan may conceivably be influenced more by defensive fears than by
aggressive desires. If Communist China looked upon Taiwan merely as the ful-
fillment of territorial redemption it woad probably be inclined to defer
attempts at invasion until the prospect of success were fairly assured. Hole-
ever, if the Chinese Communists assessed that TaiMan were to become a bastion
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of U.S. supported Nationalist strength from which the mainland would one day
be invaded, they might then take action against Taiwan with less regard for
the risk involved and designed at the minimum to cancel Nationalist strength
as much as possible in order to forestall such an attack against the mainland.
The timing of a Chinese Communist military assault would be influ-
enced by weather conditions and the location of the main bodies of Communist
troops on the mainland. Operationally, the seasonable monsoons are handicaps.
During July to October typhoons may interrupt all movements for two or three
days, causing widespread damage to telecommunications, roads and railroadsr
From November through March the northeast monsoons seriously affect all of
Taiwan, rendering difficult any amphibious operation which is not properly
equipped with modern landing craft. Weather and sea conditions are most
favorable during the transition period of April and May. During June, July
and August the southeast summer moneoon results in moderate sea and surf
conditions.
Since it is estimated that present Chinese Communist military strength
in southeast China is insufficient to sunport a successful amphibious opera-
tion, the Chinese Communists would have to undertake a major shift of forces
from other areas to the critical staging areas located in the seven ports
located between shanghai and Canton. The major ones being Swatow, Amoy and
Foochow. It is estimated that this major troop deployment to the main
staging areas would entail a period of 90 days
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