THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT: MOROCCO'S MILLSTONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000800130002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Western Sahara Conflict:
Morocco's Millstone
F... ct.?rcr
PA 79-113/67
-ter ' IY!V
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Assessment
Center
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The Western Sahara Conflict:
Morocco's Millstone (s)
An Intelligence Assessment
Research for this report was completed
on 23 March 1979.
This assessment was prepared at the request of and
coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for
the Near East and South Asia.
Secret
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The Western Sahara Conflict:
Morocco's Millstone (s)
Morocco has lost the initiative in its effort to maintain
its hold on the former Spanish Sahara in the face of
unrelenting harassment by the guerrillas of the
POLISARIO Front. The tide of war is running in favor of
the POLISARIo and we do not believe that Morocco will
be able to reverse this trend as long as the flow of
military supplies from Algeria continues and the
Algerian safehaven for POLISARIO guerrillas is main-
tained. The Moroccan problems have been com-
pounded by Mauritania's withdrawal from the fight-
ing, allowing the guerrillas to concentrate their
offensive against the Moroccan-administered sector o
the Western Sahara
POLISARIO's 3,000 to 5,000 combatants are exploiting
the tactical advantages of the sparsely populated desert
terrain, and while they probably cannot drive the
Moroccan Army-out of the Western Sahara, they can
probably make the rice of staying there unacceptable
to Morocco
King Hassan won popular support by his 1976
annexation of Morocco's portion of the Western
Sahara, Tint since then the cost in men and resources
has become a political liability. A political settlement
is badly needed, but he would lose considerable
Several developments in the dipute seem plausible
over the next few years: 25X1
? Growing domestic opposition to the war in Morocco
may within a year or so seriously weaken Hassan's
negotiating position. In the absence of negotiations,
political, economic, and military constraints will prob-
ably keep the conflict from escalating into a conven-
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? The POLISARIO will continue to move at will through
the countryside, scoring occasional military successes
and inflicting heavy casualties on Moroccan forces.
Some guerrilla_attacks-notably those in southern
Morocco proper-will have considerable propaganda
value. For their part, Mauritanian forces will continue
to honor their cease-fire with the guerrillas and may
pull out of their sector altogether.
? Buoyed by the guerrillas' battlefield successes,
Algeria and the POLISARIO may become less and less
disposed to compromise. A political settlement would
most likely have to take the form of Moroccan
acknowledgment of Saharan self-determination and
territorial concessions to the new Saharan state.
prestige If he were to back ? If a Saharan ministate were created in the
down on his claims. Mauritanian sector, such an arrangement would be
unstable. POLISARIO leaders would view their ministate
Algeria's new leadership has not slackened from the as a liberated zone from which they would continue
late President Bournediene's commitment to the cause their insurgency in the Moroccan Sahara. They would
of Western Saharan nationalism. Algeria continues to turn to Algeria for military support when threatened
refuse to recognize the Moroccan-Mauritanian annex- by Morocco.
ations and provides the POLISARIO guerrillas sanctuary
and material support . There appears to be little ? Most countries have not acknowledged the partition
immediate prospect of a negotiated settlement to tl1is pf the Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania, and
conflict without the prodding of outside mediation. he POLISARIO'S government-in-exile will slowly gain 25X1
roader recognition.
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? Costly and embarrassing attacks from Algerian-
based POLISARIO guerrillas seem likely to continue and
King FIa`ssan_may be pressured into a more aggressive
policy toward Algeria. Given the military balance,
which is greatly to Morocco's disadvantage, Hassan is
likely to restrict cross-border operations to commando
raids that carry minimal risks of drawing a major
response from Algerian regular forces, but also afford
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The Western Sahara Conflict:
Morocco's Millstone (s)
After more than three years of conflict, Morocco's
military capability to fight an effective counter-
guerrilla war has been seriously eroded. Moroccan
forces are increasingly defensive minded and show
Ittle ability to detect and respond to concentrations of
OT.ISARIO forces.
in order to maintain the current level of pressure on
Moroccan troops. The guerrillas would have to scale
down their operations considerably if these supplies
were reduced or cut off. The loss of Algerian military
support would not mean the end of POLISARIO resist-
ance, but it would probably be reduced to a level
that could be contained by the Moroccan forces.E
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he POLISARIO forces are well armed and supp ie .
They have not yet attempted to occupy and hold
territory, preferring to operate from bases in Algeria
and thereby deny superior Moroccan forces a fixed
target. The POLi-SARIO probably hopes that a pro-
tracted guerrilla war will force Rabat to accept a
political settlement creating an independent a aran
state.
POLISARIO Military Advantages/ Limitations
POLISARIO Front Political Orientation
The PoLlsARlo Front (The Popular Front for the
Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro)' was
formed in May 1973 by members of its predecessor
organization, the Saharan Liberation Front, a guer-
rilla movement that opposed Spanish control of the
territory.' The POLISARO'S goal, enunciated at its
second congress in 1974, is the establishment of an
indeipendent, nonaligned, socialist Arab republic. In
POLISARIO militants have
d
d
f
i
ence,
epen
n
or
their drive
mobilized and politicized large numbers of Saharans
and conducted an effective public relations campaign.
More important, thePOLis--- has grown in the past
five years-with strong Algerian backing-from an
insignificant band of fighters into a well-organized and
equipped force that has driven Mauritania from the
war and forced Morocco into a defensive posture. It
has become a relatively independent political and
military force that will have to be reckoned with in any
The guerrillas continue to take advantage of their
ability_ to-move virtually at will through southern
Morocco, Mauritania, and the Western Sahara. They
also have benefited from the 10 July coup in
Mauritania, which has resulted in a cease-fire in
Mauritania and the Mauritanian-controlled section of
the Sahara and allowed the poLisARio forces to
enhance their logistic capability through the establish-
ment of additional base camps. Since the coup in
Mauritania, Moroccan casualties have increased to
about 100 men killed per month. Moroccan troops
based in Mauritania are not expected to undertake
offensive operations against the POLISARIO forces.
The POLISARIO lacks the manpower base to pursue
anything other than a guerrilla strategy_. POLISARIO'S
objective is not to defeat the Moroccans, but to force
them to the bargaining table or to withdraw. The
guerrilla forces are dependent on military aid pri-
marily from Algeria, and to a lesser extent from Libya,
future settlement of the Saharan dispute.
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The majority of POLISARIO partisans are Reguibat
tribesmen, probably the most powerful of the Saharan
peoples.; They traditionally have followed a nomadic
' Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro were the former names of the two
regions comprising the Spanish Sahara. The acronym is derived 25X1
from the Spanish translation Frente Popular para la Liberacion de
.Saeuia el Hamra y Rio de Oro.
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CPYRGHT
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Guerrillas in Land Rovers departing for
mission in Western Sahara.
lifestyle, ranging with their camels across wide ex-
panses of northwest Africa. They are known for their
ferocity, pride, and skill with firearms and have
dominated the eastern part of the territory for some
time
tary approach as the only effective means of achieving
independence.
tentative
conclusions on its political orientation, ideology, and
objectives. The key figures are single-minded young
men in their thirties who seem prepared to fight as long
as necessary to achieve inde endence
The dominant ideological orientation within the I
POLISARIO leadership reportedly is Arab nationalism.
Secretary General Mohamed Abdelaziz and most
influential POLISARIO leaders stress non-Marxist Arab
socialism and unity, the fight for independence, and
nationalism as the main features of the POLisARIo
struggle. POLISARIO leaders advocate a hardline mili-
The POUSARIO Front has been concentrating on
strengthening its shaky political credentials while
g guerrilla operations against Morocco and,
until last July, Mauritania. In February 1976 the
POLISARIO Front announced the creation of the
Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, in effect, a
government-in-exile-'The SDAR consists of a skeleton
cabinet of little-known figures and a legislative coun-
cil. The Front, however. is the dominant authority. A
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Saharan D
emocratic Arab Republic (SDAR)
President
Mohamed Abdelaziz
Countries That
Recognize the SDAR
Date
Council of Ministers
(October 78)
Prime Minister Secretary General of
Mohamed al-Amin Ould Ahmed Ministry of Commerce
(Lamine Amin) Moulay Ahmed Ould Baba
Minister of Defense Secretary General of
Ibrahim Ghali Ould Moustapha Ministry of Communications and Energy
Minister of Interior Hamoudi Ahmed Ould Baba
Mahjoub Laroussi Secretary General of
(Mahfoud All Beiba)
Ministry of Education
Minister of Foreign Affairs All Ould Mahmoud
Ibrahim Hakim (Hakim Adel) Secretary General of
Minister of Information Ministry of Health
Mohamed Salem Ould Saleck Saleck Ould Boubeh
Minister Without Portfolio
Mohamed Ould Sidati
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Burundi
Congo
Equatorial
Guinea
Ethiopia
Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar
Mozambique
North Korea
Panama
Rwanda
Sao Tome &
Principe
S
h
l
3-6-76
3-11-76
3-9-76
2-29-76
6-2-78
11-3-78
2-24-79
3- -76
3- -76
3- -76
3-16-76
7- -78
- -76
6-20-78
eyc
e
les
10- -77
South Yemen
2-1-78
President 41 members,
Tanzania
11-9-78
Sidi Ahmed Ould Mohamed including a 21-member Politburo
Togo
3- -76
Vice President
Bashir M
t
Vietnam
3-3-79
us
apha Siyed al-Quail
nine-member Executive Committee is the formal
executive body, but we suspect the shadowy Revolu-
tionary Command Council-perhaps an amalgam of
the party's political and military wings-is the real
power center.' There may be otherinflue-tial bodies
representing specific interest groups, for example, the,
commanders of fighting units based at Tindouf._l
Nineteen governments recognize the Saharan Demo-
cratic Arab Republic Eight, including Vietnam and
states that value relations with Morocco. Among the
Arab states, only South Yemen has f Algeria's _Q11Qj lead in recognizing the SDAR. 25X1
The POLISARIO leadership is closely allied politically to
Algeria, with which it shares the common objective )T~
weakening Morocco. That tie, however, should not
o scure the fact that Saharan nationalists have their
own interests and objectives and are not mere ap-
Ethiopia, have granted recognition in the past 13
onths, suggesting that the Front'sdiplomatic effort-j! An independent Saharan state would form close ties
aining momentum. Morocco's decision in March to with Algeria and Libya, the latter probably the
efuse to discuss further the Naha ra ,c . o , t
?
-
- -----
..
second most important backer, and would
national forums inevitably will strengthen the e heavil
de I
d
t
y
n
en
on them for financial assistance.
OLISARIO'S Position. Rabat's decision in March 1976 ne
S
h
w
a
aran re ime would robabl emulate these
to break relations with Algiers served as a deterrent t tates in establishing an Arab socialist political and
recognition of the Saharan government-in e-xjle by
pen ages of Algiers.
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 POLISARIO Front
(October 78)
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Secretary General
Mohamed Abdelaziz
Deputy Secretary General
Bashir Mustapha Siyed al-Quail
Habib Allah
Ahmed Baba Miske
Jumal Zakari
Hamdi All
Revolutionary Command Council
Mohamed Abdelaziz
Mohamed al-Amin Quid Ahmed
Ibrahim Ghali Ould Moustapha
Mahjoub Laroussl
economic system. It would seek close political ties with Mauritania Drops Out
"progressive" Third World states and adopt a
nonaligned posture. POLISARIO leaders would probably Coup and Disengagement
retain interest in a relationship with the United States- The military coup_in Mauritania on 10 July 1978
25X1 they appear to appreciate US policy of denying nnded 1 _ Years of rule by Moktar Ould Daddah and
25X1 arms to Morocco for useinlthe Sahara. rought to power a goyc_rnmentcommitted to ending
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taurit
ahara
cow oriented. They might, however, be susceptible to he decision to cast its lot with Morocco in partitioning
efforts by the Soviet Union and Cuba to wield he territory ofthe former Spanish colony proved fatal
infl uence locally. The USSR, Cuba, and other Corn o the Ould Daddahp~Ewernment. Algerian President
monist states currenfl g ve.limitedpolitical and oumediene warned Daddah in November 1975 that
nonmilitary support to the POLISARIO cause. This could siding with Morocco would be his undoing. As the
provide an opening wedge for Communist penetration conflict unfolded in 1976, the POLISARIO Front shifted
The leaders of an independent Western Sahara-
though presumably socialists-are probably not Mos
into a newly created Saharan state. The Soviets and the focus of its attacks to Mauritania, the weaker of its
Cubans, however, might proceed cautiously for fear of
causing strains in their relationship with A gena and
Morocco.
0
Executive Committee
(nine members)
Mohamed Abdelaziz
Secretary General, POLISARIO
Bashir Mustapha Siyed
Deputy Secretary General, POLISARIO
Mohamed al-Amin Quid Ahmed
Prime Minister, SDAR
Ibrahim Ghali Ould Moustapha
Defense Minister, SDAR
Mahjoub Laroussi
Interior Minister, SDAR
Ayoub al-Habib
Mohamed al-Amin Bouhali
Sidi Ahmed al-Batal
Omar Hadrani (Mohamed al-Quail)
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two antagonists. The relentless pressure of the guerril-
las on the poorly trained and equipped Mauritanian
forces ultimately broke the Mauritanians' will to fight.
I
The new military government, led by President
Mohamed Saleck, has, in effect, already withdrawn
from the war, and it appears determined to extricate
Mauritania from the dispute altogether. Mauritania
has worked to preserve a cease-fire that the guerrilla
declared unilaterally last July shortly after the coup.
