MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES 1960-1965

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00961A001100050002-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1960
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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*NW
NIE 11-4-60 SUMMARY
1 December 1960
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES
AND POLICIES
1960 -1965
NOTE: This is an advance copy of the summary of this estimate
as approved by the United States Intelligence Board.
? Present Soviet outlook
? Soviet power
? Soviet policies toward
Non- Communist World
Central Intelligence Agency
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Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff,
AEC and NSA.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 1 December 1960. Concurring were the Director of In-
telligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the
Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB; the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and
the Director of the National Security Agency. The Assistant
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the sub-
ject being outside of his jurisdiction.
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A GE N C Y
1 Decembe'r196O,
SUBJECT: NIE 1174-60.: MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES
AND POLICIES, 1960-1965
SUMMARY OF THE'ESTIMATE
1. The attempt to forecast developments within the
USSR and in the Soviet power and policy for five years
ahead is subject to some very severe limitations. Our
estimative reach in many of the detailed matters discussed
in the body of this Estimate is frankly acknowledged to
fall well short of such a period. In respect of matters
where we have actually made five-year estimates the degree
of certainty falls off markedly for the later years. In
the summary paragraphs which follow we are dealing with
the broader trends which will determine the nature and
magnitude of the challenge which the USSR will present to
US security in the years ahead. These we believe are
predictable in the main, although their particular mani-
festations clearly depend upon unknown and imponderable
factors, or even upon purely fortuitous developments.
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THE PRESENT SOVIET OUTLOOK
2. One of the principal factors which will shape
future developments is the outlook of the Soviet leaders
themselves. There are two essential aspects of this. One
is the Soviet leaders' belief, derived from the Marxist-
Leninist ideology which continues to dominate their
thinking, that their society and the non-Communist world
are looked in an irreconcilable struggle which must con-
tinue until their system comes to dominate the world.
There is no evidence at present to indicate that the
Soviets will come to accept a world. system which assumes
the genuine coexistence of states and ideologies. For so
brief a period as five years, Soviet behavior and policy
will surely be marked by fundamental hostility toward the
West, and especially toward the US as the principal
obstacle to the fulfillment of Soviet aims.
3. A second essential feature of the Soviet outlook
in the current period is its high confidence in the
growth of the USSR's power and influence. Looking back
to the weak and perilous position in which the new
Communist regime found itself in 1917, remembering all
the internal and external trials it has survived, and
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considering its growth in relative economic and military
power over the last 20 years, the Soviet leaders are
encouraged in their doctrinaire expectations about
communism's inevitable triumph. That it was a Communist
rocket which first ventured into space symbolizes for
them that they are marching in the vanguard of history.
They think they see a response to their doctrines and
influence in the revolutionary turmoils of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. They expect to associate the peoples
emerging from colonialism and backwardness with their own
cause, mobilizing them against an ever more constricted
world position of the Western states. The relative
internal stability of the latter at present they see as
only a transient phase.
4. While hostility toward the West and confidence
in the eventual outcome of the world struggle will
inspire Soviet behavior in the period ahead, we do not
believe that the result will be policies of recklessness.
The Soviet leaders recognize that Western resources remain
great, and that the struggle for Communist power in the
uncommitted world will be prolonged. They are particularly
conscious of the hazards of nuclear war. Moreover, they
have numerous problems of their own within the Communist
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Bloc which may move them to caution. Their policies will
be marked by a persistent activism and opportunism, but
also by what they consider to be a due measure of caution.
More important, however, than the Soviet outlook and aims,
especially since these offer little hope for accommoda-
tion and genuine peace, are the strengths and resources
which the Soviets will be able to bring to the pursuit
of their aims.
