NORTH YEMEN: CHRONIC INSTABILITY AT RIYADH'S BACK DOOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200760001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate e, Secret
Intelligence
North Yemen:
Chronic Instability at
Riyadh's Back Door
Secret
NESA 82-10176
May 1982
219
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Directorate of .
Intelligence
North Yemen:
Chronic Instability at
Riyadh's Back Door
Information available as of 4 May 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This paper was prepared by0 f the
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis. It was
coordinated with the National Intelligence Council
and the Directorate of Operations. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA
Secret
NESA 82-10176
May 1982
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North Yemen:
Chronic Instability at
Riyadh's Back Door)
Key Judgments Neither President Salih nor any successor is likely to bring stability to
North Yemen in the foreseeable future. Deep-seated ideological, tribal,
and religious animosities prevent North Yemeni leaders from constructing
a broad political base. Meddling by outside powers aggravates Sanaa's
problems. At best, Salih will continue to maintain his precarious balancing
act, playing off internal rivals and external forces
The Sanaa government is now struggling against the National Democratic
Front insurgency, which is backed by radical Arabs and the Soviet Union.
Although North Yemeni forces have scored some important gains recently
against the insurgents and the NDF's political appeal appears limited
largely to the southern areas of North Yemen, a protracted struggle that
saps North Yemeni resources ultimately may increase the regime's
susceptibility to leftist influence and subversion. Moreover, an attempt by
Sanaa to decisively defeat the NDF on the battlefield would increase the
possibility that major South Yemeni forces would join the conflict. 125X1
The Aden regime, though divided over how much military support to give
to the insurgents, is united in its view of North Yemen as a security threat
and a potential prize. Moscow, meanwhile, is pursuing a dual policy of
supplying arms to Sanaa and covert aid to the insurgents with the aim of
increasing Soviet influence and leverage in North Yemen regardless of the
outcome of the conflict. Control over the government in North Yemen
would give Aden and, in turn, the Soviet Union substantial leverage over
Saudi Arabia and weaken the US position in the entire region.
Saudi Arabia, alarmed by the scale of the fighting in North Yemen over
the past year, has reluctantly decided to increase support for Salih.
Riyadh's principal goal is to strengthen the Sanaa regime as a buffer
against Marxist-oriented South Yemen. But the durability of the Saudi
commitment is questionable. The Saudis distrust Salih for his turn to the
Soviets three years ago. They may again look for an opportunity to
undercut him and strengthen his political rivals if he goes through with a
new arms agreement now being negotiated with Moscow.
Saudi appeals to the United States for help in supporting North Yemen
against the insurgents are likely to persist. If Washington is perceived as
unresponsive, Saudi confidence in US policy, already at a low ebb because
of what Riyadh regards as Washington's failure to restrain Israel and US
insensitivity to the threat from Iran, may erode further
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NESA 82-10176
May 1982
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Geopolitical View of North Yemen
Soviet influence
US military relationship
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North Yemen:
Chronic Instability at
Riyadh's Back Door
North Yemen's Strategic Value
North Yemen is subjected to pressures and blandish-
ments from the superpowers as well as from its
neighbors because it borders on Saudi Arabia, the
world's leading oil exporter, and is adjacent to the
Red Sea route between the Mediterranean Sea and
the Indian Ocean. The struggle for predominance in
Sanaa by Saudi Arabia and Soviet-supported South
Yemen contributes to North Yemen's chronic politi-
tip of southern Africa for Moscow to ship arms to its
many African, Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asian
clients from its principal ports on the Black Sea. The
Soviets also seek to establish naval access to North
Yemen to help monitor maritime traffic between the
Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. About 25
percent of the oil shipped to Western Europe and the
United States from the Persian Gulf travels by way of
the Red Sea
cal instability.
The US stake in North Yemen mainly results from
US interests in Saudi Arabia. Saudi leaders view
North Yemen both as a strategic buffer against
Marxist-oriented South Yemen and as a potential
long-term threat. Their worst fear is that the two
Yemens will unite under leftist control. The Saudis
fear that a radical, Soviet-supported regime in Sanaa
would revive irredentist claims to Saudi territory and
exploit the presence of the more than 1 million
Yemenis in Saudi Arabia to subvert the royal family.
