UNITED STATES DELEGATION to the CONFERENCE OF THE TEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT Geneva, Switzerland March 15, 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01441R000100030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 27, 1960
• Content Type: SPEECH

Approved For tease 2005/0 /21f: CIA-RDP80R0144'{&0(yl Ael
UNITED STATES DELEGATION
to the
CONFERENCE OF THE TEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISAhMAI%1; NT
GeneVa, Switzerland March 15, 1960
Draft Wind-Up Speech for April 28, 1960
The Task Assigned Us
As we conclude the first star;e of our wort: and adjourn
for the recess, it is with a feeling of sadness and dis-
appointment that I have reviewed our p.roceodinrs of
past seven weeks in terms of the task assigned to us. I
am sure that when this Conference started on Parch 15 we
all shared the high hope that it might constitute a turn-
ing point in the postwar history of disurmomont ne,.otia-
tion -- a history that has been, as we all know, replete
with lost opportunities and successive failures.
The resolution which was unanimously approved by all
members of the UN, expressed the hope "that measures lead-
inrg towards the goal of general and complete disarrncn ont
under effective control will be worked out in detail and
ar;reed upon in the shortest possible; time."
.;]von Prime Minister i:hru.sh.chev, in his opening day
reetings to this Conference, er:p1 -iusized tr_.at we "work out
UNCL:..; lI..._,U
25X1A9A
ACDA review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80R01441R000100030001-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80R01441 R000100030001-0
within the shortest possible time r r?apt cu 1 ways" of put-
tin& into effect the recommendation of the General Assembly.
I?e said "the Soviet Government has given instruction to its
representative on the Ton Nation Committee" -- that is to
Mr. Zorin -- "to contribute in ovary possible way to fruit-
ful work by the Committee."
However, by rigidly insisting-. on general and complete
disarmament of all nations in.a specified and unrealistic
time period, it seems to us that the Soviet position has
neither sought "practical ways" to carry out the General
Assembly recommendation nor has it, as instructed by Mr..
Khrushchov, contributed "in every possible way to the
fruitful work by the Committee."
The Present Soviet Anproach to Disarmament
Lot us look briefly at the Soviet approach to disarm-
ament as set forth in the Soviet plan.
The Soviet plan recommends, and I quote Mr. Zorints
remarks at our second m?etinz , that "all armed forces must
be disbanded, all armaments abolished, and all military
production brought to an and within four years." The in-
junction from the United Nations General Assembly was that
measures leading towards the disarmament -,-oal be "agreed
upon in the shortest possible time" -- not that the entire
UNCLASSIf"i'l:]D
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80R01441R000100030001-0
 Approved For Release. 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100030001-0
disarmament process be carried out in an imprc:ctically
short and unrealistic period of time.
Mr. Zorin has said that such a program of cor;'Aplete and
,:,oneral disarmament "would of course create serious tech-
nical problems in as much as States nowadays possess
powerful and large armed forces and armaments, the elimi-
nation of which would demand a certain amount of time."
Ho also made another important admission. Ho said,
"Similar difficulties would be experienced on the political
plane for under the conditions of distrust still prevailin
between States, no State obviously would agree to dispense
im.ri-odiately with all its armed forces and armaments."
Thus, even in Mr. Zorin's own words, doubt .s raised
in the mind of any reasonable person whether the Soviet
Plan is in fact a practical plan. It would appear, rather,
that the Soviet Union has as.:ed the Ten-Nation Conference
to underwrite an impossible undertaking.
The only conclusion to be drawn from this is that the
Soviet plan for disarmament is simply a deceptive propa-
ganda device to lead the mass of people to believe complete
disarmament can be accomplished overnight.
The Soviet Fall-back Position
In as much as the Soviet plan itself does not provide
U N CT, L) :.~ .1. -I J r_ D
Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100030001-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80R0l441 R000100030001-0
U TCj1-~,; ?1, -D
a practical approach to achievinc aE.roerrment on rricasuros
leading toward the goal of ;encral and complete disarma-
ment, we must look elsewhere. We look to the fine print
of what Khrushchev has said on a number of occasions
and here he seems to offer a _-,roro realistic approach. 1.0
has said that if it is clear that complex complete disar,.a-
mnt cannot be solved immediately there is another solu-
tion: initial steps on which we might more easily a`;roc
leading to our disarmament goal. For such statements I
refer you to his article written in last fall's issue of
Forei ^:n t'Affairs; to his speech to the United Nations
General Assembly on September 19, 1959; and his speech to
the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1959.
