OMAN: A HANDBOOK

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National S
F
i
ore
gn
Assessment
Center
Oman: A Handbook
Secret
NESA 81-10062
December,1981
COPY 2 4 2
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Oman: A Handbook
Information available as of 19 November 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
This paper was prepared by Office of
Near East-South Asia Analysis. Comments and
This paper was coordinated with the Offices of Global
Issues and Central Reference, the Directorate of
Operations, and the National Intelligence Officer for
the Near East and South Asia.
Secret
NESA 81-10062
December 1981
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Secret
Oman: A Handbook
Introduction Oman seems an unlikely place to become the focal point of an emerging su-
perpower competition in the northwest Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.
A decade ago this small, mostly barren piece of real estate with a
population of 600,000 and an army of mostly foreign mercenaries had only
three schools, no college graduates, a largely subsistence economy, and an
aged ruler who saw his main duty as keeping Oman in the 15th century.
Vestiges of this recent past linger, but the old Sultan has been replaced by
his son, a graduate of Sandhurst, who instituted reforms and belongs to a
small group of world leaders who have defeated-with foreign help-a
Communist-backed insurgency. The regime of Sultan Qaboos still rests
heavily on foreign, particularly British, advice and assistance and on new
ties with the United States. Military accords were signed in 1980 that give
the United States access to Omani air and naval bases.
Oman's value to the West derives from its strategic location. It lies on the
Strait of Hormuz, through which is shipped about 40 percent of the free
world's oil production, and borders Saudi Arabia, OPEC's largest oil
producer. It also flanks South Yemen, a Soviet-backed radical state that
affords Moscow a toehold on the Arabian Peninsula, a position from which
to threaten Saudi Arabia and North Yemen, an anchorage for Soviet
warships patrolling the northwest Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, and a
position adjacent to the Horn of Africa and the entrance to the Red Sea.
Oman's relative political stability over the past several years is linked to the
revenues acquired from its oil production of about 330,000 barrels per day.
This has allowed Qaboos to institute reform and welfare programs while at
the same time building his internal security and military forces. Oil
revenues should continue to finance development programs well into the
1990s. Dependence on oil-60 percent of GDP-will persist despite efforts
to expand private involvement in mining, agriculture, and industry. A
substantial or prolonged drop in oil revenues, however, would touch off
intense competition for scarce resources and stimulate criticism of the
corruption of the circle surrounding Qaboos, high expenditures on defense,
and the role of foreigners in running Oman.
iii Secret
NESA 81-10062
December 1981
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Little organized opposition to the Sultan is evident in Oman. Remnants of
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman still operate in the
mountains of Dhofar, but Qaboos appears generally popular, and the
populace seems to tolerate his autocratic, reclusive style of rule because it
is consistent with the historic pattern. Qaboos, however, may prove to be
the last ruler of the Al Bu Said family which has ruled Oman since 1749.
He has no heir, When
Qaboos passes from the scene, Oman's military almost certainly will play a
more influential role.
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Political Situation and Trends 9 25X1
Armed Forces
Chronology 27
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Geography
Location and Boundaries
The Sultanate of Oman occupies the southeastern
corner of the Arabian Peninsula. It is bordered on the
northeast by the Gulf of Oman and on the east and
south by the Arabian Sea. Oman has a 1,700-kilome-
ter coastline. To the southwest it borders on South
Yemen and to the west on Saudi Arabia; the Saudi-
Oman border is undefined. The United Arab Emir-
ates borders Oman on the northwest, and UAE
territory separates Oman from its northernmost ex-
tension, the tip of the Musandam Peninsula. The
peninsula juts into the Strait of Hormuz, whose main
shipping lanes are in Omani territorial waters. Ma-
sirah Island off the central coast and the Kuria Muria
Islands, the latter claimed by South Yemen, also
belong to Oman.
Area
Because of largely undefined borders, estimates of
Oman's area vary widely. The Omanis claim an area
of 300,000 square kilometers, about the size of Kan-
sas, making Oman the third largest country on the
Arabian Peninsula
Its maximum east-west extension is about 600 kilome-
ters and its north-south axis including the Ru'us al-
Jibal portion of Musandam runs about 800 kilome-
ters.
Topography
Oman is a land of barren, mainly limestone moun-
tains, sand and gravel desert plains in the interior, and
comparatively fertile coastal plains. The al-Hajar
mountain range extends from the northern tip of
Oman to the most eastern point, Ra's al-Hadd. The
Qara mountains in the south extend about 300 kilo-
meters into Oman from South Yemen. Elevations
range mostly between 500 and 2,000 meters. Most
streambeds radiate from the mountains toward the
sea and the interior, but they are dry gullies except
during brief and sudden storms.
The climate is characterized by extreme heat (average
daily temperature in Muscat in the summer is in the
mid-90s F) and by high relative humidity of 80 to 90
percent. Rainfall (about 100 millimeters) is infrequent
except on the eastern slopes of the Dhofar mountains,
which are cloaked in monsoonal mists from June to
September.
Natural Resources
Oman has oil reserves but is poor in other fuel and
mineral deposits and in agricultural resources. Proven
resources total more than 2.5 billion barrels of oil and
more than 5 trillion cubic feet of gas. Other exploit-
able subsoil deposits include copper, chrome, lime-
stone, and marble.
