RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT SITUATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A002300010041-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: January 3, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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25X1A 25X1A USIB-D-41. 15/74 ,t_A.c x'.y
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT : Reconnaissance Resources for Crisis Mana ement Situations
REFERENCE USIB-D-41.15/72 (COMOR-D-48/104)
4 June 1965, Limited Distribution
1. The enclosed memorandum from the Director, National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) on the subject in response to above reference
is circulated for information of the Uxiited States Intelligence Board (USIB).
2. This item is being scheduled for discussion at the USIB
meting on 6 January 1966.
3. It is suggested that, following Board discussion, USIB refer
the attached memorandum to the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
(COMOR) for study and comment to the Board.
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USIB-D-41.15/74 25X1
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3 January 1966
Limited Distribution
January 3, 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance Resources for
Crisis Management Situations
REFERENCE: USIB-D-41.15/72
In the referenced document, the United States
Intelligence Board requested that the National Reconnaissance
Office advise the Board as soon as practicable on the results
25X1D of its studies toward increasingly advantageous
capabilities and plans for speeding up processing and fi m
handling. This request was pointed toward meeting the needs
of the United States Government in critical international
situ: ,.ions.
In responding to this request, the NRO is doii3g Q
in the light of the framework in which the subject of crisis
mana,ciao nL,.Uais_.__bc opcast in previous Board disc1ssirc i, --namely,
periods of international tension of some duration during which
photographic reconnaissance might provide information of
critical importance for policy decisions.
Over the past six months, several informal discus-
sions on this subject have taken place between the NRO Staff
and the COMOR. As a result, the NRO has evaluated all recon-
naissance assets available now and in the near future which
might be employed for crisis management purposes. Attached
is a paper which briefly summarizes the characteristics,
limitations, and program status of all satellite, aircraft,
and drone reconnaissance systems in this category.
With regard to satellites, except for the use of
25X1A CORONA (HI-1-4) a . ' s of providing coverage of those indi-
cations targets I I near- 25X1 D
term prospects are not good.
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3 January 1966
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The KII-4 program, because of its maturity, is in a
much better nosition to be employed in crisis situations.
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NRO
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to the Board, in conjunction with a regular launch in tito
next Cow months, I plan to test the reaction capability of
'he Ii1I-4 and the processing/production facilities in a simu-
lated crisis situation. Unfortunately, as noted previously,
the resolution of the KII-4 is not adequate to provide a
majority of the information needed.
I am sure the Board will agree that it and the NRO
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241D should together insure that plans are in effect to take maxi-
mum advantage of the II K11-4 c;:, nn h i 1 ; t; c.5 The COMORn
has provided tiax going lui the s EEGIB
and { =x' these targets are kept constantly untie
review in order to advise the NRO of any change. I ,am also
advised that COMOR is indicating which of these targets might
usefully be covered by the IC11-4 if the situation demanded that
both the KII-4 and II be used simultaneously to collect
information at a given point in timed 25X1A
With regard to aircraft systems, the Board is well
.ware of the uses which could be made of the U-2 and the
BLUE SPRINGS drones in crisis situations, particularly in
those areas where present air defense capabilities permit.
The OXCART aircraft will shortly be available for emergency
situations which might arise in China and Southeast Asia.
However, the use of the OXCART over the USSR when it achieves
full operational capabilities poses certain problems, not so
much in terms of its ability to survive, but rather in terms
of its political impact. In some circumstances its use might
exacerbate unpredictably the tense situation pertaining at a
time of international crisis.
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In addition, there is the SAC version of the OXCART, ! .+ ., 1 t
namely, the SR-71, which will shortly become an available
national asset.
There are two other photographic assets under
development which would be of importance in covering crisis
situations in certain areas, particularly, China and South-
east Asia. 1 refer t -AGBOARD drone which will operate
at high altitudes at
This vehicle, which is launched from a modified OX air-
craft, should be operational by late CY 1966. The Department
of Defense is also purchasing advanced subsonic drones known
as the 147-11 which will be available by mid-1966, and is
contemplating an even more aavanced subsonic drone for use
in CY 1968.
The NRO has under active study and feasibility
investigation photographic readout satellite
systems as a part of the NRP. Also, as a means of reducing
the time of receipt of information after photography has
been collected, the NRO is investigating' the feasibility of
installing an in-flight processing and exploitation capability
in a KC-135 aircraft. This would permit a saving of many
hours after the retrieval of either a manned aircraft or a
satellite photographic package.
in summary, in consideration of the foregoing and
the attachment, several points seem clear. Neither the
existing satellite, aircraft, or drone systems nor those
currently in development have the desired truly quick-
reaction capability to deal. properly with rapidly changing
international situations. Aside from considerations of
quick reaction, no single system available or contemplated
is capable of doing the total. crisis man1hement task. Collec-
tively, there is a substantial national collection capability
on hand and/or projected for the near term which could be
employed in an emergency.
The NRO will continue to improve the capabilities
of all systems for use in crisis situations, including the
reduction of time from retrieval of aircraft and satellite
product to delivery of findings to national authorities.
Additionally, greater emphasis will be placed on investiga-
tions leading toward quicker reacting photographic satellite
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s ems (i.c readout)
Alexander H. Flax
Director
National Reconnaissance Office
Attachment
Assets for Crisis Management
cc: Ch/COMOR
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Enclosure
USII3-D-41.15/74 25X1D
(COMOR-D- 13/52-2)
Where K.11-4 resolution is adequate to provide the desired infor-
mation, the CORONA program is in an excellent position to respond
to crisis management requirements. Approximately 5-6 systems are
continually maintained at R-38, or less, days from launch. One
CORONA system is always maintained at an li-7 to R-9 status, even
on '::e launch date of another CORONA. In an emergency, it is esti-
mated that CORONA systems could be maintained on orbit for approxi-
mately 60 consecutive days (barring catastrophic failures during; launch
or shortly after injection into orbit), returning a "bucket" of film each
five days.
On the debit side in a crisis management role, the CORONA has
several cl -: acteristics which limit or hinder its effectiveness. These
limitations, plus plans to improve system capabilities, are:
1. The present J-1 CORONA provides about 10 foot resolution
at nadir, varying occasionally in consistency. With the introduction
of the J-3 model in early 1967, the KH-4 is expected to be more con-
sistent (less random vibration-induced smear), and to have the capa-
bility to provide 8 foot resolution by orbiting at lower altitudes (perigee
at approximately 80 miles which is not possible with the present KII-4).
2. The present CORONA can be held at R-1 for approximately
7 clays; however, by preparing two systems simultaneously and
recycling their count-downs in a complementary fashion an almost
continuous R-1 capability can be maintained.
3. A completely new orbit and camera program can be placed
in the CORONA system at R-9. There are no plans to improve on this
capability since major development efforts would lie involved.
4. At the present time, CORONA camera program options
for each revolution are preset in the vehicle prior to launch; then,
when on orbit, any one of ten alternative operations for each revolution
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may be selected by the NRO. A more flexible camera programmer
which permits additional alternatives will be available in 1967.
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS:
Depending on the area to be covered, the U-2 (IDEALIST) air-
craft has considerable potential as a crisis management system. It
is basically a simple airplane system and easy to maintain. It can be
kept on ready alert for extended time periods; and when in this
posture, a mission launch can. take place approximately 2 1/2 hours
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