Thus, Riyadh looks to the United States to help it
prevent a leftist takeover in Sanaa.
The Soviet Union seeks influence in North Yemen in
part to gain leverage over Saudi Arabia and to
weaken the US position in the region. Moscow hopes
to undermine Western access to Persian Gulf oil
resources and to secure its own access. Moreover,
while already having paramount influence in South
Yemen and Ethiopia, Moscow would like another
close ally to offset the expanding US military rela-
tionships in the region with Egypt, Somalia, and
Oman.
In addition, the Red Sea is important to both the
USSR and the West, which use it to make commer-
cial and military shipments to the Indian Ocean-
Persian Gulf region. The Red Sea provides a shorter
and less costly route than the alternative around the
Internal Strife
North Yemen has been wracked by civil war, military
coups, political assassinations, and a continuing insur-
gency since the republic was established in 1962. It is
not one country, but three: the Shafii (Sunni Muslim)
south and west coast, the Zaydi (Shiite Muslim)
north, and the Sanaa central region. No leader has
ever been able to control all three areas
Shafii tribes, resentful of longstanding Zaydi domina-
tion of the Sanaa government, traditionally have
looked more to Shafii South Yemen than to Sanaa for
leadership. Aden has exploited these bonds to orga-
nize and direct the insurgent National Democratic
Front. Despite Zaydi control in Sanaa, Zaydi tribes in
the north look as much to Saudi Arabia as to the
central government. Riyadh, in turn, traditionally has
used its leverage to influence the rulers in Sanaa. Two
staunchly anti-Communist tribal confederations in
the north are able to mobilize large armies to influ-
ence political events in Sanaa and periodically to
participate in fighting Front insurgents.
Salih's Success
President Salih has survived in power for the last four
years by balancing the competing tribal, religious, and
political factions and external forces. His immediate
predecessor lasted nine months and the one before
that three years
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North Yemeni President Salih
.Salih, like those he succeeded, ultimately relies on the
military-the strongest and most modern institution
in this underdeveloped country. He has placed rela-
tives in key military and security positions and devel-
oped an effective network of informants. The Presi-
dent acts-often ruthlessly-against domestic
opposition. Personal loyalty, not competence, is the
key to survival. Salih recently withdrew operational
control of the National Security Organization from its
Deputy Director because he was suspected of develop-
ing a personal following. The pro-Saudi Armed
Forces Chief of Staff was also replaced with a
strongly ro-Soviet officer with no independent power
base.
The NDF Challenge
Before 1981 Salih regarded the Saudis and their
North Yemeni allies as his primary political adversar-
ies. That changed last summer, however, when the
NDF scored several successes over North Yemeni
military forces, securing virtually complete freedom
of movement throughout the southeastern countryside
and allowing it to step up assassinations, propaganda,
and weapons distribution.
The Front, officially established in January 1979,
comprises several dissident groups united more by
expediency and opposition to Salih than by a shared
ideology. Backed principally by South Yemen, Libya,
and increasingly by Syria, the NDF's Marxist-domi-
nated leadership is dedicated to gaining control of the
government in Sanaa, eliminating Saudi and Western
influence in the Yemens, and eventually uniting
North and South Yemen. The leadership has already
established an apparent government-in-exile
The Front also is demanding important cabi-
net posts in the Sanaa government.
The intense fighting that began last June has been
interrupted only long enough for each side to resupply
and reposition units or to probe for weaknesses in its
adversary's political position. Both the NDF and
government forces can claim local victories, but the
cost in casualties has been high. Moreover, the sus-
tained fighting so near the border increases the
possibility of clashes between North Yemeni and
South Yemeni regular forces.
To offset its losses in manpower, North Yemen has
committed an increasing number of units to areas of
the heaviest fighting. It also has assumed a more
aggressive military posture and appears determined to
operate against the Front near the South Yemeni
border despite Aden's sensitivities.
advisers.
