IRAN: THE REEMERGENCE OF THE LEFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500100026-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: December 1, 1979
• Content Type: IM

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National Top Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Iran:
The Reemergence of the Left
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Top Secret
Summary
Iran:
The Reemergence of the LefiI
The crisis between the United States and Iran has permitted the
reemergence of Iran's Marxist left after several months of repression and
quiescence. By far the most visible leftist group in the last month has been
the pro-Soviet, Communist Tudeh Party. It has enthusiastically supported
the takeover of the US Embassy as well as Ayatollah Khomeini's new
Islamic constitution.
The Tudeh's support for Khomeini has paid off, in that the party is
functioning openly in Iran now and actively recruiting new members.
Although still suffering from an image of subservience to Moscow, the party
also benefits from outside support from the USSR and its allies. In sum, the
Tudeh is probably stronger now than at any time in the past decade.
Moreover, Iran's economic problems give the party new opportunities to
exploit.
Iran's other leftist groups, including the Fedayeen guerrillas, have been less
visible than the Tudeh, but have also increased their level of activity. Only
the Tudeh, however, has tried to align itself with Khomeini, while the rest
have opposed his new constitution.
The duration of the Tudeh's tactical alliance with Khomeini depends on the
Ayatollah's willingness to tolerate the Communists. Khomeini's problem is
that he may allow the Tudeh to gain too much strength before he decides to
move against it.
Despite recent gains, the left in Iran is split and too weak to challenge
Khomeini directly. The independent armed leftist groups will continue to
pose a challenge to Khomeini's security forces, but there is no sign that the
various leftist groups are prepared to unify enough to overthrow Khomeini's
Islamic Republic.
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This memorandum was prepared byl 1 the Iran Task Force, Office of Political
Analysis. It was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officerfor Near East and South
Asia. Information available as of 5 December 1979 was used in its preparation. Questions
and comments are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief of the Task Force, OPA, on
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The Reemergence of the Left F-1
The crisis between the United States and Iran has permitted the
reemergence of Iran's Marxist left after several months of repression and
quiescence. The left has been far more visible in the last few weeks than at
any time since the chaotic days of last February when Ayatollah Khomeini
took power. For a brief period last spring the left was extremely active as the
symbol of opposition to Khomeini's theocratic state. By late summer,
however, Khomeini had turned on the left and successfully intimidated its
leaders, forcing most leftist activists to go underground. 0 25X1
The seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran on 4 November and the crisis that
followed gave the left an opportunity to reappear. The left shares
Khomeini's desire to purge Iran of all US influence and to radicalize the
revolution further by removing relatively moderate figures like former
Prime Minister Bazargan from positions of influence. Khomeini, for his
part, has tolerated the reemergence of the left only because it has supported
his stand. II
The Tudeh Party By far the most visible leftist group in the last month has been the pro-
Soviet, Communist Tudeh Party. First Secretary Nureddin Kianuri has
enthusiastically supported the Khomeini regime on virtually all issues. In an
interview on 26 November, Kianuri defended the taking of the US Embassy,
which he called "a center of espionage activities." Kianuri has also lauded
the Khomeini regime as an "anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist" movement
that is seeking to establish a "real, not a formal, popular democracy."
Kianuri claimed that Khomeini was vigorously defending the revolution
against threats from the right and thus deserved the support of progressive
elements. 0
The Tudeh is the only major leftist party in Iran which supports Khomeini's
new Islamic constitution. Tudeh Party spokesmen urged Iranians to vote for
the constitution in the 2-3 December referendum. Kianuri has frankly
admitted that the Tudeh has little choice but to support Khomeini if it wants
to function in Iran. Last September Kianuri said "everything depends on
Khomeini. He has the people's support." II
Kianuri's support for Khomeini is consistent with the Tudeh's longstanding
policy of calling for a national front of all popular forces. The Tudeh has
never tried to seize power for itself out of recognition of its weakness, but
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rather has sought to form alliances with other political forces in the
country-alliances which the Tudeh hoped, in time, to dominate. F1
The Tudeh's support for Khomeini has paid off for the party. After more
than 20 years in exile in East Germany, the Tudeh leadership returned to
Iran last March, and although the party is still technically illegal, it
functions openly in Tehran and other cities. The party has an office in
Tehran, and one press report suggests it has a small militia. During
Khomeini's crackdown on the left the party's journal Mardom and
newspaper Navid were banned, along with 60 other papers in August, but
reappeared on 2 October. Tudeh members sporting red armbands openly
distribute party literature now. F-1
Press sources also report that Tudeh members have visited the US Embassy
compound in Tehran to show support for the "students" holding the
hostages. Kianuri has hinted publicly that he is in indirect contact with the
Ayatollah, and other press reports suggest that Tudeh Party leaders have
been received by government officials in Tehran.
The party has also been actively recruiting and trying to build up its popular
support. The Tudeh has long had some strength among oil workers and
probably is trying to broaden its support among other labor groups. The
Communists have also focused attention on building a clandestine apparatus
in the military.=
Despite these efforts and the Tudeh's support for Khomeini, the party still
lacks significant popular backing. It suffers from an image of subservience
to Moscow that erodes its credentials among Iranian nationalists.]
The Tudeh's support for Khomeini has probably also cost it support among
Iran's minorities-especially the Kurds and Azarbayjanis. Iran's other
leftist parties have backed the minorities' demands for autonomy but the
Tudeh has supported Khomeini's constitutional opposition to autonomy]
Nonetheless, the Tudeh has several important strengths. The Communists
have a tradition of clandestine behavior that has enabled them to survive
years of repression by the Shah. Moreover, the party is doubtless benefiting
from the widespread unemployment and rampa inflation that is turning
some in the lower class away from the mullahs.
Finally the Tudeh has the benefit of Soviet assistance and the support of
other Communist parties in the region
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Other Leftist Groups Iran's numerous other independent Marxist parties have been less active
than the Tudeh. The largest Marxist guerrilla group, the Peoples Fedayeen
(formerly known as the Chariks), has held several demonstrations in Tehran
supporting the seizure of the Embassy. Some evidence suggests that
members of the Fedayeen may be among the group occupying the Embassy
compound, but there is little to suggest that the Fedayeen elements control
the situation in the compound or that the takeover is a repetition of last
ry's attack on the Embassy, which was carried out by the Fedayeen.
The Fedayeen opposed Khomeini's constitution, and the Ayatollah has
sharply criticized the group for failing to support the revolution. Most
reports indicate that the group is badly factionalized and that its leadership
is still intimidated by Khomeini's mob support. 25X1
Nonetheless, the Fedayeen remain well armed and dedicated and retain the
ability to cause trouble for Khomeini. They have been active in support of
the Kurds and other minority groups in their efforts to secure autonomy.
Like other leftist groups the Fedayeen are recruiting and organizing,
waiting for an opportunity to move against Khomeini. D 25X1
The leftist Islamic guerrilla group known as the Mujahidin is apparently
even more factionalized than the Fedayeen. It is badly split over how much
support to give Khomeini. Some reports suggest that Mujahidin members
may also be among the students in the Embassy compound.
The Tudeh Party is clearly trying to establish itself as the junior partner in
an alliance with Khomeini and the Islamic movement. To date, it has been
relatively successful in starting to organize and propagandize its message.
The Tudeh doubtless hopes that over time it can develop more influence with
the Islamic movement and Khomeini. II 25X1
For his part, Khomeini has quietly accepted the Tudeh's backing in the
struggle against the United States and for the constitution. He remains a
staunch anti-Communist, however, and will tolerate the Tudeh only as long
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as the Communists follow his line. The danger for Khomeini is that the
Tudeh gain enough influence, if he allows the party to r~ and organize
for a long period of time, to pose a threat to his control. I I
The left would be far stronger if it were united. The Fedayeen and most
other leftist groups, however, continue to be wary of the Tudeh's close ties to
Moscow. The left in general is plagued with ideological differences and
factionalism that hinder its ability to confront Khomeini. ^ 25X1
In the long run, however, the left is in a good position to gain more influence.
The left benefits from Khomeini's efforts to radicalize the revolution
because the moderate center has been weakened. Secularists are beginning
to see the Communists as an alternative to Khomeini. The left also gains
from the country's economic problems, which may over time encourage the
lower class to break with Khomeini. ^ 25X1
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Background on the
Tudeh Party
Communism in Iran dates from 1917, when Iranian workers returning from
the Caucasus oilfields-with encouragement from Soviet agents-formed
the Justice Party, which in 1921 became the Communist Party of Iran. In
1920-21, Communist groups supported by Soviet troops tried unsuccessfully
to form a separatist republic in northern Iran. Communists in the urban
areas in the late 1920s had considerable success in organizing workers. The
party was outlawed in 1931 afer the government discovered that the
Communists were responsible for the oil workers' strike of 1929.
During the 1930s, Communist covert activity focused on propaganda and
recruiting among intellectuals, including students returning from Europe.
