BACKGROUND NOTE: POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001200050013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2002
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: May 23, 1960
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA001200050013-5
NSC BRIEFING 23 May 1960
BACKGROUND NOTE:-' POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
I, In current exceedingly complex situation, long-term direction of
Soviet policy virtually incalculable.
A. Although Khrushchev clearly does not now intend a fundamental
reversal of his detente line, this not entirely under his
control.
1. At a minimum, official US-Soviet relations will be strained,
and this, perforce, will effect to some degree all Soviet
relations with Free World.
2. Further effects of Khrushchev's animus toward President,
feeling of injured pride, generally vindictive mood in
Paris, difficult to assess. He may wish to "punish" US and
seek out opportunities to embarrass its leaders.
B. Specific Soviet foreign policy behavior in the months ahead
may go along the following lines:
1. In relations with US, Moscow may effect an across the board
reduction of official contacts.
2. Soviets may suspend or sharply curtail exchange of official
(though not private) delegations. (Note visit of US
railroadmen authorized on 19 May, but visas for USAF jazz
band scheduled to play in Moscow were withdrawn.)
3. In Geneva, Soviet attitude at disarmament talks likely to
toughen, delegates will seek to exploit U-2 incid
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a. Khrushchev claimed in Paris USSR ready to sign test
ban "at any time."
b. But may demand participation in planned US nuclear
experimental explosions (with right to inspect US
devices) and insist on very small number of explosions.
4. We do not expect cut-back in Khrushchev's travels and
personal diplomacy.
a. Scheduled for Austria next month, Africa in fall.
Said he would go to Latin America if invited.
5. We expect Soviets to seize every opportunity in Latin
America to make trouble in US "backyard."
a. Signs of impending arms deal with Cuba,
6. In respect to. underdeveloped areas, Soviets not likely to
cut down on economic assistance. May even step up aid to
some countries (e.g., UAR, Ethiopia, Afghanistan) in order
to "show up" US.
a. At same time, Moscow likely to step up pressures against
US bases (in Libya, Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, etc.).
b. May heighten subversive campaign too, with Greece and
Iran likely targets. Unpleasant incidents involving
American personnel (as in South Vietnam) a possibility.
7. Together with Chinese Communists (or Chinese alone) could
revert to "shooting" campaigns in Far East,
a. Guerrilla activity in Laos, South Vietnam--assets in place.
b. Heightened tension in Taiwan Strait--air combat, artillery
duels. (We think all-out assault on offshore island or
Taiwan itself unlikely, especially if it were unilateral
Chinese action.)
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : -