STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF'S PERFORMANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000600180002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 3, 1980
• Content Type: MF

SECRET NFAC #0027/80
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000600180002-8
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
3 January 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH . Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
FROM : Richard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT : Strategic Warning Staff's Performance
1. Action Requested: That you sign the attached memorandum
to Director for Strategic Warning Staff.
2. Background: The Strategic Warning Staff was the prime mover,
and at times t e sole voice of dissent, during the period leading up to
massive Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Starting in August, the
Staff attended meetings, wrote memoranda to the National Intelligence
Officer for Warning, requested additional collection, and generally
kept the pot boiling when the conventional view of the community was
one of complacency. A brief summary of the Staff's memoranda is at-
tached.
3. As a direct result of the Staff's analysis and constant at-
tention to the more ominous alternatives, the Intelligence Community's
performance can only be termed a success: we issued Alert Memoranda
on 14 September, 19 December, and 25 December. Our policymakers were
well warned.
4. In view of the amount of attention devoted to "intelligence
failures," it seems appropriate to recognize a resounding success.
To that end, I recommend you sign the accompanying memorandum.
Richard Lehman
Attachments:
A. Summary of Staff's Memoranda
B. Letter for DCI Signature
All Portions of areARpgg944 this 200574/ : CIA-RDP81 B 0401 R000600180002-8
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 SECRET
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SUBJECT: Strategic Warning Staff's Performance (NFAC #0027/80)
Distribution:
1 - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI/
1 - ER
1 - NIO/W Chrono
1 - A/NI0/W
1 - NFAC Registry
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USSR-Afghanistan Memoranda from Strategic Warning Staff
10 August : There is a strong likelihood that the Soviets will commit
a limited amount of combat forces, and are likely to find
themselves being drawn into a larger operation.
(to NIO/W)
24 August : A number of events in recent days point to an impending
increase in Soviet military aid--suggesting that the
decision to increase support has in fact already been
made.
(to NIO/W)
28 August : A request that attachee tasking for Kabul be expanded to
include Soviet air activity was submitted to DIA when the
Strategic Warning Staff discovered that Soviet flights
were not being detected by technical means.
(to DIA)
6 September: We are not arguing that the Soviets have made a decision
to commit combat troops (although they may have) but that
they have made decisions which indicate they are prepared
to introduce forces if that is what it takes to preserve
their position.
(to NIO/W)
14 September: On balance, taking into account the evidence available to
us, we believe there is a better than even chance that the
report of Soviet troop movement to Afghanistan is accurate.
(to NIO/W)
21 September: Following is a chronology of Soviet military activities in
the week which we view as indications of possible Soviet
intentions to introduce combat forces into Afghanistan.
(to NIO/W)
26 October : We are concerned that in the month that has been elapsed
since the USSR-Afghanistan Alert Memorandum (14 September),
the Soviets appear to have put themselves in position to
move a larger ground combat force into Afghanistan in less
time with less advance warning.
(to NIO/W, readdressed to Warning Working Group on
29 October)
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12 December: Continuing analysis leads me to believe we should immed-
iately produce a follow-up to the 14 September Alert
Memorandum. The Soviets appear to be preparing to intro-
duce sizeable combat forces into Afghanistan.
(to NIO/W)
13 December: I left the meeting yesterday with the feeling that we had
not accomplished much. Most of those present seemed to
continue to hold the view that the Soviets are moving
tentatively. By their actions, the Soviets have indicated
they are willing to take the large political step of put-
ting their own combat units into a foreign country.
(to NIO/W)
14 December: We believe the additional indications we have detected in
recent days are particularly significant in that they sug-
gest that the forces to be committed come from units other
than just the 105th Guards Airborne Division.
(to NIO/W)
-2-
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Strategic Warning Staff
SUBJECT : USSR-Afghanistan
The performance of your Staff during the period pre-
ceding massive Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was
exemplary. Through your attendance at various meetings
and your memoranda to the National Intelligence Officer for
Warning, you caused the Intelligence Community to consider
alternate, more ominous, hypotheses. As a result, our
policymakers were warned as early as 14 September of the
possibility that Soviet troops would be employed in Afghan-
istan. It is encouraging to witness such a resounding in-
telligence success, for which you deserve a large share of
the credit. Well done.
STANSFIELD TURNER
All Portions of this memorandum
are classified SECRET
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