NOTE TO WAT FROM HC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A002000050024-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: September 6, 1966
• Content Type: NOTES

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State Dept. review completed
6 September 1966
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Ukais
WAT,
My memorandum to on actions arising from
approval of NSAM 156 is incomplete in that I did not spell out the
fact that any approach I made would be jointly with CGS.
With the approval of and in coordination
d
I called Floyd Sweet and acquainte
him with USIB approva o the OMOR special committee recom-
mendations. With regard to a (see attached) I invited him to send
2018s to me, pointing out that I was the Acting TCO. With regard
to b I told him that "we, " probably you to start with and CGS carrying
on, would be prepared to meet with him, Dr. Jaffe, and anybody
else who might be helpful to get the ball rolling.
Floyd said that they have already drawn up a list of key
persons to be cleared and that they are working on the panel problem.
Colonel Sweet then suggested that there be a piece of paper as a
matter of record. I proposed that either the Executive Secretary of
USIB or the Director forward to U. Alexis Johnson a record of the
Board action and send a copy to Floyd considered this
to be optimum action because Johnson was the Chairman of NSAM
156 and he could control actions in this area if he had
any objection to the Board recomm n tions.
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I have conveyed this to and Jimmy 25X1A
told me he would find out from the Director whether he preferred to
sign the proposed memorandum. I have also briefed 25X1A
and asked him to keep advised. ILLEGIB
Attachments
Memo to
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t c /~fi ct c'
TALENT- TOP SECRET
29 August 1966
e-ntation of Board Appr
Recommendations on NSAM 156
August the Board approved CO OR recommendations
plementation of NSAA 156. The recommendations
4d approach to NASA are as follows:
a. NASA select an increased number of key
personnel for clearances in the TALENT-,KEYHOLE
system to aee it the risk of uninformed discussion can
be controlled by this means.
NASA be invited to select a panel
so scientific and technical disciplines
be cleared for access to TALENT-
participation in the TALENT-KEYHOLE prog
to NASA concerning the desirability of increased NA
current T-KB materials at NPIC and exploitation
proceares used by NPIC, the Mapping, Charting,
Geodesy community, etc.. and make recoex rnenda
KEYHOLE information in order that they may study
25Xi1A
Z. Colonel Sweet and Dr. Jaffe of NASA attended our first
meeting of NSAM 156 and were aware that our recommendations to
the Board would be along theses lines. I believe that 1 ::1 may 25X1 A
have given the precise warding of the recommendations to Floyd Sweet.
At any rate, he knows what to expect.
3. In order to got on with the job, I would like to acquaint
Floyd pert with the fact of Board approval, invite him to submit
additional clearances to meet a above, and ask him how soon we may
most with him and Dr. Jaffe regarding the panel proposal. I em sure
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF USIB-D-41. 12/23
SUBJECT : Recommendations 18(6)(9a) and 18(6)(b) of the
11 July 1966 Report of the NSAM 156 Committee
REFERENCE : USIB-D-41. 12/23 (COMOR-D-7/51)
17 August 1966, Limited Distribution
1. In, restricted session at the United States Intelligence
Board (USIB) meeting of 25 August with the Deputy Director, National
Reconnaissance Office (DD/NRO) in attendance, the Chairman,
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) began the Board's
consideration of this subject by a brief explanation of the reference
report. He noted that when COMOR had looked at both of the recom-
mendations it found that the ultimate disposition of either item was
not crystal clear at this time. COMOR, however, had been able to
reach unanimous agreement on an initial procedure for dealing with
Recommendation 18(6)(b). In discussing Recommendation 18(6)(x.)
involving the question of removing the fact of the U. S. satellite
reconnaissance program from codeword control to a SECRET or
TOP SECRET classification, I commented that on the
surface it may seem silly not to do this since the Russians know that
we have such a program. However, looking at the problem in detail,
COMOR (except for the State Member) felt that there was such a
danger in uninformed discussion of this program that it would be
better to clear a few additional State and NASA people so that any
discussion would be based on accurate knowledge. After these
additional people had been cleared and had looked at the situation,
COMOR would in six months see if the problem had been solved or
whether there was a need to take further steps.
