THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000600230013-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: January 16, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
On 27 December the Soviet Union toppled the government of
President Hafizullah Amin and installed a new regime headed by
Babrak Karmal. The coup was supported by a major Soviet military
operation designed to ensure that the new regime retains power.
The open-ended nature of the USSR's commitment to control Afghanistan
in the face of what is likely to be protracted insurgency means that
Soviet military forces will be involved there for the foreseeable future.
This in turn will have profound implications for southwest Asia and
could substantially influence the future course of Soviet foreign policy
as well.
Soviet Motivations
The Soviet invasion followed almost two years of gradually increasing
Soviet. military support for the Marxist Afghan regime that took power
as a result of the April 1978 revolution. But the instability of Marxist
Afghan politics, the ineffectiveness of the new leadership and its
counterproductive policies, and a growing tribal-based insurgency threatened
the pro-Soviet regime's control over the country.
Moscow was deeply concerned throughout 1979 with the regime's ability
to hold onto power. Moscow recognized that the Afghanistan military was
becoming increasingly ineffective and that the insurgents were extending
their operations throughout the col-ntry.
Throughout the year, the Soviets tried to get an effective government
in Kabul that could deal with the growing problems. The Soviets wanted a
regime better able to win military and tribal support. Moscow was involved
in intrigues with former President Taraki to oust Amin in the summer of
1979. But Amin turned the tables on Moscow and, in a bloody coup in
mid-September, ousted Taraki and his supporters. Amin's move--only days
after Soviet President Brezhnev met with and personally endorsed Taraki---
may have added a personal dimension to Moscow's interest in removing him.
The Soviets thought Amin was alienating the military, was failing to
establish broader political support, and was unresponsive to Soviet
counsel. Moscow probably thought his government was losing ground against
the insurgents.
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The Soviets probably considered installing a non-Marxist
government in Kabul. But Moscow must have decided that it needed
greater control over Afghanistan than reliance on such elements would
have allowed.
Soviet Security Concerns
In the first instance, the Soviets probably were motivated to
move into Afghanistan less by the positive benefits to them of main-
taining a Marxist regime in power, than by the negative costs if it had
been defeated. They probably perceived that the continued deterioration
of the security situation would at best have led to prolonged fighting,
further coups, and political chaos. At worst, they may have thought it
would have led to the installation of an anti-Soviet regime that might
have sought to develop ties with Iran, the United States and China.
Such a development would have been a blow to Soviet prestige and
could have damaged Soviet credibility with other client regimes, which
might reassess their ties with Moscow if the USSR failed to save a
revolutionary government on its very borders. Coming at a time when
the United States was beginning to reassert its presence in. the Indian Ocean,
the Soviets might have seen it as creating an image of Soviet weakness.
Moscow has claimed that it intervened in response to foreign
intervention in Afghanistan and because the country might have become
a "br; dgehead" fogy ucti v i ties by Scviet "eii, -,~i Es'' agaifis?Z. the USSR
itself. While the Soviets probably do not believe such hyperbole, an
unfriendly government in Afghanistan would have put another hostile or
unstable regime along the USSR's southern border. The prospect of an
unstable regime alongside Iran probably particularly troubled Moscow..
The political disarray that has accompanied the hostage crisis in Tehran
may have intensified these fears.
Finally, Moscow may have been concerned by long-term implications
for Russian domination of Soviet Central Asia. Although Moscow is not
now confronted with significant unrest among its own Muslim population, the
predominantly Russian leadership may have been troubled by the possibility
of having yet another militantly Islamic state on its border.
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Soviet clients. It would contribute to Moscow's strategy of encircling
China.
Potential Benefits
Moscow probably also saw geopolitical benefits from dramatic, forceful
action. It would be a clear demonstration of Soviet power--and willingness,
to use it--that would have a positive impact on neighboring states and on
to Moscow's longstanding attempts to improve its position in the Persian Gulf
and Indian Ocean.
Opportune Timing
The Soviets undoubtedly saw almost no risk of outside military reaction.
For one thing, Tehran and Washington were preoccupied with the hostage
problem.
Indeed, Moscow might have thought the United States could be
induced to acquiesce in the Soviet invasion in return for Soviet
nonobstruction of US pressure on IVVdn. Fur?ihermu;?e, the West was
occupied with the Christmas season. This would lead to a less intense
foreign reaction. Moscow's Czech experience--when the sharp Western
reaction soon led to business as usual--probably also comforted the USSR.
The Soviets probably thought the negative trends in Soviet relations
with the West made this as good a time as any for its move. The Soviet
action came at a low point in US-Soviet relations. The Soviets saw
the SALT treaty in deep trouble and probably expected few new initiatives
from the United States during an election year. Moscow said the NATO
theater nuclear force decision had "destroyed the basis" for serious
negotiations in West Europe on Brezhnev's arms proposals. Relations with
China were already bad, and Moscow had no expectation that the negotiations
with Beijing set to resume in early 1980 were going anywhere.
the longer run, Moscow may have thought control of Afghanistan could contribute
Moscow may have thought Soviet control over Afghanistan would pressure
Iran and Pakistan to accommodate to Soviet policies. It would leave
Pakistan isolated between a pro-Soviet India and a Soviet-controlled
Afghanistan. In the event that either Iran or Pakistan fragmented or
deteriorated into political chaos, it would provide Moscow with a potential
bridgehead for extending its influence in such areas as Baluchestan. Over
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In the subcontinent, Moscow probably recognized that Pakistan
would be apprehensive, but may have thought the strains in US-Pakistan
ties over nuclear proliferation and the Embassy burn.ing.made a US-Pakistani
rapproachement unlikely. The Soviets may have reasoned that Islamabad
would eventually come to terms with the Soviet action. In any event, India
has long been the focus of Soviet interest on the subcontinent. The
increasingly good prospects for Indira Gandhi's return to power made it
likely that the next Indian government would be more pro-Soviet than
either the Desai or Charan Singh regimes.