In his article in Forei `Affairs he said it had
become clear to him that it was very difficult "to solve
the complex disarmament problem. immediately". He then
wont on to say, and I quote, "Let us concentrate our
attention on those problems which lend themselves most
easily to a solution. Let us undertake initial partial
measures on matters concerning: which the views ofd
difforant attics have been brouLht closer to :;ether."
While we have grave reservations about the particular
neasures Mr. Khrushchev went on to propose, the approach
U1\IOL. S 11 IED
Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80R0l441 R000100030001-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100030001-0
LIT
CLASSI-D
- 5 -
of be inning; with initial measures lj8dir- F toward -oneral
disarmament is one my deleL-ation advocates. Let us
irirediately tu.'in our attention to those initial measures
on matters coyicorning which the different
parties have some hope of agreeing. This I believe is
exactly what the UN meant when they asked us "to wort: out
in detail and agree upon in the shortest possible time" --
"measures leading toward the `oal of general and complete
di sarma`-ent."
In its speech of September 19, 1959, to the UN, when
he presented the present Soviet Plan, Mr. Khrushchev added
a significant after-thLught, as though he understood well
that the Soviet elan was not realistic. I need not quote
hia exact words. He all recall his offer to move to a
discussion of the Soviet version of partial measures if,
as he put it, the Western powers are not prepared to embark
upon general and complete disar', ament .
The maneuver hero is plain for anyone to see. The
Soviet Union -- knowinr- its plan is unrealistic -- wishes
to fain a quick and easy propaganda advantage by trying to
persuade the world that because the vJest opposes the Soviet
Plan it therefore does not support the UN Resolution.
The next maneuver is already apparent. If the West
will not make this admission, which they won't -- the
UNCLASSIFI=-~D
Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100030001-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80RO1441R000100030001-0
UNCLA'ASSIr'LE D
6 _
Soviet Union will say that it concludes that the West is
not for general and complete disarmament. Then with all
the Soviet propaganda trumpets heralding a great "concos-
sion" to the West, they will then move over to their version
of partial oasures, something which they have intended to do
all along.
1
71 repeat here and again that the Allied nations voted
for the UN resolution, and support that Resolution and
its throe principal ideas: (1) that the question of
general and complete disarmament is the most important one
facing the world today; (2) that governments should make
every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this
problem; and (3) that measures loading toward the goal of
general and complete disarmament under effective inter-
national control should be worked out in detail and agreed
upon in the shortest possible time.. Again I say let us
proceed with this task without delay and put aside the
unrealistic, impractical, and obstructive plan of the
Soviet Union.
I agree with Mr. Khrushchev when he says that we
should concentrate our attention on those problems which
lend themselves most easily to a solution; that we should
undertake initial concrete stops on matters concerning which
UNCiASSIPIi,D
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80RO1441R000100030001-0
 Approved Forlease 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80R014 14000100030001-0
UNCLA3SIF{IED
- 7 -
the views of the different parties have been brought closer
together. Lot us by all moans do this.
Day before yesterday, Mr. Moch tabled on behalf of the
Allied Delegations a statement of the general conditions
to govern the fulfillment of a program of general and com-
plete disarmament under effective international control.
This paper reflects the basic considerations which nations
must recognize and be willing, to accept if the .oals ex-
pressed in the United Nations Resolution are to be achieved
and not merely paid homap;e to. The thoughts set forth in
that paper can serve as a guide to all of us.
So that there may be no misunderstanding, I wish to
make clear that the purpose of the U.S. Delegation in the
elaboration of its understanding of the term "general and
complete disarmament" under effective international control
was solely to induce the Soviets to enter into discussion,
negotiation and agreement on those initial measures which
are essential to the attainment of that goal. It was made
in response to the constant Soviet insistence that we
advise them in more detail of the meaning which we attach
to these words. We do not believe that any useful purpose
is served by now entering ii1to a discussion which would
have as its purpose the reconciliation of our views in this
U'c LASSI P ED
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80RO1441R000100030001-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80RO1441R000100030001-0
UNCI,iSSI2IED
_a_
regard. This would only divort us from our task of arriving
at the earliest time at an agreement of those initial
measures which are essential to the goal whether it be
defined in Soviet terms or in our own. I speak of those
early measures which would brinL. about a reduction of ten-
sion and as a result of which agreement could then be reached
on those final measures which would result in the reduction.,
`4 limination+
of armed forces to the levols
^
of those weapons of mass destruction which cause such con-
corn to peoples everywhere.
Attention must be given to those concrete initial
measures which lend themselves most easily to a solution.
These are spelled out, with conditions and safeguards, in
the Western plan of March. 1., 1960.