Nouakchott's leaders have made a permanent peace
the Western Sahara their overriding objective, but
many key factors are beyond their control. II
Moving cautiously in deference to Rabat, the
Mauritanians have made extensive contacts with
Algeria, the POLISARio Front, and a number of
potential mediators, including France, Libya, and
Mali. Since the beginning of the year, the Mauritania iverge on tactics and Morocco is much tougher on
leadership, faced with growing POLISARIO impatience, terms. Ki Hassan recognizes that a harsh Moroccan
has inched closer to a unilateral withdrawal from the reaction ag inst Mauritanian peace feelers might
Sahara. Public and private Mauritanian statements backfire and drive Nouakchott to renounce its claims
have indicated that Nouakchott now: to its portion of the Western Sahara, leaving Rabat
even more isolated internationally. For the near term,
? Accepts the principle of Saharan self-determination. Mauritania will probably continue to press the 25X1
Moroccans to take a more flexible approach toward
? Would agree to a referendum under OAU or UN negotiations in return for a pledge from Nouakchott
auspices. not to conclude a separate peace with the guerrillas.i
? Admits tacit POLISARIO control of the Mauritanian The principal constraint on Mauritanian freedom to
sector of Western Sahara. II seek a unilateral settlement is the presence in
? Mauritanian diplomatic recognition of the Saharan
Democratic Arab Republic.
By early March, Mauritania's talks with Algeria and
the guerrillas appeared to have reached an impasse.
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Troubled Relations With Morocco
Mauritania's courting of Algeria and the PoLISARIo
Front has created strains in its relations with Raba 5X1
Such is the intention of the Algerians, and the
uerrillas, who exploit each opportunity to drive a
edge between Rabat and Nouakchott. o l
he obvious inability of Mauritania to continue its role
n the costly conflict has encouraged Morocco to
eassess its position and look for a political rather than
ilitary_solution. Both Morocco and Mauritania now
gree on the need for a negotiated settlement, but they
Mauritania of a 6,000- to 8,000-man Moroccan
military force sent there in 1975-76 a_t the request of
the Ould Daddah government. After the coup the new
government requested their withdrawal. King Hassan
grudgingly acceded, apparently in the belief that th 5X6
political costs internationally of using Moroccan forces
in Mauritania to block a se arate neace
prohibitive.
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25X1 Economic Imperatives
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Arab countries provided $400 million in financial
sins on the budget in the past two_
reated severe
ears even en though Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other
,ion to withdraw from the Saharan conflict was based
argely on its_WOrsenmg_eeonomic situation The war
From Nouakcho f zerspective, renewal, of hostilities
ould be economically disastrous. Mauritania's deci-
Combined with falling iron ore prices, this cut into
foreign exchange earnings. Iron ore export earnings f
1977 were $127 million below the average for the
he war cut deeply into Mauritania's foreign exchang
arnings. Last year repeated guerrilla attacks agains
he vital iron ore rail line from the Zouerat mines to t
port of Nouadhibou sharply reduced iron ore exports
Morocco ontheir dispute n part derives from internal
power.po.~it,jcs,. Prexs denLjfendjedic] does not enjoy
-and depends_on-
Boumedjerte's._pnchallenJg! d authority
the support of the Army_t lntil power relationships are
sorted out, .Bendjedidand his military backers will
probably hold fast, to Boumnediene's Saharan policy to
deny powerful rivals any exploitable openings.n
upport. During this period an estimated 60 percent of Algeria has noterritoriaj laims oa the Saharan
he budget was spent on defense, while nonmilitary although it has steadfast maintained that it is an
pending wasreduced by at least 20 percent.interested Harty with pojjtical and security interests to
f 11 1 d
t
t
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Although a settlement in the Western Sahara would L
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several factors preclude a quick recovery. The price of
ron ore-which constitutes 86 percent of Mauritania's
xports-is depressed on world markets and is not
xpected to recover soon. Mauritania therefore will
eed to diversify its exports and encourage more
rivate participation-both foreign and domestic-in
evelopment schemes. Saudi Arabia and other affluent
rab states will remain necessary important sources of
nvestment capital and financial assistanc4
ew Regime's Position Toward Conflict
There is no slackening of support for the POj,1 xiQ
Front in the new Algerian Government under Chadli
Bendjedid, who was elected President on 7 February.
as become clear that Algerian support for the
nediene's death was government policy as well as a
ersonal commitment by Boumediene.
The new leadership has emphasized continuity with
Boumediene's Saharan policy, implying support for
naximum POLISARio objectives. The inflexibility of
Algeria regarding a face-saving compromise with
rva
e
protect. in keeping with its care u y cu
anticolonial image, Alger' a has publicly supported a
referendum on self-determination for the people of
Sahar
The realities of Algeria's position are more complex;
Western Sahara is but one aspect of the larger
problems of Algeria's relations with Morocco and
M ghrebstability. Algiers opposes Moroccan absorp-
tion of the northern Sahara, with its rich phosphate
deposits, because this could reduce Algerian pre-
eminence in northwest Al rica. The ideological diverg-
ence between socialist Algeria and the traditional
monarchy of Morocco ha,- intensified their geopolitical
competition. Moreover, the specter of an irredentist
Morocco, which has laid claim to part of Algeria, and
memories of the 1963 border war have not faded
Views Toward a Peaceful Settlement
Algeria's role will be crucial if there is to be a
negotiated settlement oft he Western Sahara conflict.
