AFGHANISTAN: THE REVOLUTION AFTER FOUR YEARS

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Afghanistan:
The Revolution
After Four Years
Secret
NESA 82-10341
July 1982
Directorate of secret
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Afghanistan:
The Revolution
After Four Years
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and
the National Intelligence Council. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, South Asia Division,
Secret
NESA 82-10341
July 1982
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Afghanistan:
The Revolution
After Four Years
Key Judgments Four years after seizing power, the Afghan Communists face strong
resistance throughout the country. The weak and divided Babrak regime
must depend on Soviet troops to counter the insurgency.
The Soviets are helping the Afghan Communists set up the same kind of
party and government institutions that the USSR uses to control its own
population. The Soviets are also urging the Afghans to adopt the same kind
of social, economic, and political tactics that enabled the early Bolsheviks
to consolidate control over the USSR. Most of those programs, however,
are implemented by a bitterly divided Afghan Communist Party and by
civil servants and military officers, many of whom secretly oppose the
Babrak government. The insurgency, moreover, denies these officials
access to much of the population.
These programs have failed to overcome the popular perception that
Communist policies threaten Afghan traditions. Moreover, they have failed
to establish effective institutions for controlling Afghanistan or for fulfill-
ing promises-ranging from democracy to prosperity. Significant popular
support for a Communist government installed by foreigners is probably
unattainable, but government programs could create conditions in which
the benefits of cooperation and the costs of opposition outweigh, for many
Afghans, their dislike for the Communists. Such programs cannot be
implemented, however, so long as a large part of Afghanistan remains
under insurgent control.
The Afghan military remains largely ineffective. Overshadowing its other
problems is its inability to find men willing to fight for the Communist gov-
ernment, a problem unlikely to be solved until after the government's
nonmilitary programs are effectively implemented.
The Afghan Government faces an impasse that prevents it from dealing
with the insurgents:
? Widespread popular hostility toward the government and lack of control
in the countryside preclude the recruiting of a loyal army.
Information available as of 1 May 1982 has been used in
the preparation of this report.
iii Secret
NESA 82-10341
July 1982
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? Without an effective army, Kabul cannot. establish enough control to
implement policies that might gain it some degree of popular acceptance.
The weakness of the Afghan Army, moreover, forces the government to
depend on Soviet troops for survival, even though the Soviet presence is a
major cause of popular hostility.
A defeat of the insurgents by Soviet troops appears the only way to
overcome this impasse. Moscow, however, has too few men in Afghanistan
to suppress the insurgency. The Soviets currently appear to be counting on
a war of attrition that will eventually make the cost of continued resistance
too high for the insurgents to bear. In the meantime, the Soviets will
continue to experience human and equipment casualties and a steady drain
on their resources.
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Afghanistan:
The Revolution
After Four Years
The Soviet Role
The key to managing the Afghan Government or its
programs has eluded the Soviets. Soviet advisers
pervade the government, and the Afghan Communists
could not survive without Soviet military and econom-
ic support. Still, the Soviet ability to control events in
Afghanistan, except through military force, is limited.
Even in the parts of Afghanistan under government
control, effective implementation of Soviet-inspired
programs is rare.
popular hostility to the Communists is so great-in
part because of policies pursued against Soviet advice
before Soviet troops intervened-that few Afghans
are willing to cooperate with the Soviets
many instances in which the Soviets, apparently reluc-
tant to alienate the Afghan Communists, have negoti-
ated with Afghan political leaders rather than sup-
press factional disputes in the ruling party or remove
unqualified senior officials. Because the Afghan Com-
munist Party cannot furnish enough loyal and capable
civil servants and military officers, the Soviets have
allowed men to remain in office who through inaction,
incompetence, or sabotage frustrate Soviet efforts.
Improving the Government's Image
In the two years since its installation by Soviet troops,
the Babrak government has made no progress toward
consolidating its position. Babrak's greatest political
liability is the presence of Soviet troops, a situation
that condemns him as a foreign puppet. Moreover,
almost all diplomats, journalists, and scholars agree
that he has been unable to convince most Afghans
that his government is any less doctrinaire, narrowly
based, tyrannical, or anti-Islamic than those of his
Marxist predecessors. He has denounced the mass
arrests and executions carried out under President
Amin, and his rule has been somewhat more lenient
than those of his predecessors. Thousands, however,
remain in prison, basic freedoms are denied, and some
officials. associated with the oppressive Taraki and
Amin governments still hold important posts.