THE SOVIET POWER BASE
Economic Aspect
5. Perhaps the most firmly based of our estimates
are those which relate to the growth of Soviet economic
power. The Soviet economy has the resources and plant
as well as the planning and directing mechanisms to
insure steady fulfillment of most of the goals in
industrial expansion which the leadership sets. The
industrial targets of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965),
providing for 8.6 percent annual increase in industrial
output, will almost certainly be met ahead of schedule.
We estimate that by 1965 total investment will reach
about one-third of gross national product (GNP) as
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compared with the present US rate of about one-fifth of
GNP. Only in agriculture, which is burdened by a heritage
of errors and neglect, will the regime fall well short of
its goals, but even here we estimate that output will in-
crease by about 3 to 4 percent per year. The GNP of the
USSR in 1959 was somewhat less than half that of the US;
it is growing about twice as fast and by 1965 will probably
be somewhat more than half of US GNP.
6. GNP is a'rough measurement, however. More
important in terms of world power competition are the uses
to which economic resources are put. The USSR maintains a
defense effort judged to be of about the same magnitude as
that of the US. The dollar value of Soviet investment in
industry in 1959 exceeded the highest US figure, achieved
in 1957. .,.For purposes related to national power --
defense, science, foreign economic and political operations
-- the Soviets are increasingly in a position to assign
resources freely and without agonizing self-denials. That
they are able to provide the resources for national power
on a scale equivalent to the US is due to the virtually
absolute command which the leadership has over the disposal
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of resources. It will continue to give the highest
priority to purposes related to national power in order
to "overtake and surpass" the US. The Soviet regime
has bought economic growth and military strength at the
expense of the living standards of the Soviet people.
But its resources are now great enough so that it feels
able to provide for improved living standards also. The
consumption level remains low but we estimate that per
capita increases will occur over the next five years at
the respectable rate of four percent annually. The
Soviet challenge in the economic field will be increasingly
formidable, not because the USSR has any chance of over-
taking the US standard or style of living, but because
Soviet resources for the competition in power are already
great and will continue to grow rapidly.
Military Aspect
7.
.As indicated, military power has one of the
first claims upon Soviet resources. Our estimates on
the development of Soviet military power until 1965
are far less certain than those on the Soviet economy.
This is partly due to unpredictable developments during
a period of rapid change in military technology. It is
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due more to gaps in certain kinds of critical informa-
tion about Soviet military programs. Although in recent
years the Soviets have released fuller economic data
than previously, on essential matters in the military
field they continue to maintain a policy of extreme
secrecy, which they evidently view as a major military
asset in itself.
8. The most significant development in the military
field during the period of this estimate will be the
USSR's emergence from strategic inequality, primarily
through the buildup of an ICBM force, and also through
development of its defense systems against nuclear
attack. The overcoming of an inferiority under which
the Soviets have operated throughout the postwar period
is already having a profound effect on Soviet attitudes
and policy. It inspires the confidence remarked upon
above, has emboldened the Soviets to challenge the West
on a vital issue like Berlin, and has led them to engage
the West in other areas around the world formerly con-
ceded to be beyond the reach of Soviet power.
9. The Soviet leaders will'not be content with
the gains in military power they have made. They will
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seek, by intensive research and development through the
years ahead, as well as by equipping their forces with
advanced weapons as these become available, to acquire
an advantage over the West. If they succeed, they will
press their advantage ruthlessly, though still within
what they would consider to be the limits of tolerable
risk to their own rule and system. It seems quite clear
that in their present view both sides are deterred from
the deliberate initiation of general war as a rational
course of action. Moreover, with the weapons systems
now on hand or likely to be available during the next
few years, the Soviets probably do not count on acquiring
an advantage so decisive as to permit them to launch
general war under conditions which would not gravely
menace their regime. Nevertheless, they are building
their nuclear striking power with vigor, and we believe
that they will build a substantial missile force.' What
we can learn of Soviet ideas suggests that their long-
range striking capability is thought of primarily in
terms of deterrence, and of employment ghould.the?Sb iets
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finally conclude that deterrence had failed, rather than
in terms of the deliberate initiation of general war.*
The Soviet missile force will also constitute an important
means of political pressure, even though it is never used
in actual combat.