Only Algeria has the leverage to persuade the guerril-
las to come to the conference table. The Algerians
provide the YOLISARIO F,t-ont with vital military assist-
ance-sanctuary, arms, and training-without which
the guerrillas' fighting Capability would be seriously
impaired.
The chances are very slip-: that Algiers.-Will decrease its
support of the guerrillas in an effort to force them to
accept asettlement that falls short of Saharan self-
determination. There would seem to be little incentive
for Algiers to abandon a 'iolicy that is succeeding in
weakening its regional rival at relatively little cost.
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The Algerians have little interest in extricating Hassan
from a war t aecoming an increasingly serious
poffical liability for him. They would probate prefer
keeping the Moroccan Army bogged down in a long
and costly insurgenc
y
in the hope that Moroccan
--
_
military coup plotters, war-weary and disgruntled with
Morocco's mounting economic problems, will topple
Hassan. Algerian leaders would see the end of the
Alaoi ffiasty as forestalling indefinitely Moroccan
aspirations for hegemony in North Africa and clearing
Small Cost of the War
Algiers can sustain its commitment, to their.
a relatively small cost. It presently provides financing
arms aid, logistical support, and a haven for both
ro%tsaRlo fighters and some 20,000 to 402000 refugee
near Tindouf. Financing the insurgency has not been
significant drain on Algerian resources and has not
interfered with economic development, Algeria's num
ber-one priority.
The proportion of Algeria's budget spent on national
defense fell from 14 percent in 1976 to 10 percent in
1978,ethe _latter amounting to $469 million. It is not
clear that these figures include support for the
POLISARIo Front. Such financial outlays, in any event
are probably small because the guerrillas have been
supplied only with small arms, ammunition, and light
equipment.
Morocco's Limited Options
Political Repercussions
The stability of King Hassan's regime is closely tied t
the outcome of his Saharan venture. Hassan com-
mitted his personal prestige to this policy. His success
in forcing Spain in 1 5 to relinquish its Saharan
province to Morocco and Mauritania greatly boosted
his popular image initially, but enthusiasm has waned
in the face oJ' military stalemate and rising costs. (s)
Morocco's leadership, despite setbacks in the war,
continues to view annexation of Morocco's portion of
the Sahara as vital in domestic political as well as
national strategic terms. Hassan links the successful
absorption of the-Sahara-to his ability to compete `2 "X1
his primary geopolitical rival, Algeria. Having com-
mitted hi s personal prestige, moreover, Hassan would
lose considerable domestic support
he were to back away fr
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The King's objective of absorbing the northern sector
of the Western Sahara as an integral part of Morocco
is popular, but his failure to achieve results is not. The
unending conflict over mineral-rich Western Sahara is
Hassan's principal preoccupation. Complaints from
Moroccan citizens about the costs of the war and fr25X1
- students about the sacrifices involved in holding on to
he Sahara have increased markedly. .The King's 25X1
oderate response to a highly embarrassing POLISAR10
aid in late January on the southern Moroccan tow128X1
antan-even though intended to keep the door open
or negotiations-evoked w'
overnmen
25)41
he principal constraint on-Hassan in preserving his
old on power is the loyalty of the armed forces. That
oyalty cannot be taken for granted; the leaders of the
wo coup attempts in 1971 and 1972 came from the
enior officer corps. Military officers, like their civilian
ounterparts, support Morocco's annexation of West-
rn Sahara, but they are increasingly frustrated with
he unending guerrilla war there. The inevitable
trainsotl.troops engaged in a no-win situation in the
esolate Sahara have compounded other morale prob-
ems-poor discipline, lackluster leadership, and a
Foor logistics system.)
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assan's options in_reaching a resolution of the three-
ear long_conflict that will leave his power intact are
xtremely limited..The Moroccan Army has demon-
trated its inability to bring the insurgency under
ontrol and_is steadily losing group to the guerrillas.
assan recognizes that a political settlement offers the
my hope of extricating himself from this predicament.
t. is difficult, however, to visualize fruitful negotia-
ions
given the inflexible positions of his _opponents
nd the lack of incentive to push them to compromise.