Intense summer heat and insufficient water restrict
farming; less than 1 percent of the total land is
cultivated. Nevertheless, two-thirds of the native pop-
ulation derives its livelihood from agriculture, which
is heavily dependent on an ancient system of under-
ground canals that collect rainwater from the moun-
25X1
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tains. Major crops are dates, alfalfa, limes, and 25X1
onions. Omanis must import most of their food.
Oman's coastal waters are rich in fish-a largely 25X1
untapped resource. Cattle, sheep, and goats are
raised. 25X1 25X1
Human Resources
Population. With a population of 900,000, Oman
ranks sixth after Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, South
Yemen, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates
among the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. Nearly
all natives are Muslims, either from the dominant (75
percent) Ibadhi sect, or the Sunni sect. An estimated
13,000 Omanis are Shias. Ethnically 88 percent of
Omanis are Arab. Foreigners largely from Pakistan,
India, and the United Kingdom comprise about 20
percent of the population and over 80 percent of the
nonagricultural work force.
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Most Omani tribesmen are descendants of one of two
waves of Arab immigrants that arrived nearly 2,000
years ago. The Qahtani were southern Arabs originat-
ing in the Yemens; the Adnani came from the Najd
region of what is now Saudi Arabia. In the early 18th
century a minor tribal feud eventually split most of
Oman's more than 200 tribes and subtribes into two
camps: the Ghafiri confederation composed largely of
Sunni Muslim northerners and the Hinawi confeder-
ation consisting mainly of Ibadhi southerners. These
alignments are still generally valid but their impor-
tance has greatly diminished. As recently as the 1950s
Ibadhi tribes, headed by an elected Imam, challenged
the authority of the Sultans in the mountains.F_~
? The Shihu tribesmen of the Musandam Peninsula
are primitive and xenophobic. For centuries they
subsisted on dates, fishing, and few crops. They
probably have the lowest standard of living in
Oman, but the government has launched extensive
development programs in the past two years to
improve their lot.
? The Dhofar tribes are separated from northern
Oman by a gravel desert. Not surprisingly, the
Dhofaris have closer historical ties to South Yemeni
tribes than northern Omanis. The mountain dwell-
ers speak a distinct language called "Jebeli" that
reportedly is dying out. The coastal tribesmen fish
and raise crops; those in the mountains tend herds of
sheep, goats, and camels.
? The "Zanzibaris," Omanis from Zanzibar, fled to
Oman during the bloodbath in Zanzibar in the
1960s. They have not been well integrated into
Omani society because of cultural differences, their
inability to speak Arabic well, and their superior
education. Many Omanis resent the Zanzibaris, a
feeling reciprocated by the Zanzibaris.
Distribution. The overall population density is three
persons per square kilometer. Most Omanis live on the
coastal plains or in the mountains. Dhofar, the south-
ern province, has a population of about 60,000, and
the Musandam Peninsula about 5,000. Few Omanis
are nomadic. The largest city is Muscat, which to-
gether with the port city of Matrah and environs has a
population of perhaps 50,000. Salalah, the capital city
of Dhofar Province, is the second largest urban center
with a population of 3,000.
Demographic Trends. The annual population growth
is estimated at 3 percent. Population distribution has
shifted in the past decade as interior tribesmen mi-
grate from rural to urban areas attracted by employ-
ment opportunities in Muscat and in the other, Gulf
oil-producing states.
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Tribes
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--- Administrative line
DURU' Tribe
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
0 50 100 Kilometers
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Economic Background
Government Economic Policy
The goals of Oman's second five-year plan (1981-85)
are to expand the private sector, reduce dependence
on oil, achieve a better regional balance in develop-
ment, and further improve the physical infrastructure.
Just over $21 billion is earmarked for this plan,
compared with $9.7 billion in the previous planF_
The government will invest $6.2 billion directly and
hopes the private sector will generate another $3.4
billion. Nearly half of private investment is likely to
come from the foreign-owned oil companies operating
in Oman and will be used to maintain existing
facilities and develop new sources of oil. The govern-
ment offers interest-free loans to encourage private
involvement in mining, agriculture, fisheries, and
handicraft industries. It also plans to fund the most
costly projects itself and to sell them to the private
sector once these enterprises become viable
The government has earmarked large sums for educa-
tion with the aim of reducing Oman's dependence on
foreign labor in the modern sectors of the economy.
The number of schools in Oman has risen from three
in 1970 to 363 in 1980. The student population has
grown from less than 1,000 to nearly 100,000.
Growth Rate and Trends
As in many other Middle East oil producers, govern-
ment spending drives the economy. During 1976-80
the gross domestic product more than doubled from
$2.4 billion to $5.2 billion. Overall real growth has
averaged more than 6 percent annually over the past
five years. Real growth reached 10 percent in the
nonoil sector in 1980.
Before the development of its oil resources, Oman's
economy was based on agriculture and to a lesser
extent on fishing. Oman began exporting oil only in
1967, and economic development began in earnest
after Sultan Qaboos assumed power in 1970.
Despite growing revenues, the government ran budget
and current account deficits from 1972 through 1978,
except for 1977, because of Oman's limited financial
resources, poor fiscal management, and the cost of
suppressing a tribal rebellion in Dhofar Province.
Since then, the government has been in the black as a
result of better control over public spending, reforms
in fiscal and management procedures, and large world
oil price increases following the Iranian revolution. By
the end of 1980 official foreign assets totaled $1.7
billion-almost one year's worth of imports. 125X1
Income Distribution
Per capita income reached $5,780 in 1980, a dramatic
increase over the $375 in 1970. Nearly two-thirds of
Omanis, however, continue to earn their living from
subsistence agriculture and fishing. Incomes among
Omanis in urban and coastal areas are considerably
higher than in the interior because government pro-
grams have been concentrated in these areas. More-
over, foreigners-predominantly from the Indian sub-
continent-make up 80 percent of private-sector wage
earners and 40 percent of the civil service.
