THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP: SECOND THOUGHTS ON AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000600230006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 1, 1980
• Content Type: IM

r v ,' ationaFor Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000600230o6p ecret 25X1
Foreign
Assessment
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The Soviet Leadership:
Second Thoughts on
Afghanistan
Top Secret
PA 80-10097CX
e ruary 25X1
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National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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Top Secret
The Soviet Leadership:
Second Thou hts on
Afghanistan
Summary 1 -14 1some Soviet
tare disturbed about the impact of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan on Soviet foreign and domestic policy. Although
some of this concern may stem from initial reservations, the evidence
suggests more that it reflects their unhappiness with, and rise
at, the price the Soviets have had to pay for this action.
While misgivings may have arisen within the leadership, a change in policy
is not yet in prospect. Brezhnev has clearly approved the invasion, and other
leaders who have spoken out publicly have all rallied behind him. Such
support will make it difficult for any of them to advocate a change in polic
or to use this issue against Brezhnev or other senior leaders in the future
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This memorandum was prepared by he Office of Political Analysis
USSR - Eastern Europe Division and has been coordinated with the National Intelligence
Officerfor the USSR-EE and with the Office of Central Reference. Information available as
of 19 February 1980 was used in its pre arati
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Ton Speret
The Soviet Leadership:
Second Thoughts on
Afghanistan ('
Second Thoughts
hat some leading Soviet officials have had
second thoughts about involvement in Afghanistan.'
concern about both the general state of the Soviet economy and
the consequences of a deterioration in East-West detente for Soviet policy in
Europe is a matter of record.
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Konstantin Chernenko, a party secretary and Brezhnev protege, hinted in a
15 February election speech that he shares concern
about the consequences of the invasion for relations with the West. Over the
past year, Chernenko has been one of the Politburo's most ardent defenders
of detente. Although he does not appear to oppose the Afghan involvement
per se, he clearly wants to limit the damage to other Soviet policies. In a
comment probably intended as much for his leadership colleagues as his
' This memorandum is a preliminary assessment
=hat suggest certain Soviet leaders are now concerned about the negative consequences
for other Soviet foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Some
of the information used in this memorandum, in addition, comes from abridged versions of
public speeches given by some Soviet leaders prior to the Supreme Soviet elections. Because
only excerpts were available, and because not all of the top Soviet leaders have yet spoken, the
judgments in this memorandum must necessarily be tentative and speculative. A further
assessment will be offered when this other information becomes availablelI 25X1
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constituents he argued that under present circumstances it was necessary to
keep "cool and calm heads" and noted that "aggressive forces would very
much wish us to respond in kind, with a similar ruthlessness," a statement
suggesting that some of his colleagues might wish to do just that. He further
asserted that the Soviet Union still seeks cooperation and hopes through
equal negotiations to ensure "political settlements to the difficult problems
existing between states.
Some lower level officials have expressed their view that the invasion of
Afghanistan was a mistake. Several senior government representatives
connected with the foreign trade establishment-including Minister of
Foreign Trade Nikolay Patolichev, and Vladimir Alkhimov, the Chairman
Patolichev and his governmental associates would not be expected
to welcome the prospect of long-term disruption of their efforts to get
Western, and particularly US, technology
The Foreign Ministry, too, would probably only reluctantly endorse Soviet
policies that might increase cohesion within NATO and place the USSR in a
diplomatically defensive position. Its own objective appraisals aside, the
Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the KGB may want to protect itself from
any charges that it did not properly assess the consequences of developments
in Afghanistan, and KGB officials in AfAnnignn uld probably prefer to
keep events there under their control.