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Moroccan soldiers and equipment captured
during raid on Tantan. Morocco
ing it. With the cooperation of or coercion from the
25X1 ilassan's ability to obtain a political settlement de-
he may eventuallJ cry some b olchimtitive
pends on a shared perception by all parties that a Army,
major concessions, to break out of s
ilitary solution is impossible and Morocco's willing including hi-'-' to make previously unpalatable territorial conces- increasingly constricting predicament.
ions. Algeria and the guerrillas may increasingly
elieve that a military solution in their favor is-in -deed Economic Constraints
ossible. The cool response of Algeria's new leadership The Saharan venture is unlikely to divert popular
o the Moroccan Foreign Minister's peace feeler in an opinion much longer from chronic economic problems
pen letter on 1 February does not augur well for an f unemployment, inflation, and depressed wages,
arly negotiated settlement which are causing social unrest The Western Sahara
conflict has contributed to a marked downturn in
he declining fortunes of the Moroccan Army are Moroccan economic growth since late 1977 following
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five years of expansion.other factors contributing to
onverging with increasingly pressing domestic prob
the economic slowdown are depressed prices for
ems; together they encourage domestic opposition and
v phosphates-Morocco's leading export--and Euro-
eaken the King's position. In the absence of a
pean Community import restrictions on other Moroc-
everely olitieal tested solution, in the the King's political skills will be
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year ahead.
At some point Hassan ma conclude that the risk of
ontinuing the present policy outweighs that of chang-
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Morocco's overall economic situation in 1979 appears avoid unnecessarily alienating the Moroccans, with
considerably less favorable than it was two years ago. whom they have netiated a major deal involving
Foreign exchange holdings have declined steeply since phosphates. In addition, neither the Arab nor African
mid-1977. Rabat has been forced to resort to large nations were backing the Algerian position, and the
scale foreign borrowing to finance a reduced version of Soviets did not want to be openly identified with a less-
an ambitious development program begun in 1975.
Morocco's foreign indebtedness rose by about 50
percent to $4 billion during 1977 and by September
1978
was nearly $5 billion.
Sizable expenditures on military operations in the
than-popular cause.
The Soviets have longstanding and expanding military
assistance programs, a substantial economic aid pro-
ram and significant trade ties with Algeria. The - 25X1
I fS
t
l
Western Sahara have aggravated budgetary problem
Although a foreign-financed defense budget-$800
million from Saudi Arabia alone-paid for many of
the outlays through 1977, there have been large
indirect costs that have fallen on the Moroccans. An
estimated 40 percent of Morocco's 1978 budget of $4.
billion went for military expenditures and the outlay i
likely to be as high this year.
Morocco's financial problems reached crisis propor-
tionsafter Saudi aid flows were cut in early 1978.
Since then, the burden of the Saharan war and the
military modernization program has weighed heavily
on Morocco. This setback, if not overcome, will force
King Hassan to reconsider how much longer Morocc
can finance the war.
Soviet Role
Soviet sympathy for the Algerian position on the
Sahara issue is clear. The Soviets have supported
Algeria's calls in the United Nations for self-determi-
nation for the Sahara, and they have collaborated wit
Libya in support of Algeria and the POLISARIO.
n egra
ion o oviet mi
rtary equipment into the
lgerian armed forces and its reliance on Soviet
echnical expertise have led to an expanded Soviet
resence there. An estimated 1,000 Soviet military
ersonne7 and 2 500 civilians are currently in Algeria.
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ven so, Algiers has been an inconsistent friend. It has
ublicly attacked Soviet aspirations in the Middle East
nd has rejected a special Soviet role among the 25X1
onaligned. The late President Boumediene period-
ally called for the removal of the Soviet as well as the
S Navies from the Mediterranean
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he Soviets have apparently decided that they have
ttle to gain by more forthright support for Algiers,
Ithough they remaina reliable source of military
upplies. Although sympathetic to Algeria's interest in
enying the. Western Sah ra to-Morocco, lbIoscow fias -
cen publicly neutral on the issue in recent years and
as withheld recognition of the Sahar-a-n-5-e-mocid-tic
rab Republic. The Soviets do not want to risk their
rowing economic stake in Morocco-,and-they will
obably keep Algeria uncertain about Soviet backing
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I the event of hostilities. -
Indirect support of the POLISARIO offers several
advantages to the Soviets. They have been able to avoi
being pulled into deeper involvement in the crisis,
particularly when direct clashes have occurred be-
tween Afgerian/POLISARIO forces and Moroccan
forces in the Sahara. The Soviets have also been able t
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he POLISARIO guerrillas currently count for little in
oscow's calculations. The Soviets are undoubtedly
are of the movemdnt pot ial value, but they
cognize that Algeria wants to remain POLiSAxto's
rincipalrorcign bilker. Moscow probably would not
ant to jeopardize its ties with Algeria by seeking to
fluence Algeria's POLISARIO clients. Moscow has not
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provided the POLISARJo any direct military support,
but it has made no attempt to block Algeria's transfer
of Soviet weaponry to the guerrillas.
