NORTH AFRICA (LONG)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000900070028-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2002
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: March 12, 1958
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2002/09/03 :A-RDP~9R00890A000900070028-1
NSC BRIEFING
NORTH AFRICA
12 March 1958
I. Latest French move is proposal for Western Mediterranean defense
pact to include France, Spain, Italy, the UK, Morocco, Tunis and
the "Algeria of tomorrow." Paris may, as additional come-on,
propose French-Tunisian-Moroccan economic exploitation of the
Sahara with a place in this scheme for Algeria.
A. Rabat and Tunis will almost certainly view these moves with
great suspicion and will demand independence for Algeria a3 a
prerequisite - a condition France will not accept.
B. Paris showing more flexibility on Tunisia and seems to be
prepared to move the bulk of outlying French forces to Bizerte
and to evacuate four or five thousand completely.
1. However, Tunis unlikely to accept long-term French
occupation of Bizerte.
2. Finally, Gaillard still at mercy of ultra-nationalists
who are likely to withdraw their support causing fall of
government if Gaillard makes toomany concessions,
C. Indications that North African and other problems may be
influencing majority in French parliament and parties to toy
with notion De Gaulle could be answer to French problems,
especially Algeria,
1. De Gaulle increasingly identified withidea of French-
dominated federation embracing former North African
protectorates and autonomous A1
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ge
State Dept. review completed
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2. De Gaulle has thus far insisted that he will come to
power Cn
II. In North Africa most significant development is revival of the
Maghreb (North African) Union of Tunisia, Morocco, independent
Algeria, and possibly Libya. This has been publicly endorsed
by Bourghuiba and King Mohamed.
A. An important reason is desire of King and Bourghuiba to counter
Nasir's influence in the area.
B. Tunis and Rabat probably also hope this move will speed Algerian
independence.
III. Algerian rebel upsurge continues, particularly near 'T'unisian border
where rebels reported in control of countryside at night,
A. French have acknowledged nearly 400 of their troops killed in
February - highest for any month of the rebellion.
B. French Defense Minister Chaban-Delmas told Murphy that he is
pushing for a border no-mans land 20-25 miles wide and 300
miles long (this is probably not feasible).
1. In Murphy's opinion Chaban-Delmas considers this an "open
season" on Algerian Arabs,
IV. Paris has decided on a phased major reduction of their 40,000
ground troops in Morocco, leaving air and naval units.
A. Meanwhile, Rabat on verge of yielding to public demands for
evacuation of French and Spanish troops.
1. Although a small minority demands evacuation of US troops
too, it is unlikely that Rabat will change its favorable
attitude toward US presence over at least the short tern-?i.
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2. Rabat has also reiterated request that US prevent
French use of Port Lyautay as entry point for material.
US observes report French material buildup there.
B. King's endorsement of Istiglal Sahara claims has worsenec
relations with Spain and probably France.
V. In Spanish Morocco fighting could break out again in southern
border regions.
A. In view of Rabat's dispatch of troops to area, this might
lead to clash between Morocco and Spain although neither
side intends aggressive action.
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