THE AFGHAN REFUGEES: AN IRRITANT TO SOVIET-PAKISTANI RELATIONS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP81B00401R000600220002-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 18, 2005
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 1, 1980
Content Type:
IM
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CIA-RDP81B00401R000600220002-3.pdf | 754.99 KB |
Body:
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Nati I
Assessment
Center
The Afghan Refugees:
An Irritant to Soviet-
Pakistani Relations
An Intelligence Memorandum
Secret
GC 80-10035
April 1980
Copy 005
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National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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Summary
The Afghan Refugees:
An Irritant to Soviet-
Pakistani Relations n
Afghan resistance efforts are receiving support from families encamped as
refugees in Pakistan and from related tribes who live in the Pakistani
borderlands. Soviet and Afghan military forces may attempt to cur
border activity when weather conditions improve in April and May
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If retaliatory action is taken against refugee groups in Pakistan, likely
danger zones are in the upper Konar Valley in Chitral District, in Mohmand
tribal territory north of the Khyber Pass, and in the area of Parachinar in the 25X1
Kurram Valley. The Pakistani Government may choose to reduce the strain
in Soviet-Pakistani relations by removing refugees from the border area. I?I
More than 700,000 Afghan refugees are located in the border areas of
Pakistan; most eventually register with government agencies in order to
establish eligibility for relief supplies, and about 650,000 are already
registered in camps ranging in size from 500 to 11,000. Almost all the
refugees are Pushtun tribesmen. 25X1
Cross-border tribal ties, combined with the tendency to travel in extended
family units, have enabled the refugees to survive until now without much
government support. The need, however, for food, shelter, and sanitation
systems is growing. I?I
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The author of this memorandum is 'Office of Geographic and 25X1
Cartographic Research. This paper was coordinated with the Offices of Economic Research
and Political Analysis, the Afghan Task Force, and the National Intelligence Officer for
Near East and South Asia. Information available as of I April 1980 was used in the
preparation of the text. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Chief, East Asia Branch, OGCR 25X1
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The Afghan Refugees:
An Irritant to Soviet-
Pakistani Relations El
Support for rebels in Afghanistan by Afghan refugees in the border zones of
Pakistan could provoke retaliatory action by Soviet forces in Afghanistan.
Afghan male refugees reenter Afghanistan from Pakistan to defend their
tribal homelands from what they perceive as the godless government in
Kabul. They return periodically to Pakistani territory to visit their families,
to acquire arms and ammunition, and to seek medical treatment, in effect
using the frontier areas of Pakistan as safe havens. Afghan Government and
Soviet spokesmen accuse them of being among the "foreign elements"
responsible for the widespread dissidence in Afghanistan.T1
Pakistani Government authorities have tried to discourage activities by the
refugees that would precipitate a border incident and have restricted their
official support to relief aid in the form of food, medicine, and other
humanitarian supplies. But they cannot prevent the movement of small
groups of people back and forth across the border, which cuts through
mountainous terrain in tribal territory over which government forces have
never exercised more than limited control.
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Apart from rhetoric, the Afghan Government and the Soviet authorities
have been restrained in their reactions to refugee cross-border activities.
Last fall the Afghan Government?probably at the urging of Soviet
advisers?attempted to defuse the situation by establishing a grace period
for the return of the refugees without reprisals. Although the period was
extended, few refugees accepted the offer. More recently, Soviet sources
have privately indicated that unless the refugees returned in the near future,
they would forfeit forever their rights in their homeland. 25X1
There is some indication that Soviet officials are now willing to consider
retaliatory airstrikes against rebel sanctuaries in Pakistan. In addition, the
rugged terrain in the border zone would not preclude small cross-border
land-based raids by the Soviets, although land operations using mechanized
equipment would be restricted to three or four major crossing points. 25X1
Retaliation The spring offensive by Afghan and Soviet military forces in the Konar
Danger Zones Valley in eastern Afghanistan, which began in early March, increased the
flow of refugees into Pakistan along the section of the border north of the
Khyber Pass. Present danger zones for refugee-caused incidents are in the
upper Konar Valley in Chitral District and in Mohmand tribal territory.
During the past 18 months, the Mohmands in Pakistan have actively
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supported their tribal relatives in Afghanistan. Several large-scale?though
abortive?raids into eastern Afghanistan originated in Mohmand territory.
The Soviet forces have recently expanded their guerrilla-clearing operations
into the provinces south of the Kabul River Valley, and a primary danger
zone now is the Parachinar area of the Kurram Valley. In this region are
concentrations of refugees from the tribes which have been most active in
the guerrilla activity in the environs of Khowst in Paktia Province. Most of
the routes from neighboring Nangarhar, Lowgar, and Paktia Provinces in
Afghanistan funnel into the Kurram Valley, which provides access to the
Pushtun tribal gun and ammunition manufacturing center at Darra in the
hills south of Peshawar. The Kurram Valley is a traditional invasion route
into Pakistan from Afghanistan; at its closest point, Pakistani territory is
only about 90 kilometers from Kabul.
By current best estimate, more than 700,000 Afghan refugees are located in
the border areas of Pakistan, from Chitral in the north as far south and west
as Dalbandin in Baluchistan Province. Most are in the North-West Frontier
Province; fewer than 110,000 are in Baluchistan. The number in the
northern areas has increased as refugees from the current military
operations make their way to Pakistan. Most of them entered Bajaur
District and Mohmand tribal territory. If Soviet antiguerrilla operations
continue to expand, the refugee totals in Pakistan could approach more than
1 million by May or June.
