MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD FROM L. K. WHITE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01284A001800090124-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 124
• Publication Date: March 3, 1969
• Content Type: MFR

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3 March 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Morning Meeting of 3 March 1969
DD/I characterized Anatole Shub's article in the Sunday Washing-
ton Post on Soviet intentions regarding Berlin as rather dramatic and
alarming and reported that he has asked to prepare a 25X1
critique of the article today.
*DD/I related that a draft brief for the Director's use in appearing
before Congressman Pike's Pueblo subcommittee will be completed
today. The Director asked the DD/I, Bross, Houston, and Maury to
review the draft to determine whether it constitutes a sensible approach
to the problem. The Director asked them to keep in mind the fact that
all the subcommittee members with the exception of Congressman Bray
are new to CIA.
Godfrey noted that the results of the Chilean congressional elections
were somewhat surprising in that, while the Christian Democrats lost
some ground, the radicals, Communists, and Socialists did not make
substantial gains.
Godfrey reported they are puzzled that the ChiComs and Soviets
are each publicizing their differences over the most recent ChiCom/
Soviet border dispute. He noted that there have been some 3,000 such
incidents in the past.
Godfrey reported that Berlin is essentially quiet, with traffic
moving this morning.
Godfrey reported that they have received word from State Depart-
ment Counselor Richard Pedersen that Agency support to the Secretary
of State during the course of the President's trip was quite satisfactory.
In response to the Director's question, D/ONE noted that USIB
will meet on Thursday to consider SNIE 97-69, Peru and the U. S. --
The Implications of the IPC Controversy, and SNIE 13-69, Communist
China and Asia.
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Carver reported that Saigon was hit by rockets again last night.
Carver noted the loss of to the North Vietnamese and led
a brief discussion on the technical and political implications. DD/I
characterized Ambassador Sullivan's message as perhaps overstating
the significance of the event.
Carver called attention to the Saigon station's follow-up message
to MACV's cable regarding the turnover of Phoenix.
Maury mentioned that today he will be receiving the text of
Admiral Moorer's intended testimony before the Pike subcommittee.
Maury noted that Saturday's briefing of Senators Jackson and
McClellan went well and observed that, according to Senator Jackson,
Senator McClellan now seems predisposed to support our position on
the Ervin bill. The Director passed a "Well done" to all concerned
and observed that Senator McClellan will return for additional briefings
in the future. The Director observed that this was apparently Senator
Jackson's first visit to Headquarters.
Maury called attention to differences that exist between New York
Times correspondent John Finney and Senator Jackson. The Director
pointed to Finney's article in Sunday's New York Times regarding
differences as perhaps contributing to Finney's uneasy conduct on the
Meet the Press panel.
Bross noted that he saw Admiral Taylor during the course of his
recent leave.
DD/S&T reported that they are doing a post-mortem analysis of
Senator Jackson's remarks on Meet the Press, giving particular attention
to the Senator's data on FOBS and on the ChiCom orientation of the pro-
jected ABM system.
25X1
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The Director called attention to the Saigon message relating
the value attached to station reporting on Communist intentions as
expressed by General Phillip Davidson, MACV/J-2, and General
Abrams.
*The Director asked that DD/I analysts study the Nasser/Sulzberger
interview as reported in yesterday's New York Times.
*The Director called attention to the New York Times article of
2 March noting the appearance of a book by Marshal Zhukov on Stalin's
posture at the Potsdam Conference. He asked the DD/I to obtain a
copy and analyze it with respect to whether this might not be a Soviet
effort to seek to document the state of their nuclear understanding.
25X1
The Director outlined Admiral Moorer's intended testimony before
the Pike subcommittee and observed that Secretary Laird was recently
aboard the Palm Beach to acquaint himself with Pueblo-type vessels.
The Director noted the President's scheduled visit to Headquarters
on 7 March. The Executive Director is organizing the necessary arrange-
ments. The Director emphasized that DD/P officers who do not wish to
be photographed should stay away from the first floor area. He asked
that Goodwin decide where photographs are to be taken.
25X1
Goodwin noted that he advised New York Times correspondent
William Beecher that Agency order-of-battle methodology is too delicate
to provide a basis for a requested briefing on this matter.
*Extracted and sent to action officer
L. K. White
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Nixton's Job Offer to Humphrey
Included Wide Patron* Power
By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, March 1 ?
President Nixon was willing to
grant former Vice President
Hubert H. Humphrey unusual
patronage powers in the Repub-
lican Administration if the
Democratic Presidential candi-
date had become United States
Ambassador to the United Na-
tions.
In ?offering the United Na-
tions job to his opponent short-
ly after the election, Mr. Nixon
suggested the Democratic lead-
er would be free to pursue his
own political ambitions, would
have veto rights over appoint-
ment of Democrats to the Ad-
ministration and would have
the right to nominate a cer-
tain number of persons to Gov-
ernment jobs.
The offer was refused by
Mr. Humphrey, largely because
he felt he could pursue his
own political interests and am-
bitions better outside the Ad-
ministration. The proposal,
without parallel in modern po-
litical history, underscores,
however, how far Mr. Nixon
was willing to go in his de-
sire to establish an Adminis-
tration of "national unity" with
bipartisan participation at the
Cabinet level.
Mr. Nixon, who during the
campaign proclaimed his inten-
tion of bringing Democrats into
his Administration, failed to
find a prominent Democrat
willing to serve in a Cabinet
level job. But it has become
apparent that in the immedi-
ate weeks following the elec-
tion, Mr. Nixon was willing to
go to considerable political
lengths to find a Democrat for
Continued on Page 25, Column 3
?,?
THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH .2, 196,
NixonjobOffertoHumphreyClarified
Continued From Page 1, Col. 6
his Cabinet.
When Mr. Humphrey de-
clined the United Nations post,
the President-elect unsuccess-
fully approached Sargent Shri-
ver, an in-law of the Kennedy'
family, and then Senator Eu-
gene J. McCarthy. Meanwhile,
Mr. Nixon was pressing Senator
Henry M. Jackson, Democrat
of Washington, to be Secretary
of Defense.
After declining the Pentagon
post, Senator Jackson learned
that if he had been interested
in joining the Nixon Adminis-
tration he probably could have
had the job of Secretary of
State if he preferred that post
to the Defense Department.
The Nixon offer to Mr. Hum-
phrey, so politically generous
that it momentarily interested
the defeated Democratic can-
didate, was made during a
meeting between the two at
Opa-Locka, Fla., three days
after the election, according to
Humphrey associates.
Mr. Nixon's offer of the
United Nations post to Mr.
Humphrey has become known,
although never officially con-
firmed by either party. What
has not been disclosed are the
unusual political concessions
that went with the offer.
At the private, 30-minute
meeting in an upstairs room in
the Coast Guard operations of-
fice at the Opa-Locka Airport,
the President-elect, after the
customary political pleas-
antries, was reported to have
made his offer and then gone
on to add the following con-
ditions:
As United Nations Ambassa-
dor, Mr. Humphrey would have
Cabinet status and be consulted
on all matters affecting for-
eign policy.
Mr. Humphrey would have a
veto power over all Democra-
tic appointments to the Govern-
ment, such as to regulatory
agencies, thus, in effect, giving
him control over Democratic
patronage.
Aside from this veto power,
Mr. Humphrey would have the
right to nominate an unspeci-
fied number of persons for Gov-
ernment jobs, with the implica-
tion that his nominations would
be accepted by the Nixon Ad-
ministration,
While serving in the Nixon
Administration, Mr. Humphrey
would be free to pursue his
party activities, such as mak-
ing speeches to help repay the
campaign debt of the Demo-
cratic party.
The discussion then turned
into a frank, intimate political
talk between the two Presi-
dential candidates as they con-
sidered the possibility that they
might be running against each
other again in 1972.
The talk was led by Mr.
Nixon. Mr. Humphrey, on his
way to a vacation in the Virgin
Islands, was still depressed
over his loss of the Presidency.
Just the day before, on a stroll
down a Washington street, he
had confided to a friend "I
was prepared to be President.
I was prepared for the job. I
knew what needs to be done."
Appreciates Party Loyalty
Despite their _political differ-
ences, there is considerable
personal respect between the
two men. In a personal, confi-
dential manner, therefore, Mr.
Nixon said he appreciated that
Mr. Humphrey still had per-
sonal political ambitions as well
as obligations to help rebuild
the Democratic party.
The President-elect empha-
sized that Mr. Humphrey would
be free to pursue his politi-
cal ambitions and to fulfill his
obligations to his party. He
then observed that it was pos-
sible that Mr. Humphrey would
be his Presidential rival in 1972
and that the United Nations
job might help him politically
in keeping him in the public
limelight.
"Tha is a risk I am prepared
to take," the President-
elect was reported to have con-
fided to his defeated opponent.
Mr. Humphrey did not im-
mediately reject the offer. His
initial reservations were over
the uncertainties of the Nixon
Administration's foreign pol-
icy and over who would be
Secretary of State, and thus
his direct boss at the United
Nations.
These initial reservations
were then overtaken by poli-
tical considerations. In finally
rejecting the offer, Mr. Hum-
phrey was said to have con-
cluded that he could not remain
as head of his party and leader
of the loyal opposition, speak-
ing out on issues, if he took a
job with the Nixon Adminis-
tration.
Approve. or -e ea e
?
Zhukov, in Book Sold to British,
Depicts Stalin at Potsdam Talks
By HENRY RAYMONT
Stalin, who reacted with ap- the British publishing house
Macdonald and Co., Ltd. Mr.
MacGibbon said in London he
bought the rights for "a six-
figure dollar sum" in an un-
usual arrangement with Novosti
parent indifference when Presi-
dent Truman informed him at
the Potsdam conference in July,
1945, that the United States
possessed a new weapon of fear-
ful power, was in fact attempt- Press Agency, the Soviet fea-
ing to conceal the Soviet ture syndicate.
Novosti has agreed to let
Macdonald publish the book in
its Russian version in London
to establish copyright and has
said that the Soviet Union
would issue the book in Russian
only after the English transla-
tion is published next year.
Since the Soviet Union is not
a member of the Berne Copy-
right Convention, its books nor-
mally pass into the public do-
main and are available to any-
one to translate.
Under the agreement be-
tween Nervosa and Macdonald,
Marshal Zhukov, who is 72
years old, will add some pas-
sages for the English-language
version, which is being trans-
lated by Prof. John Erickson, a
military historian at Edinburgh
University.
Macdonald has offered the
American book rights to sev-
eral United States publishing
houses through its representa-
tive here, MTS. Rhoda Weyr, a
literary agent. It is reported to
have stipulated a minimum
price of $200,000.
Earlier efforts by Novosti to
sell the book directly to pub-
lishers in the United States
were unsuccessful. Publishing
sources said the Soviet agency
ha dasked $1.5-million to
$2-million.
Reached at his home in
Edinburgh yesterday, Professor
Erickson said Marshal Zhukov's
book begins with his childhood
in Moscow, tracing his quick
rise in the Red Army through
the border encounters against
Japan, the crucial battle of
Leningrad, and the defense of
Moscow.
According to Marshal Zhu- The book ends with the post-
kov, Stalin drew him and war conferences and does not
Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the deal with the marshal's demo-
Soviet Foreign Minister, aside tion by Stalin in 1949, his re-
after the conversation with turn after Stalin's death to be-
President Truman and declared: come Defense Minister in 1955,
"They simply want to raise the his dismissal in 1957 by Nikita
price. We've got to work on S. Khrushchev and his rehabili-
Kurchatav and hurry things tation under the present lead-
up." ership.
This was a reference to Dr. Professor Erickson said that
Igor Kurchatov, a nuclear phys- the memoirs, except for a
icist who was in charge of small part dealing with the de-
atomic bomb development. The fense of Moscow, have not ap-
Soviet Union exploded its first peared before and that an es-
bomb in September, 1949. say published by the marshal
World book and magazine in 1965 to counter charges that
serialization rights to the 280,- he had unnecessarily delayed il -1
000-word memoirs of Marshal fature of Ber ?
-
Zhukov were acquireapp eigeliNS*
Gibbon, managing director of new book.
cow last month by James Mac- acerbic style" as part of the
Union's own atomic bomb pro-
gram, according to a com-
mander of Soviet armed forces
in World War II.
The account of Stalin's re-
sponse is contained in the un-
published memoirs of Marshal
Georgi K. Zhukov, the com-
mander, who accompanied Sta-
lin to Potsdam two weeks be-
fore the first American nuclear
weapon was dropped on Hiro-
shima.
Marshal Zhukov's version,
which became available to The
New York Times yesterday,
suggests that Stalin was aware
of the implications of Mr. Tru-
man's report and ordered the
Soviet nuclear research pro-
gram to be accelerated.
A Soviet physicist who
worked in the program, Dr.
Igor N. Golovin, disclosed in a
history of the project published
In 1966 that it had been accel-
erated after the United States
had exploded its first bomb on
July 16, 1945, near Alamo-
gordo, N.M.
Mr. Truman said in his
memoirs that "the Russian
Premier showed no special in-
terest," and Prime Minister
Winston S. Churchill wrote,
later, "I was sure he [Stalin]
had no idea of the significance
of what he was being told."
Marshal Zhukov indicates
that the Soviet leader deliber-
ately appeared indifferent in
an effort to conceal the Soviet
Union's own research on the
atomic bomb.
Stalin Urges Speed-up
6) 1969 The New York Times Company.
Nasser Foresees 4t War
Unless Israelis Withdraw
In Interview, He Emphasizes There Can
Be No Peace in Mideast Unless Problem
of Million Arab Refugees Is Solved
By C. L. SULZBERGER
special to The New York Times
CAIRO, Feb. 26 ? President
Gamal Abdel Nasser of the
United Arab Republic is con-
vinced that the conflict with
Israel must some day see a
fourth round of fighting unless
the Jerusalem Government is
persuaded to abandon every
inch of soil occupied during the
six-day war of June, 1967.
He also says Israel must take
back into her territory those
Transcript of the interview
is printed on Page 28.
refugees who have left since
the state was formed in 1948
and who wish to return.
"This is the main problem
?the right of the Palestinians
in their own land," President
Nasser said. "They lived there
for thousands of years and now
they are expelled. Without fu1-
fillment of such claims, this
problem will continue for tens
of years."
Mr. Nasser estimates that
there are more than one million
Palestinian Arab refugees?Mos-
lem and Christian. He gives
the impression that he does not
expect Israel to accept a politi-
cal solution on the terms he
suggests and that, therefore, a
solution must be found by other
means. He adds:
"One could not accept oc-
cupation of his country by ag-
gressive armed force. One has
to fight."
The Egyptian President,
widely regarded as the most
charismatic of contemporary
Arab leaders, spoke in fluent
English, calmly and with no
Continued on Page 28, Column 1
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 2, 1969
franscnpt of Interview W...11 President Nasser 1I the United Lsab Repub1i6
Seidel to 'Me New Tack Times
- CAIRO, Feb. 26? Follow-
Jng is a transcript of an in-
terview with President Gamal
Abdel Nasser by C. L. Sulz-
berger of The New York
Times.
Q. Are you now ready to
re-establish diplomatic rela-
tions with the U.S.? Will you
take the initiative in this
since, after all, it was Cairo
which broke relations origi-
nally?
; A. We are ready to resume
relations with the United
States, but if the situation
and the circumstances facili-
tate this step?that is to say,
as long as the United States
supports the Israeli occupa-
tion of our territory and as
long as the United States
supplies Israel with planes
while it is occupying our ter-
ritory, there will be difficul-
ties, because if we resume re-
lations and Israel receives
Phantoms, what will be the
reaction? Receive Phantoms
while occuping our territory?
This means the United States
encourages Israel to continue
to occupy our territory.
Q. Do you expect more
from the Nixon Administra-
tion than its predecessor?
Did the Scranton visit seem
to encourage a better atmos-
phere?
A. Of course, we hope so.
Really, after the June war
we faced a situation where
the United States supported
completely and 100 per cent
the point of view of Israel. It
was said by Governor Scran-
ton that he thinks the United
States must have a more
even-handed policy in deal-
ing with the. situation. That
is to say, we want from the
United States not to take
sides. Not to take our side,
but not to support the occu-
pation of our territory by Is-
rael.
View of American Policy
Q. Why is United States
policy always viewed so neg-
atively? After all, in 1956
we strongly opposed Britain,
France and Israel, and in
1967 we gave no active aid
to Israel.
A. We have great admira-
tion for President Eisenhow-
er and for Nixon. When Nix-
on visited us in 1963, he was
out of politics but we re-
ceived him as Eisenhower's
Vice President, although not
as a President who will be
elected. But of course people
still look back today to the
fact that there is Israeli oc-
cupation of our territory. No-
body could look at 1956 and
forget what happened in
1967-68.
Q. Do you foresee a fourth
round of war?
A. This is a very simple
question. We are striving to
end the occupation of Arab
territory - in Egypt, Jordan
and Syria by a political so-
lution ? by peaceful means.
If we don't achieve it by
peaceful means, what result?
We must strive by other
means to achieve it. One
could not accept occupation
of his country by aggressive
armed force. One has to fight.
Q. Do you feel there is
danger of a nuclear explo-
sion in the Middle East?
A. As long as they don't
sign the nonproliferation
treaty, there is danger. We
have signed it. But if they
begin, there will be a race
also. If they tried to build
nuclear weapons, we would
try to have our own. We
have the capacity but what
we need is the investment
money required for produc-
tion. I do not believe the Is-
raelis have such weapons
now.
Cairo's Terms for Peace
Q. Would you spell out (A)
the short-range and (B) the
long-range terms for peace.
A. When I speak of a set-
tlement I don't mean ? short-
term and long-term. If we
solve the problem of the oc-
The New York Times
C. L. Sulzberger with President Gamal Abdel Nasser as the Arab leader commented on problems Pacing the Middle East
cupied territory and of the
refugees from Palestine, this
will result in a peaceful set-
tlement in spite of what took
place during the last 20 or
more years. But if we solve
only the problem of the oc-
cupied territory but neglect
the other part, there will be
no peace.
According to the U.N.
1948, 1949 and 1966 Assem-
blies, there were resolutions
for the right of Palestinians
to return back to their own
land. But this was neglected
completely by the Israelis
and this is the main part of
the problem. The Israelis have
expelled more than one mil-
lion Arabs ? Christians and
Moslems. They wanted a
country based on Judaism. If
they accept refugees and
evacuate conquered areas,
there will be lasting peace.
Q. What would be the ba-
sis for this Jewish-Arab state
in Palestine?
A. After the war of 1948,
there were resolutions in the
United Nations according
to Arab refugees expelled by
Israeli terrorists the right to
return to their own land.
Now they are outside be-
cause Israel refused; and
they want to return back to-
their own land. This is the
reason for the fedayeen
movement. They are mostly
the children of those expelled
in 1948 and who wish to re-
turn. The man who was killed
by the Israelis in the recent
Zurich airport raid was born
in Haifa and expelled.
This is the main problem
?the right of the Palestin-
ians in their own land. They
lived there for thousands of
years and now they are ex-
pelled. Sirhan was expelled
from his home and village
and went to the United
States; and he has the de-
sire to return to his own
land. Without fulfillment of
such claims, this problem
will continue for tens of
years.
'The Right to Return'
Q. How do you conceive
of an Israel with the refugees
returned: a larger state?