Main Sectors of the Economy
Petroleum. Oil contributes over 90 percent of govern-
ment revenues and export earnings and over 60
percent of GDP. Crude oil production is handled
mainly by Petroleum Development Oman (PDO), in
which the government has a 60 percent interest, and
Royal Dutch Shell, Compagnie Francaise des Petroles
(CPF), and Participation and Exploration Corporation
(PARTEX) hold shares of 34 percent, 4 percent, and 2
percent, respectively. Since 1974 the foreign partners
of PDO have paid royalties and taxes on their 40-
percent share of the production; they also buy back or
sell directly to third parties the government's share.
All crude production is exported. A refinery to meet
Oman's domestic requirements is expected to be
completed by May 1982.
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Oil production peaked in the northern fields in 1976
at 365,000 barrels per day and declined to 282,000
barrels per day in 1980. Production from new fields in
the south and west, however, is expected to reach
70,000 barrels per day in 1981. The government has
set a ceiling of 330,000 barrels per day from all fields
for 1981-85, somewhat below estimated capacity.
Known oil reserves exceed 2.5 billion barrels, enou h
to sustain targeted production for at least 20 years.
Gas. Proven natural gas reserves are estimated at 5
trillion cubic feet, with current production amounting
to about 290 million cubic feet per day. These gas
resources are used both as fuel for the power and
desalination plant near Muscat and for reinjection in
the oilfields to improve crude recovery. An extension
of the gas pipeline to the copper project at Sohar is
currently under way. A new natural gas liquid plant
at Fahud was completed in 1980 but is not expected to
start operation until late 1981
Agriculture. Agricultural output (including livestock
and fishing) accounts for only about 2 percent of
GDP. Development is limited by scarce water re-
sources and arable land, as well as by migration from
rural areas. Dates account for 40 percent of the
cultivated areas.
Rich fishing waters extend along Oman's coastline.
Fish output continues to be substantially below poten-
tial mainly because of inefficient techniques and
migration of fishermen to urban areas. The govern-
ment helps to purchase small boats and has estab-
lished cold storage and fish processing facilities. The
Oman National Fishing Company is jointly owned by
the government and the private sector.
Industry. Manufacturing consists principally of small-
scale enterprises producing foodstuffs, light manufac-
tures, and construction materials. This sector ac-
counts for roughly 1 percent of GDP. Heavy industry
includes the government-owned Oman Cement Com-
pany with a capacity of 600,000 tons per year, due to
begin operation in 1983. A copper mining and smelter
scheme with a capacity of 20,000 tons per year also is
scheduled to begin operation in 1982.
Foreign Assistance
Oman's improved financial and security situation has
lessened the need for external financial assistance.
Since 1975 concessional lending and grant aid have
totaled almost $870 million, mainly from Saudi Ara-
bia, the UAE, and Kuwait. Oman has repaid most of
its commercial loans ahead of schedule, and total debt
outstanding at the end of 1980 amounted to $490
million. Debt service payments in the next few years
will be small.
Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments
Crude oil is Oman's only significant export, earning
$3.6 billion in 1980; Japan purchased at least half
that amount. Singapore-a new customer-and the
Netherlands vied for second place in 1980 with
around 11 percent each; the remainder went to West-
ern Europe and North America. Oman imports main-
ly machinery and transport equipment (40 percent),
manufactured goods (16 percent), and food (13 per-
cent). Its major trading partners are Japan, the UAE,
and the UK.
Exchange and Trade System
Oman's exchange and trade systems include import
tariffs designed to protect some infant industries.
Trade and payments to Israel and South Africa are
banned, but this is not always strictly enforced.
Otherwise, trade and payments systems are free of
restrictions
The Omani rial continues to be pegged to the US
dollar at the rate of RO 1 = $2.895, which was set in
February 1973.
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Musandam
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ABU DHABI ?~~
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Petroleum
International boundary
Administrative line
Oil pipeline
PDO oilfield
Elf oilfield
50 100 Kilometers
50 100 Miles
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Political Situation and Trends
Historical Background
Modern Oman dates from 24 July 1970, when Sultan
Qaboos bin Said and several British advisers deposed
his repressive father in a nearly bloodless coup and
instituted social and economic reforms. Oman was
until then the most isolated and backward country in
the Arab world. It had a medieval economy, minimal
contact with its Arab neighbors, and virtually no
political institutions. Reforms have transformed
Oman into a relatively modern state with increasing
ties to the West and other Arab states.
Sultan Qaboos's first priority was to quell a rebellion
in the southern Dhofar Province. The rebellion began
in 1963 as a secessionist movement by several tribes
who turned for help to South Yemeni tribesmen with
whom they had strong ties. The leftist regime that
took over South Yemen after the British withdrawal
in 1967 backed the rebels' organization, later called
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman. Thus,
a localized, tribal revolt was transformed into a
foreign-dominated revolutionary movement aided by
the USSR, China, and Iraq
To counter this threat Qaboos instituted reforms and
counterterrorist programs in Dhofar with the help of
the British. The rebellion was finally quashed in
December 1975, but only with the assistance of
Iranian and Jordanian troops.