President Salih also has sought foreign aid to
strengthen his position. When he was unable to
persuade either the Soviets to intercede on his behalf
or South Yemen to reduce its support for the Front,
Salih turned to the Saudis-as he has in the past-for
more financial aid and to the Jordanians for military
effective antiguerrilla tools.
For its part the NDF, is
relying more heavily on the direct participation of
South Yemeni Army and People's Militia units. The
Front also is receiving increasingly sophisticated Sovi-
et weaponry as well as support from Syria. The Front
recently employed antiaircraft systems effectively for
the first time, causing Sanaa temporarily to suspend
Air Force combat operations, one of Sanaa's more
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Areas of National Democratic Front (NDF) Activity
Saudi.. Arabia
National Democratic Front
operations
Northern Tribal Confederation
-- Approximate Shafli-Zaydi
religious division
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Road
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Saudi Maneuvering
Riyadh, alarmed by this turn of events, has reluctant-
ly decided to increase support for Salih in the near
term
The Saudis increased their financial aid
in early 1982, probably to alleviate the rising econom-
ic burden of military operations against the Front.
Saudi Defense Minister Sultan, Foreign Minister
Saud, and Interior Minister Nayif visited Sanaa
together in early April, an unusual gesture of support
In addition to budgetary and development aid Saudi
Arabia finances US military equipment and training
assistance for North Yemen. The Saudis send muni-
tions to North Yemeni forces and open their hospitals
to North Yemeni wounded, especially during periods
of heavy fi htin .
The Saudis have also sought other foreign assistance
for North Yemen. During the latest clashes Saudi
Crown Prince Fahd and Defense Minister Sultan
appealed for increased US support. Riyadh proposed
joint Saudi-US counterinsurgency training assistance
as well as a public gesture of support. Saudi Arabia
also urged moderate Persian Gulf states to pledge
increased financial aid during Salih's tour of Arab
states in February.
Salih, we believe, has tried to exploit Saudi fears of
increasing NDF, South Yemeni, and Soviet influence
in Sanaa to get more aid while at the same time
attempting to assuage Saudi concerns about his reli-
ability as an ally. Perhaps more importantly, he has
temporarily neutralized the Saudis' key North Yeme-
ni allies and his potential rivals-the northern tribes.
Still, Riyadh distrusts Salih, in large part because of
his continued dealings with the Soviets, and as in the
past may back away from him if and when the
South Yemeni President al-Hasanii
immediate threat subsides. Similarly, Salih probably
will put more distance between himself and Riyadh if
his immediate need for Saudi military aid diminishes.
The View From South Yemen
Aden views North Yemen-which has more resources
than South Yemen and almost four times the popula-
tion-both as a potential threat and a long-term prize.
Control over North Yemen would give Aden substan-
tial leverage over Saudi Arabia and deny US access to
North Yemen. South Yemen is convinced that the US
access agreements with Oman and Somalia are de-
signed to encircle it and that the establishment of the
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is a direct securi-
ty threat. It also alleges that the United States and
Saudi Arabia are behind the recent attempt to sabo-
tage power installations in Aden.
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Secret
Libyan-backed South Yemeni hardliners and their
NDF allies, however, favor a militarily aggressive
armed insurgency. Indeed, the South Yemeni hard-
liners may press al-Hasani to send the South Yemeni
Army to intervene to protect NDF positions and to
keep North Yemen from moving more forces into the
border area, where Sanaa could mount subversive
operations as it did prior to the 1979 conflict.
The Soviet Angle
North Yemen has traditionally invited Soviet assist-
ance to balance other outside pressures. In 1928 and
1956 conservative North Yemeni leaders turned to
Moscow to counter British influence in the region.
Since 1962 North Yemen has used the USSR to
offset Saudi influence. Disillusioned with Saudi ma-
nipulation of deliveries of US military equipment,
Sanaa concluded its largest arms deal, worth more
than $750 million, with Moscow in 1979.