Most of the refugee influx occurred during the last six months. A trickle of
refugees began to flow toward Pakistan in May 1978. The number of
registered refugees in camps increased from approximately 18,000 in
January 1979 to 153,000 in September 1979, then doubled to 390,000 by
January 1980. Many uncounted Afghans have been absorbed into tribes in
Pakistan related to their own.
Currently, there are 53 loose concentrations of refugees, which in a broad
sense can be considered camps. Of these, 23 are in the North-West Frontier
Province and 30 in Baluchistan. The size of these encampments ranges from
500 to 11,000; the number fluctuates as refugees move in and out. Most of
the refugees not in camps are in the North-West Frontier Province. Many of
these are clustered in groups of three to eight families, encamped wherever
water is available. Scarcity of water and forage in the arid border zone limits
the size of encampments and dictates periodic moves.
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Composition of
Refugee Groups
No clear pattern on the composition of the refugee groups emerges. Children
up to 14 years old constitute a third to half the total number of refugees, and
in most camps there are twice as many children as women. The ratio of men
to women is high in some camps, low in others. The camps with
comparatively large percentages of males are in Pishin and Zhob Districts in
Baluchistan. One of the largest of the refugees camps, with 11,000 people
near Loralai, for example, is 38-percent male, 31-percent female, and 31-
percent children. At another encampment in Baluchistan, a group of 300
Hazara males?ages 18 to 35?arrived without women and children, saying
that the trip would have been too arduous for them. They are seeking
weapons, not food and shelter. 25X1
Cross-border tribal ties, combined with the tendency to travel in extended
family units, have enabled the refugees to survive without much government
support. The need, however, for food, shelter, and sanitation systems is
great. Most refugees eventually register with government agencies in order
to establish eligibility for relief supplies, including UN aid administered by
the Pakistani Government. 25X1
Some clearly are not refugees in the normal meaning of the term. In
determining refugee status, the Pakistani Government is systematically
excluding kuchis, the nomads who annually migrate from the mountains in
Afghanistan into the warmer valleys in Pakistan during the winter. Trying
to justify their registration as refugees and thus their eligibility for
government largesse, the kuchis say that although they arrived as usual last
fall, they do not plan to return to Afghanistan this spring because of
unsettled conditions there. Most of the kuchis are Ghilzais and are
concentrated in Baluchistan and in the Gomal and Tochi River Valleys in
Waziristan.
Almost all the 700,000 refugees?kuchi and nonnomadic alike?are
Pushtuns. In the Peshawar Valley and to the north, they are mostly
members of the Safi, Mohmand, Shinwari, and Khugiani tribes; in the
Kurram and Waziristan areas, they are principally Jajis, Mangals, Jadrans,
Waziris, Mahsuds, and Ghilzais. Most of the refugees in Baluchistan are
from seminomadic Durrani tribes. Pushtuns who arrived from urban areas
in Afghanistan flocked to Peshawar, the center of refugee activity, and to
Quetta; the minority who could afford it moved on to Western Europe and
the United States. Those from rural villages are scattered along?and are
generally close to?the border. It is these rural Pushtun tribesmen, with
warrior traditions and a conservative Islamic outlook, who make up the most
inflexible and active opposition to Communist rule. 25X1
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Spring in the Military activity in the borderlands resumed in early March with the
Borderlands: Afghan?Soviet guerrilla-clearing operations in the Konar Valley. Harsh
A Season for winter conditions had restricted military activity in Afghanistan's eastern
Change provinces, confining Soviet and Afghan military forces to strong points
along the main roads and at Gardez and Khowst. With the recent increase in
Soviet antiguerrilla operations in the provinces south of the Kabul River
Valley, the Soviets may try to restrict tribal movements in the vicinity of the
border in Afghanistan. This could reduce but not eliminate cross-border
movement between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The rugged mountainous
terrain, with hundreds of seldom-used border passes, makes effective
patrolling extremely difficult.
The concentration of refugees in the proximity of the border is an issue in
Soviet-Pakistani relations that the Pakistanis may attempt to defuse. They
may attempt to move the refugees into camps away from the border area to
facilitate distribution of relief supplies, to better control the movement of the
refugees in the frontier areas, and to reduce the inevitable tensions that will
erupt between the refugees and the local population over grazing and water
rights and other economically based issues. The refugees have exhibited a
reluctance to leave the border area near their homelands and may resist the
government's efforts to relocate them; moreover, many are not acclimated to
the high summer temperatures at lower elevations in the hill lands.
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Spring in the Military activity in the borderlands resumed in early March with the
Borderlands: Afghan?Soviet guerrilla-clearing operations in the Konar Valley. Harsh
A Season for winter conditions had restricted military activity in Afghanistan's eastern
Change provinces, confining Soviet and Afghan military forces to strong points
along the main roads and at Gardez and Khowst. With the recent increase in
Soviet antiguerrilla operations in the provinces south of the Kabul River
Valley, the Soviets may try to restrict tribal movements in the vicinity of the
border in Afghanistan. This could reduce but not eliminate cross-border
movement between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The rugged mountainous
terrain, with hundreds of seldom-used border passes, makes effective
patrolling extremely difficult.
The concentration of refugees in the proximity of the border is an issue in
Soviet-Pakistani relations that the Pakistanis may attempt to defuse. They
may attempt to move the refugees into camps away from the border area to
facilitate distribution of relief supplies, to better control the movement of the
refugees in the frontier areas, and to reduce the inevitable tensions that will
erupt between the refugees and the local population over grazing and water
rights and other economically based issues. The refugees have exhibited a
reluctance to leave the border area near their homelands and may resist the
government's efforts to relocate them; moreover, many are not acclimated to
the high summer temperatures at lower elevations in the hill lands.
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