Structure of Government
Political reforms have not accompanied economic and
social change in Oman. Decisionmaking remains
highly concentrated; Qaboos is his own defense, fi-
nance, and foreign minister as well as commander in
chief of the armed forces and police. Oman has no
constitution, political parties, or elected national as-
sembly. Unlike other traditional rulers on the Arabian
Peninsula, Qaboos does not hold an open court that
permits subjects to raise grievances directly with their
ruler. Instead Qaboos relies on indirect contacts
through his officials and infrequent visits to local
leaders in the interior of Oman. He appointed a token
consultative body in October 1981, but he continues
to rely on the advice of a handful of people around
Qaboos has no heir, is unlikely to have one, and has
not named a successor. Were Qaboos to die, senior
government officials-both Omani and British-
probably would select someone from the royal family.
The family is small it plays a
relatively minor role in decisionmaking. Almost any 25X1
successor would be less qualified than Qaboos and
would soon be challenged. The military's influence in
the succession issue will probably increase over time
and make a military ruler more likely
Outside Muscat, government still reflects the tribal
nature of Omani society. The 37 provinces are admin-
istered by "walis" (governors), nearly one-third of
whom are members of the royal family. Traditional
elites-tribal shaykhs and elders, and members of the
area's prominent families-dominate the tribal and
town councils, the latter an innovation set up by 25X1
Qaboos in 1974. The councils settle intratribal dis-
putes and advise municipal officials on local matters.
On the provincial and national levels the Council of
Qadhis-religious judges of the Ibadhi sect of Is-
lam-advises the Sultan on Islamic affairs and passes
on the conformity of individual decrees with Islamic 25X1
law. 25X1
Qaboos's centralized, remote style of rule encourages
bureaucratic infighting, corruption, and inefficiency.
The Sultan has little taste for day-to-day administra-
tion and frequently leaves important decisions un-
resolved while he makes lengthy visits to his palace in
Dhofar. This neglect encourages senior officials to
treat their positions as fiefdoms to be exploited for 25X6
personal gain. Qaboos places high value on loyalty
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the ruler. If foreign influence and corruption persist
unchecked, the frustrations of young Omanis are
bound to grow, and Qaboos will be held accountable.
Qaboos appears to face no immediate threat, but over
1,500 Omani students now abroad will be returning to
assume positions in the government and military.
Their exposure to the Western political process and
Arab nationalist ideas is likely to make them less
tolerant of the regime's policies
This resentment is reinforced by the preponderance in
senior Omani military positions of seconded British
officers and contract personnel. The pace of Omaniza-
tion of the armed forces, always slow, has been
reversed in recent years, in part because the Sultan
trusts the British more than Omanis, and he is
concerned that Omani officers are not experienced
enough to counter aggression from Soviet-backed
South Yemen. Omanization has been further delayed
by the acquisition of new military equipment that is
too sophisticated for Omani nationals to operate.
Chief of Defense Staff Sir Timothy Creasey's recent
removal of several Omanis from the command struc-
ture leaves little doubt that Omanization is dead for
now. Their replacement with British officers should
improve military efficiency, but it runs the risk of
generating serious disaffection among young Omani
officers.
Qaboos has so far escaped much direct criticism. He
is widely viewed as well intentioned but ill advised and
is esteemed for overthrowing his repressive father and
instituting economic and social reforms. In a highly
autocratic state like Oman, however, responsibility for
nearly every government policy ultimately rests with
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The Sultan's armed forces are headquartered at
Mu'askar al-Murtafa' near Muscat and include the
Land Forces (SOLF), the Air Force (SOAF), and the
drawn entirely from Omani recruitment. A pay in-
crease is being considered as well as improved living
conditions to facilitate recruitment.
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Navy (SON).
British seconded and contract officers dominate
Oman's military. There are over 500 British officers
and 300 enlisted men in the Sultan's armed forces.
British officers occupy virtually all command posi-
tions. Half of the SOLF officers, two-thirds of the
SOAF officers, and all of the senior SON officers are
British
A seconded British general, Sir Timothy Creasey, is
Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
and Chief of the Defense Staff. Reversing the 1977
restructuring of the armed forces which provided for
three independent services controlled by a joint staff
in the Ministry of Defense, Creasey recently reinsti-
tuted the previous structure where he personally
commands the service chiefs and reports directly to
the Sultan. He reportedly will try to bring the Royal
Guard Brigade, the Sultan's Special Forces, the Royal
Oman Police, and the Oman Research Department
under his command in the near future. These forces
are all commanded by British officers and report
directly to the Sultan.
The Sultan has embarked upon a sizable expansion of
his armed forces, reflected in an announced defense
budget for 1981 of $1.7 billion dollars.' This rate of
expenditure is almost double that of 1980. Military
spending constitutes 40 percent of total government
expenditures in 1981, up from 31 percent in 1980.
The Sultan intends to expand his ground forces by 50
percent within the next year-the manpower to be
' The announced defense budget includes activities that are ancil-
lary to the normal definition of defense such as expenditures for the
Royal Omani Police; related internal security operations; and road
building and other development projects in Dhofar Province and the
northern interior. It does not include funding for the Intergrated
Air Defense System (IADS), payments to local Firqa troops, and
hidden funds to the Royal Guard Brigade and the Sultan's Special
The Land Forces are composed of some 11,800 men
(620 officers, 11,180 enlisted men) organized into two
infantry brigades, a small special forces unit, and one
"firqa" (irregular) brigade. The estimated 3,000
"firqa" tribesmen are primarily former members of
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO)
who were induced to change sides and whose loyalty is
still suspect. They usually operate as distinct units in 25X1
Dhofar. The Frontier Force, the Southern Oman
Regiment, and the Western Frontier Regiment are all
Baluchi recruited units and serve only in Dhofar.