10. In order to deal more effectively with the
continuing bomber threat the Soviets are incorporating
a large number of surface-to-air missiles into their air
defense. They are now also doing large-scale research
and development on antimissile systems in the hope of
obtaining an advantage in this critical aspect of the
future weapons balance. By the period 1963-1966 they
will probably begin to deploy such a system, though its
effectiveness is uncertain. Soviet research and develop-
ment effort will probably also focus on the new threat
presented by Polaris.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, be-
lieves that the evidence of offensive missile and
bomber production and deployment shows a definite in-
tent by the Soviet rulers to Achieve a clear military
superiority at the earliest practicable date. He feels
we are entering a very critical twenty-four month
period in which the USSR may well sense it has the
advantage. The Soviet leaders may press that advan-
tage and offer the US the choice of war or of backing
down on an issue heretofore considered vital to our
national interests.
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11. Partly as a result of the increased security
the Soviets feel they have gained from their development
of a variety of offensive and defensive missiles, they
have announced a major personnel reduction in their forces,
from about 3.6 to about 2.5 million men by the end of
1961. Barring a serious deterioration in the international
situation, we believe the out will be substantially
carried out. We believe that tactical aviation has
already been cut by one-half and naval aviation by two-
thirds, the latter primarily through elimination of the
fighter arm. However, the main weight of the cut will fall
on the very large ground forces. Even with the reduction,
the Soviets will still have substantial field ground
forces: we estimate nearly 1.5 million men organized in
65 divisions averaging two-thirds strength and some 60
cadre divisions at about one-fourth strength. The
submarine force will become even more than it is today
the primary component of the Soviet Navy, and will include
nuclear and missile-carrying types suitable for strategic
attack.
12. In sum, the USSR will continue to develop
formidable military strength despite the personnel
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reduction. The Soviet military posture is designed
primarily, we believe, to deter general war but also to
fight such a war if necessary., Equally, it is intended
to bolster the USSR's power position- and thereby to
promote its general policies. Soviet capabilities for
limited war in areas close to Bloc borders are obviously
great, but for conflict in more distant areas they are
comparatively slight. We do not believe that the USSR
intends as a matter of policy to conduct limited war at
remote ranges. However, we do not exclude that, with
their current tendency to political involvement in remoter
areas, the Soviets may seek to develop a greater capacity
for intervening militarily, even if only to establish a
military presence, in such areas. A really effective
ability to do this would presumably depend heavily upon
acquisition of base rights and facilities under friendly
political arrangements.
The Assistant of of Staff, Intelligence, USAF,
believes the Soviets seek a clear military superiority.
See his footnote to paragraph 9.
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Scientific Aspect
13. The Soviets obviously. understand that science
has become one of the key fronts in the world struggle,
not only because of its relations to military capability
but also because it is a major element in great power
prestige. The scale of their effort, thanks to the
heavy investment they made in training scientists in
past years, is probably now roughly on a par with that of
the US, at least in some fields of the basic sciences and
in critical areas related to weapons technology. Pre-
sumably the scope of Soviet scientific activity will
broaden as needs in these first priority areas are met.
The quality of Soviet scientific work in many fields is
now such that achievements conferring great prestige are
as likely to occur in the USSR as in any other country.