Babrak has sought unsuccessfully to widen popular
support by including prominent non-Communists in
the government.
= most senior officials of pre-Communist govern-
ments remain hostile to the Communists and the
Soviets and some refuse to cooperate even when
threatened. The menace of insurgent retaliation de-
ters others. In addition, the Communists' reluctance
to give prominent non-Communists real authority
reduces the attractiveness of high office. The few who
have accepted government positions are suspect to
most Afghans, The
most prominent, Commerce Minister Jalalar, the only
non-Communist in the cabinet, is believed-probably
correctly-by many Afghans to be a longtime KGB
agent. Some other appointments have led to embar-
rassing defections including Babrak's economic advis-
er and a delegate to a UN conference who used the
meeting to denounce the Soviets
Babrak has been unable to dispel hostility stemming
from the belief that his government seeks to destroy
Islam. In contrast to his Communist predecessors,
Babrak claims to be a devout Muslim; his frequent
attendance at religious services is well publicized.
Official meetings-including those of the cabinet-
begin with readings from the Koran. Councils of
religious leaders regularly endorse government pro-
grams, citing passages from the Koran to prove
regime policies are Islamic.
most Afghans doubt
the sincerity of the government's devotion to religion,
both because of the close links between Kabul and the
avowedly atheistic Soviet regime and because many
government programs are seen as anti-Islamic. For
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(land reform is viewed as contrary to
Islamic precepts governing property rights and educa-
tional programs as an effort to propagate an anti-
Islamic ideology. Most prominent religious leaders
are either in jail or openly support the insurgents;
those who back the government are generally regard-
ed as traitors to God.
Sporadic attempts to demonstrate concern for the
interests of minorities by such measures as increasing
radiobroadcasts in their languages have had little
impact.
lindicate continued
strong opposition in minority areas to the government,
with most people not even aware of the government's
gestures. Those who seek greater freedom from domi-
nation by the Pushtuns-who constitute about half
the population-regard the Babrak regime, like all of
its predecessors, as a Pushtun government.
no lessening
of hostility toward the government since the elevation
of the ethnic Hazara Soltan Ali Keshtmand to the
prime-ministership, the highest rank for a non-
Promises and Policies
In our view, Babrak's policies have generally failed
because they have the conflicting goals of winning
popular support and turning Afghanistan into a so-
cialist state on the Soviet model. The land reform
program illustrates most of the problems government
efforts have encountered. The Taraki government
intended the program to win peasant support and
destroy the power of the "feudal" landowning elite
through redistribution of land, to increase production,
and to lay the basis for organizing Afghan agriculture
on the Soviet model.
Like many other government programs, it reflected
doctrinaire Marxist misconceptions about Afghan so-
ciety. Most peasants had little reason to support the
program. Fragmentation of holdings was a more
serious problem than large estates. Land reform
threatened mutually beneficial relationships between
the large landlords and the tenants or small landhold-
ers.
many peasants regarded land redistribution as steal-
ing and hence anti-Islamic. In any case, the govern-
ment lacked the power to enforce the program or to
Pushtun in more than 50 years.
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protect those to whom it gave land. Realizing the
program was only fueling resistance, the Taraki gov-
ernment eventually announced it had been completed
ahead of schedule and quietly abandoned it
Notwithstanding earlier failures, the Marxists still
seem to regard the program as both a means of
restructuring Afghan society and-despite wide-
spread opposition-winning rural support. Babrak
announced that land reform would be one of his
immediate goals. His government did little about the
program until the summer of 1981, when it an-
nounced a revised program that virtually abandoned
the original Marxist goals in favor of winning popular
support. Almost anyone who agreed to support the
government would have his holdings restored, and the
government would even help military officers increase
their holdings. Still, the government kept grievances
alive by discussing such unpopular institutions as
"cooperative" farms, and in January it issued a
probably fictitious survey of land reform that both
promised that reform would follow Afghan traditions
and proposed measures that violated those traditions.