Soviet Miscalculation I I the Soviets are experiencing
sigm i an i icu ies in norma izing a si uation in Afghanistan and are
being battered by worldwide condemnation. The mechanics of the coup
against Amin appear to have been botched, the Soviet Army has not
performed all that well, and Moscow's Afghan clients have not been able to
establish any legitimacy in the country. The insurgency, rather than winding
down has grown artly due to the mass defections from Afghan Army
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The foreign reaction evidently has also been more negative than Moscow
anticipated. The Soviets have responded by increasing the role of their
military forces somewhat,
accomplish this.
ere is little likelihood, however, that
these efforts will be successful in the near term. The Soviets now contend
with the prospect of a prolonged involvement in the face of continuing
international opprobrium. While some would like to move relations with the
West back to a less confrontational mode, they appear at a loss as to how to
Leadership Divisions
frustratioij I convey the definite
impression that someone misjudged the difficulties Moscow would encoun-
ter in Afghanistan and the economic and foreign policy cost it would have to
bear
Imiscalculation was
involved, but suggested that US restraint would be helpful in returning
things to normal.
a power struggle is under way in the Kremlin.
few details, however, and are not very convincing. The list of
so-called hawks now said to be in charge is limited to party secretary
Mikhail Suslov and the military (read Ustinov), while the alleged dove2s5X1
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rez nev as personally identified
himself with the Soviet decision an taken the leading role in justifying it to
the Soviet public and the world. He alone signed the letter congratulating
Babrak on his "election" (a possible indication that the ailing Kosygin did
not support the decision). Brezhnev's 13 January "interview" in Pravda,
moreover, has become the standard reference for Soviets who discuss this
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Brezhnev, to be sure, may have believed that endorsement of and support for
the decision was necessary to cover his political flanks. But, if so, his actions
have so identified him with the invasion that the policy must be considered
as much his as any other leader'
It is very unlikely, moreover, that Brezhnev stands alone on this issue.
Bureaucratically, it is difficult to imagine how the n
put to ether without '
Andropov and Gromyko, wearing their KGB and MFA hats, surely were
also deeply inv their institutional role may have made them
initially
pushed for the invasion, a
"
ary gains
lends credence
With this group of senior political and institutional leaders probably in
agreement on the final decision and with Kosygin (a likely focal point for
Kremlin moderates) silenced by illness, others in the Politburo would no
doubt have found the decision difficult to oppose at the outset. Not only did
they probably not have the necessary facts and arguments, most would have
deemed such opposition politically unwise. Many of these men, moreover-
especially Kirilenko, Shcherbitskiy, Romanov, Masherov, and Grishin-
appear inclined in general to support a tough approach in foreign policy and
may have perceived the Afghan decision in that light.
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Suslov 25X1
g "revolution-
In any case, since the decision, those other Soviet leaders who have spoken
publicly have endorsed the action. In their election speeches they have
routinely cited Brezhnev's Pravda "interview" justifying the Soviet role in
Afghanistan, effusively praised Brezhnev's leadership, and endorsed the
decision. This uniformity of response suggests that the Politburo has
adopted an agreed upon line for leaders to follow in discussing Afghanistan.
Even if some leaders have reservations about the policy, it will not be easy-
in view of the defensive position into which the Soviet Union has fallen and
their own public comments-to reverse their stand. Rather, they will
probably argue-as Chernenko already seems to be doing-that they must
not let the negative foreign reaction drive the USSR into a policy of
confrontation across the boardI I
A prolonged involvement in Afghanistan, of course, probably will increase
the economic and foreign policy costs to the Soviet Union. As a result,
dissatisfaction may well increase within the ranks of some Soviet bureaucra-
cies adversely affected by these costs. Indeed, we may be already witnessing
the development of serious differences within the leadership over how now to
proceed
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ret
There is little in the evidence available that suggests how the apparent
concern of Ponomarev and perhaps others will manifest itself politically. To
the extent that its expression serves to excuse these leaders from
responsibility for the more difficult situation in which the USSR now finds
itself and shifts to the West the onus for the deterioration of detente, their
views may have no further political consequence. If their expressions are,
however, more than a protective reaction to events, it could suggest in
addition that these leaders are the ones who are advising against a
significantly greater Soviet investment to pacify Afghanistan and are
attempting to define Soviet objectives there as narrowly as possible. These
officials might even advocate gestures fore' n and domestic, that would
enervate the Western will to retaliate 25X1
In this environment, it is conceivable that an ambitious, younger leader in
the Kremlin might seize upon the Afghanistan issue to challenge the position
of senior policymakers. Yet, such a move would be risky and more likely to
succeed after Brezhnev and, perhaps, Suslov have left the scene. For now,
the Politburo leaders appear to have rallied once again behind Brezhnev on
the correctness of the initial decision to intervene. 25X1
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