AFGHANISTAN: IRAN'S ROLE IN THE CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000600200001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

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T.... Q..,..., a
Afghanistan: Iran's Role
Summary Iran has become increasingly involved in the Afghanistan crisis in the last
few months. Tehran has provided important diplomatic support to the
insurgents fighting the Soviets. The central government has apparently not
lived up to its promises to provide material aid, but Tehran continues to
assert its willingness to do so if the Soviets do not withdraw from
Afghanistan. The Afghan insurgents have received material aid, however,
from the Iranian clergy, elements of the Revolutionary Guard, and local
officials-aid that reflects the general consensus in Iran in support of the
rebel cause= 25x1 25X1
The Afghans have established a significant presence in Iran. The insurgents: 1
train fighters in camps along the border that house more than 100,000
refugees and have offices in Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad
ome Revolutionary Guar units
apparently are providing support for cross-border operations= 2 5X 1
Iranian involvement with the insurgents seems certain to increase. Domestic
pressures will incline the government toward more active support of the
rebels. For their part, the insurgents will probably continue to find Iran an
attractive base of operations, especially given the small number of Soviet
forces located in the border are= 25X1
Since early June the Soviets have become increasingly alarmed by Iran's
role in Afghanistan. They have taken a tougher line toward Iranians who
have taken outspoken public positions favoring the insurgents. Foreign
Minister Ghotbzadeh has, for example, been characterized as an agent of
the United States and China, and local authorities in Mashhad have been
accused of cooperating with the CIA. But Moscow has avoided direct
criticism of the Khomeini government= 25X1
The tougher Soviet posture is not likely to dissuade Tehran, and the Soviets
may be forced to step up their pressure. They could do so-but only at the
cost of a significant deterioration in ties with Tehran= 25X1
The author of this memorandum is Bruce Riedel, Office of Political Analysis. It was
coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Near East/South Asia. Research for
this memorandum was completed on 27 June 1980. Comments and queries are welcome and
should be directed to the Chief, So ea$t Asia Analytic Center, Near East-South Asia
Division, OPA, telephone 351-528 I 25XI
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Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh
at the Islamic Conference
in May.
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Afghanistan: Iran's Role
in the CrisilI
Negotiating Posture Iran has become the most vocal Third World supporter of the Afghan
insurgency. Iranian leaders-especially Foreign Minister Sadegh
Ghotbzadeh-have repeatedly taken a tough approach to President Babrak
Karmal's government. Ghotbzadeh played a major role at the recent Islamic
Conference in obtaining support for the Afghan insurgents' demands for a
total Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. He also has played a key role in
the three-man commission on Afghanistan set up by the conference
25X1
Ghotbzadeh has outlined Iran's position on Afghanistan in simple terms:
? All Soviet troops must leave Afghanistan.
? The insurgents should be brought into a new government.
? The Babrak regime cannot be recognized as Kabul's legitimate govern-
ment, but it can Particinate in gotiations on the country's future as an
"interested party.'I 25K1
Tehran has rejected offers from Kabul to improve relations. Babrak reversed
his predecessors' tough anti-Khomeini line and has suggested that "the most
reverend leader, Imam Khomeini," join him in improving ties between the
two countries. Tehran, however, summarily rejected Kabul's 14 May peace
proposal addressed to Iran and Pakistan, and Ghotbzadeh labeled the 23
June Soviet troop w "maneuver" aimed at influencing Western
and Islamic opinioni
National Consensus Ghotbzadeh's hard line reflects a consensus in Iran in favor of the
insurgents, as well as the Islamic revolution's anti-Communist and anti-
Soviet ideology. President Bani-Sadr and Ayatollah Khomeini have made
strong public statements attacking the Soviets as have most Iranian clerical
leaders. Only the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party has defended the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan. Other leftist groups like the Mujahedin have
criticized the Soviets or taken a low postur 25X1
The Iranian consensus on Afghanistan indicates that Tehran's concern
about the situation on its eastern frontier will be lasting. Even if Ghotbzadeh
were to leave office, other Iranian leaders would probably continue to back
the insurgents as a means of keepin h Soviets off balance and
demonstrating Iran's independence
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Khomeini has longstanding ties with at least one Afghan rebel leader. Assef
Mohsini, who was a student of Khomeini's during the Ayatollah's years in
exile in Iraq, currently heads an Afghan group in Qom. Khomeini's ties are
strongest with the Shia Muslim Hazara minority in central Afghanistan, a
group that has been particularly active in the insurgency against the Babrak
regime. Shias comprise only about 12 percent of the Afghan population and
have long been discriminated against by the majority C, Many
Hazaras like Mohsini look to Khomeini for leadership
Iranian leaders appear to have little fear of the Soviet reaction to their tough
line on Afghanistan. Although Tehran is concerned that Afghanistan may
be used by ,the Soviets as a base for subverting Iran's dissident Baluchi
minority, the Iranians are confident they can resist any overt Soviet move
into the country through the same kind of massive civil disobedience that
brought down the Shah=
Tehran, however, has tried to keep its relations with Moscow on other issues
from deteriorating. The Iranians value Soviet economic assistance or at least
its propaganda value in circumventing US and West European sanctions.