Other programs have had similar problems
give women greater freedom-by such measures as
abolishing dowries and forbidding forced marriages-
have pleased a few Westernized Afghans but alienat-
ed most of the population-including most women-
who view such programs as attacks on the family and
religion. programs to establish
rural schools and teach adults to read are regarded as
efforts to interfere in local affairs and corrupt the
youth-especially girls. The destruction of thousands
of schools by ordinary villagers as well as by hardcore
insurgents demonstrates both the adverse popular
reaction and the government's inability to carry out
the program
Marxist Prosperity
The Marxists have tried to justify the changes they
seek in Afghanistan by pointing to potential material
benefits. Four years of civil war, however, have
brought shortages, inflation, unemployment, and vir-
tually no sign of improvement
In agriculture the government has announced an
increase in the area under cultivation, but even if the
claim is true, this most important sector of the
economy faces serious problems. The flight of 2 25X1
million or more refugees has in some parts of the
country drastically reduced the manpower available
for labor-intensive phases of agricultural activity such
as the harvest. The livestock population has been
reduced by the exodus of herds belonging to refugees,
by increased slaughtering, and by diseases resulting
from inadequate nutrition.
Agricultural problems have hurt the government more
than they have the insurgents
firmed reports of shortages in a few
isolated areas, but they also report that the standard
of living in most of the country-although low-is no
worse than before fighting began.
the fighting has not interrupted the crop
cycle. The disruption of the transportation system, the
government's inability to collect grain and other
agricultural products in insurgent-controlled areas,
and the reluctance of some farmers to sell to the
government, however, have created serious shortages
in government-controlled areas. During 1981 Kabul
announced agreements to import 215,000 tons of
wheat from the USSR.
The small industrial sector suffers from shortages of
fuel, raw materials, spare parts, and labor. In 1981
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shortfalls in the processing of such major products as I
sugar beets and vegetable oil more than offset an-
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industrial aid projects are five to 10 years behind
schedule because of suspended economic aid from the
West and the lack of security at many sites. The few
Soviet-sponsored projects under wa are intended to
ease military supply problems
According to Afghan Government statistics, govern-
ment revenue collections are at a record low. Import
duties-formerly the most important source of reve-
nue-have plummeted, revenues from tourism have
almost stopped, and in most of the country the
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government cannot collect taxes. Official statistics
also indicate that the 1981 budget was financed
primarily by Soviet grants and loans and by drawing
down $11 million monthly in foreign exchange re-
serves-compared to an average rate of $6 million a
month in 1980. Additional Soviet subsidies in early
1982 and the purchase of goods from the USSR
rather than non-Communist countries have kept for-
eign exchange reserves stable this year.
Mechanisms for Control
The Communists have been unsuccessful in maintain-
ing institutions to control the population.
the Babrak government has been unable to
establish effective local government in most of the
country. Officials appointed by Kabul are frequently
isolated in district or provincial capitals without the
means and often the will to extend their authority into
the countryside. In many places local governments are
controlled by village elders acting independently or by
local insurgent leaders. In some places rudimentary
governments responsible for larger areas-in central
Afghanistan the greater part of three provinces-
reportedly are developing in opposition to central
authority.
Kabul's efforts to buy off or win over local leaders
have usually failed. One tactic has been to promise
almost complete autonomy to a village or tribe if it
stops fighting. Such agreements, however, in effect
turn over an area to the insurgents and end-usually
quickly-when the government tries to exercise its
authority. Although promises of arms, money, or
support against traditional enemies have won the
support of a few tribes, tribal contingents have proved
highly unreliable in combat.
some tribal ea ers ake the bribes and contin-
ue fighting against the government.