The Soviet Operation
The Soviets have undoubtedly been examining their military options in
Afghanistan for some time. During his stay in Afghanistan in late summer
and early fall, Soviet Army Chief Pavlovskiy probably had as one of his
tasks contingincy planning for a military occupation of Afghanistan.
The final Soviet Politburo-level decision to invade was probably made.
in late November or early December. This would have been around the time
of the 28 November Central Committee Plenum and the return to Moscow on
6 December of Ambassador Dobrynin--who probably was asked to assess likely
US reactions. Increased urban violence in Kabul, rumors of military
disaffection and continued insurgent activity during the period may have
helped push the Soviet leaders toward their decision.
Military Pr parati ois
Soviet military preparations for the move entered into high gear in
early December. The Soviets made carefully and systematically to plan
and prepare the operation.
In early December some 1,500 Soviet troops were sent to Bagram Airfield
north of Kabul to join 400 lightly armed troops that had been there since
summer. We suspect that Moscow obtained Amin's approval on the grounds
that these troops were to protect Soviet advisers. and to ensure the
security of his regime.
Additional Soviet airborne forces apparently began to prepare for the
operation in mid-December. Ground and tactical air combat forces were
assembled. Motorized rifle divisions at Termez and Kushka were mobilized
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With airborne forces in Kabul, the Soviets moved quickly on 27 December
to topple Amin and replace him with Babrak Karmal. An airborne unit
went to the People's Place--the Afghan seat of government. Airborne
troops along with some Babrak partisans went to the Darulaman Palace and
battled loyal Afghan forces. Amin was apparently executed on the spot.
did so on the pretext that this would give Amin better security, but
actually to make it easier to eliminate him. Furthermore, on the after-
noon of the coup, the Soviet communications minister met with Amin,
apparently to indicate that it was business as usual. The. Soviets also
tricked Afghan army units by taking away their weapons under the pretense
that they would give them new ones.
Palace, a residence on the outskirts of Kabul. Some reports indicate they
and moved to forward staging areas near the Afghan-Soviet border. Soviet
reservists were recalled; some interviewed in Kabul at year's end had
been activated'within the previous 20 days. Tactical aviation forces
opposite Afghanistan were reinforced.
The Coup
The massive airlift of troops and equipment into Afghanistan began
on 24 December. The operation provides a vivid example of Moscow's
ability to organize and rapidly move an intervention force, and under--
scroes the growth in the Soviet airlift capability during the 1970s.
Airborne units in the western and south central USSR flew to
Afghanistan and airborne units already in Turkestan also moved into
Afghanistan. At least two regiments--about 4,000 troops equipped with
armored vehicles--went to Kabul, while smaller units went to Shindand
and Qandahar.
The Soviets continued to mislead Amin about the nature of their
movements. On 23 December, Pravda, possibly for Amin's benefit, denied
there were Soviet "combat troops" in Afghanistan. Amin may have accepted
Kremlin assurances that the Soviet forces were there to guarantee the
security of his regime and that some of the flights carried new equipment
for his forces. The Soviets apparently got Amin to move to the Darulaman
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Heavy fighting broke out near the Kabul radio station and in other
sections of the city, but Soviet troops quickly got the upper hand.
By 28 December, fighting was sporadic and the Soviets had control. They
manned most strategic points. and encircled some recalcitrant Afghan
garrisons.
Babrak Karmal--who had earlier been in exile in Eastern Europe--
apparently arrived in Kabul by plane from the USSR soon after the coup.
His initial broadcasts appear to have been tape recordings carried by
radio stations in the USSR. His supporters, as well as other Marxist
enemies of Amin, some of whom may have been in hiding at the Soviet Embassy,
moved quickly to take over government administration.
In coordination with events in Kabul, the Soviets moved tvo Ground
Forces divisions into Afghanistan on 28 and 29 December. The Termez division
drove south into the Kabul area. Prior to the movement of this division,
Soviet troops secured the difficult Termez-Kabul road, including the Salang
Pass. The division from Kushka drove south to Herat--some of its elements
also moved into Shindand and other areas.
Some Afghan forces apparently offered limited resistance that cost
the Soviets several hundred casualties,.especially in the street fighting
in Kabul. The number two man in the Soviet MVD (the internal police), Lt.
Gen. Paputin, apparently was killed in the fighting. Paputin had. been in
Kabul in early December, probably to survey the scene for the coup. He
r,,ay have had the job of get.-Ing Amin. Aside from some relatively minor
incidents, insurgent tribal forces did not attempt to tackle the heavily
armed Soviet troops.
By 1 December, the Soviets had seized control of key cities, airfields
and communications routes. But they will face the hard task of subduing
the fiercely independent Afghans and considerable additional fighting
against the tribal based and Islamic insurgency is in store.
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