OUTLINE: THE SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100050008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: June 18, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

A r edFor Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDPi 8 OAK0 1 Q, 050008-3
Outline: 'bo; yiet peace Offens
x. Since the death of 8talia;
soviet g ove tit has modified many
tactics characteristic of the Stalin
in internal and foreign policy,
the strategic objectives of the. US8 under
Stalsi.n, y changed. These.
euper%Qrity in ataxic recs.
3. The weakening and disz up t ion
of the Western. coalition 3d the
isolation of the US from its allies.
elimin?:.stion of Western, part
power and
influence
the Far East. NC cHi ANV,E IN CLAS
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The achievement of Communist
control of, or -a alur voice i i,Asjan
gover ments.
B. We consider, however, that
curre st Soviet titctic,s, both in the ",,)eace
offensive'' and in Soviet internal affairs,
are more intell.igent.lyr devised to accoi.q; i.sh
II
these ob;jlectives and are being more subtly
applied Than Stalin's tactics.
II. Foreign policy
A. In general, Soviet foreign tactics
are morel cleverly desigfed to accomplish the
weakenilg of Western alliances, reduction of
US
and dissipation c:>>""'
Western; influence in Asia.
v3.vwed thc; truce a a sic. -iua non
B. Korea -- Vhe Kremlin apparte n
to foster unity sentiment. There
no indication of Soviet willirgne:,:-:
2
success of its outer tactics.
C. Tactics in Germany at
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achkeve unity on terms acceptable to Lhe
West. Developimient:: here are:
1. Aboiitiou of ttia Soviet
Control Comrj~iss;_: 3 and appointment c?
a civilian high ct; missioner parallel-
ing the setup in West Germany.
12. Reversal of Sovietization
drivo, including;
a)Agreement with the church.
b)IIalt in collectivization,.
c)Promise to restore land to
refugees who return.
d)Lifting of restrictions on
businessmen and teachers.
e)Liberation of 4000 imprison-
ed for economic crimes.
D. Tactics in Austria are designed to
offset Soviet refusal to negotiate a pact
and to underline the Kremlin's new liberal
approach. Developments here include:'
1. Appointment of Soviet
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,ift.iti:; ! sCi'JCt1On S
cats policy on Austrian
4. Sale of disputed hydroelectric
plant at Ybhs, on the Danube west of
Vienna, to Austria.
E. Diplomatic moves in Balkans are
designed to upport the peace offensive,
nullify the Ialkan Pact, and undermine Tito
Developments here are:
l. Offer to exchange ambassadors
With Greece.
2.1 Offer to exchange ambassadors
with YujgosIav.ia.
3. Relinquishment of territoria
claims agai.n.:t Turkey and of dei andp.
for share in def -ise of the Straits.
F. L! the Near Eat, there have been
the following developments related to the
"peace" cam#)aign :
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iLh I'ran
N I ndic.xtions of a 1orthcl;r.i r, ;
f: ? oc t t - t: t ie. outstanding SovitAt-
I.rani< 'Cit7}1, tennioi, and vitr'i.oli ,,
aty wt? I.I Iiave been the product:
h .gh.ly industrialized and better
educated .country may feel that their
approach will give them better stability,
raise the morale of the people and achieve
the primary objectives of Communism with
greater ease and less cost.
V. Satellites - Evidence from the
I
satellites reinforces the view that the new
Soviet policies are tailored to accomplish
specific objectives and do not indicate any
significant change in basic aims.
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A. No m jor changes in he l cztder-
ship of the satellite communist art3 s or
gover ft .ha%o occurred.
pressures
Them has been no significant
on satellite peoples.
C. geastres to increae the
popularity
of the USSR and
the orbit regimes
are et- ,t e misting or on a weary minor scale;
preaching
I~.?
anges.in security apparatus;
at "vigilance" cQntjnues.
nued military buildup.
0=tlus ions
At tie World Peace Congress,;
d up Soviet aims as:
dmission of Comuuuuist China
Currant situation illustpa.te$
increased flexihil$ty of the new regime in
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2. Creation of neutral Geruaany.
3. 'freak-oii of **all natjous.
from NATO, and their negotiation of
regional pacts with neighbors.
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