A. I don't mean that Is-
rael should gain part of our
Arab territory and then say
in exchange it would accept
Arabs. But certainly those ex-
pelled have the right to re-
turn back to their homeland.
Q. Would you want the
1967 U.N. resolution frontier?
That is to say, the June 1,
1967 borders?
A. Nobody will accept the
expansion of Israel because
if this is permitted, it would
merely be a step to achieve
the dreams of some of the
leaders of Israel to have Is-
raeli territory expand be-
tween the Nile and the Eu-
phrates. Yes, we would take
the June 1, 1967, frontiers.
Q. What might be the in-
fluence of Eshkol's death?
Could there be a succession
contest of hawks versus
doves in Israel?
A. I don't believe there are
hawks and doves there. Some
people like to speak diplo-
matic language like Abba
Eban. They say he is a dove.
Yet last week he was for
continuation of the occupa-
tion of Arab territory. You
say he is a dove? There are
no real differences and I
don't think there will be any
change.
Q. What do you think of
Eisenhower's formula for in-
stalling several large nuclear
plants in the general area of
Palestine in order to desalt
water for irrigation and pro-
vide power for industry in
new settlements which could
be developed by Palestinian
refugees?
A. I will tell you some-
thing. We gave great atten-
tion to these statements by
General Eisenhower and
those by President Johnson,
and we tried to have con-
tact between American offi-
cials and our Government
and American enterprises and
our Government to put these
ideas into effect in our coun-
try. All were without any re-
sult. The last contact took
place two months ago.
But what happened after
the ideas of General Eisen-
hower were only statements.
We need water for our des-
erts, but there is no attempt
to put that into effect We
could not neglect the rest of
the problem and deal with
it from this point of view
only. The idea of nationalism,
the Palestine problem, the
people who want to return
to their homeland ? this is
our character and our inheri-
tance, and we cannot separ-
ate it from other approaches.
Jews in the Arab States
Q. What is your view of
the position of Jews now re-
siding in Arab states? What
is the status of the Jewish
community in Egypt? Are the
Jews now in Egypt free to
leave if and when they wish?
A. First of all, I want to
speak about the question of
the Baghdad hangings. I am
sorry to say that the press
of all the Western countries
tried to visualize the ques-
tion as the hanging of Jews.
It was not hanging of Jews;
it was hanging of spies. Some
were Moslems, some Arab,
some Christian. It was not a
hanging of Jews. After that,
the second time, there was
the hanging of Moslems only.
But these were spies. It was
the hanging not of Moslems,
Christians, Jews, but of spies.
We have here about 5,000
Jews. We have about 100
under arrest because they
are Zionists and are in con-
tact with Israel and put un-
der arrest after the war.
Those who want to leave the
country can leave, and many
got permission to leave the
country. The rest live as
Egyptians and have all rights.
The Israelis are creating
propaganda against that. Yes-
terday I was reading a re-
port about the visit of the
Red Cross in Gaza. Six hun-
dred Arabs were in the pris-
ons of Gaza. Of course, if we
speak about the rest of the
occupied territory, there will
be thousands under arrest by
the Israelis for reasons of se-
curity. We also arrest for
the security of our country.
Q. Given the present sit-
uation, do you think that
Jews in the Arab world ought
not only to be permitted but
perhaps even encouraged to
emigrate?
A. The Jews are our cous-
ins. Moses was born in Egypt.
Don't stress this. I don't want
it to be an Israeli claim.
They say we are anti-Semitic,
which is nonsense. We are
Semites ourselves. We look
upon Jews in our country as
Egyptians, The Jews who
live in the Arab countries
feel it will be always more
suitable for them to live in
Arab countries rather than to
go to other countries. Theft
fathers and grandfathers
lived here for thousands of
nyeatairosn.without any discrimi-
Q. What is your attitude
toward Al Fatah? I have
heard this described as both
favorable and unfavorable.
A. I admire them. As a
man, I admire, them because
they are fighting for their
rights. They waited for 20
years looking to the world
to regain for them their de-
prived rights. Now they are
fighting for these rights. I
think everyone must agree
with them because they have
to fight. I admire them as
we admired the resistance
movements which took place,
for example, in Europe and
the Philippines during the
Second World War,
Q. Don't you think there
is a danger that Al Fatah
may politically take over the
Government of Jordan or
other Arab states?
A. I am sure the Fatah
movement has as one of its
main principles not to inter-
fere with the internal affairs
of any of the Arab countries
like Jordan or Syria. It con-
centrates on planning on the
Palestine question and how
Palestinians can end the oc-
cupation and achieve their
rights in their homeland. '
Q. Do you still feel there
should ultimately be one sin-
gle Arab state, a kind of fed-
eration of Pan-Arabism? It
seems to me that comparable
ideas, such as the Pan-Turk-
ish and Pan-Slavic move-
ments, never worked; do you
think that present circum-
stances in the Arab world
favor such a concept?
A. I think when the Arabs
realize that unity and feder-
ation will be in their own
interests and strength, this
will help to achieve the ob-
ject of Arab unity. It is not
an easy question because of
the contradictions politically
and socially. These contradic-
tions remain to be liquidated.
People of all Arab countries
want unity, but how to ful-
fill it is not an easy ques-
tion. It can best be started by
unity between two or three
countries ? by federation or
confederation.
Ties With Syria Affirmed
Q. At one time Syria was
a member of the U.A.R. but
this did not work.
A. I accepted that union
in spite of myself. I was not
convinced that the time was
Nasser Foresees Fourth Round of War Unless Israelis Pull Back
Continued From Page 1, Col. 2
histrionics in an interview at his
residence today on the eve of
the Moslem holiday period of
Bairam, in which Id el Adha,
the Feast of the Mutton, is cel-
ebrated.
It was most informal. He
wore slacks and a short-sleeve
shirt with open collar. We sat
around a table, sipping Turkish
coffee, along with Mohammed
Hassanein Heykal, Mr. Nasser's
close friend and editor of Al
Ahram, the Arab world's larg-
est newspaper.
The President spoke easily and
patiently for two hours, cover-
ing a wide range of topics. The
meeting took place in a salon
often used as a waiting room,
outside his presidential office.
On the mantle and atop tables
were the many signed portraits,
ranging from Nehru, Tito and
Prince Sihanouk to a colored
drawing of Lyndon B. Johnson,
with an inscription exxpressing
the hope for good relations.
Willing to Resume Ties
The conversation started on
that subject. Mr. Nasser ex-
pressed readiness to resume
diplomatic relations with the
United States?which he sev-
ered in June, 1967, but made
it clear that serious difficulties
existed, since the United States
was selling Phantom jets to
Israel while her forces occupied
conquered Egyptian territory.
ffiFI,"NM.E
uudncLeqFx-Anfisp igLi,irmA?
courages Israel to continue to
occupy our territory."
He thought that the Johnson
Administration had "supported
completely and 100 per cent
the point of view of Israel"
but hoped that the Nixon Ad-
ministration would be, as he
saw the situation, less partial.
"We want from the United
States not to take sides," the
Egyptian President said. "Not
to take our side, but not to
support the occupation of our
territory by Israel."
As might be expected, a good
part of the interview was taken
up with the Arab world's most
burning question ? the per-
sistent if intermittent Palestine
war.
Mr. Nasser said he did not
think that Israel had any
atomic weapons. But he
warned:
"As long as they [the Israel-
is] don't sign the nonprolifera-
tion treaty, there is danger. We
have signed it. If they tried to
build nuclear weapons, we
would try to have our own.
We have the capacity but what
we need is the investment mon-
ey required for production."
Fears Israel's Expansion
President Nasser professed
to be convinced that Israel, if
permitted to retain any of her
1967 conquests, would some
day again seek to expand, aim-
ing at a realization of "the
dreams of some of the leaders
of Israel to have Israeli terri-
tory expand between the Nile
[OLA GX auci p6fM6GIJ fpG 14116
Ili rn iirt, n
Government has denied such
an idea.
Mr. Nasser did not think
that the death this week of
Premier Levi Eshkol would
have any effect on the situa-
tion. He made it clear that he
regarded all Israeli leaders?an
therefore Mr. Eshkol's ultimate
successor?as hawks.
The President showed re-
strained interest in the Eisen-
hower-Strauss plan to construct
large nuclear plants in the pal-
estinian area?both Israeli and
Arab?to provide desalted sea
water, power industry and jobs,
hoping to absorb many of the
Arab refugees. The plan was
advanced in 1957 by President
Eisenhower and his Secretary
of Commerce, Lewis L. Strauss.
He said that Washington did
not respond to his "contacts"
on this ? the last but two
months ago; anyway he thought
the program could not be con-
sidered practical while the
frontier and refugee issues re-
mained unresolved.
Says Jews May Leave
Mr. Nasser insisted that Jews
n the United Arab Republic
were treated as Egyptians
with "all rights" and were free
to emigrate if they wished?
a statement that is contested
by foreign observers.
He reckoned that there were
about 5,000 Jews in Egypt, of
whom about 100 were under ar-
rest "because they are Zionists
and are in contact with Israel."
He insisted that in the Gaza
Strip ? a segment of former
Israel-600 Arabs were in pri-
son for security reasons.
Mr. Nasser thought it silly
to talk of anti-semitism in the
Arab world because: "the Jews
are our cousins. Moses was
born in Egypt. Don't stress this.
Don't want it to be an Israeli
claim. They say we are anti-
semitio, which is nonsense. We
are Semites ourselves."
He criticezed Western reac-
tion to the hanging of nine
Jews in Iraq on Jan. 27.
"It was not hanging og of
Jews," he said, "it was hang-
ing of spies. Some were Mos-
lems, some Arab, some Chris-
tian."
Admiration for Al Fatah
Asked about reports of dis-
sension between Cairo and Al
Fatah, the principal Palestin-
ian guerrilla organization, Mr.