Moreover, Tehran is determined to keep some balance in its relations with
the superpower I
Aid to the Insurgency Since January Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh have promised on several
occasions to provide the insurgents with material support including money,
arms, and volunteers he insurgents
have yet to receive aid from the Iranian central government
I
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
some aid is going to the
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I
e confusion in the e ran-government, it is not surprising that individual
Iranian clerical leaders, businessmen, local officials, and elements of the
Revolutionary Guards have provided assistance to the insurgents without
the explicit aps even without the knowledge of the ceeiitlral
government
The insurgents, moreover, have established a significant presence inside
Iran. Estimates of the number of Afghan refugees in Iran range from
100.000 to 300.000
uggest that Iranian volunteers are already
25X1
3 Ton Secret
Tehran provides the insurgents with propaganda support and allows them to
have offices in Tehran. Moreover, Ghotbzadeh has taken the lead in
bringing insurgent leaders to diplomatic conclaves such as the Islamabad
conferenc I 25X1
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ret
Potential Iranian Aid Iranian involvement with the insurgents seems certain to increase, partly
because it will come under increasing domestic pressure to take a more
active part in aiding the insurgents. Ghotbzadeh and other Iranian officials
have already said that if negotiations fail to persuade the Soviets to
withdraw from Afghanistan, the government will support the insurgents
with arms and financial backing. Even if it wanted to, the Tehran regime
lacks the ability to curb activity along the border.
The insurgents are likely to look to Iran as an increasingly attractive base of
operations. The Iranian-Afghan border area has both disadvantages and
advantages as a base for insurgent activity:
? The terrain is less suited to guerrilla operations than the mountainous
Pakistani-Afghan border region. In the Zabol area the ground is marshy
and subject to seasonal flooding from the Helmand River. North of Zabol
to the Soviet border the terrain is very barren and primarily desert.
Although it is mountainous, there is very little vegetation and guerrilla
activity could be easily countered from the air.
The area is thinly populated. Aside from some agricultural activity along
the Helmand, most residents are nomads. The largest city in the area is
Mashhad (780,000)-most are much smaller (in Iran, Tayyebat has less
than 15,000 residents, Zabol perhaps 30,000; in Afghanistan, Herat has
around 75,000, Zaranj less than 10,000).
? There are few Soviet troops in the area. Only one understrength Soviet
motorized rifle division is in the Shindand-Herat region, although another
is at Kushka just north of the Soviet-Afghan frontier.
The 400-mile long frontier is impossible to close without a major increase in
Soviet forces. Even before the insur ency and the decline in Iranian border
security, smuggling was widespread
Soviet Reaction Until mid-June the Soviets generally refrained from commenting on Iran's
support for the insurgents. To improve their ties with the Khomeini regime,
Moscow chose to ignore Tehran's stand on the Afghan issue on most
occasions. Ghotbzadeh's highly visible role in the Islamic Conference in
Islamabad in May and with the conference's Afghan committee apparently
led to some reevaluation in Moscow that has been reflected in several press
commentaries. The Soviets were probably particularly disturbed by a
meeting between Ghotbzadeh and Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua in
Oslo, Norway, on 1 2 T, uring which the Afghan issue was almost
certainly discussed I
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It
On 16 June a TASS dispatch filed from Kabul claimed that Ghotbzadeh
had discussed aiding "counterrevolutionary forces" with Hua during the
visit to Norway. TASS suggested that Ghotbzadeh was acting as an agent of
the United States and China-a line consistent with Soviet policies aimed at
courting Khomeini and the Islamic clergy while suggesting that secular
Iranian leaders are insufficiently revolutionary. I 25X1
Several subsequent articles have accused Ghotbzadeh of "echoing American
propaganda" and of cooperating with other "circles in Iran" who want to
emulate Pakistan's example by setting up bases on Iranian territory for the
A 25 June Pravda commentary by A. Petrov-a pseudonym used to convey
authoritative endorsement by the Soviet leadership-accused "local
authorities" in Mashhad of conniving with CIA agents in setting up a
"center of armed struggle" against the Karmal regime similar to the "rebel
training bases" in Pakistan. The article carefully avoided blaming the
Khomeini government for complicity in the "Mashhad center.' 25X1
The increase in Soviet public concern about Iran's role in Afghanistan
probably reflects the unease in Moscow over the potential for increased
Ell
Moscow faces a fundamental dilemma in developing its policy toward Iran's
role in Afghanistan-it must try to balance its desire to maintain fairly good
relations with Khomeini while preserving its equities in Afghanistan. The
Soviets are clearly trying to avoid an open split with the clerical wing of the
Islamic revolution by focusing their attacks on Ghotbzadeh~ 25X1
This tactic is not likely to succeed, given the backing Ghotbzadeh enjoys on
the issue. The Soviets will probably adhere to this line as long as possible,
however, especially if the central government's direct involvement with the
insurgents remains unclear. 25X1
Iranian aid to the insur enc as well as the embarrassment caused by
Ghotbzadeh's polemics
The Soviets may choose to ignore an escalation in Iranian involvement with
the insurgents for some time. Nonetheless, Moscow has several options in
dealing with increased Iranian involvement.I I 2 5x 1
The Soviets could choose to increase their forces in Afghanistan's western
region to prevent cross-border activity, but this is unlikely in the near term.
Unless the Soviets increase their troop strength significantly in Afghanistan,
they would have to transfer forces from other regions where the insurgency
I 25X1
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Moscow might try to signal its unease by adopting a more aggressive policy
toward Iran. The Soviets could exert pressure on Iran more directly by using
their economic relationship or increasing their aid to leftist groups in Iran
such as the Tudeh. Moscow could also take a more direct role in supporting
Iran's dissident minority groups like the Kurds and the Baluchis. These
options probably would seriously strain relations with Tehran
The most dangerous Soviet option would be an aggressive policy of pursuing
insurgents across the border and disrupting their activity in the refugee
camps. The Iranians have charged that Afghan Air Force helicopters
entered Iranian territory on at least two occasions (23 February and 20
May), apparently in pursuit of insurgents. A Soviet decision to move
aggressively against rebel activity in Iran would risk a fundamental
deterioration in T- --;---Soviet relations and would probably be chosen only
as a last resortI I
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Source of Copyrighted Photograph
Page ii: Photograph on this page. is from the
Associated Press, 30 March 1980.