Political differences between Morocco and the USSR
States moved dramatic, Illy to inre military ship
ments to Rabat, the Sox iets would be under much
greater pressure to respond with substantial resupply
of Algeria.
over Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa have not French Interests
curbed the growth of commercial dealings that could President Giscard, like 'pis predecessors, sees North
make Rabat the Soviet Union's most important Africa as France's natu -al sphere of influence and
trading partner in Africa. The short-term prospects for believes France has a special responsibility to ensure
Soviet political gains in Morocco are not good, but the stability and preserve French and to a lesser extent
Soviets may see in their commercial relations the basis Western interests there A durable solution would
for influence over the longer term0 xtricate, France from a conflict that threatens
Of enduring importance to both countries is the $2
billion economic aid agreement signed in March 1978
for the development of the Meskala phosphate de-
posits. This 30 year arrangement-which could rise to
$9 billi n with_trade and credit transactions-is the
largest single accord Moscow has ever negotiated with
a Third World country. It underscores the importance
to the Soviet agricultural program of developing a
stable source for this critical fertilizer component. A
fishing agreement was signed the following month
after Moscow assured Algeria that the agreement did
not contain an implicit recognition of Moroccan claims
to Western Sahara territorial waters. Moscow has also
supplied to Morocco minor amounts of military
equipment.
1 f the current level of fighting in the Sahara continues,
the Soviets are likely to try to pursue their balancing
act. In order to reaffirm their credentials with the new,
regime in Algiers, they may expedite deliveries of arms
to Algeria, but they would probably couple this with
intensified efforts to assuage Rabat.
Should large-scale fighting break out, the Soviets
would offer political backing to Algeria and probably
make at least a limited effort to resupply Algerian
arsenals. This might consist of some resupply flights
and an increased flow of seaborne arms deliveries.
Nevertheless, Moscow is not likely to underwrite an
all-out Algerian military effort against Morocco. C
The attitude of the United States toward a Moroccan-
Algerian conflict would have an important bearing on
Soviet policy. The Soviets do not currently view the
Sahara issue as a superpower contest. But if the United
xtemely important if not vital French interests. Many
ousands of French live: and work in the former North
frican colonies in.positions ranging from senior
dvisers and company directors to mechanics and shop
lerksl
aris is primarily conce: ned that the moderate govern-
ent of King Hassan '. hich faces manifold domestic
nd foreign policy probl ms including the Western
ahara, will be replace(: by a "progressive" regime as
ifficult to deal with as Xlgeria. Although officially
eutral in the Western Sahara dispute, France is pro-
oroccan because of its, economic interests in and
ilitary relationship wit h Morocco and the congruence
f French and Morocca i security interests elsewhere
Africa
he French do not want a -widening of the fighting in
he Sahara nor a greats: French military role, but they
ave been frustrated by the impotence of the
auritanian Army--w iich they have been helping to
rain-to control the PCfLISARio or protect French
terests in Mauritania.
ith the changes of go, ernment in Algeria and
auritania, France has tried to adopt a more balanced
osition. It has been act ing as broker, but with little
uccess. Paris wants to continue to improve its relation-
hip with Algeria, with which it has more important
rade tiesthan it has wi h Morocc
ranee has demonstratc3 in-the past, however, that it is
illing to risk Algerian hostility as well as domestic
nd international criticism by taking military action
gainst the POLL' ARION+ hen it believes its interests are
hreatendd: Tn the wince r of 1977-78 and again in May
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1978 France carried out effective air strikes in
_---- .__--
retaliation against the POLISARIO in Mauritania for the
taking ofFrenc-l hostages from the mining complex at
Zouerat.-
France wanted to display its determination to protect
French citizens and demonstrate to pro-French gov-
ernments in Africa that Paris would use force when
necessary to-safeguard its interests. The raids were
well received by the French public, which greeted with
enthusiasm the su_bsequen-t release of the French _ -
hostages. The government recognizes, however, that
military intervention usually pays few dividends do-
mestically, especially should there be French casual-
ties. Thus, France has been careful to emphasize the
selective and defensive character of its strikes in
Mauritania
Should military hostilities break out between Algeria
and Morocco, France would support Morocco
militarily-discreetly, if possible. The French have
continually stressed the need for a political solution
and initially would probably offer to mediate. If
unsuccessful, they probably would expedite delivery o
previously ordered equipment to the Moroccans and
might send some advisers. They might also provide
pilots for restricted use in Morocco and the Western
Sahara. Paris continues to promote the idea of an
African mutual security organization, and the French
might try to aid Morocco under the guise of an ad ho
the Mediterranean coast of Morocco are coveted by
Moroccans; grid Madrid worries that friction with
Rabat could provoke a "green march"6 against the
enclaves. Spain is even more determined, however, to
keep its Canary Islands-where Algiers has demon-
strated an ability to stir up trouble among a small
separatist group in order to apply pressure on Madrid
to renounce the Sahara settlement. Spanish fishermen,
moreover, are vulnerable to Moroccan-,Algerian-, and
POLISARIO-sponsored attacks the fishing
grounds Wihe Saharan coast
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The transition to democracy in Spain has also brought
pressure on the government from the socialists-the
principal opposition party-who threw their support 25X1
the Algerian-backed POLISARIO Front in 1977. Partly
in order to protect his government from charges of
favoring the Moroccan monarchy, Prime Minister
Suarez has encouraged informal public contacts be-
tween leaders of his party and the POLISARiO; he also
seemed to be moving toward a rapprochement with
Algeria last fall when Boumediene's declining health
interrupted negotiations. I
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Torn by conflicting pressures, Madrid is likely to stay
aloof from direct involvement in any negotiations. The
Spanish Government believes that Spain pulled out of
the Sahara just in time to avoid a colonial war, and it is
determined not to be drawn back into the fray. In the
event of hostilities between Morocco and Algeria
Spain would keep its distance, while possi6Ty offering
to mediate. 25X1
Spain's Residual Ties
Madrid's policy toward the Western Sahara is also..