Nasser said: "I admire them
as we admired the resistance
movements which took place,
for example, in Europe and
the Philippines during the sec-
ond World War."
He expressed confidence that
Al Fatah would not interfere
in the internal, affairs of any
Arab country.
Mr. Nasser said that, al-
though Soviet naval vessels
often visit Egyptian ports, there
were none here at the moment
and that no military bases on
his territory had been granted
to any foreign country. He as-
serted that there wer probably
fewer than 1,000 Russian tech-
nicians and training personnel
otian-held terntopti, in' _.4g
E bc!so-pGiq AP tg9W- F eefiF
Cairo diplomats?and added,
"But I am asking for more."
The President also said that
while Moscow had sent in large
arms shipments to make up for
losses in 1967, the United Arab
Republic has not at this date
exceeded its prewar weapons
strength.
Worried About Arms Ban
"That is why we are parti-
ularly worried about state-
ments in Western countries
that they want to ban arms
entering this area," Mr. Nasser
said. "The meaning of an Arms
ban would be that Israel will
have superiority . . . in both
army and air force, while we
won't get the opportunity to
replace what we lost . . . this
would put Israel in a superior
position and encourage it to
continue occupation of Arab
territories."
On other subjects, Mr. Nas-
ser did not believe that there
was any unusual power con-
test in the Kremlin now. "At
the top," he said, "there is al-
ways a power contest in every
country.'
He thought that his revolu-
tion had evolved its own par-
ticular ideology, which he de-
scribed as a "socialist commun-
ity" and that it had made great
strides in improving living stan-
dards. Moscow, he said, had
given much aid by financing
and helping to construct the
Aswan High Dam and a steel
041tPgpililegotatIs84Ah68lifgdod
11 lin I 611 I rnm ?
? ripe for union. I said to the
Syrians that I don't know Sy-
ria. In order to have unity,
politicians must know each
other. I thought we needed
five years, but they insisted.
But we now have coopera-
tion with Syria in all fields.
Q. What rights does the
Soviet Navy have in Alexan-
dria, Port Said and Port
Suez?
A. We don't have any base
in our country for any for-
eign country. Of course, the
Soviets were visiting our
ports before the aggression
against our country and they
visit our ports also now.
However, no single ship is
here right now. We don't
have any ships now in Alex-
andria; but they visit us ev-
ery now and then. We wel-
come visits because the So-
viet Union helped us after
the aggression, they helped
us in the United Nations and
they supplied us with arms
after we lost our arms.
Q. How many Soviet mili-
tary training personnel and
technicians are there today
in the U.A.R.?
A. Really, I don't know
the figure, but I am asking
for more technicians.
Q. Is it a large figure?
five thousand?
A. It is less than 5,000.
You know, it is probably
even less than 1,000. But I
am asking for more.
Q. Does the U.A.R. have
greater military, air and na-
val strength now than on
June 1, 1967?
A. Of course, we are try-
ing to rebuild our armed
forces and, of course, we
have new arms now instead
of the older arms which were
lost during 1967. Also we
have acquired other material.
But I could not say we have
exceeded what there was in
1967.
That is why we are par-
ticularly worried about state-
ments in Western countries
that they want to ban arms
entering this area. The mean-
ing of an arms ban would be
that Israel will have superior-
ity in both army and air
force, while we won't get
the opportunity to replace
what we lost. We are wor-
ried because this would leave
the Israeli's Phantoms from
the United States and tanks
from the United Kingdom
while we attempt to rebuild.
This would put Israel in a
superior position and encour-
age it to continue occupa-
tion of Arab territories.
Condition of the Economy
Q. What is the economic
situation of the U.A.R. today
and has the Aswan Dam had
any effect on the standard
of living? When the dam was
first started you told me the
population was increasing so
rapidly that at its optimum,
the dam would only keep
the standard of living at the
level it then was. Is this the
way things have worked out?
A. No. The standard of liv-
ing rose because the increase
in the economy's annual
growth rate was about 6.5
per cent from 1960. The in-
crease of population was 2.8
per cent. This makes a differ-
ence of about 3.7 per cent.
Last year and this year we
were not able to achieve this
same level because of the
conditions of occupation and
the shifting of part of our
budget to defense invest-
ment. But we think that we
could increase the national
economy every year by 7 per
cent ? not only by agricul-
ture but by industry.
Q. What is your feeling
about recent speculation that
there is a power contest at
the top in the U.S.S.R. to-
day?
A. I will tell you something
from my experience. At the
top, there is always a power
contest in every country. This
is my experience. There are
always differing points of
view and ideas in the top
everywhere. I think in ev-
ery country there is a power
contest. I don't know about
the United States.
Really, I read press art-
icles from the Western coun-
tries on Russia, but I don't
think it is like that Last
July I met Brezhnev and Ko-
sygin and Podgorny, and we
discussed and were able to
agree about many questions.
Shelepin later came here and
he spent about 10 days and
told me he would return and
give a report to Brezhnev. I
think in Western countries
they exaggerate these ques-
tions. There are always some
differences in governments
Take Israel. Under Eshkol,
there were Dayan and Esh-
kol. At the top, there is al-
ways some difference.
Matters of First Concern
Q. What is your feeling
about the so-called Brezhnev
doctrine ? the right of Mos-
cow to intervene in other so-
cialist countries? Tito says he
is very much opposed to this
and I know you have a high
regard for Tito.
A. I will tell you some-
thing. As long as the Israelis
are occupying our country,
we are not concerned with
these questions. I am speak-
ing to you frankly. Our main
problem is the Israeli occupa-
tion of the Arab countries
and how we can work to get
rid of it either politically or
by any other means.
Q. Do you intend to invite
General de Gaulle to visit
Cairo or do you have any in-
tention of visiting Paris?
A. No, we have no plans
for that. But I am sure that
Ezvptian
90 people -would
24=2 ? ?
de Gaulle to our country at
any time.
Q. I remember in your
book, "Philosophy of the
Revolution," you discussed
the three linked circles of
Arabism, Islam and Africa.
Have you made any progress
along this philosophical line?
A. I think it is progressing.
We have better relations with
the Arab countries. We are
sending delegations to the
Moslem countries. You know
how the Moslems look to Je-
rusalem as a sacred city. We
have contacts with all the
African countries who sup-
ported us when Israel occu-
pied our territory. I would
add to that: not only African
countries, but also Asian
countries.
At the time the "Philoso-
phy of the Revolution" was
published, there were only
three independent coun-
tries in Africa. Now there
are more than 30. We have
an African unity organization
which has its center in Addis
Ababa. There is a Moslem
congress next month in Ma-
laysia, and you know the
Arab League is now strong-
er. After that there were
many Arab meetings of the
Kings and the Presidents.
The Nasser Ideology
Q. You have told me in
the past that you have no
ideology as such, that you
are pragmatic rather than
dogmatic. Have you by now
developed an ideology and
could you describe this to
me a bit?
A. We met the last time
in 1963. In 1962 there was
a Charter and the principle
of the ideas of development
in our society and our cul-
ture was published in May,
1962. Our line for develop-
ment after that was clearer
than before.
Q. Could you describe this?
A. We don't describe it as
socialist democracy, but as
a "socialist community." Peo-
ple base their lives on social-
ism. Democracy, according
to the charter, is freedom
for the community and free-
dom of the individual, but it
ends exploitation of the indi-
vidual. The result was na-
tionalization in 1961.
Q. Forgive me for saying
this, but it seems to me that
you have an unusual talent
for turning defeat into vic-
tory and for climbing out of
pits. What is the secret?
A. You know, I believe
that I am a lucky man in
spite of the catastrophe we
face now. On the other hand,
I don't plan it. It is natural.
After the defeat, I was will-
ing to leave. But you know
when I said that I was self-
ish. I was trying to escape,
but I was not able to.
Nobody was informed of
my intention except three
men. I was really intending
to leave. I was very tired
and sick. But now it is over.
When I went to Khartoum,
all the people came to the
streets and I could not for-
get what was said in one of
the magazines: "Hail the con-
quered." To be conquered is
not a determined issue, but
to surrender is. I am not go-
ing to surrender. I believe
in God. I am a fatalistic man.
I believe in His will. I don't
plan for any of these crises.
Q. Who most influenced
the shape of your life and
philosophy ? what person
during your lifetime or what
historical figure?
A. Of course, I was influ-
enced by Mohammed and
also by Jesus. I believe in
both of them. Did you know
that we believe in Christ
also? I think many people in
our country are influenced
by him.
No Longer Plays Tennis
Q. Is there a more con-
temporary figure who had an
influence on you?
A. I think the most effec-
tive man was Gen. Aziz el-
Massa I admired him when
I was a young officer. He
fought for independence, in-
sisted on independence. I met
him many times before the
revolution and after the rev-
olution until his death. He
was appointed in the army
as a general. He was in Tur-
key during the First World
War and then he came to
Egypt, and he was not in
the army except for a period
during the Second World
War.
Q. What are your hobbies
nowadays; do you still play
tennis?
A. No. You know my leg
was not well last year. I can-
not play tennis. The recom-
mendations of the doctor was
not to have hard sports but
to walk. Now I have returned
to being normal, because last
year I was not well. But I
walk generally before lunch.
During the winter it is bet-
ter to dip it before lunch.
Q. Do you watch movies a
lot still?
A. Yes, but not as much as
before. Only about once a
week. When I see a film, I
begin about 11 o'clock or
midnight. I have so many
meetings until then.
Q. Do you read?
A. Last year I was not
able to read a lot, but now
I am regaining my capacity
to work as before, so I read
more books. In the last few
days I have been reading a
book by Mao Tse-tung by a
Canadian author. I can read
some more now because we
are starting a holiday.
Q. What is your dream
that Egypt will be in 25
years' time ? both in terms
of its internal society and
its external world position?