Oman is currently organizing a tank regiment but to
date has little armor combat capability.
The Omani Navy strength is almost 1,000 men (90
officers, 900 enlisted). Its inventory includes two
missile patrol boats, nine other patrol boats, six
amphibious craft, and four auxiliary ships. Oman has
small naval bases at Mukalla (Muscat Bay), Raysut
(Dhofar), and Goat (or Ghanam) Island in the
Musandam.
Air Force personnel strength is about 1,700 (500
officers, 1,200 enlisted), including 40 pilots, half of
whom are jet qualified. The SOAF is organized into
eight squadrons-two fighter, one fighter/trainer, one
air support, two transport, one helicopter, and one to
support the Sultan. The Air Force has 40 jet fighter/
bomber aircraft, 30 fixed-wing transports, and 31
transport/utility helicopters. There are four major
airfields-at Seeb. Salalah, Thumrait, and Masirah.
Mission and Capabilities
Within the limits imposed by its small size and light
combat equipment, the SOLF is among the best on
the Arabian Peninsula. During the Dhofar insurgency
in the early 1970s, it proved that it could effectively
carry out one of its missions-maintaining internal
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security. The SOLF probably could defend the na-
tion's borders for a limited period against a conven-
tional attack by one of its neighbors acting alone, but
it lacks the firepower and armor necessary to sustain a
static defense
The SON is well trained and expertly led but is too
small to do more than patrol nearby waters. The SON
plays an important role in monitoring shipping to and
from the Persian Gulf including reconnoitering Soviet
naval operations near the Strait of Hormuz. Oman's
two missile boats armed with Exocet antiship missiles
are capable of inflicting heavy damage on isolated
ships. The SON could not, however, defend against a
major seaborne invasion nor protect its own shipping
against a serious naval threat.
The SOAF is better equipped for ground attack than
for air defense. Oman's Jaguar and Hawker Hunter
fighter-bombers can attack targets inside neighboring
countries and, therefore, have a deterrent value, but
these aircraft would be hard pressed to defend Omani
airspace against modern enemy interceptors. Oman
has a weak early warning system. Its Rapier surface-
to-air missiles would play a key role in its air defense,
but they are manned by inexperienced crews and
could protect only a few economic and military
targets because of their limited numbers.
Defense Agreements
Oman has close historic military ties with the United
Kingdom. An Agreement of Friendship concluded in
1878 provides the basis for subsequent formal and
informal defense agreements. In 1958 an exchange of
letters committed the British to assist the Sultan in
strengthening his armed forces. In return the UK
received permission to use two military airfields. (The
British subsequently withdrew their Air Force detach-
ments as part of domestic budget cuts.
The UK remains the primary source of training
assistance. Nearly 1,000 British commissioned and
noncommissioned officers serve in Oman in training
or operational positions. Some 1,250 Pakistanis serve
in similar positions, although generally at a lower
level. In addition there are smaller detachments of
Jordanian, Indian, and Egyptian advisers in the coun-
try
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Foreign Relations
Oman's foreign policy is shaped by its fears of foreign
military aggression and foreign-inspired subversion.
The Omanis see the USSR and its surrogate, South
Yemen, as their principal enemies and believe that
Soviet activities in South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Af-
ghanistan are part of a pincer movement designed to
gain control of Persian Gulf oil. In this view, the
Soviets are believed to regard Oman as a particularly
attractive target because of its location on the strate-
gic Strait of Hormuz through which about 40 percent
of free world oil production is shipped. Other Gulf
states share Oman's concerns, but Oman's proximity
to South Yemen and its experience in putting down
the Soviet-backed Dhofar rebellion in 1975 give the
Soviet threat more immediacy
South Yemen and the USSR
The Omanis are convinced that Marxist South Ye-
men, probably with Soviet backing, will eventually
renew its efforts to destabilize the sultanate. They are
uncertain only over the timing and strategy that the
South Yemenis will employ: overt military aggression,
a revival of the Dhofar rebellion, political subversion
of the more populous north, urban terrorism, or some
combination of these. They believe they have only a
few years to prepare for such a challenge.
The United States
The Omanis believe that only the United States can
counter Soviet designs and have consequently sought
closer military and political ties to the US since the
British withdrew from the area in 1971. Qaboos has
encouraged the US to increase its military presence to
discourage Soviet adventurism and to demonstrate
US determination to assist pro-Western states in the
region. Oman welcomed the recent buildup of US
naval forces in the Indian Ocean and has participated
in joint military exercises. Oman concluded an agree-
ment in June 1980 providing the US access to certain
Omani military facilities in exchange for improve-
ments in these facilities and limited economic assist-
ance. Sultan Qaboos has supported the Camp David
accords, in part to curry favor with the US and to
Oman, however, has sought to minimize the political
cost of its close identification with the US, whose
support for Israel is resented throughout the Arab
world. The Omanis insist that US uniformed person-
nel in Oman be kept to a minimum and distant from
populated areas. They discourage publicity of US
exercises and other US involvement with Oman. They
have toned down their support for the Camp David
accords in response to Arab nationalist pressures at
home and abroad. Even so, Arab hardliners at various
Arab forums have tried unsuccessfully to isolate
Oman. South Yemen, Libya, and some Palestinian
groups have increased diplomatic and propaganda
efforts to weaken the Sultan's regime
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has been the primary ally of the
Sultanate for over a century. Like his father and
grandfather, Qaboos used British troops to help put
down a rebellion. Oman's armed forces are largely
British equipped, and the UK was the third largest
exporter to Oman in 1980.
