THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002100090008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 19, 1978
• Content Type: PAPER

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Approved F
I IA/ORPA/ME
19 October 1978
Background Paper
The Western Sahara Conflict
The three-year-old conflict over the desolate but mineral-
rich Western Sahara has entered a new, political phase. The
military coup in Mauritania on 10 July brought to power a
government committed to ending its involvement in the dispute.
The coup also prompted the two key players, Morocco and Algeria,.
to reassess their positions, and this may eventually produce a
? compromise settlement.
Moroccan-Algerian diplomatic contacts--initiated well
before the,Mauritanian coup--have moved beyond the exploratory
stage. Senior Moroccan and Algerian emissaries met in Paris
in early August and in Brussels in late September. Mauritania
has also established its own contacts with Algeria and the
rebel Polisario Front.
Although these contacts are hopeful signs that a dialogue
will continue, they do not assure a dramatic breakthrough.
Moroccan allegations of Algerian aggression in southern Morocco
nd )Scunlel-ene's i roes Sus end.cd
in early Octobe ave temp rarily tee a ~ ??? ?r talks.
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Only protracted negotiations are likely to find a solution to
the conflict over Western Sahara, which is part of a larger
historic rivalry between Algiers and Rabat for preeminence in
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Morocco bases its claim of sovereignty over Western Sahara
Moroccan Irredentism
northwest: Africa.
on pre-colonial history, when Moroccan rulers intermittently
exercised varying degrees of control over much of the area.
The International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion in
October 1975-determined, however,. that Moroccan and Mauritanian
precolonial links with the area did not establish a tie of
Bu Craa, and Mauritania gained control of a lucrative fishing
industry at Dakhla and unexploited iron ore reserves at
Agracha. Algeria considers the partition illegal, demands a
referendum on self-determination, and gives substantial material
support and sanctuary to the Polisario Front guerrillas.
The lack of internationally supervised consultations to
determine the wishes of the territory's inhabitants, as called
for in various UN General Assembly resolutions,
sovereignty.
Morocco considers its partition of Western Sahara with
Mauritania in April 1976 irreversible. Morocco acquired the
northern two-thirds, including the rich phosphate reserves at
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;remains a contentious issue. Spain
still holds that its transfer of administrative control under
the Madrid Accords did not
resolve the question of sovereignty
-.a matter that only the Saharan pMle could decide. Morocco
argues that Saharans were consulted in February 1976 via the .
territorial assembly--a. consultative. body subservient to Rabat
at the time--and again last year when Saharans participated in
Moroccan regional elections. While Morocco's annexation and
administration of its part of the territory seem to be regarded
internationally as a fait accompli, recognition of Moroccan
sovereignty there has been withheld.
Military Situation
The focus of fighting is now in southern Morocco and the Moroccan
portion of Western Sahara. Moroccan casualties have increased
The cease-fire against Mauritanian forces declared by the
Polisario Front after the 10 July coup there is still holding.
substantially above the estimated monthly average of40..killed
before the Mauritanian-coup.
In response to alleged Algerian incursions into southern
Morocco in late September-early October, King Hassan is said to
have ordered retaliation in kind to any future attacks. The
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difficulties of mounting such attacks may dissuade Hassan
from following through against the Algerians. Moroccan armed
forces operations in general continue to be hampered by low
morale, logistic problems, and lack of effective air support.
Some difficult compromises will be required from all.partici
Negotiating Prospects
pants if a peace settlement is to be reached. Morocco and Algeria
will have to overcome/ deep-seated distrust of each other's inten-
tions, and this fact alone argues. against a quick solution.
Morocco, given its popular,'irredentist claim, will not
compromise on the issue of its sovereignty in the northern two-
thirds of Western Sahara or its-control of the large reserves
of high-grade phosphate rock around Bu Craa. It is highly
unlikely to accept an independent Saharan ministate. Morocco
has repeatedly stressed that it will not allow itself to be cut
off from: the rest of Africa by a Saharan state with borders that run from
Algeria to the Atlantic.
Morocco might reluctantly agree to-ja rigged referendum for
that independence not be
Sahara. Morocco probably
Mauritanian portion feerat-P wit-h taurit via,
would accept, after much bargaining, a Saharan homeland in the
the Saharan people, but would insist
an option for its portion of Western
Mauritania is the only party that can be counted on to be
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genuinely flexible. The new military-dominated government
which recognizes that only a settlement will enable
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it to get the economy moving again, gives first priority to
an early end of the Saharan conflict. Maruitania is willing to with-
draw from its portion of Western Sahara but is restrained from
federated with Mauritania and probably would grant Saharans a
agree to their sector becoming an autonomous Saharan state
doing so by Morocco. The Mauritanians,almost certainly would
Algeria's negotiating pogition is less easy to define.
Algeria has no territorial claim in Western Sahara, although
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proportional role in the central government.
it has steadfastly maintained that it has political
and
security interests to protect. Boumediene seems unwilling to
accept a Moroccan fait accompli in Western Sahara without some
way of salvaging his own prestige. He is, however, a pragmatist
and may think his chances of obtaining compromises now are greater
than they will be later.
The Algerians
Saharan state if a
laid the basis for
portion of Western
Moroccan influence
might settle for less than an independent
controlled referendum were held that at least
creating an autonomous region in the
Mauritanian
They would hope eventually to supplant
in such a federation with their own. In return
for recognizing Moroccan
probably would insist on
under Moroccan control.
sovereignty in the territory, Algeria
limited local autonomy for the Saharans
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a lasting settlement. Its militant leaders appear genuinely
committed to a Saharan republic, and they will not easily be
The Polisario Front will have to be dealt with to achieve
:_ persuaded to accept--anything less than. an. independent Western
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operations, however, without Algerian support.
The Polisario Front has an estimated 3,000_t
Sahara. They could not sustain the present.level of military
5,000
active guerrillas and a shadow government in exile recognized
by 15 countries. The guerrillas also control the large Saharan
refugee population in southwestern Algeria, which could range
as high as 20,000 to 40,000---nearly a third to a half of the
estimated population of Western Sahara in 1974.
Some of these exiles may be nomads from surrounding
countries, but most probably are from Western Sahara. Three
years of Algerian and Polisario indoctrination may have create
a sense of national identity that will be difficult to satisfy
in the future.
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