Kabul lacks the military power to impose in most of
the country the new system of local government that
it announced in September 1981. Despite some ges-
tures toward Afghan tradition, the system is modeled
on the soviets in the USSR. The announcement of a
program that cannot be implemented but that so
clearly reveals the intention to turn Afghanistan into
a Soviet-style state suggests a judgment by Afghan
leaders that efforts to establish local government will
be futile until the insurgents are defeated. The Com-
munists, anticipating that the reaction would be
strong only if they tried to implement the system, may
have decided there was no need to propose less than
the program they wanted
The Communist Party
The Kabul government's main political instrument-
the People's Democratic Party-has failed to control
even Afghanistan's Communists, let alone the popu-
lace. he party has only
about 18,000 members-not the 75,000 to 100,000 it
claims, and even Soviet propagandists have at times
contradicted Kabul's claims. Prospects for the party
gaining new supporters are dim. In rural areas those
proselytizing for the party can travel safely only with
a strong military escort. A few join in hope of
obtaining personal benefits, such as promotion in the
bureaucracy or the military, but the party has nothing
to offer most Afghans. Most potential party members
believe they have little chance to advance in the party,
and the disadvantages of membership outweigh the
benefits for many. Party members are prime targets
for assassination by urban insurgents-27 reportedly
were killed in Kabul in one three-week period late last
year. Adding to the unpopularity of party membership
are efforts by party leaders to force members into the
Army.
is rampant disunity and disloyalty within the Afghan
Government. Fighting between the rival Khalq and
Parcham factions may account for as many deaths of
party members as insurgent activity. Even some mem-
bers of Babrak's Parcham faction object strongly to
his reliance on Soviet support. Although there is no
firm evidence of tensions between Babrak and Prime
Minister Keshtmand, the latter could eventually be-
come a focus of opposition to Babrak
There is little chance the party will resolve its major
problems. The Soviets-fearful of reducing what little
support they have in Afghanistan-have been unwill-
ing to allow either faction to purge the other. More-
over, Soviet efforts to resolve party differences have
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been fruitless. A year ago Moscow apparently tried to
work out a compromise, one element of which would
be the appointment of a prime minister acceptable to
both sides.
Moscow was soon faced with Khalqi demands or
virtual control of the government and Parchamist
refusals to yield power. After more than a month of
negotiations, Moscow abandoned its effort, sided with
Parcham, and allowed Soltan Ali Keshtmand-one of
the most anti-Khalqi of Babrak's supporters-to be-
come prime minister.
In late 1981 the Soviets began organizing a party
conference that they apparently hoped would encour-
age unity among the Afghan Communists, resolve
factional differences, increase support in the party for
government policies, and enhance the party's author-
ity and legitimacy in Afghanistan. In generally honest
elections for delegates, the Khalqis made a strong
showing, but Parchamist officials ignored some of the
results and chose their own delegates. The two-day
session, which opened in Kabul on 14 March, was
completely controlled by the Parchamists, who al-
lowed no serious attempt to deal with the party's
many problems. The Soviets presumably decided that
factional differences were still so great that it was
safer to concede to the Parchamists' control of the
gathering than to allow a bitter fight over party
organization and policies. The heavyhanded methods
used to guarantee Parchamist control nevertheless
added to Khalqi resentments against both Babrak's
followers and the Soviets
Party fronts to attract specific social groups have been
less successful in Afghanistan than elsewhere, partly
because Afghan society is loosely organized and tradi-
tional. In other countries, for example, Communist-
controlled labor fronts have co-opted the membership
of non-Communist unions; in Afghanistan almost no
labor unions existed when the Communists seized
power, and the government created most of those
organizations that now comprise the Central Council
of Trade Unions.
Afghan fronts are used primarily to generate propa-
ganda directed at foreign countries rather than to win
support or exert control in Afghanistan. For example,
the primary function of the Democratic Organization
for Afghan Women is to remind world opinion of the
contrast between the government's progressive poli-
cies toward women and the much more traditional
views of most insurgent leaders. Most of the fronts
seem to do little more than issue occasional state-
ments in support of Kabul's policies; they apparently
do not even seek new members, at least outside Kabul.
The only group not concentrating on propaganda, the 25X1
Democratic Organization for Afghan Youth-pat-
terned after the Soviet Komsomol-has gradually
become an adjunct to the military rather than a
mechanism for organizing Afghan youth. The Afghan
press reports that the group has sent a few military
units to fight in the countryside and also provides
recruits for the Defense of the Revolution Organiza-
tion, a local defense force. Finally, the group tries to
reinforce discipline and propagate Communist ideolo-
gy in the military establishment.