Under Prime Minister Thatcher's government, the
British have increased their cooperation with Oman
and agreed to extend the scheduled date for convert-
ing the military into a purely Omani force. Queen
Elizabeth and Prime Minister Thatcher have visited
Oman in recent years to demonstrate British support
and willingness to meet Oman's arms needs. The UK
probably will increase its efforts to sell arms to Oman.
Arab States
Because of Oman's geographic isolation and seafaring
tradition, it did not view itself as a part of the Arab
world. Under Qaboos, however, Oman has reduced its
isolation, moving closer to the Arabs, in part to obtain
financial, political, and military support against South
Yemen. Oman received Jordanian and UAE support
troops during the Dhofar rebellion, and Saudi Arabia
and the UAE have provided economic aid. Even so,
assist the late President Sadat.
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Strait of Hormuz
Jazireh-ye Larak
Ma'rid A,
Ra's al Khaymah, j
Bathymetry
0 20 50 100 fathoms
I0 37 91 183 meters
Geographical limit of the Strait of Hormuz
Iran-Oman continental shelf boundary
12-nautical mile limit
Directed traffic lane
Kilometers
0 20
Nautical Miles
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Secret
Oman has avoided involvement in the constant bicker-
ing within the Arab world and tried to protect what it
views as its more important relations with the West.
Expanded contacts with the rest of the Arab world
have increased Oman's sensitivity to Arab nationalist
issues. Oman's educated elite in particular is increas-
ingly exposed to the currents in Arab politics, includ-
ing criticisms of Oman's close ties to the United
States. Omani leaders, therefore, are likely to pay
increasing lipservice to Arab causes, both for internal
Saudi Arabia. Oman maintains reasonably good rela-
tions with Saudi Arabia, but it is reluctant to depend
on the Saudis for support because of their indecision,
sudden policy reversals, and failure to follow through 25X1
quickly on aid commitments. Saudi ambivalence to-
ward Oman reflects disagreements within the Saudi
ruling family and reluctance to strengthen Oman for
fear of creating more threats to Saudi security. The
Saudis also share some of Kuwait's misgivings about
Oman's growing military ties to outsiders.
consumption and to placate fellow Arabs.
The Persian Gulf States
Oman long has urged closer security cooperation
among the weak Gulf shaykhdoms. Past efforts at
regional cooperation were thwarted by Iran and Iraq,
which sought to dominate such a grouping. Iraq
frustrated Oman's efforts to create such a coalition in
1976 and denounced Oman's proposal in 1979 for
Gulf cooperation with the West to protect oil tankers
passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia
also opposed the idea for fear this would weaken its
influence with the shaykhdoms. In May 1981, how-
ever, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Bah-
rain, and Qatar took advantage of the Iran-Iraq war
and Iraq's dependence on their logistic, financial, and
political support to form the Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil.
Although the member states of the council hope to
concert their efforts "in all fields," strong differences
over foreign policy remain. The Kuwaitis are critical
of Oman's close military ties to the United States,
which they believe will provoke Soviet countermeas-
ures in the region and make Kuwait appear aligned
with the West. The Omanis believe that council
members have no choice but to cooperate with the
West to ward off Soviet threats. These differences-
and eventual Iraqi and Iranian efforts to reassert their
influence in the Gulf-could impede the efforts of
these states to increase defense and security coopera-
The United Arab Emirates. Oman and the UAE are ^
the worst of friends. Relations are colored by mutual 25X1
suspicion, unresolved border disputes, and Omani
irredentist designs on northern portions of the UAE.
The Omanis regard the federation of seven small
shaykhdoms as weak and unstable and have refused to
establish a diplomatic mission in Abu Dhabi until the
border issue is resolved. Border negotiations appear to
be making slow progress. The UAE is concerned that
Oman's closer ties with the United States will improve
in Oman's military capabilities to the point of encour-
aging Oman's expansionist ambitions. The UAE be-
lieves it is particularly vulnerable because Omani
nationals of doubtful loyalty comprise about 80 per-
cent of the UAE armed forces. The UAE has strongly
supported Kuwait's efforts to lessen US-Omani ties.
Iran. Oman and Iran have had uneasy relations since
the Shah was ousted. The Iranian Government re-
gards Qaboos as an illegitimate ruler and Oman as
hostile because of its close military cooperation with
the United States, which Iran believes included in-
volvement in the aborted hostage rescue mission in
1980. Iran's response has been tempered by a desire
not to expand the present war with Iraq, but even so
Iran has tried to incite Oman's 13,000 Shias, without
much success. For all its unhappiness with the Iranian
Government, Oman will seek relations with any gov-
ernment that controls the northern shores of the Strait
of Hormuz.
ence among Arab moderates.
years reflects Iraq's desire to gain friends and influ-
Iraq. The improvement in relations with Iraq in recent
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^
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Iraq in turn has lessened its criticism of Oman's
support for Egypt and the Camp David accords and
its signing of the military access agreement with the
United States. It also closed the PFLO office in
Baghdad in February 1981. Oman, however, remains
wary of Iraq's hegemonic designs in the Gulf. Oman
welcomes Iraq's new found moderation but intends to
,keep the Iraqis at arm's length.