1. Prohibition against placing, into orbit or stationing
in outer space of 'ehicles carrying weapons of mass destruc-
tion, as an initial stop towards insuring the use of outer
space for peaceful purposes only. This proposal, if
accepted, would have tremendous importance for the future
of mankind in that it would have as its objective the
denial to all nations of the use of outer space for war-
making purposes, Today we all know it is possible to put
satellites, which could carry nuclear weapons, into orbit
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80RO1441R000100030001-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80RO1441R000100030001-0
UNChL 5sa.PIED
- 9 -
around the world. It is not yet possible to use such
vehicles as launching platforms for nuclear weapons which
could be fired with accuracy at a predetermined point on
earth.
However, we have had ample evidence of the speed of
scientific research and we would be foolish to assume that
the technical problems here will not be mastered sooner
than we think. As I said In discussing this measure in
some detail on April 1st (i'\I 14t p. 5): "The prospect that
this danger can be averted before we have reached the point
of no return is therefore of very great and compelling
interest to all the peoples of the world."
What has been the Soviet response to this? iVfr. Zorin
has said the Soviet Union has always boon opposed to the
extension of the armaments race to outer space. This we
agree with, but then he adds that this must be conditioned
on the liquidation of forein military bases. Apparently
he does not understand the Western proposal, as he says that
what we are proposing is the prohibition of intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
But we do not include in our outer space measure the
prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The
Western outer space proposal is aimed solely at prohibiting
the placing into orbit or stationing in outer space vehicles
Approved For Release 200510 1 12-0 . - 80R01441R000100030001-0
 Approved Fir Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80R01R000100030001-0
1 2 1 1ED
carrying weapons of mass destruction. It does not affect
the Soviet earth based ICBi'-s at all -- and therefore it
is unreasonable for the Soviet to link such a proposal to
the elimination of foreign bases. if they have done this
out of a misunderstanding of what the Western proposal
encompasses, then there may be some hope for a,resment in
this area.
(2) Cessation of production of fissionable materials
for weapons purposes and transfer of a-reed quantities of
fissionable material from east production to non-weapons
uscssin order to halt the further increase and to begin
the reduction of present stocks of nuclear weapons as an
initial measure toward the final elimination of those
wee ens. This proposal by the West which I outlined at
some length on April 8th and 1LIth is intended as 1 said on
April 8th "to reverse the nuclear arms rac: by stopping, the
growth of stockpiles and by reducing thorn" until sciontists
find the means of inspection that would enable us to
achieve the final elimination of nuclear weapons. These
arc disarmament measures which the West is ready to under-
take immediately.
What has been the Soviet response to this concrete
disarmament measure? Mr. Lorin has said that such a rovcrsal
UNCLASSa. L IE'I)
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80RO1441 R000100030001-0
 Approved For elease 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80R011R000100030001-0
UNCLtaS$I!~ l: ,D
of the growth of nuclear weapons stockpiles and the, reduc-
tion of those stockpiles by international agreement is
"devoid of practical content as a measure of disarmament."
Instead he and the Soviet plan advance the unrealistic
and uncontrolled measures for the elimination of nuclear
weapons and for the ban on the use of nuclear weapons. Both
of those are admitted by the Soviet to be incapable of
effective control. The Soviet May 10, 1955, plan sooclfi-
cally stated this as did Mr. K(hrushchev himself more recently
in June of 197. Mr. Zorin on April 14 has called the ban
on use a moral and political obligation -- requiring 'elf-
control". But given the low state of mutual confidence
which both Mr. Khrush.chev and Mr. Zorin admit exists in the
world, what nations would rely on "self-control" as a means
of enforcing a measure on which m.ig,,ht depend the very life
or death of that nation?
(3) Prior notification of proposed launchint-; of
missiles as an immediate stop "to reduce the risk of war by
accident or miscalculation. The primary pur:pose of such
notification is to reduce the danger that missile firings
conducted for experimental or training purposes might be
interpreted as a si;..n of hostile action and thus tri?;L;er a
nuclear war. Such a measure would Go far to help reduce
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80RO1441R000100030001-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80RO1441 R000100030001-0
~Wi %90
UNCI 'S.. I I- T T)
the fear of military preparation carried on in secret which
is one of the prime causes off' international tension.
But what is the Soviet reaction to such a proposal?