A. You know, during the
last 17 years we were not
able to fultill all our dreams
because of the continuous
problems: the occupation, the
aggression of 1956, and so
on. My main dream is to de-
velop this country. To have
electricity in each village and
have work for every man.
We have work for every man
in spite of many problems ?
the increase of the popula-
tion by one million per year.
We must have an. increase
in order to have jobs for
one-half a million every year.
This year we will have elec-
tricity in 300 villages. We
have surplus electricity and
water because now we have
the water of the High Dam,
which will help in land re-
form.
We don't have money for
investment. We want also to
use this electricity, and we
have a committee of Soviet
experts which handed us rec-
ommendations for using sur-
plus electricity of the High
Dam. We also want to devel-
op the nhosphate and ferti-
lizer industry. We are going
into heavy industry. We are
building steel mills to give a
production of one million tons
of steel with a loan from the
Soviet Union. The first phase
will end by 1972
We have to encourage in-
vestment in industry. This is,
of course, my dream. I want
to see this coubtry without
servants before my death.
Now it is difficult for people
to find servants. And
this always-increasing prob-
lem about getting servants
means an increasing standard
of living.
'No Personal Life'
Q. You are still quite a
young man (52)t what is your
dream for your own person
in 25 years? Is there any-
thing out of the realm of po-
litical life you would like to
have achieved by that time?
such as writing a book or
painting a picture?
A. I have no personal
dreams. I have no personal
life. I have nothing personal.
Many people may not be-
lieve that, but this is the
truth.
Q. What would you consid-
er as your greatest success
and greatest failure?
A. You know, as I told
you, I velieve in God; I am
a fatalistic man. I believe
that life is a combination of
success and failure. It could
not be comprised of only suc-
cess. Look at history. I have
to accept failure. I have to
do my best in order to change
failure to success. I think
the main success was the suc-
cess of the revolution, the
success of the 23d of July,
1952. I don't think that our
defeat by Israel is a failure.
I believe it will be followed
by success.
My biggest mistake? Our
life is full of mistakes. Al-
ways there are mistakes.
There are many mistakes. I
cannot really see something.
Daily we have mistakes.
X1
ApproveclegjeleasTOPO
IA-
001800090124-2
Bross reported that recently received
a detailed briefing on DIA s information handling system and noted the
progress which DIA is making in this field.
DD/S&T reported that he will attend a Defense Science Board
briefing on the Sentinel system next Tuesday.
Executive Director reported receipt of a telephone call last night
from Hugh Sloan advising that the White House will abide by our wishes
that no pictures be taken in the auditorium during the course of the
President's visit tomorrow. The Director asked the Executive Director
to walk him through the President's schedule today or tomorrow.
The Director briefed on his several observations growing out of
attendance at the President's briefing of Congressional leaders on his
recent European trip.
The Director briefed on yesterday's NSC meeting, noting that it
was exclusively confined to the Sentinel problem, with Secretary Packard
personally and ably presenting DOD material. The Director observed
that following Secretary Packard's presentation BOB Director Mayo
lucidly remarked on the cost of the program. The Director suggested
that, given Mayo's perceptibility, we should be well prepared for hard
questions from this quarter.
The Director thanked those who participated in preparing the text
of his testimony yesterday and asked that similar careful attention be
given to responding to additional questions growing out of the hearing.
The Director summarized his response to the questions raised with
respect to the role of the 303 Committee and Senator Symington's release
of the Director's letter. The Director noted his reservations concerning
the value of those testifying as to the "tremendous loss" in terms of
damage done to the intelligence collection effort.
The Director noted,
however, that he did have an opportunity to converse with General
Westmoreland, who made it clear that he had not requested the 206,000
troops as reported in today's New York Times.
*Extracted and sent to action officer
Approved For Release 201%1
tits It,
L. K. White
RDP80 oi
1,q
U [10
01800090124-2
25X
25
25
'1,NIM YORK T is'
ApprovecIr Release 2005/12/0414'041:W80R 84A001800090124-2 ,
1
Viefilaliii ,o1icy Reversal . 968
"... s* " ? ? l' 1 Of.
:?.
struck for 'bureaucratic purposes ancii,;, 'On the other hand, the general said ;
? ; ?1,--''-' 1, with .opponentS in -agreement for con-
Speceitl lw The New 'York Ilmee n n ' n , :;that more ? many more ? American.'
' t :trarY reasons.; ::, .?. ? ? 'troops were needed because the allied ',!:
0 ? WASHINGTON, March 5?'' i
i' ;At the': time of that breakfast meet-: forces ? were off balance and, vulnerable? ?,
i. On the cold and cheerless.1 ii :.ing; President Johnson had been thinking to another offensive. ?: , early morning of Feb. 28,' '.1. ;for about two months about?not seekine:? .,
General Westmoreland felt, General I ?
.. Id ?
:
1968, the Chairman of the'
re-election. His principal advisers had i
iWheeler reported, that massive rein-
!Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen.
little inkling or his thoughts, and the,
jorcements would guard against a quick
,'Earle G. Wheeler, landed at il ? ',,Presiderit . hirnself1?, had ato?? expectation I
; I ?L Tepeti kion of the TeL offensive and would,:','
'that the zteriSions : In. the ,Govern,ment
''Andrews Air Force Base after 'i
'It , r inner ,l'allaw? the allies to regain the initiative,
? tn? an urgent mission to Saigon., O.' . i'?Would shatter, the consensus?of his . ., Ito exploit the enemy's losses and. to
''?cirele. :'-':' ? ?.;:?:, ,? ., ,?'? ::?,.' . ? , ? i
speed the' course of ,the war to our
Pausing only to change into a ??'i, , Clarlt M. Clifford; appointed but not b? ? ii
? ' ,r fresh uniform, he hurried:, .., ., objectives. 'yet?sWorn .in as Secretary of Defense, , ? . .
. . . . .
? General 'Wheeler gave the Westmore. ,,,
?.. .1:through the rain to the White, ??, ' ',? was to,play.? the pivotal*role in the Viet.1
. .
? I House to deliver a report and I land reqnest his personal endorsement,.
, '; nam reassessment, it was net a'One-.....:
' I.,' make a request. ! ,,,,:i , : '??? ,??? ' ',It added up to 206,000 more men.
Imaii*ShoW. :.,. :* .. ';'... ' ? **
il. ,:mt,-,:lifford had ;:to be persUadecL I-1,e *!.,,, . ,.?
...,, I! The report was designed to, ? ????? .'it Was Rough as a Cob!' .?'?,
.,encourage an anxious Presi- ?: irnmediatelycaMe under pressure from a,
;,faction : of , civilian dissenters at the ': General , Westinoreland, who ? did not
?,.' , , ?
,' dent and his beleaguered ad-? ; .:
? 1P,eritagon' Who. believed the ..war wriiactually use the figure, regarded the''',, ?
, j:',..yisers, but it served only Ad 1
, 'deadlocked, questioned American objec-IpropoSal aS a planning paper. But Presi- ?-::
shock them into extended de- 1 FtiVes, .and felt' that time ' to salvage ..,,dent Johnson and other officials, know- ,
1. bate. ',ArrieriCan ?Policy'.was fast runniry, out. mg that,. as a matter of administrative
. ii,?.';: The request ? for more !; '?,When, the ?debate was over, thebPresk.jtechnique, no request became formal ,'; ?
? t' troops?was designed to bring . ident. had ? set :.the ?Government ' on 'the' until. the President had decided how ', ?
military victory at last in the ? ? path toward peace hegotiations"and als???,many troops would be sent, treated the:::??
? ;1'
? . i'?:eight-year American military' ? ' i?engagement from the...War:He .had im-HWestmoreland paper as a request. Even.,,,i, :
effort but it led instead to a :1305ed; a limit 'On the Military ' commit without a precise total they sensed how
? ? , 1. , '
,
? ;ment,:?to' SOuth`, Vietnam, ordered. a re much was being sought. The "shopping
..fatetti ,!.
tel.l sries o
ef .dericions that
. .,? ictien,, in. 'bombing ? ot?North?-Viet-dist" outlined by General Wheeler called
?,,.? stand in retrospect as one of ciii
!narri,?'and offered to negotiate 'with:?.thelfor three more combat divisions, with.'i.
?,the most remarkable turn- ;Hanbi,?vegirne.: And, he had. coupled1'theipizahle air, naval and land support,..,? ,.. .
'ahouts in United States for-: , [offer . with the ?? announcement of this 1 ?
, l'? eign policy. ?, ; Once the plan was fed through the:?;? ,
? . ?,,
: .! withdrawal'Irom,the 19.68 political eam-;ipentagon cornputers the precise number
f?'. ' The month of March, 1968,. ?!, lpaign. ? ' - , ' : : ' : ' ',' ? '. ;??? .:' ,? ? .,.' :?? / ' I emerged. It became so seeret that to thist?,
? . .
I-, became a watershed for a na-' . :,. The replaCement Of the qtiest for mili!:, day, some officials. will not utter it?a ?,:.
:'. tion and a Government in. f,tarY. victory 'with: the 'search for ? com-lreminder of the ?PreSident's wrath when,
r?.
1%.,turmoil. The Johnson Admin.' ' '?promise rnighti,'haVe.::been' reversed byl: it did leak to"the press dUring the?March.?,,,t
1 .
istration, by pulling back,': :' l?lOrth Vietnam' if ,it?:had net-,--to aimosti debate. ' . ? ?
l';.' from the brink of deeper com-;; ' i.eVerYone"s?stirprise .7.,..,: responded .favOT?4 , : The .sheer size of \the requesta 40 c?