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2. In response to the Chairman's request for reactions, the
Acting State Member said that he hoped the other members had read Tab
A of the reference which was a good expression of State's point of view,
Mr,Denney then called attention to some of the features of the COMOR
report as follows:
a. Regarding the first sentence of paragraph 2, he
did not think this was a true statement. First, there were many
indications that the Soviets do have an adequate idea of the success of
the U. S. satellite program. Secondly, we will never know whether
the Soviets developed their very good system by their own efforts
entirely, or whether there have been some breaches in our security
controls.
b. With reference to the third. sentence of paragraph 2,
which states in effect that removal from compartmental controls of the
fact of the program or of its product would "increase the security risk,
Mr. Denney pointed out that nowhere else in the COMOR report was
there an explanation or discussion of how the security risk would be
increased. He thought this was the $64 question that the Board should
address. Nevertheless, the report does mention but does not balance
two existing security risks which would be reduced by relaxation: (a)
the third sentence of paragraph 3 does mention the existence of loose
talk by uncleared officials but the report does not discuss how serious
this problem is and (b) the last two sentences of paragraph 3 mentioned
but did not weigh the existing risk of warnings by TALENT Security
Officers to uncleared persons.
3. Mr. Denney then observed that the COMOR report
contains no discussion of the benefits of the relaxation of KH products,
such as general convenience, cost, saving, mapping, shortcuts, the
importance to NASA, etc. In short, since there was no discussion and
weighing of the security risks as against benefits of various kinds,
Mr. Denney believed that the report is not responsive to the USIB
request to give "due consideration to the broad implications of the
NSA.M 156 Report from the intelligence viewpoint. "
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4. On the merits of the question the Acting State Member felt it was
important to distinguish between relaxation concerning the fact of the
program and relaxation of controls on the products:
a. On the fact of the program: in 1960 the problem was to keep
the existence of the program secret from the Soviets because of the danger
that Soviet knowledge of it might bring some kind of retaliation. In 1966
the problem is completely different; that is, to avoid official public state-
ments about the program which might jeopardize national policy to gain
international acceptance of it. Today the Soviets have knowledge and have not
retaliated--hence that part of the problem has disappeared.
b. On the protection of the product, there have been a number of
reasons for that. One was to keep the fact of the program secret, and this
reason no longer applies. The second reason was to conceal the quantity
and quality of the program, and it seems that the Soviets know most of the
essential facts on these points. The third purpose in 1960 was not to give
the Soviets help on developing their own program. Now we could give them
the KH-4 product and probably the camera and not help them much.
5, Mr. Denney agreed that the analogy to COMINT in justifying special
compartmented security measures existed in 1960 but argued that no such
analogy pertains in 1966 for two reasons. First, revelation of the fact of the
program or its product now will not cut off the source. Second, unlike policy
on COMINT, it is Government policy to gradually gain world-wide acceptance
of satellite photography,
6. The Acting State Member said that one sometimes hears the argument,
and he understood that it was made in the COMOR discussions, that once a
paper has been classified then the burden is on those who wish to downgrade
it to show some positive benefit. Mr. Denney believes this overstates the
intent of Executive Order 10501 which underlies the whole classification
system and which in Section 3 calls for avoiding overclassification and in
Section 4 for continuing review of classified material to downgrade or declassify
that which no longer requires security protection in order to protect the integrity
of the system. He expressed the concern that continuing to hold the fact of
the reconnaissance program in a special security compartment is prejudicial
to the integrity of the system.