As Mr. Khrushehev said on January 1L.th it wishes to do
everything possible "to develop rocket armaments and to
take the leading position in this field". And Mr. Zorin,
after re jecting it as not bc'in; a disarmament measure, com-
plainod on April 21 that we now propose to prohibit only
intercontinental ballistic missiles and thus strive to
achieve a unilateral military advantage. Thore is nothinE
in the first two parts of oiar plan which calls for the
prohibition of intercontine tal ballistic missiles. All
we ask is that a beggainnin - be made to control t.ris r ,cans
of delivery of nuclear weapons -- knowing.; full well that
the Soviet; Union jealously guards this modern means of
destruction and will not countenance any further practical
step.
(Li) Establishment of initial fore; level ceilings of
2.5 million for the US and the USSR, and of force level
coilings for all militarily significant naticns to o into
effect simultaneously with the establishment of further
force level ceilings of 2.1 million for the US and the USSR,
as an initial step toward the reduction of national armed
forces to levels required for internal security and the
fulfillment of United Nations Charter obliEations.
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80RO1441R000100030001-0
UNCLASSIFTI'D
 Approved FoS.Please 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80R0144&000100030001-0
UNCT.113SJ 'Ia~D
- 13 -
(5) Deposit of ar;rood quantities _and typos of nodern
armaments in internationall-supervised stora~c depots, as
an initial step toward the final reduction of armaments to
the level required for internal security and the fulfillment
of United Nations Charter obligations.
What is the Soviet response to these concrete di sarrr_a.-
ment measures? Mr. Zorin on April 20th rejected them as
not being; very significant""'and not beings "a real disarma-
ment measure". Instead he called them a pretext for setting
up very wide controls over armaments and armed forces. The
Soviets, instead of accepting; the Western proposal of a. ;reed
controlled reductions, make much of unilateral uncontrolled
Soviet reductions of armed forces as disarmament :~ oa&Urc:s.
However, in justifying such a reduction to his own
people on January 14, Mr. Khrushehev's true purpose became
more evident. On that occasion he frankly stt.tad -- and I
quote -- "In our time the defense potential of the country
is not determined by the number of our soldiers under arms
or by the number of persons in naval uniforms -- the defense
potential of the country to decisive extent depends on
the total firepower and the means of delivery available to
the given side . . . The Soviet Army now has combat moans
and firepower never before possessed by any army."
Therefore, rather than a disarmauent Treasure, the Soviet
Approved For Release 20Q ( j?R;: ~gIAlf tW80R01441 R000100030001-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80R01441R000100030001-0
UNCLASSIi1I 2,'D
unilateral reductions turn out to be in the total picture
just the reverse. Mr.' Khrushchev makes this crystal clear
when he said again on January 111th, "I emphasize once more
that we already have so many nuclear weapons -- both atomic
and hydroCen, and the necessary rockets for delivering
these weapons to the territory of a potential agrrossor that
should any madman launch an attack on our state or other
socialist states we would be able literally to wipe the
country or countries which attack us off the face of the
earth."
Mr. Zorin makes even more ridiculous the deceptive
Soviet attempt to put forward unilateral Soviet reductions
as real disarmament measures when he on April 20th described
in detail the breaking, up of one cruiser in the Soviet
float. However, Mr. Khrushchov himself had already stated
in his January 14 Supreme Soviet speech: "The military air
force and navy have lost their ;previous importance in view
of the modern development of military equipmont. This
t a of armament is not boin reduced but replaced." In
Mr. Khrusbehev's own words, what Mr. Zarin hails as a reduc-
tion is not a reduction.
(6) Establishment of ap ropr iate measures to ,ivo
participatin States p;reaterprctection against surprise
attack, as an initial step toward the achicvemont of an
UNCLASSII?IED
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80RO1441R000100030001-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100030001-0
UT,NCL!:. ~SI I_~,D
- 15 -
open world in which all nations arc safer,-uardod aainst
surprise attack.
As Mr. Khrushchev and 1-Jr. Zorin woll know, President
Eisenhower is keenly interested in the developments of
safeguards against surprise attack as a means of reducing
tensions and making the world a more secure place in which
to live. His famous "open shies" proposal at the Summit
in 1955 was an offer to open the entire United States to
internationally supervised aerial inspection if only the
Soviet Union would do the same. But the Soviet Union
a.3parently fearful of such openness -- never accepted this
offer which, I might add, still stands.
Those then are the key concrete disarmc.rrent measures
loading towards the goal of Ionoral and complete disarma-
rmont which the West offers to the Soviet Union as a basis
for consideration in carryinr o-c_t our task. The Soviet
P io- eia to th.m he s boon colt LLn,_ no ativo . Under such
conditions I regret to say it is impossible for me to see
how we are going to make pho,: ress in fulfilling the task
given to us by governments -- namely, to r a- ku every effort
to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of .cnoral
and complete disarmament by working out in detail and in the
shortest possible time measures loading toward that gal.