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US Interests
Economic and Military Assistance
In an exchange of notes signed on 4 June 1980, Oman
and the United States concluded military and eco-
nomic aid accords that give the US access to Omani
air and naval bases on Masirah Island and on the
mainland. The US will improve Omani military facili-
ties to make them suitable for US needs.
The US has provided about $50 million in foreign
military sales during fiscal years 1980 and 1981. It
sold Oman six M-60 tanks in 1980, TOW missiles and
launchers, and Sidewinder missiles for Oman's Brit-
ish-built Jaguar fighter aircraft. The US has also
agreed to sell C-130 transport aircraft.
An agreement signed on 31 July 1980 established a
joint commission for economic and commercial co-
operation, under the chairmanship of the US Ambas-
sador to Oman and an Omani official. The Omani
Government desires US assistance in carrying out
highly visible projects that can be completed relatively
soon to demonstrate to the Omani populace the
benefits of cooperation with the US.
The US agreed to provide $5 million in grant aid in
fiscal year 1980 and $5 million in grants and a $10
million loan in fiscal year 1981. The Omani Govern-
ment is committed to match the $10 million loan.
Most of the funding will be used to develop water
resources for agricultural irrigation
and about 60 Americans are directly employed by the
Omani Government. In all, an estimated 400 US
citizens reside in Oman.
Trade
The US was the fourth-largest exporter to Oman in
1980 (after Japan, the UAE, and the UK) with $99.6
million or 5.7 percent of total imports. The US
exports mainly machinery and transport equipment.
Oman's main export is crude oil, of which slightly
over 3 million barrels-3 percent of Oman's crude
exports-were purchased by the US in 1980.
No US or Oman commercial carriers have regularly
scheduled flights between the two countries. Oman is
a part owner of the Bahrain-based Gulf Airlines.
which connects to the US.
Education
About 1,500 Omani students are studying in the
United States; no US students are studying in Oman.
Investments
US investment in Oman is minimal as is Omani
investment-both official and private-in the US.
Investments may increase with growing US-Omani
ties and Oman's recent budget surpluses. Oman,
which had a current account deficit as recently as
1978, established the State General Reserve Fund in
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US Presence
US-Omani relations date from the early 19th century
and include a Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggres-
sion concluded in 1833. A US consulate functioned in
Muscat from 1880 to 1915. The US had no diplomat-
ic presence in Oman until the US Embassy opened in
The official US presence in Oman is small-seven
civilian employees and 14 Department of Defense
personnel. There also are 40 Peace Corp volunteers,
1980 for investing excess oil revenues.
Most US firms now operating in Oman are involved
in petroleum and minerals. Only one US construction
firm is active in Oman, but increasing cooperation
between the two countries may create new opportuni-
ties for US firms. One US bank operates in Oman;
another has a management contract with a local bank.
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Secret
Chronology
1749 Ahmad bin Said Al Bu Said elected Imam, founding the Al Bu Said dynasty.
1798-1800 Treaties of friendship concluded with Great Britain.
1826 Dhofar Province annexed.
1833 Oman-US Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression (first US treaty in the region).
1880 US consulate opened in Muscat.
1915 Interior tribesmen besieged Muscat before being routed by British-led Indian
troops.
1920 "Treaty" of Seeb concluded in which interior shaykhs accepted status of Sultan
and the Sultan agreed to respect traditions of the interior.
1938 Sultan Said bin Taymur Al Bu Said-Qaboos's father-succeeded his father,
Sultan Taymur.
1952 Saudi Arabia occupied part of Buraimi oasis.
1954 Imam Muhammad Abdullah al-Khalili, Ibadhi leader since the signing of the
Treaty of Seeb, died; Ghalib bin Ali elected new Imam; armed rebellion began.
1955 Sultan Said's British-led forces crushed rebel bases in Nizwa and Rastaq; Imam
remained and pledged fealty; other ringleaders fled to Saudi Arabia.
1957 (June) Ringleaders returned to Oman to incite tribes.
(September) British-led forces reoccupied Nizwa and most of the interior; ring-
leaders retired to al-Jebal al-Akhdar.
Oman relinquished its seaport colony Gwadar to Pakistan, retains rights to a
recruitment office.
Sultan Said's troops and British regulars stormed Imamate stronghold; ringleaders
fled to Saudi Arabia.
1963 First overt manifestations of the Dhofar rebellion, led by Dhofar Liberation Front,
appeared.
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Oman exported first oil.
South Yemen achieved independence; soon began supporting the Dhofar rebellion.
Dhofar Liberation Front assumed name Popular Front for the Liberation of the
Occupied Arab Gulf, later changed to the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Oman.
(23 July) Sultan Qaboos deposed his father.
(9 August) Tariq bin Taymur Al Bu Said, Qaboos's uncle was named Prime
Minister.
(30 November) British withdrew from the Persian Gulf.
(1 January) Tariq resigned in protest over his limited powers.
US Embassy opened.
(November) Iranian troops, eventually numbering 3,000, arrived in Dhofar to
support the Sultan's armed forces.
Resident Ambassador appointed.
Sultan Qaboos declared the Dhofar rebellion ended.
British announced intention to cancel lease to Masirah Island airbase; military
withdrawal from Masirah completed by April 1977.
(June) Oman concluded agreement permitting US access to Omani military
facilities.
(May) Oman joined Gulf Cooperation Council.
National Day
Celebrated on 18 and 19 November
Muslim Holidays
Legal holidays whose dates are determined by the Muslim lunar calendar.