The way in which the government established the
Vast National Fatherland Front was a further indica-
tion that Kabul finds these organizations useful pri-
marily for generating propaganda. Provincial repre-
sentatives, "prominent" individuals, and 12 front
organizations formed the Fatherland Front at a pre-
liminary meeting in December 1980 and a founding
meeting in June 1981. The organizers of both meet-
ings clearly devoted efforts to staging a well-publi-
cized gathering, but they evidently paid little atten-
tion to the Front's ability to organize the Afghan
people. in selecting
provincial delegates the only consi eration seems to
have been to ensure that the government could claim
every province was represented, if only by civil serv-
ants from Kabul posing as provincial delegates. The
government failed to bribe or coerce prominent non-
Communists into attending in order to give the ses-
sions more credibility.
The Military Solution
With little prospect that its political and social pro-
grams will give it effective control of Afghanistan,
Kabul appears to be counting increasingly on a
military solution. Several public statements by
Babrak in recent months appear to make combating
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the insurgency-rather than pursuing reform-the
highest priority for the party. The Afghan press still
gives a distorted version of events, but over the past
year it has stopped pretending that the insurgency is a
minor problem and now reports extensive fighting. It
recently noted, for example, that forces subordinate to
the Interior Ministry had been in 5,200 clashes with
insurgents in 1981
When military and other programs conflict, priority is
almost always given to the military. Communist
leaders have been willing to risk damage to both the
party and the youth organization by forcing members
into the Army. The government almost certainly was
aware that its attempt to call up several hundred
thousand reservists in September 1981 would be
unpopular. The speed with which it began exempting
men, however, suggests it did not anticipate the
severity of the economic disruption caused by the
flight of reservists. Forced conscription also fuels
public resentment. Economic programs that might
win popular support have been largely abandoned-
the emphasis is on those directly related to the war
effort
The government's armed forces, however, almost al-
ways cannot or will not cope with the insurgents. The
few major offensive operations the Afghan Army has
staged without significant Soviet participation have
been failures.
lin the spring of 1981 an Afghan
offensive designed to block a major insurgent supply
route in northern Paktia Province collapsed quickly,
in part because of desertions that included the defec-
tion of almost all of one regiment. In the summer of
1981 Soviet advisers ordered Afghan units and a
group of untrained cadets to clear insurgents from the
Paghman area near Kabul.
Over 5,000 Afghan troops partici-
pated in the ill-fated operation in which 267 were
killed, 400 deserted or were missing, and 180 vehicles
were lost. Afghan forces have fared just as poorly
when they had significant support from Soviet troops.
in
north of Kabul-an effort that accomplished even less
than previous attempts to wrest control of the valley
from the resistance.
Probably because of the repeated defeats, exclusively
Afghan offensive operations have become rare. Units
in northeastern Afghanistan reportedly almost ceased
offensive operations between July and October 1981.
special units, such as commandos, carry
out sal-scale raids, but in large-scale operations
Afghan units are generally used only in support of
Soviet troops., and even then results are usually disap-
pointing. One of the few important Afghan clearing
operations this year was in Samangan Province in
March.
the Army, although accompanied by a Soviet unit,
suffered heavy losses and lost control of three districts
in a week of fighting
Afghan troops seem unable to respond effectively to
insurgent ambushes of road convoys. Their tendency
to slow down or sto=p when under fire-without re-
turning fire effectively-leads to high casualties, and
a lack of coordination among convoys, main garrisons,
and the Air Force makes matters worse. Afghan units
are also unable or unwilling to counter insurgent
attacks in the main urban areas. Only major Soviet
efforts have been able to bring the second- and third-
largest cities--Herat and Qandahar-under tenuous
government control
Afghan soldiers and police in isolated towns and
military posts maintain what government presence
exists in much of the countryside. In many areas,
however, these units survive because commanders
have established tacit arrangements with local insur-
gent groups. In exchange for noninterference, the
insurgents bypass the cooperative garrison and attack
other Afghan posts., convoys, and Soviet units.
some Afghan commanders have bought immuni-
ty from attacks by supplying arms and ammunition to
the insurgents.