North Yemen obtains most of its arms-more than it
can absorb-and some development aid from the
USSR. Approximately 700 Soviet military techni-
cians train North Yemeni forces, and an additional
125 Soviets provide support on economic projects.
Some 1,200 Yemenis are undergoing training in
various military academies in the Soviet Union.
Salih visited Moscow for the first time last October,
when the Soviets reportedly agreed to reschedule
Sanaa's $600 million arms debt and to accelerate
arms deliveries under the 1979 accord. Negotiations
apparently were begun for additional types of sophis-
ticated weaponry requested by Sanaa, including sur-
face-to-surface missiles, which would increase the
number of Soviet advisers in North Yemen. Most
Soviet training and arms-including MIG-21s,
SU-20/22 fighter-bombers, T-54/55 tanks, and SA-2
and SA-7 air defense missiles-however, are unsuited
for counterinsurgency operations in North Yemen's
rugged terrain
The Soviets favor the same approach as South Yeme-
ni President al-Hasani and probably believe that, with
proper preparation, the NDF Marxists will be able to
dominate other factions within the Front after gaining
can increase their leverage over Sanaa.
power. In the interim the Soviets hope that by simul-
taneously aiding North Yemen and the Front they
Soviet and US aid programs are in direct competition
in North Yemen. The Soviet Union has provided
much greater quantities and types of arms and trained
more Yemeni military personnel than the United
States, but US-supplied F-5 aircraft are regarded by
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the North Yemeni military as its most effective 25X1
weapon against the NDF. On the economic side the
Soviets have concentrated on large projects to gain
favor in Sanaa. The United States provides slightly
more economic aid than Moscow but has not gained
as much recognition in part because of strong pro-
Soviet sentiment in the largely Soviet-trained North
Yemeni media. Overall US influence in Sanaa is also
limited because North Yemenis associate Washington
with Saudi manipulation of military and financial
assistance to North Yemen and perceive a pro-Israeli
tilt in US foreign policy.
Outlook M
President Salih's need to balance competing internal 25X1
and external forces to survive will prevent him from
broadening his political base. Saudi Arabia, South
Yemen, and North Yemen are locked into a pattern of
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lingering suspicion and antagonism. The Salih regime
has survived only by playing one side against the
other. North Yemen probably will be able to fend off
the military threat from the NDF with infusions of
foreign military aid, especially ammunition, spare
parts, and specialized counterinsurgency training.
North Yemeni forces recently have made some impor-
tant gains against the insurgents. But a protracted
struggle, sapping North Yemeni resources, ultimately
may increase the regime's susceptibility to leftist
influence and subversion.
The Front appears to have serious weaknesses of its
own that reduce the likelihood that it will soon gain
control of the Sanaa government. The Shafii sectarian
base of the Front leadership probably limits its ap-
peal, and at the same time Shafii tribal leaders appear
increasingly fearful of Front intentions. Shafiis in
some areas have facilitated NDF incursions; others
have openly opposed the Front. The Front's internal
divisions open it to exploitation by Salih.
Implications for the United States
The continuing struggle in North Yemen must be
seen against the backdrop of events elsewhere in the
region. The Saudis' confidence in American policy is
at a low ebb as a result of what they regard as a US
failure to restrain Israel. They see this turn of events
as strengthening Arab hardliners and making it more
costly for Arab moderates to maintain close relations
with the United States.
The US purchase of Iranian oil has raised new doubts
about the dependability of US support against Iran
and its radical Arab allies, Syria, Libya, and South
Yemen. Uncertainty about American policy toward
the Persian Gulf had begun to appear earlier because
of Israeli support for Iran and US unwillingness to
supply arms to help Iraq stave off defeat.
Sanaa.
If the United States responds weakly to Saudi appeals
for help in strengthening North Yemen, Riyadh's
doubts about US reliability might harden into convic-
tion. In a worst case, Saudi leaders might consider
adopting a more genuinely nonaligned policy to pro-
tect themselves, even if this meant improving relations
with Moscow in exchange for Soviet restraint of not
only South Yemen and the NDF but also Syria and
Libya. Riyadh probably then would revert to its
previous emphasis on using tribal allies in North
Yemen to promote a friendly but weak government in
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