U'VC L 1` S SI II_D
Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100030001-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100030001-0
3 I I:~D
U C.
- 16 -
The Future Pros cot
Having said that the Soviot have thus far boon cold
an. negative in their responso to the positive, constructive
Western disarmamont proposals, it remains to be said that
the future prospect for our no;%,otiations after the Summit
still bolds promise of movin forward on the task assigned
?!hile it is true that the Sovi ct have adopted as their
first tactic in the Ton Nation talks an attempt to gain
what has turned out to be an unsuccessful propaganda ad-
vantaC,e, it is likewise true that Mr. Khrushchev -- and
perhaps Mr. Zorin -- have loft the door open tc moving to
a realistic consideration of those concrete measures which
le^d towards our mutual disar amont goal. This fact itsolf
is an augury of promise and of progress.
While it is true that the partial measures referred to
in ii-.r. 1Lhrushchev's September 18th U .N. speech almost all
center around one geographic location -- Europe -- it is
likewise true that Mr. II-hrus').clhcv in that same speech has
stated that he considers t?'r .t the May 10, 1955 propcsals
constitute a sound basis for agreement at this time.
While we cannot agree with this, Mr. Khmshchev indi-
cates that - and I quote:
UNCLASSI1 ED
Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100030001-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100030001-0
UY-CL.S IT.1';D
- 17 -
"T*' Soviet Government is prepared to come
to an agreement w- th regard to appropriate,
partial measures on disarmament and to
strengthening; security."
This may offer real reason for hope, although what
Khrushchev would envisage as partial measures we would look
on as initial measures movin-xr down toward the road to the
attainment of our goal.
T=se primary question now is -- after a review of the
proceedings to date and of other Soviet pronouncements in
the field -- which a re the concrete disarmament measures
which may hold most hope for agreement? (1) prevention
of surprise attack; (2) reduction of forces and arrc,s; (3)
control of outer space; and (L) cessation of production
of fissionable materials for ti-:capons purposes and there-
after the reduction of nuclear stockpiles. It goes without
saying that if there is hope for agreement on any of these
disarmament measures it is because there is hope that the
International Disarmament Ori;anization and the control mea-
sures affecting these disarmament measures are possible of
acceptance by both sides. There would be no hope at all
if it wore a proven fact that the Soviet would not accept
the correspondint verification required.
I recognize that Mr. Zorin on April 7th rejected the
!^Jestorn plan as not meeting; Soviet requirements for a program
liNCFLSSI e' .LL.D
Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100030001-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100030001-0
UT\ICLZ~SSI IUD
- 18-
of general and complete disarmament -- just as we had
earlier rejected the Soviet plan.
But I also recognize -- as I have taken some oairls to
point out -- that the Soviet Union will almost certainly
turn soon to their alternative approach
consideration of what they call partial
welcome^
measures leading toward the
disarmament under effective
this happens -- some of the
and some of the Treasures in
-- that is, a
measures, wee. 44
G C . f . a .'., ; Otte , .. 19
initial
coal of general and complete
international contrcl. lrJhcn
measures in the Wes ter_z plan
t'1c various Soviet ply ns may
be found not to be too far apart.
If we but follow this course here after the Summit
meetings our work will have hope of success. :M1Je will then
have begun the execution of the task assigned us by the
UNG: Resolution -- the tifor~ 1n out in detail and agrees nt
upon the measures loading toward our goal. We will then
have begun to realize the hi-h hopes with which this
Disarmamnont Conference started --Adodicated as it is to
aciiev~_n ; the aspirations of all mankind, will mark a
turning, point in the long; post-war history of lost oppor-
tuniti3s and successive failures.
As President Eisenhower said in his message to me at
the beginning of this Conference: "We .must not be pessimistic
UNCLi S31FI n
Approved For Release 2005/07/20: CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100030001-0
 Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80RO1441R000100030001-0
%0 %00
UNCL.,-: O I `71 D
- 19
bccauso of the; lack of success in past c.isar ai'ent no ;otia-
ticns. Nor should we necessarily expect immediate,
dramatic, and far-reaching strides, although we would
certainly welcome such proc,ress. Rather it should be our
objective in these negotiations to contribute by carefully
balanced, phased and safefaarded arms control agreements
to the ultimate objective of a secure, free, and peaceful
world in which international disputes hill be settled in
accordance with the principles of the United Nations
Charter.
Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80RO1441R000100030001-0