EAST GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100260009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 8, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC Briefing
8 July 1953
To turn now to Germany and the implication of recent events-. 25X1
The uprising in the East zone began on 16 June as an appar-
ently spontaneous, small-scale movement launched by the working
class. It appears that the East German regime winked at the
early stages of the development. The uprising grew in size
as other segments of the population joined the original demon-
strators.
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During the early stages, the intervention of the East German
People's Police was sporadic and half-hearted, and was successful
only where backed by Soviet military might. Soviet intervention
reflected a swift appraisal that the situation was getting out of
control. It also indicated a definite lack of trust in the'ef-
fectiveness of the People's Police.
The situation which developed rapidly was potentially rev-
olutionary. It was generally based on widespread popular hatred
of the SED functionaries, the managerial bureaucracy and the
organs of repression. A number of additional factors seem to
account for the explosion of feeling at this time:
A. The ten percent raise in production norms was only the
last straw. It inflamed the prevalent bitterness over
drastically reduced living standards under the SED
economic program. The repressive measures accom-
panying this program had caused large-scale desertions
from the East zone. A further aggravation was the food
shortage and the chronic lack of consumer goods.
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B. The new course of conciliation announced by the East
German Politburo on 9 June afforded enough respite for
the uprising to get underway. The workers apparently
felt that under the new line reprisals against them
would be less severe. The SED leadership seemed con-
fused and unable to chart a course for the workers --
so the workers took things into their own hands.
The resulting large-scale uprisings were unquestionably
spontaneous. Some of the local demonstrations, however, showed
a remarkable degree of organization which suggested good mass
discipline and ad hoc leadership by experienced tacticians.
There was a visible pattern in most of these local uprisings,.
First the news of the East Berlin strike, next declarations
of solidarity, then strikes, and finally marches against such
strongholds as SED headquarters, city halls, jails, and police
installations.
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It is believed that shop stewards and the revolutionary
tradition of the German trade union movement played a vital role
in providing leadership and unity. "New" Soviet methods of
production had affronted the pride of the German worker and
upset the accepted pattern of organization of the working class.
East German developments have demonstrated that an uprising
from below is possible, under certain circumstances, even in a
Communist police state. The Kremlin faces the imperative neces-
sity of forestalling similar developments in the Satellites,
but is loathe to admit the popular nature of the German up-
risings. Consequently, Soviet propaganda insists that the
riots in East Germany were engineered by outside agents who
exploited "justified grievances" for their own ends.
The "uprising from below" theme should be useful in
psychological warfare against the USSR. The following points
inevitably suggest themselves:
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A. SED authority is demonstrably based on Soviet bayonets.
B. The SED not only does not have the support of the workers,
but is an instrument for their repression.
C. Soviet troops, "protectors of the workers," were used
against them.
D. Communism, far from being progressive as it claims, is
reactionary in that it represses the revolution it
claims to espouse.
The riots in East Germany have created problems of great
magnitude for the Kremlin. In the first place, Soviet capabil-
ities there may have depreciated to the point where the Soviet
leaders must question the value of East Germany as a base for
an offensive against Western Europe. They must be gravely con-
cerned over the security of their lines of communication through
East Germany in the event they launch an attack. The Kremlin
must fear that the morale of East German paramilitary and
police forces would break under the impact of a major war, and
that these instruments could not be trusted to maintain order
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The new economic policies of the SED run counter to the
East German quest for economic self-sufficiency. If the SED
policies are implemented, the build-up of heavy industry at the
expense of consumer goods production will have to be scrapped.
Emphasis must be placed on the farmers and consumer goods pro-
ducers, but this will weaken the SED and in turn the Soviet hold
over the East zone populace.
The disclosure of the extreme hostility of the East Germans
to the communist system may make the German Democratic Republic
less useful to the Kremlin as a base for penetrating and sub-
verting West Germany. The appeal of communism to the West
Germans, never great, has now vanished.
While Soviet unity appeals still carry some weight with the
West German electorate, they no longer constitute a potent draw-
ing card--this despite German socialist contentions that the
riots prove the validity of their "unity before integration"
policy.
