NORTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000900060010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 5, 1958
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 5 February 1958
NORTH AFRICA
I. Spain may initiate at any time a major military offensive against
irregular Moroccan Army of Liberation (AOL) concentrations in
Spanish West African territories (Spanish Sahara, Spanish Southern
Morocco and Ifni). France will probably lend some tangible
support but precise extent of French participation unclear,
A.. Irregulars--nationalist extremists from Morocco and dissident
local tribesmen--succeeded during November-December offensive
in forcing Spanish withdrawal to five coastal defense perimeters,
II. Numerous reports of a pending "Joint offensive't received from 25X1X6
25X1X6 since 9 January when Spain's
25X1X6 such an operation would be carried
out in early February.
A. Apparently the Spaniards plan to move against all rebels
concentrations in the area,
1, Full authority to initiate joint action said to rest now
with French and Spanish commanding generals in West Africa
who are in direct communication.
B. Although French concerned about AOL incursions over the border
and fearful consequences complete disappearance Spanish power
from area, France's participation likely to be limited.
1. France anxious keep friction along Moroccan-Algerian border
to minimum and avoid arousing Moroccans whom many French
officials apparently still hope to use as channel to
Algerian rebels,
2. Any direct action by French accordingly likely to be
restricted to dstehpped-up patrol activities on the border
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French cabinet reported divided on question several
weeks ago.
i, Paris has apparently already made available to Spanish
navy one LST and one LSD. Some light armored scout cars
have also been furnished.. Additional material and
intelligence support will probably also be available
to Spain,
III, Spain has been building up its military position in Canaries and
West African mainland in recent weeks.
A. Spanish now have estimated 7,000 men in Ifni and about
more troops dispersed among the four strong points in the
Spanish protectorate and Spanish Sahara. Forty military
planes (15-20 year old German types) and five helicopters (H-19)
give Spain's unchallenged air control and may soon be augmented
by about a dozen ancient vintage fighters.
B, Much, if not most, of Spain's operational naval fleet is also
deployed in West African waters,
IV. French strength in Mauritania is estimated at 4,000 to 5,000 men.
At least 2,000 to 3,000 additional troops available in extreme
western triangle of Algeria. Actual figure may be considerably
higher as result of recent transfers from Morocco where 40,0.00
French army personnel remain on duty,
V. Rebels have approximately 7,000 armed guerrillas in entire Ifni-
Spanish Sahara area,
A. Extreme mobility of guerrillas and their ability to lose
identity among local tribesmen and to melt across Moroccan
frontiers, makes ultimate success of any operation against
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VI. Meanwhile, on other side of Algeria, situation along Tunisian
frontier continues to have explosive potentialities.
A, French frustration--civilian in Paris as well as military
in Algeria--growing over Algerian rebel concentrations and
bases French believe are located across border on Tunisian
territory,
1. French reports of size these concentrations believed
exaggerated. 25X1X6
25X1X in Tunis saw no evidence of such in recent
visits to northwest frontier region.
2. Nevertheless, reports reaching French of rebel
build-up for a spring guerrilla offensive is fostering
sentiment for early action to deny rebels their sanctuary
in Tunisia.
B. Premier Gaillard not likely to sanction any major punitive
offensive at this time but new incidents--which can be
expected. at any time--could force his hand, and create new
crises which might induce Tunisian President Bourguiba to
appeal to UN, and directly to US for assistance,
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