Political Aspects
14. it is in estimating the political aspect of
future developments within the Soviet Bloc that the
greatest imponderables intrude. The political system
within the USSR itself is stable, and it will almost
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certainly retain its totalitarian features. The regime
will not be openly challenged by the Soviet people who,
even though many of them view it with apathy and ideo-
logical disillusionment, are in general hopeful for
improvement in the conditions of their life and
patriotically moved by the USSR's achievements and its
position of world power. If there is change in the
Soviet political system it will come from the higher
levels of the party and government. In the relatively
small group which constitutes the real governing class
there are some signs of a desire for more regular parti-
cipation in policy making, and for more reliance in policy
execution on professional expertise instead of party
agitational methods. While Khrushchev has avoided or
been obliged to avoid the arbitrariness of Stalin, among
those who surround him there are probably some who would
like to move still further away from the domination of
one man in the system. Given Khrushchev's age and state
of health he may not survive as the dominating leader
throughout the next five years. His successor at the
head of the Soviet Government and party may be more
restricted in the personal power he wields, but in any
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totalitarian system political developments are likely to
depend heavily on the qualities and style which individual
personalities bring to the exercise of great and arbitrary
power.
15. In the area of political developments within
the Communist Bloc it is the evolution of relations among
the Bloc states which raises the greatest uncertainties at
present. In general, the states of Eastern Europe have
gained in economic strength and political stability in
recent years, despite the continuing alienation and resent-
ment of large parts of their populations. There seems
little doubt that, with the more flexible and indirect
methods of control the USSR has been employing since
1956-1957, it will be able to maintain a generally effective
hegemony. However, China has raised a fundamental challenge
to Soviet leadership of the Bloc. Even if some way is
found to resolve the issues posed by China's desire to
pursue a more militant policy toward the West, it raises
the serious question as to whether the long-term unity of
the Bloc under Soviet leadership can be maintained. We
believe that there is a trend away from monolithic unity,
and that in the long run, if China is to remain within the
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Bloc, a looser relationship is bound to develop. The
future course of Sino-Soviet relations will obviously
have profound consequences for the nature of the challenge
which communism poses for the Free World. The West may
be faced either with new dangers or new opportunities, or
both.
SOVIET POLICIES TOWARD THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD
16. The general Soviet strategy for carrying on the
world struggle in the present phase rests on two proposi-
tions. The first is that general nuclear war must be
avoided because the costs in physical damage and social
disintegration would be intolerable. The second is that
the world position and power of the "imperialist" states
* The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department
of the Army, and the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff,
believe that, in spite of Sino-Soviet frictions, the USSR
and Communist China will continue to be firmly allied against
the West and will render one another mutual support whenever
an important interest of one or the other is threatened by
the non-Communist world.
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can be undermined by a persistent and aggressive cam-
paign waged by methods short of war -- political struggle,
economic and scientific competition, subversion. Political
struggle takes the form of a constant agitation designed
to capture and organize in broad mass movements the
sentiments which focus on the great issues of the current
period peace, disarmament, anticolonialism, social
justice, economic development. By manipulating these
issues and by dramatizing the growth of Soviet power,
the Soviets are also trying to align the governments of
the underdeveloped and uncommitted states with the Bloc,
and against the West. The Soviet leaders hope that the
result will be a progressive isolation and loss of in-
fluence for the Western Powers, divisions among them,
and a decline in their ability to deal effectively with
threats to their interests. This is;what the Soviets mean
by "peaceful coexistence" -- a strategy to defeat the
West without war.
17. This is not strategy which aims immediately
at the revolutionary seizure of power by Communist parties
and the setting up of Communist regimes. The Soviets
know that there are few countries where the Communists
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are strong enough to undertake such action, and where
they themselves could count upon being able to deter
intervention by non-Communist forces. The "peaceful
coexistence" strategy is aimed mainly at gradually
eliminating Western and building up Soviet influence
around the world. The Soviets naturally expect that
conditions will thereby be created which are favorable
to the growth of Communist movements and which will
sooner or later permit the latter to acquire state power
peacefully, or by revolutionary action if necessary.
Even though overt seizt}re of power is not now the main
aim of the Soviet strategy, over a five-year period
situations might arise where the gains from such action
would seem important enough to the Soviets so that they
would be willing to depart from their present general
line.