August and September 1981 the Afghans suffered
heavy losses in men and equipment in the fourth joint
effort to clear insurgents from the Panjsher valley
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Afghanistan: Military Operations
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The Army's most serious problem is its inability to
find men willing to fight for the Babrak government.
Monetary incentives for enlistment and reenlistment
have failed to attract volunteers. Lowering the official
draft age to 20 as well as ending many deferments has
not strengthened the Army, and a further lowering of
the draft age to 19 in April 1982 is to be an
more effective. In the fall of 1981,unlikel
only about 18,000 men
out of a pool of 300,000 either responded or were
caught by press-gangs when the government tried to
recall all veterans under the age of 35. Kabul is now
forced to rely on press-gangs as its primary means of
conscription. To fill their quotas, recruiters have
taken boys as young as 12 years old, causing Afghan
Army officers to complain of the "low-quality chil-
dren" that the draft has brought in
The motivation and training of recruits is extremely
poor.
Conscripts are taken from the
areas where they are captured directly to units far
from their homes. Most men receive only 10 to 20
days and some as few as four days of training. Small
arms training includes firing less than 20 rounds.
Units sometimes wait three months before giving
arms to recruits because of fear that deserters will
take their weapons when they defect
Desertions and casualties have taken a heavy toll of
army manpower. The Afghan Government believes
that there were at least 27,000 desertions in 1981.
Few conscripts feel any allegiance to the Babrak
regime, and many clearly are hostile to it and its
Soviet allies. Poor living conditions and low morale-
in part because of many defeats-also contribute to
the hemorrhaging of the Army. The government has
also lost the services of many veterans-18,000 were
discharged in December 1981. Kabul decided against
another involuntary extension of their enlistments
because of the high probability that these men would
mutiny. the Afghan
Government estimates that the Afghan Army has also
lost over 12,000 killed and 14,000 wounded.
Adding to the Army's problems are the deep factional
rivalry in the ruling party, corruption, and active
support for the insurgents from within the military.
Khalqi officers
in armored units in Kabul tried to overthrow Babrak
on at least two occasions in 1980, but they were
stopped by Soviet troops. There have also been many
instances of open fighting between Khalqis and Par-
chamists.
some Khalqis in the mili-
tary covertly supply arms and information to the
insurgents and encourage government troops to de-
sert. Khalqis are an overwhelming majority of the
party members in the military, but despite their
disloyalty, the government cannot purge them without
decimating an already weak officer corps.
Many Afghan Army officers and veterans are as
untrustworthy or disloyal as most recruits.
some Afghan
commanders embezzle funds allocated for troop sala-
ries and supplies, a process aided by inflating unit
strength reports. conscripts are
often allowed to escape by sympathetic or venal
soldiers. The Soviets do not tell Afghan commanders
of operations, deployments, or objectives until just
before the action begins in order to limit the intelli-
gence passed to the insurgents.
some Afghan troops also engage in sabo-
tage-the most spectacular instance was the destruc-
tion of the ammunition storage area at Bagram
Airbase in June 1981.
Relations between Afghan and Soviet officers are
Paghman operation in 1981.
Afghan military officers have
complained that Soviet troops in many areas will not
take the offensive. They blame the Soviets for numer-
ous atrocities against civilians, and Afghan troops
reportedly have refused to follow Soviet orders for
"scorched earth" tactics. Heated disputes between
Soviets and Afghans have followed joint operations.
The Afghans., for example, blamed the Soviets for the
high casualties-especially among the cadets-in the
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The Soviets indirectly control the Afghan Army but
have little contact with most of its soldiers. Roughly
3,500 Soviet advisers are attached to Afghan units
down to the battalion and perhaps company level and
must approve all orders. Soviets routinely approve and
oversee all combat operations. Soviet orders, however,
are implemented through Afghan officers and non-
commissioned officers. These men are still largely
responsible for the handling of Afghan troops-espe-
cially at the lower echelons where direct supervision
by Soviets is rare.