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In East Germany itself, it is now unlikely that the SED can
muster popular support on a mass scale'. Eventually it may have
to be reduced to a mere cadre organization. However, reports
that the East zone regime is about to be reorganized with the
SED out and the bourgeois parties taking over appear to be highly
wishful and premature. Moves which would bring the bourgeois
parties more to the fore and give them an ostensible role in
the government are, of course,` possible. And it seems likely
that an attempt will be made to broaden the popular base of
the BED.
The future position of Deputy Premier Ulbricht is uncertain.
However, in the light of his present treatment in the East German
press his continued influence seems assured.
Despite the critical damage to the East German government?s
prestige it appears that the Kremlin has no other logical choice
at present to maintaining the SED in power. To restore its
authority, however, the USSR may be forced to compromise its
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policy of concession by resorting to mass arrests. These actually
have already begun. In general, however, the conciliatory course
set earlier by the SED politburo will probably undergo no major
change as a result of the uprising. But the concessions dictated
by this course should be recognized only as tactical detours.
It is expected that the USSR will make every effort to
restore order in East Germany before any four-power conference
is proposed. At the moment, the Kremlin could not very well de-
mand that SED representatives be present at such a conference.
In preparation for the remote contingency that it may have
to concede German unity on Western terms, the Kremlin will main-
tain a covert nucleus of communist control within the East German
bourgeois parties, as it probably would in any event. The long-
range prospects for the success of this maneuver are not very
bright, however.
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Kremlin?s entire German policy have sustained at least temporarily
a paralyzing blow.
The broader, and perhaps in the long run more serious, im-
plications of the German developments for the Orbit as a whole
The Soviet position in East Germany and the
are still unfolding. Germany highlights for the Kremlin the
question whether an alien people can indefinitely be held by
force alone. If, as an alternative to force, a policy of con-
cession be adopted, then can this be implemented without changing
the basic character of the satellite regime and in the end for-
feiting a serious measure of the control on which it depends?
That is the dilemma.
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Western press reports of large-scale demonstrations in Poland
as an aftermath of the East German riots are denied by US embassy
officials in Warsaw. They report that the situation is calm in
Warsaw, and they noted no evidence of demonstrations or increased
security precautions during trips through central, northern and
southwestern Poland in late June.
Similarly, reports of strikes and demonstrations throughout
the other Satellites are unconfirmed and probably untrue. The
Czech security police alert, which was declared on 18 June fol-
lowing the East German riots, was lifted 24 hours later. None
of the other Satellites is known to have taken additional security
precautions.
Folldwtng the riots in East Germany, the Hungarian, Albanian,
and Rumanian governments announced concessions designed to im-
prove living conditions and bolster morale. While the timing
of these concessions may have been partially influenced by the
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events in East Germany, there is no evidence that a sudden
worsening of the situation forced the changes. Moreover, the
nature and extent of the Hungarian Party and government reorgan-
ization, coinciding with the announced intent of the regime to
slow down the tempo of socialization, appear to be more a reflect-
ion of the Kremlin's new conciliatory tactics, now applied to
Eastern Europe. Failure of the Hungarian Parliament to meet
on June 17 as prescribed by the constitution suggests that the
internal changes were'at least being formulated prior to the
outbreak of the East German riots.
The changes in the top leadership in Hungary, which appar-
ently ended Rakosi?s one-man dominance, resemble those in the
USSR following Stalin's and in Czechoslovakia following Gottwald's
death. Although Rakosi retains his post as the principal
member of the new Politburo and Secretariat, his post as sec-
retary general has been abolished and he has been dropped from
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the government. Imre Nagy, a long-time Communist and former
minister of crop collection, was promoted to the premiership,
while former number-two man Erno Gero retained his post on the
Politburo and assumed the additonal responsibilities of first
deputy Premier and minister of interior.
The new government has pledged a slowdown in industriali-
zation and collectivization, a partial return to private trade,
the abolition of internment camps, an amnesty, and a rise in
living standards.
In Albania, the government on 22 June cancelled all agri-
cultural debts for the years 1949-1952. Rumania recently re-
laxed its grain collection program and released additonal food
supplies in order to alleviate a severe shortage of foodstuffs.
On 6 July the Czech government suddenly repealed a week-old
decree specifying stringent measures to combat labor absenteeism.
Although there have been no similar developments in Bulgaria
and Poland, these concessions in the other Satellites may
presage a softer policy throughout the Orbit.
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