? ,,
. 1:',?.: mitments and moving toward ? ? ;abl$,,ta Mr. johnson's offer. Furthermore;:xi
'::, AhebaWkishfaction in the Whited ;-100sq ifpre.e,
per cent increase in the 535,000-inan .,
%committed.; to.,?Vietnan:17-7st,nnn.r,4;
, disengagement, set a course'::
,: !'iriner :Circle! solight to resist the .,-1'ew IMi; 'Soliiison -and 'ill& Civilians atounci`:,
r, that affects the 'daily deci-; 'Atend. Until ? tho. 'JohnSon Administration Ihim,, thou h the initial impulse was to.;
;' sions of the Nixon Adminis.', .lefoffice 'in 'January. .7.? ' :?? -1, see how . !e ,Cummanuer .s . needs might .:,
,',- The Tet.""Drive Assessed ? ! be filled. ? 7 : ' ! : ? ' . 't,
I
tration.
Many of the ingredients of
. ' "It was a hell of .a serious breakfast," ,.'i.
, , .
'one . " :
I decision i ngt4 nen?troop? rire "ana Wh4f1 :*The catalytic event in the policy reap rough
to do about bombing Norfh Vietnam-- -
participant recalled It was
praisal ? and the centerpiece of General i: as a cob!"I . ", -: ? ? , : ' ..,,, !:.!i
. r.,?=., 2.
Some or the participants believed that J
are still live issues, and many of the Wheeler's vivid report?wasthe enemy's' . '
.a substantial troop increase could' well
? , principal actors involved a year ago ,are
.- Lunar New Year offensive, which began
;.- participants in yet another crucial policy' Jan.?30, dswelled o cl* revive arguments for widening the war ';,?:
1968; an into co r 1- ?forgiving Gene
debate on Vietnam. ,, ral Westmoreland per-'.?,
:nated assaults. 611,36 South.- Vietnamese !
r, On that day at the end. of February,:i cities and included,' in Saigon, a bold 1:mission to go after enemy sanctuaries on -
.President Johnson and his 'closest aides! penetratian' 'of: the ',United States Erntl,the ground in Cambodia and Laos, ? and 2.'
I assembled for breakfast around thek ? ? . ?, ;? . .. 1,, , ? 1...:j perhaps even in North Vietnam. :" ,' .1 ?
oassy cornpouna ? .. , . , , ,
: ..,. Chippendale table in the elegant family; ? ? : ?:' ., ? ? %. ?: ' - I - The President was wary about a mas-:,:y
Confident :and ,Sccure. one ' daY, Gen.4
' dining room on the second floor of the! i sive new commitment Had he not gone
William: Cs.' ,Westriaorelandi then ? the to extraordinary lengths to send half a
ftonriAmeriean commander in Saigon, : found i
Executive Mansion. Before rising i million men to Vietnam without calling
.; the table, they had set in Motion the !himself an the next dealing with a vast 1,,._
p reserves or imposing economic con
rn ?'?'?
'.'ost intensive policy review of thp5battle the length of South Vietnam
. ., ' .: , trols? Every year the generals had come';
... : .
. 'Johnson Presidency ? and one of ?thej The psychological impact on Washing- 'to him?sometimes :more , than once a:i ?;,,,
most agonizing of any Presidency. ; ? . , 'tori had outrun the event; ?The eapital:'.; year?with ' the plea . for "a little bit
Tho wrenching debate began almost by was stunned. ;But General Wheeler, *with more to get the job done.", Novi?with .,? ?
? abcident and then gained a momentum murals of ,the American revolution be the nation sharply divided over the war, .
' all ? its 'own. One dramatic record of its hind biro,'!:effered a more:reassur_ingi they were asking for Mobilization ? ' ?
. .,
Vrogr0ss appeared in the 12 versions oflpiature to the White House breakfast 1 They had confrented Mr. Johnson with.
, a Presidential speech that evolved during on Feb. 28. , i
. a dilemma., The gist, of the 'Wheeler- '.?
the Month?the last draft pointing in the : The Tet attacks had not caused a Mili.! Westmoreland report,' in ' the words of
ca.pposite direction from the first. : tary defeat he said. The enemy , hadi one breakfast guest,, was blunt: "We've 4
The entire episode also provided a' been thrown back with heavy losses . got to have a big infusion of troops ox';', l'
remarkable demonstration of how for -;and had failed to spark a popular up- we can't achieve our objectives."
' !'f.:ign policy is battled out, inch by inch,irising against the South Vietnamese ' No one at that 'breakfast table . that f?l
? ,' by negotiation rather than decision. The regime Not only had the , Government" day advocated , lowering objectives. It
turnabout emerged through iharp can-:in Saigon and its army survived thewas'a? time; hoWeverowhen many pros-,
'Y
?tontations and subtle, even conspiraHhurricane, he continued, but the offcnj sures for a c i e f'' tfeicon? '.? '
;?
,torial, maneuvering-rwithmsfitiWocoyeReleager2C1010/12114 cldalgit,,R RaciRre218 fii
'- ' , . ? , out of non-Communists, and they were 4 ?'? ?'''? .---C!"?-'44" -:
, l beginning to cooperate. A A;va1,
. .
0MM:rated
4
Approveciar Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP80R?84A001.800090124-2 .
?;'''.:7'.- siirse-a.din.g. Doubts AlioUt WNW
_. . .
'-'-'.','',. Instead there was an early collision illy. .
started on the basis of the se,-.called,San'l
?, The Tet offensive had punctured the :1!.. ? , . . ,',.;
the. task force over War strategy and Antonio formula
.heady optimism over the military prog-i the Possibilities of ? victory. There were,1?:- That proposal, made public by Pres1;
l-ress reported to Congress by General -:
of course, shaOngs of viewpoint on most .;.':clent Johnson in a speech in the Texas,;;,
.'
Westmoreland and by Ellsworth Bunker, .
: questions, but two broad' coalitions city, on September 30, 1067, offered to '4
in ? emerged.: , ...
"... the Ambassador to South. Vietnam,. . .. , 'c',. halt the bombing of North Vietnam pro-'-'?,.
';.November, 1967. Not only had the pool '... One favored continuation' of General -?,.?, \tided it would lead promptly to pro-A '
of -disenchantment spread, by late Feb- .:'Westmoreland's strategy.. of wearing' jductive talks and assuming' that Hanol:'!, :
' ruary to fence-sitters in Congress, to , '..clown the- enemy by intense military 1:'?would .not take. military advantage of:,1
newspaper offices and to business or '. PePnding.': The argument's assumption I ...the cessation. : ''. . ... . : ?; : ?
' n.? ganizations. It had also reached the Was that the Tet situation was less 'al, At. Mr. Clifford's Senate confirmation'
upper' echelons of the Government, ? ,. setback. than an opportunity. By boldlyhearings on Jan. 25, 1968, '.he had. added;: .-
s. ? If tolerance of the war had worn thin; ' seizing. the initiative, according to this.1:, the important interpretation - that this ..'!.
;.' so had the nation's military resources? '..view, the .allies could decimate and de -'.,1 meant that the President' would tolerate', ,
, , .
.;.: so thin, indeed, that . there was almost -?moralize the enemy and open the way to "normal" .levels . of infiltration ?from,,.'
!,?,;nothing more to send to Vietnam with-. : aIavOrable settlement.' - ? .!.. , ?;?.! North to South Vietnam. .:
.. .
.',.-:'out either mobilizing, ? enlarging draft :!,. The other group' challenged'the 'very The ? The .president had .not cleared mr.A ,
: t,calls, lengthening the 12-month combatCliffo --
rd's remarks in advance and, as a :?4
premises of-the. , old strategy. .Its mem'....,' ?,
.''tour or sending Vietnam veterans back :.`,:cresult,'?according to one informed source, ?
bers Urged a less aggressive ground war",,. ,, ,
:. k?
,.for second tours of .duty--all extremely :'called for new :efforts te open, neogtiai.,' ....all hell broke loose at the White House l; '
i'..unappealing .' -.'? ..." .. : : .. .? '-and the State Department."?. ? ' ? -.,1-4 ?
' :- ':',?tions and; implicitly; laid the ?ground--,
Congress was in such. ferment . that work for political'' ? ? ' . '; -., .: 'Secretary' Rusk ' was Said ? to havel -,
?., compromise., .,:. .? ? ? , ::., , ,.
? 1,4he process of, -legislation was partly ,,,.,..,.. .. ? . ?, .. .,, . ? . ?, . , . ,1,.. argued for two ;days ,with Presidenti
kY, paralyzed. The dollar was,being.battered 2,! Four Exponents of Continuity. ' ..-s: 'Johnson . against giving Administration;,i
lthy the gold crisis in Europe and ,inflar? :*' The exponents of cOntinuity. were. Mr.:
. .. . . . - , .. ":endorsement to ? the Interpretation. He
tion at home .,% .:.. '..-.. '?,. :'...? - t. .,.! :.: ' ? '.'.? ,..Rusk and ? Mr. Rostow and .Generals .., Was overruled. On Jan. 29 the State De-4
More fundamentally,: the nation was ::,Wheeler and Taylor. Mr. Rusk, by then partment said Mr:. Clifford 's? remark's?'
f?seriously divided. The ? fabric of ,.public :-.the stanchest defender of the, war in. -,; represented United States policy.,
, &civility had begun to unravel as bpinain'. public patiently bore the heat of critic? ,;:' He plunged into the minutiae of Viet.:4.
ion ,the war polarized :,-. .: ????!' ' ..: . :. ,' .: ism.' Tall,. unbending; composed he waS,', ?Inam like a lawyer taking a new case. A -
,
''' ? - ' ' ...,:''' in his:own -words the iceman."( , ? ? ? ...; He had private talks with Mr. McNa-.?,-
{". ? Rusk Breaks a Pr.ecedent ? i!., : . . . . , .1.
1.: ? % . mt:: Restow';and General Taylor, who` :mara, whose own misgivings had sharp,;(,?
EPresident Johnson chose his long-time I'h'ad gone to Vietnam early in '1061 .as, ened in his final months at the Pentagon,,: .:.