Af-
ghans frequently ignore, circumvent, or misinterpret
Soviet orders, contributing to the failure of both
combat operations and efforts to rebuild the Afghan
military. This presumably is the result of incompe-
tence, inexperience, poor relations with the Soviets,
sympathy for the insurgents, and the desire to avoid
combat. Purges and massive desertions have resulted
in an officer corps composed of professional soldiers
who generally seek to avoid trouble with either the
insurgents or the Communists and of party loyalists
promoted regardless of experience or competence.
Kabul's efforts to improve its armed forces have
accomplished little. Recruiting programs clearly have
failed. The Defense of the Revolution units formed for
local defense and border battalions intended to pre-
vent insurgent infiltration from Pakistan and Iran are
even less effective than the regular Army. The divi-
sion of the country into zones, each headed by a senior
party member, which is intended to increase coordina-
tion among the various security organizations and
give Kabul more control over military operations, did
There also is little the Soviets can do soon to improve
the Afghan military. More aircraft-especially heli-
copters-could improve air support for ground opera-
tions and boost the Air Force's currently weak capa-
bility to supply isolated units and evacuate wounded.
Training of officers and specialists-about 2,000,
including Defense Minister Rafi, are now in the
USSR-will raise the professional competence of the
military and might create a cadre around which a new
Afghan Army eventually could be built, should there
be a rebirth of the Army's loyalty, morale, and
motivation. As long as most enlisted men and many
officers have little desire to fight for the Babrak
government, potential improvements in mobility and
firepower will have only a marginal impact
Outlook
Both the Soviets and the Afghan Communists will
continue to try to win popular toleration, if not
support, for the Babrak government and strengthen
party and government mechanisms for control of the
Afghan people. The reluctance of prominent non-
Communists to be associated with the Soviets, the
popular perception that those who do cooperate have
sold out to the enemy, and the inability of the
government to pursue policies-such as reducing the
Soviet presence-that would establish its credibility
as more than a Soviet puppet almost preclude the
formation of a government more acceptable to the
Afghan people. The Soviets are trying to build a loyal
cadre of Afghans who may someday be able to
administer an effective Communist government, but it
will be years before such a program will have much
impact.
Government economic, political, and social programs
might not make the government more popular, but
they would increase the costs of opposition and make
cooperation with Kabul more attractive. For example,
development programs, technical and financial assist-
ance for farmers, and positive government influence
on marketing and tax policies all could be used to
encourage cooperation rather than resistance among
the rural population. Greater political control would
inhibit cooperation with the insurgents and give the
not slow insurgent gains in 1981 ~
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government greater opportunities to win over or re-
place local elites by making it clear that cooperation
with Kabul rather than resistance is the route to
prestige and power. Social programs would begin the
long process of changing the outlook of the Afghan
people to one more compatible with a Communist
state.
The programs, however, cannot be implemented so
long as the government presence in much of rural
Afghanistan is limited to a few isolated police and
army posts. The government can neither protect nor
reward those who might be inclined to cooperate with
As long as the government appears to be a foreign
puppet pursuing policies that do not benefit the
Afghan people, few will be willing to fight for it. The
Army will have to rely on forced recruiting, desertion
rates will remain high, and government units will be
undependable in combat.
With Afghan Government forces unable to hold their
own against the insurgents and little prospect that
social, political, and economic programs will succeed,
the burden of maintaining and extending government
authority falls on Soviet troops. The Soviet military
does not appear to be following a strategy designed to
bring a quick victory. There are enough Soviet troops
to maintain control over the most important areas-
such as the capital and major military installations-
but Soviet forays into the countryside have brought no
lasting control because the Soviets cannot spare men
to establish permanent garrisons in the areas they
clear. The clearing operations, however, raise the cost
of the war to both the insurgents and their civilian
supporters and. demonstrate Soviet military power.
The Soviet generals appear to be basing their strategy
on the belief that continued military pressure will
eventually make the cost of continued resistance too
great for the Afghan people to bear. In the meantime,
the Soviets will continue to experience human and
equipment casualties and a steady drain on their
resources
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