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7. Although the COMOR report does not do so, the Acting
State Member believed that USIB should weigh the security risks
versus the benefits as follows:
a. With regard to relaxation of the fact of the program,
on balance State proposes a SECRET level for the three propositions
specified in the next to the last paragraph of Tab A. Mr. Denney
thought that accepting something close to that formula would enhance
the security of the system.
b. Regarding relaxation of the product, he thought
that as to the KH-4 product, the original reasons for special
handling have been greatly erroded. Therefore, there is much less
security risk to weigh against the many benefits to be gained.
Mr. Denney said that he was prepared to leave to the special
committee the question of how fast and how far to go in downgrading.
8. General Davis commented that it seemed to him that
Mr. Denney had some good arguments. On the three propositions
General Davis thought in the not too distant future these might be
a good plan. However, he understands that what NASA wants and
how they plan to use it is not clear. Therefore, General Davis
believed that the COMOR Recommendations were the appropriate initial
steps, after which the Board can consider the problem following
NASA study.
9. The DIA Member believed that most of the comments
by Mr. Denney were applicable to the paper the Board had previously
considered on Security Handling of Satellite Reconnaissance Materials. In defense of COMOR, General Carroll mentioned that the Board did
get into the pros and cons in considering the earlier paper. Speaking
of NASA, the DIA Member thought that it was all the more urgent to
hold the line on the existing system since we did not know just how far
they might want to go at this point. General Carroll was concerned that
we might rapidly be on the way to losing our intelligence shirt, and felt
that we should be most cautious about relaxing security controls until
we could review the full intelligence implications in a more practical
perspective. Regarding downgrading to SECRET, the controls over
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*See USIB-D-41. 12/ 15 (COMOR-D-7/42) 13 September 1965;
USIB-D-41. 12/ 18 (COMOR-D-7/45) 13 June 1966; USIB-D-41. 12/ 19
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dissemination of this classification are practically nonexistent, therefore,
General Carroll believed that the fact of the program would then be known
all over the Government. He agreed that the COMOR Recommendations
were only an interim action, but he did not believe that we should go
farther at this time.
10. The Chairman asked that the minutes show that the Acting
State Member had made an extremely able presentation of the State
Department viewpoint. It was thoughtful, tactful and on the mark. As
to the broad implications of the NSAM Committee's Recommendations,
however, Mr. Helms thought that the Board had now looked carefully
at those. The Chairman said that he would like to close consideration
of this item by accepting the majority COMOR Recommendations in
USIB-D-41. 12/23 which he understood the other Members of the Board,
except the Acting State Member, approved.
11. Mr. Helms then expressed his feelings on this matter.
He noted that it was very complicated, and that a lot of issues as
well as departmental questions and interests were involved. He
stated that by temperaxrn nt he did not like the necessity for compart-
mented handling, and he hoped that sometime soon the community can
get a more rational means. However, we do have the system which
has been in existence for some years. Mr. Helms emphasized that
we are now heavily dependent on satellite photography and therefore
we now have to adhere to the protection of that asset by minimum
changes in our classification system. Mr. Helms recognized that
the effort of the policy makers to push for the acceptance of satellite
photography was a proper course of action. However, he believed
that the intelligence community was right in taking a restrictive
view on relaxation. He pointed out that the Soviets had known we
were flying the U-2 over the USSR but never said anything publicly
about it until one had been shot down. He thought that the same
attitude would apply to our satellite reconnaissance. Mr. Helms
said he would not like to embarrass the Soviets by telling them how
good our photography of the USSR is. Moreover, Mr. Helms stated
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I Mr. Helms stated that, last but not least,
as Director of Central Intelligence, he was charged with the security of
intelligence sources and methods, and would therefore have to come
down in support of maintaining our classification system as tight as
possible.
12. In light of the above discussion, the Chairman determined
that, based on the consensus of USIB except for the Acting State Member,
the COMOR Recommendations in paragraph 6. a. , b. and c. of
USIB-D-41. 12/23 were approved.
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