I. friend: Clark Clifford, toheacl a taskl , President Kennedy's personal envoys and ' '...'' As a newcomer with limited knowl-,:i .
. florce to advise him on the'troop requestl ,
who 'came back advocating intervention, ,,'edge, Mr. Clifford had to rely on civilian .
It quickly' became. a forum for debating ..were even more opposed to?"letting. subordinates more than had his brilliant:),
i? I? . up .
..the entire rationale for the War. '
experienced predecessor. The large ,... .
.: ' .1' . the, Pressure." Mr. Rostow, athletic and
- ? t''' At .1030 A.M. on Friday,' March 1,1ebullient.'s ? :.faction Of dissenters. from Administra-',*:, .
5.' ? , , funneled the news' from Saigon .
in the East room' of the White. House, ; tion policy, was quick to seize the oppor-.; .
!"???to the President. ? ? ' ? - - ' '..
t
,-,Mr. Clifford took the oath of office as -'. The advocates of change were. mes.s.r. j. tunity to press its views.' The Tet offen:;:t -
the successor to .Robert S. McNamara.:TNitze;- Warnke, and ? KatzenbaCh, and ,:::sive, recalled ? one dissenter, "gave, us ) ,....
!Three hours later he gathered the task; later :.L most powerfully -L. Mr. Clifford. ,i!something we could hand our arguments'!,
?,force around the oval . oak table in ? the. ' Mr helms, thoughtful and angular, was.' on something to contradict the beguiling '.
i,private Pentagon' dining room of the, -neutral on policy .questions: The weight. --;t1PWa.rd ettl've on ,'the progress. charts".
-
? i..Secretary of Defense. ; ? '',' of his C.I.A. analysis called into queStion?..,from Saigon." ,; ? ? . . .,
t:- Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for the ' military judgments, past strategy. and -'.' With the lid? off, the new Secretary
first time in bis seven years- in _office,, ...the 'quest for victory implicit in so many . discovered. a nest of "hidden doves" at.
'?-..-"went to the Defense Department for a .
_ :, ..ear ler ecisions. - . the Pentagon, 'including his deputy, Mr.,,,
' formal meeting. '
-? .Althou h Mr. Clifford was never' 'alone ,;;Nitze; 'Assistant ' Secretaries Warnke,.1,;
' The otfiers present were all, like Mr. - ... , g .- , 1 Alain C. EnthoVen, Goulding .and Alfred
Rusk, veterans of arguments on Vietnam ,:. his ? eventual role was remarkable be .:,,13., Pitt; -' the Under Secretaries of the5 ,
eauselt.was wholly unexpected. ' .. .
'..' policy?Walt W. Rostow, the President's 1 :' Army,' Navy and Air, Force--.-David E.',I '
, assistant for national security' affairs,: ..? He came into government with a rep-. McGiffert, Charles F. Baird- and Town-..,4-..
,,, , ? ...; :,
Richard Helms, Director of Central In '., tation .as .a ..hawk, as a' trusted, loyal. send W. Hoopes; a few younger generals ,1..
'back room counselor to ; Mr. Johnson:,
? 't. telligence; General Wheeler, General; ,, and colonels and a score of young civil-4.
? 'Maxwell D.- Taylor, former Chairman of .-2-, who had steadfastly supported Adminis-' lans brought in by Mr. McNamara, prin;;4; ,
? ' .,r
the J. f Staff, former Arnbas- ? 'tratiori policy. In. December; , e o it n Chiefs o . 1965, he. vci ' 11 D MortonH I-1 I e ? Dr 'T
.. pa y r. . a p rm, .. L
r sador to Saigon and a Presidential' ad- ,,;, had Opposed. the 36-day bombing pause. Les Gelb and Richard C. Steadman. ,
il visor on Vietnam; Paul H. Naze, Deputy then advocated by his predecessor, One,. : , The men who clearly had the 'greatest
... .
; Secretary., of Defense; Under Secretary . man acquainted with the circumstances impact on the new Secretary's thinking
? '''i of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach; Paul .,: Of the Clifford appointment said later: Were.Messrs.'Nitze,' Warnke and Gould-"
f;.C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of De- ,.:.. 'I am sure the President felt, 'Here is ing7---perhaps:Mr. Warnke?mcire-than
.,
. ,fense for International Security Affairs; :,..
,. a good, strong, sturdy ,supporter of the , others: -.' ? .. - -',.
'r"Phil G. Gouldin,,, Assistant Secretary of
b ! war, and that'S what I need.'
' McNamara: "Warnke was deeply upset about Viet-.
,
. Defense for .Public Affairs; William P.:. was' wobbling,...--? particularity on ?the, ".nam and he was persuasive," a colleague:':. I
: t Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for J.-bombing issue. X think the President felt (said. His style and , Mr. Clifford's
.. .:?East Asian Affairs, and, for financial !...Clifford was strong and sturdy." .* : -,meshed." As a measure of .their. mutual.';
advice, the Secretary of the Treasury,- Mn Clfford. had . begun to have :confidence, '-Mr. Clifford chose ? Mr.--:
"-Henry H. Fowler. ' . ' ''', doubts during.. a :trip in: August,..19671 .Warnke as a 'law partner., when both:,
. .('-:: ? None Of the civilians present advocated 'to Vietnam 'and allied countries *Con- left the Government., - .. .,
,
a 0 more men 6,000
?., i tributing troops to the war., On his re- .., ' .
flat commitment of 2 1,
When ' the. Clifford task' force got'' ,
d:snor did they want to reject the req ., turn he confided to the President 'that', ? under way, a 'number of officials took
0 out of hand. Several' insiders later sug.1,;.he was deeply . uneasy at having . dis- -the troop request as evidence of panie';,,
j.gested that .a smaller request, for 30,00 i....,covered that the American view of the on General Westmoreland's -'art. But
to 000 ,;.been ?-granted ,:and.:the;,ArlatiniStr4t45:01,,New Zealand, Thailand and the Philip:, *headquarters during :and' after ? the Tet:
. 50, men , would ' probably have ?-,, .war ' was . not fully shared by Australia ; ranking officers .. who ? were.' in Saigon.:
crisis would' have been avoided,. or ,4 , pines. ' : ? ? ? . .,
' . . ?offensive : assert ,that there .: was no
least, d,elayed-,.:?,.. ,, ? .?-...\?-?I'..',.'0?????.:.'?? ?'.. Disturbed he was, but he remained a thought a'asiting for maay more troops'
_supporter of Administration policy.. He:unt.it. shortly 'before Generai:.-Wheeler's1 -
? ..? . ,,, was enourageci by secret diplomatic el,.
?
AO proved; For:Kildtit*A2005/1714 4 irIGIA4RDP80.0614i'atieWdelg94).124174 orxrova
. ary,.1968,.to get negotiations with'
?
4
,
- :177 "The President askei?effe9MAIrr Rtiffriv# A.99,51.1 41)14s:sCIA1RPPagOR, 1118441 $91,194Q14.4a? it ' was "al ..
? r?' to go out to Vietnam to find out at ' it' had a psychological .impact: on Pim," .'Aurrary fiction". that American combat ?i
I
? General Westmoreland thought he could ; the source added. ? i, 'casualties would rise ? if the' 'bombing i .
;... Use" a Pentagon official said. Civilian i. The first weekend in March was con l? I.were halted. American losses,' he said, , ,..
*officials were irritated by this approach. i sunied by a study of the papere,drafted ; were primarily a result?of the aggressivei
.
It was a mistake to ask a damned-fool; for the task force and by questions. "It ; ground strategy in the South. ..
question like that," a State Department I was meet all day, sandwiches , in for ; ? ,
official remarked. ' ,, ? ,. lunch, sandwiches, in for dinner," a par- ' Under the impact of such arguments, ..1
. ,1 Mr. Clifford's doubts became convic-
tc The joint Chiefs of Staff, had their : ticipant recalled.
own reasons for favoring a massive in ,
i.,- Word was passed to President John- !...tions. :He supported the President's pre-
i`
. .crease and a reserve call-up. For months .. son that the review "wasn't going well .1;vious . restrictions on the war?no in
!;Vasion 'of North Vietnam, no:expansion 1
.. i-..thcy had teen deeply concerned that the and ?had hit 'a "discordant note." But 1.,ef the ground war into Laos Or Cambo...L.:.,
? i? strategic reserve had been dangerously. Mr. Clifford's:doubts had not hardened? i dia; no mining of the Haiphong harbor
depleted and they had 'been looking for into conVictions by the time he handed
!----and he became Convinced that within :
i. a chance to reconstitute it by persuading the President his first report on March. ''those restrictions, there was no military.f.
. , ;
., ; the President to mobilize. National Guard ?.,5... ' ? ? , . ' ? :answer. He began the search:for a path '.1
. ,, units. ? " i:?:. :A ?short,., unsigned,. four-or-five-page to disengagement. - ' .',,:, .'ii? '...'? .? ? ' - '
? ' ':.memorandum, it ? recommended giving 1
Another view was held. by Ambassa- ? . The debate, by now 'in' the' Whitei
General Westmoreland 50,000 ' more ? l:?dor, Bunker, who never fully . endorsed ,. !House, seesawed' through the middle oC,,
trqops in the next three months and set
. l ;the troop request and who wanted first ; March. At this Utile Mr. Clifford began.;
, ? ? . out a. schedule . for readying the rest 'to .
,
;,priority for re-equipping and expanding ; state his case for a fundamental.:
of the 206,000 men for. disp,atch. over. !
',. the South Vietnamese Army?a sugges- , change in American policy: It was time:, .
.?? the next 15 month . ? . ." "?'"
- ?i; tion endorsed by Pentagon civilians. ' ?..:? 'to emphasize peace, not a larger was.. .
-, The Wheeler-Westinoreland plan, pre- ...:?. From Divergent Points of View- i ?:.". ? ,?i' .; He now challenged the task force .