The arrest and imprisonment of 53 ringleader s---~jnown as the Erani
Circle-ended this phase of activity in 1937. 1]
The members of the Erani Circle were released in 1941 after the abdication
of Reza Shah and the occupation of Iran by Soviet and British troops. They
immediately formed another party organization named the Tudeh (Masses)
Party. With Soviet troops occupying the northern part of the country and
Allied troops elsewhere, the Communists quickly built -a nationwide
organization.I I
The Communists skillfully exploited grievances resulting from the modern-
ization program of Reza Shah. The middle and working classes had
expanded considerably, but had been given little opportunity to participate
in politics. This, coupled with the abrupt removal of restrictions on political
activities, allowed the Communists to make rapid progress in the cities.
Numerous front organizations were formed to work among the various
groups and minorities. In 1944, eight Tudeh members were elected to
Parliament, and for three months in 1946 the Cabinet included three Tudeh
In 1945-46, Communist Party organizers, with the support of Soviet troops,
organized two autonomous republics in Azarbayjan-e-havari. These puppet
republics collapsed after the Soviets withdrew in May 1946. An attempt to
assassinate the Shah in 1949 led to the proscription of the party throughout
Iran, but the government failed to root out the Tudeh organization
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? Keep activity alive in Iran through radio, press propaganda, and covert
communications.
Europe.
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? Communicate with party members within Iran. u I I 25X1
The expatriate organization consisted of about 400 individuals, including
the senior leadership and its families. The Central Committee convened in
Moscow; the Executive Committee and Secretariat were based in East
Germany The party apparently had cells in both Eastern and Western
In early 1979 most party leaders returned to Iran. A small cadre
organization remained in East Germany, however, to provide support for the
party. III
For years the party used a transmitter in East Germany to broadcast party
statements, commentaries, and summaries. The station, named Radio Iran
Courier, was moved to Bulgaria in late 1965 and closed altogether in late
1976 after the Shah had protested to the Soviets. The Iranian Communists
may now have access to the National Voice of Iran, which broadcasts from
Baku in the Soviet Union.I I 0
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Although still nominally outlawed, the party reemerged between 1951 and
1953 when Mohammed Mossadeq was Prime Minister and, by using
xenophobic slogans, again gained followers. The Tudeh appeal was greatest
among university students and civil servants. In addition to indoctrinated
members, the Tudeh gained a large number of sympathizers. The party
successfully penetrated professional and union groups and also much
of the civil service and the military.
In supporting Mossadeq it played a
in inciting mob violence on the
streets of Tehran. The Shah's triumph over Mossadeq in 1953 was followed
by another suppression of the Communists. Over 1,000 party members and
supporters were arrested, and most party leaders fled to Eastern Europe.
The party was dealt a crushing and near fatal blow when Iranian security
forces broke up the Communist apparatus within the military. Some 500
pro-Communist army officers were arrested.
The Party in Exile From 1953 until the fall of the Shah in 1979, the leadership of the Tudeh
Party was centered in Leipzig, East Germany, where it attempted to:
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Pragmatic Party The Tudeh Party has been notably pragmatic in its policies. Aware of its
Policies limited strength and its need to cooperate with other radicals and .
nationalists, for years the party has espoused a united front policy. Even at
the peak of its power in 1953, the party did not seek to compete by itself, but
called for a voice in a democratic front. The Communist content of its
platform has, therefore, not been emphasized.
As part of its effort to gain broad popular support, the Tudeh Party has
consistently been careful not to criticize religion or religious leaders. The
party is not known to have recruited heavily among the Shiite hierarchy,
although a few opportunistic members of the clergy were active in front
organizations during the early 1950s. ^ 25X1
A second cornerstone of party policy has been the maintenance of close ties
with Moscow. The Tudeh has always depended on Soviet support and has
faithfully followed Moscow's line, even to the extent of toning down its
opposition to the Shah when the USSR was trying to improve relations with
Iran. 0
Soviet allies also support the Tudeh. East Germany has long been host to the
exiled Tudeh. The party has a history of cordial relations with the ruling
Marxist party in Afghanistan. The Marxist regime iQuth Yemen has
apparently had some contact with the Tudeh Party. I I 25X1
Leadership The increase in Tudeh activities since late 1978 coincided with a change in
party leadership. Iraj Eskandari, who had been first secretary since 1971,
was replaced on 4 January by Nureddin Kianuri, formerly second secretary.
The party statement announcing the shift gave no explanation for'the
change. It is possible that Kianuri obtained the top post after a split over
policy. It is also possible, however, that the 72-year-old Eskandari was
simply not able to exercise effective leadership. Kianuri, who at 63 is one of
the youngest Tudeh leaders, is said to be the f ost Tudeh theoretician.
He is virtually unknown outside party circles.
Party Size There, are no good figures nv2flahle on the size oMe Tudeh Party
Tudeh's demonstrations early this year.
that there were no more than 10,000
party activists in Tehran. About 5,000 people turned out for one of the
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