based on a need to maintain a rough balance in its
relations with Morocco and Algeria. Spain continues
to pay lipservice to the Madrid Tripartite Agreement
of November 1975, in which Madrid surrendered
administrative power over the SpanjT ahara to
Morocco and Mauritania. This position-is- calculated t
please Morocco. Madrid has sought to hedge its bets
and placate Algiers by insisting that sovereignty over
the, region resides with the people of the Sahara, whos
aspirations toward independence must be determined
in a UN-sponsored referendum.
Strong Spanish security interests in North Africa are
closely tied to the struggle between Morocco and
Algeria. The Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on
Should a settlement create an independent Saharan
state, Madrid would probably offer what limited
financial and technical aid it could to bolster the new
regime. The Spanish Government would hope that -
such support would be favorably received internation-
ally. Spain's support to an independent Western
Sahara would also assuage guilt feelings over the
precipitate withdrawal b Spanish forces in early 1976
and perhaps a lltate S apish access to the phosphate
deposits in he-SaTara. - - 25X1
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No Settlement in Sight
There seems to be little immediate prospect of a
peaceful solution to the Saharan dispute, and the war is
likely to drag on through its fourth year. Desultory
settlement efforts between Morocco and Algeria had
stalled at the time of Algerian President Boumediene'
has yet shown a willingness to back away from its basi
position. Although changes of governments in Algeria
and Mauritania might have been expected to break th
stalemate, the dispute now seems even less tractable,..
The continuing negotiating deadlock is attributable t
Western Sahara are growing relative to those of the
increasingly frustrated, dispirited, and ineffectual
Moroccan Army. The guerrillas' battlefield successes
are reinforcing the Algerians in their rigid Saharan
policy. The Algerians show no sign of considering the
withdrawal of their support to the guerrillas, the one
pressure tactic that might compel the guerrillas to
settle for something less than independence in all of th,
former Spanish Sahara. The POLISARio Front seems
more concerned with consolidating its military gains
against an increasingly isolated Morocco than with
formulating a negotiating position.
For his part, King Hassan is presently unwilling..ao
consider compromises-self-determination and terri-
torial concessions-that might encourage Algiers - to
press the guerrillas to adopt a more flexible posture.
Hassan is likely to continue to temporize, perhaps
hoping that outside powers-France or the United
States, for example-will encourage Algeria to chang
its policies. He may, also believe that he needs Arab_
mediation to provide a suitable framework to
rationalize territorial concessions in the interests of
Arab unity.
The ou1linea pf a politieta settlement are hard to
"visualize, given the prescnt positions of the parties, and
the likelihood s,high t,b~ t the insurgency will continue
to thr.ea.t_en regional stability for some time.
Restraints Against a Moroccan-Algerian War
Costly and embarrassinj; attacks on Moroccan terri-
tort', f,,rQm_ lgerian Abased POLISARIO guerrillas no
doubt will continae, aijO. King Hassan may be pres-
sured into a more aggressive military policy toward
Algeria. There is wide support in Morocco for direct
strikes against POLtsARtj) sanctuaries near Tindouf in
Algeria, even at the risk of war with Algeria.F
Hassan's military alternatives for mounting a punitive
operation against Algeria appear as bleak as his
options to reach a politic-al settlement of the conflict
with the PoLISARIO. WJule the King may permit
commando raids against PoLtsARio outposts near the
Algerian border to assuage public opinion, he is
unlikely to mount operations that would draw Algerian
regular forces into the fighting. Given Algerian
military strength in, tb,g Tindouf area, the chances of a
successful Moroccan conventional attack are slight,
and the costs are likely to be high.
II
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