Corresponding dates on the Gregorian calendar advance by approximately 10 days
each year. Dates shown are approximate for 1982.
Islamic New Year. (1 Muharram) (19 October)
"Mawlid'=Birthday of the Prophet. (12 Rabi' al-Awal) (17 January)
Night of the Prophet's Ascension. (27 Rajab) (31 January)
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`Id al-Fitr'-Four-day feast commemorating the end of the month of fast,
Ramadan. (Last day of Ramadan through 3 Snawah) (21-24 July)
"Id al-Ahda'-The major religious festival, commemorating Abraham's sacrifice
of his son Isaac and culminating in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca; lasts five
days. (9-13 al-Dhulhijja) (28 September-2 October)
Some of Oman's 13,000 Shias also celebrate Shia religious holidays including:
Ashura-Commemorating the death in 680 AD of Husayn, grandson of the
prophet Muhammad and heterodox pretender to the caliphate. (10 Muharram)
(28 October)
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Statistical Summary
Land About 300,000 square kilometers:
Wadi and desert
Mountains
Coastal plains
Population: about 900,000. 25X1
Limits of territorial water (claimed): 12 nautical miles; (economic zone 200
nautical miles).
Average annual growth rate: 3 percent 25X1
Ethnic divisions: almost entirely Arab with some Iranians, Baluchis, Indians, and
non-Arab natives of uncertain origin.F1 25X1
Religion: Muslim (Ibadhi and Sunni sects, small Shia communities). 25X1
Language: Arabic; educated classes also speak English. Some hill tribesmen speak
distinct languages of non-Arab origin 25X1
I
Literacy: 20 percent 25X1
Labor force: 300,000.
Agriculture 100,000 6,000
Other private 30,000 126,000
Government 23,000 15,000
Y Organized labor: None.
1-1
Government Legal name: Sultanate of Oman (Sultanate of Muscat and Oman until 1970). 25X1
Capital: Muscat.) 25X1
I
Political subdivisions: 37 wilayas (provinces) 25X1
0
Type: MonarchyF__1 25X1
246,000 square kilometers
45,000 square kilometers
9,000 square kilometers (u)
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Legal system: Based on English common law and Islamic law; no constitution
25X1
Government leader: Sultan Qaboos ibn Said (Al Bu Sai
d)
25X1
Suffrage, elections, and legal political parties: Non
e.
25X1
Illegal political groups
: The Pop
ular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO),
based in South Yemen.
25X1
Member of. Arab League, FAO, G-77, Gulf Cooperation Council, IBRD, ICAO,
IDA, IFC, IMF, Nonaligned Movement, UN, UNESCO, UPU, WHO
.
25X1
GDP: $5.2 billion (1980); $5,780 per capita estimate
d.
25X1
GDP breakdown: Oil-60 percent; agriculture--2 percent; industry-1 percent;
construction, trade, and government comprise the bulk of the remainde
r.
Agriculture: Based on subsistence farming (fruits, dates, cereals, cattle, camels,
fishing, and trade).
Major industries: Petroleum discovered 1964; production 1980-282,000 b/d;
pipeline capacity-400,000 b/d; oil revenue for 1980 estimated at $3.2 billion
.
Electric power: 408,000 kW capacity (1980); 957 million kWh produced (1980);
1,060 kWh per capita.
Exports: $3.8 billion (f.o.b. 1980) mostly petroleum; nonoil exports (mostly
agriculture).
Imports: $1.9 billion (c.i.f. 1980); major items--machinery and transport equip-
ment, manufactured goods, foodstuffs; trading partners-exports: Japan, Nether-
lands, Singapore; imports: UK, Japan, UAE. 25X1
Economic aid: OPEC (ODA) $870 million (1976-80)
25X1
Budget: Actual expenditures $2.7 billion (1980).
25X1
25X1
Fiscal year: calendar year. 25X1
25X1
Pipelines: Crude oil 370 km; natural gas 200 km
25X1
Ports: 1 major (Qaboos), 3 minor (Raysut; Mina al-Fahal (oil); Khasab)
.
25X1
Merchant marine: 1 cargo ship; totaling 1,400 GRT, 2,900 DWT. 25X1
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Civil air: 23 major transport aircraft.
Airfields: 29 usable; four with permanent-surface runways; one runway over
3,660 m, four with runways 2,440-3,659 m
Telecommunications: Fair system of open-wire, radio-relay, and radiocommunica-
tions stations; 13,000 telephones (0.9 per 100 persons); three AM, no FM stations,
one TV channel, one Indian Ocean satellite station
Defense Forces Military manpower: Males 15-49, 131,000; 75,000 fit for military service 125X1
Personnel: 11,800 army, 1,000 navy, 1,700 air force (500 officers 25X1
Major ground units: Two infantry brigades, one special forces unit, one artillery
regiment, one armored car squadron, one guard regiment, and one airborne
company
Ships: Two guided-missile boats, four motor gunboats, five patrol boats (police),
five mechanized landing craft, one large personnel landing craft, three auxiliaries,
four miscellaneous service craft, one amphibious command ship, and one oceano-
graphic research ship
Aircraft: 105 (51 jet, eight propeller, 17 turboprop, 29 helicopters)
Supply: Mostly from UK, some ground equipment and aircraft also from Belgium,
Italy, Iran, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia
Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 December 1980 $1.2 billion; 40 percent
of central government budget
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Sabkhat
Matti
United
Saudi Arabia
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