18. The general line of Soviet policy estimated in
the two preceeding paragraphs falls within a range which
excludes, on the one hand, the deliberate assumption of
serious risks of general war, and on the other, abandon-
ment of active struggle against the West. Within these
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will display
limits we believe that the Soviet leaders
th militancy and conciliation, at- various times and
both rofitable ?
in various proportions as seems to them most p.
However) the Chinese challenge to Soviet authority In-
s of foreign policy and brings
wolves basic q In
severe pressure to bear on Soviet policy decisions.
trying to adjust to Chinese demands for more militancy
y
and risk-taking, it is possible that the Soviets may go
rther in this direction, and do so more consistently,
fa if
than they would otherwise do. On the other hand'
the Soviets should conclude that the Chinese were pushing
shi
com-
them towards unacceptable dangers, they might feel
pelled as a matter of temporary expediency to attempt a
ater degree of stabilization in their relations with
gre though with-
the West than they would otherwise consider,
term aim of establishing commu-
out altering their long-
nism throughout the world .2:/
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF,
~ challenge to Soviet authority
.~ agrees that the Chi have its effect on Soviet policy
will, undoubtedly, world' however, he believes
toward the non-Ca
that the relationship mmuniof Soviet military power
vis-a-vis the United States
ressed in hissfootnote etorM el
minaret. Further, as exp
paragraph 9, he believes that should the supiet$ feel
that they have achieved a clear military serious
are likely to adopt policies involving
they
risks of general war.
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19. As a general rule, we believe that the Soviets
would consider that the initiation of limited war with
Soviet or even Bloc forces entailed unacceptably high
risks and political liabilities. However, it cannot be
excluded that situations will appear in which they would
conclude that some prize was great enough, and themili-
tary and political risks acceptable enough, to justify
resort to such action. The Soviets are aware, however,
that any limited war carries a danger of expanding into
general war. We believe, therefore, that their attitude
toward the involvement of Soviet or Bloc forces in local
and limited war will be a very cautious one, and will be
governed by their estimate of the risks and advantages,
both political and military, in each situation. Even so,
there is always a possibility that they may miscalculate
risks.
20. Negotiations with the Western Powers over out-
standing issues are conceived by the Soviets as one of
the modes of waging the struggle of "peaceful coexistence."
They hope that the pressures which they attempt to build up
against the West will result in concessions at the
negotiating table. Intervals of more accommodating behavior
and:appeals for relakedtensionb'are intended to encourage
the making of such concessions. We expect this alternation
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of pressure and accommodation to be the regular pattern
of Soviet behavior with respect to negotiation in the
years ahead. Since the U-2 incident in May 1960 the
Soviets have adopted a hostile and aggressive attitude
which has made effective negotiation impossible. We be-
lieve that within the next six months or so the Soviets
are likely to moderate this attitude and to attempt to
get negotiations started again. It is also possible,
however, that on the Berlin issue, where negotiation has
so far failed to get them results, they will resort to
intensified pressure and threats in an attempt to force
the West into high-level negotiations under more un-
favorable conditions.
21. We do not believe that the Soviets have a five-
year plan for foreign policy in the sense that they set
themselves particular goals to accomplish within a set
time. Their policy is marked rather by an extraordinary
opportunism, and in recent years by rapidity of response
and vigor in execution. Over the next five years they
probably look for new developments favorable to their in-
terests to occur in a number of areas, but more especially
in Africa, Latin America, Japan, Indonesia, and Iran.
They probably intend to give particular attention to
establishing a diplomatic and economic presence in Africa,
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to stimulating and exploiting movements on the Castro
model in Latin America, and to encouraging the growth
of a radical anti-American mass movement in Japan.
Above all, however, they intend to build up their base
of power within the Bloc itself, in the belief that
during the next several years they can considerably
improve their relative power position vis-a-vis the
West. They believe that if they do so, more opportu-
nities for Communist expansion, and more readily ex-
ploitable ones, will open up for them.
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