.,? ?? .
. F re-
sented . to the task force Called for ... ". . . - . ? ; 4artimendation ? for more troops. "This
206,000 men by June 30, 1969?roughly Characteristically, the President's ad-.1 isn't the way to, go at ,all," he told the'
? 7100,000-within a few months and two. 'visers disagreed on the .recommenda-. i?President.. "This is all wrong,".' : ? - '
A
ylater increments of about.. 50,000 men, I tion's significance. The Pentagon saw it':: ' .
;each. The first segment was to *come ? as a move "to get the ,pipeline going" ;:is . ? His Words .Carried Weight ? ? .,
?
from available active -duty 'units In the ? ?general approval of the troop request ;?!.- . With the nation bitterly ? divided; 'over; '
':'.United States; the rest Were to come ' State Department officials viewed it as i 'the.war and in desperate need at h.ome, i
? ?from the reserves..???? . . part of a process of "Whittling down" the he maintained, it would be immoral tel
.t .
, .. In ithe view of the Joint Chiefs; only ., 206,000 figure. , : . . .' , ? ..i:consider enormous added investment itt',4,
,.,? the full number would assure :victory. ''' Although. Mr. ' Clifford had passed 'i..Vietnam?a,'"military sinkhole." ? . '? .1 ,.
; -The implication was that with 206,000. along the report, he was uneasy about V. His outspoken challenge was deep191
? ',more men, the war would "not he ter,-' it. He was worried that if the President I disturbing to President 'Johnson, who-al-1
i i
tribly long," as one Pentagon civilian nut I approved the first batch of troops, that',1 ways, preferred a consensus amongYhis0
. ;it?but there was.no precise forecast, .: action would move ;him irrevocably to- l close advisers. Although he never turned
...i At this point Mr. Warnke, in his ward the whole 206,000. But the Secre..i his celebrated temper on Mr. Clifford 4
- 'nasal ? Massachusetts accent, read a, tary did not challenge the report. direct- i the argument chilled their 'personal ,re- .
.C.I.A. paper that challenged the military.'; ?Iy; he tried to stall, suggesting ? that the ,lations and left the Defense Secretary;
'thesis head on. Hanoi, he said, would',"task force check General. Westmore-1 a. ,friend for 30, years, feeling oddl3
? -match American reinforcements as it; land's reaction to ,be sure: the "mix" of, frozen out of the White House at times.
.. ,had in the past, . and the result. would : 'forces was,right. .. ? , ? ? - ..., ?. .t: Secretary 'Rusk apparently did
,
i. . ,
',simply be escalation and "a lot, more.; .,? General Wheeler 'wanted to Move', disagree with Mr. 'Clifford so sharply.,on 4
' !killing ' on both sides: - . ?I: ahead,, but others, including Mr.' Rusk: troop numbers, but he was opposed; to -
Besides, the task force was told,. the
;' and Mr. Rostow, were ,willing 'to :have the long-run, implications of .Mr. Clif?-?'!!
;
.? Vinancial costs would be immense. The l'? the issue studied further, so the task i ford's arguments?that in the end, the
,proposed scale of reinforCernents. would !. force' carried on for several more days. United States would have to settle :for
, 'add nearly- $10-billion to a war already'. This seemed to ? suit' Mr. Johnson'si less. Mr. Rostow felt; that the new .De-
costing.
..., ? $30-billion a year. . , , mood, too. His instinct, a White House rinse Secretary - had, fallen under- the .;
. s
,t.. As an alternative, Mr. Warnke :urged ' aide explained later, was to delay im..; iinfluence of the professional pessi-,7
. :a 'turn' toward deescalation pullback,: plementing the plan. "He kept puttinp;?inists" in the Defense' Department: i
' ;from. General Westmoreland's aggressive' off making an initial decision," the '!:,:' At the 'Pentagon. -morale .viae;rising 1
search-and-destroy tactics an'amongthe aban-- said. ? : . . ..e aide;
? . , 'among civilian' ..advocates rJ of,. e' .new
!donment of isolated outposts like the . For the President had heard .? the i policy.' "We . used. to - aSk,"?'4i forme
? :besieged Marine garrison at,,Khesanh.; grumbles in Congress over the danger to Pentagon, civilian ?saicli.Of the ?Setretary,1
He said that American forces, should. be .I the dollar from the ?gold. drain' and from' ? is he one of us? Well there Was. 'one,
used as a mobile shield in.. and around the :rising costs orthe War. 'Politicians; of us'' at the 'White House," He was:i
.:, '
:t?inorialation centers and that more should were alarmed by the size of the troop; 'Harry McPherson, the President's speechq
,be demanded from VIC South Vietnamese ..? request... . . ? .. ' ' . ' .. . ' '. '. .... drafter,' who, unknown to the Pentagon
!Army. . ? , . ?'. .', ? -' . . ? '', ' ':'? ' Old, trusted friends like Senator or the State Department, was alreadyf at , ?
.:
Z. The sheer complexity of the troop ? Richard B. Russell, the Georgia Demo.I'Work on a major Vietnam speech. The ,.
issue began to raise clOubts. in Mr. ?Clif- -crat who -headed the Armed Services . final version was Mr.. Johnson's address
ford's mind ?, Committee, were complaining ?.tartly to the nation on. Sunday; March 31. , ?
. . . . ' .
, . ? . ? ? . ., about General Westmoreland. Influential '
1,. Questions Others 'Avoided ? .., ?
; ? men like Senator John 'Stennis, the '.' .. First plea for a Stiffer Stand
-! "Part of it was Clark's intelligent, sissippi Democrat, were privately, warn.' . The' speech was originally conceived,' ,
? questioning and part of it'was his? na-' ing the President to go slow on mObiliz-:'late in February on the basis of Mr. Rns-.
wad," a colleague recalled. "He asked' ing reserves. ?? ? - ? :' .? ?? ..' . ??????!, - I tow's analysis that the Tet offensive had' ??
about things. that others more familiar 1,.. As the task force?pet:Sisted, Secretary' , not been ? a real setback and that the
:. with the details would not have asked. I,Clif ford himself .. was putting ..more allies should pull up their socks and hings.
..- "He just couldn't get .the fiaures,!!pointed questions. "What is our military! on until the enemy came to his senses. ....
.,straight on troops. He drove Bus Wheel- i plan for victory?" *he asked. "How.will 1 While the..discussions of troop strength
., ?,er mad. He would say, 'Now. I under-',we end the war?" He' was not satisfied. I were proceeding, Mr. McPherson was., ?
: :stand you wanted 22,000 men for such
t I. Then the bombing: campaign, came, developing his draft., ,' ? . .. .
? , and such,' and Wheeler would point Outi?,under his scrutiny. Mr.. Hoopes 'Wrote ;".. Initially, it included an opened-e.hded
this didn't include the support elements. 'him a memorandum urging a halt,'?argu, ;commitment to the .war?a wil?lingiv.?;:s
,?
,.and if you added them, It would be: ,ing that the homhing..was ?not: having Ito carry .on at whatever the cost. I3ut
35.000 in all." . ; " ". l.significant results and that, because or!as the internal debate over troop figures"
1 ,
'This happened again, and ' again Soviet and 'Chinese - Communist -? aid, .;.raged 'on Mid' 1110 . numbers' dwindled.,
tevery time Clark...wanted .:,.to get 'the North. Vietnam- had become "ea !balance idown to 50,000 and the tone softened.:
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the President Would not commit
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Then came a series of signal events:
Senator Eugene J. McCarthy scored a :.?
stunning upset in the New Hampshire -
.Democratic primary on March 1. Ameri-
can dead and wounded in Vietnam '
reached 139,801 ? exceeding over-all'
? Korean-War losses. American and West- ' ?
ern European bankers held an emer-
gency meeting in Washington to stem ,
the run of gold as the price soared.1
;Senator Robert F. Kennedy announced
on March 16 that he would seek the;
Democratic Presidential nomination...
,All this formed the backdrop for the) .
'most delicate argument of all ? that't
,
:about the bombing.
On March 15, Arthur 3. Goldberg', the
fAmerican representative at the United
Nations, sent an eight-page memo to the
President urging him to halt the' bomb- ?
1 Mg to get negotiations started. ' ' ,
. Others in the Administration favored'?
such a step?Mr. Katzenbach and Am-
bassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman,
among them?but it was Ambassador.,'I
, Goldberg, increasingly frustrated by his
,.?sense of powerlessness on the Vietn'arry
; issue, who dared brook the President's'
. anger by raising the issue directly.',:
, .
Few officials knew he had done so. Hel
t drafted the memo himself .and sent it
labeled "For the President's Eyes Only.",,N
Copies were given to Secretaries, Rusit,
? ;.?and Clifford, and Mr. Rostow, ?as 'the
?;,President's aide, sass it in due course,1
? (hut Mr. Goldberg discussed it with none?;
.;? of them. ?
, Still others, including Assistant Secre-,F
' tary of State Bundy, favored waiting for,,
i?several weeks on the ground that
.:another enemy offensive might be near. -?
-1 A day after the Goldberg memo ar-1;;
:rived, the subject came up in Mr. John-
son's inner circle. The President, his i.z.?
:patience sorely ?tested, sat up in ? his) ,
chair and said: ? ." , ? ? ;:,??
? !, "Let's get one thing clear! I'm telling
.,you now I am not going to stop the.,
?
'bom'bing. Now I don't want to hear any
more about it. Goldberg has written me'!'
?
labout the whole thing, and I've heard ??
.
...every argument. I'm not' going to stop it.i
?? .Now is there anybody. here whosdOesn't:,:
.understand that?" ' ? ? r'
? There was dead silence.
kr- The bombing isSue was dropped' at,
that meeting,, but it, was not dead. Mr.,,
Clifford, the lawyer, had iloticed a
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