AFGHANISTAN: THE POLITICS OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

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National / I Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Afghanistan:
The Politics of
the Resistance Movement
Secret
NESA 81-10001
October 1981
copy 2 2 1
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An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as of 15 September 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
ONESAA,
This paper was produced by the Pakistan-
Afghanistan-Bangladesh Branch, South Asia
Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, South Asia Division,
The paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and the National Intelligence Officer
for Near East-South Asia
Secret
NESA 81-10001
October 1981
National Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Afghanistan:
The Politics of
the Resistance Movement
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Afghanistan:
The Politics of
the Resistance Movement
Key Judgments The Afghan resistance movement consists of hundreds of independent
groups, many of which have no goal beyond that of driving out the Soviet
occupation force and ending Communist rule in Afghanistan. Those with
longer term political goals range from Maoists to Islamic fundamentalists,
and the number of organizations espousing regional and ethnic interests is
growing.
At present there appears to be little chance that the insurgent groups will
unite into a single organization. Former King Zahir might have the best
chance of unifying the resistance, but it is questionable that even half of
the insurgents would accept his leadership.
Substantial external support might provide one insurgent leader with the
prestige and influence necessary to combine several groups into a National
Liberation Movement, but such a group would still be plagued with
divisions and jealousies.
Any government formed by the resistance would be weak. If broadly based,
it would face serious internal tensions. If dominated by a single group, it
would face intense competition from other insurgent organizations. In
either case it would have little influence in large parts of Afghanistan.
The absence of central authority, however, has not prevented the develop-
ment of cooperation among insurgent bands in the field.
iii Secret
NESA 81-10001
October 1981
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^RR~ r s'I
'(sera
y A:
:AINABAD
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Afghanistan:
The Politics of
the Resistance Movement
Introduction
The Afghans are engaged in a spontaneous and
essentially nonideological resistance against the Com-
munist regime of Babrak Karmal and his Soviet
masters. There is no central organization. There are
hundreds of independent resistance organizations,
some with long-range plans for Afghanistan, many
more with no goal beyond keeping Soviet and govern-
ment forces out of a single valley or village. Many of
the bands fighting in Afghanistan recognize no higher
authority. Others are associated to some degree with
larger organizations-either exiles or groups based
within Afghanistan.
The Insurgents in the Field
Many insurgents-probably the majority-belong to
independent bands representing a village, valley,
tribe, clan, or family and feel little identity with a
national movement. These bands are fighting to pre-
serve Islam and tradition from outside interference,
just as Afghan rebels have done for centuries. Com-
manders of these bands often cooperate with other
leaders against a common enemy; joint operations are
becoming more common, intelligence is being ex-
changed more regularly, and assistance is extended
more frequently in moving supplies. The cooperation
is between equals, however, with neither commander
willing to surrender his independence in a common
cause.
example, some raids by bands based in Pakistan are
organized and directed by exile leaders in Peshawar.
Other bands are under the direct control of political
organizations based inside Afghanistan. More com-
mon, however, is a situation in which an insurgent
commander acknowledges his allegiance to a political
leader but is largely left on his own in conducting
military operations. Some commanders receive
neither guidance nor assistance from the political
leaders.
The Exiles
Most of the resistance leaders with a national outlook
are in exile. Among the dozens of exile groups, the
most prominent and the only ones recognized by the
Pakistani Government are six based in Peshawar,
Pakistan. Since late 1978 much time and effort has
been devoted to forming alliances among various
combinations of these Peshawar parties. The latest
alliance, announced in August 1981, will probably not
be any more durable or genuine than the preceding
three (see table 1). This particular effort is notewor-
thy, however, because for the first time it includes
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's fundamentalist Islamic
Party and excludes Ahmad Gailani's moderate Na-
tional Islamic Front (see appendix). Gulbuddin, who
has previously shunned attempts at unity, has come
under increasing pressure from religious leaders and
insurgent field commanders to curb his intransigence.
Gulbuddin's precondition for joining this time was the
These bands are often critical of the larger political
organizations, which they see as corrupt, inefficient,
prone to intrigue and petty squabbling, and useful
only as potential sources of externally supplied arms.
To obtain arms they may give nominal allegiance to a
political organization without actually allowing it any
control over their actions. A political organization
may also count among its f''lowers any who receive
its help
Other bands have more genuine relationships with the
political organizations. In some cases an organization
has direct control over a band's operations. For
exclusion of Gailani's moderate party.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's disunifying influence has
been felt in Afghanistan as well as in Peshawar.
Increasingly, Gulbuddin's men, long resented for their
gangster-like tactics, have been involved in attacks on
other insurgents and have intimidated villagers while
in search of supplies and "donations" for their party
treasury. On occasion the situation has gotten so bad
that village elders have been forced to call on the
hated government forces to help
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In the early days of the insurgency the Peshawar
parties minimized their ideological differences to con-
centrate their efforts against the common enemy.
During the past year, however, polarization between
fundamentalists and moderates has increased.
Fundamentalists advocate a revolutionary Islamic
state and the elimination of modern social trends-
such as equality for women-for post-Soviet Afghani-
stan. Although opposed to the radical Iranian brand
of Islamic revolution, the fundamentalists are
adamant in their opposition to the return of the
monarchy.
The moderates, representing for the most part the
urban, educated elite of the pre-Communist era,
envisage a secular state under democratic institutions
with a member of the exiled royal family as a
figurehead king or president. The moderates are also
amenable to friendly relations with the West.
The Regional Organizations
The growing belief among insurgents in the field that
the Peshawar parties are self-seeking and hopelessly
divided has led to the formation in various areas of
insurgent organizations based on tribal or ethnic
rather than political ties. These groups, some very
effective militarily on their own home ground, hope to
bypass the Peshawar parties in securing external aid
and have begun to send representatives to Iran and
Europe, as well as Peshawar and Islamabad, in search
of assistance. Many insurgent commanders hope that
eventually these organizations can coalesce into an
organized national consensus.
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National Front for the Salvation of the
Homeland
Late 1978 or early 1979
Revolutionary Islamic Movement
Islamic League of Afghanistan
Afghan National Liberation Front
National Islamic Front
Islamic Party (Hekmatyar)
Islamic Party (Khalis)
Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of
Afghanistan
March 1980-March 1981
Islamic Party (Khalil Faction)
Islamic League of Afghanistan
Revolutionary Islamic Movement
National Islamic Front
Afghan National Liberation Front
Islamic Party (Hekmatyar Faction)
(Moderate) Islamic Alliance
May 1981-August 1981
National Islamic Front
Afghan National Liberation Front
Revolutionary Islamic Movement
Islamic Party (Hekmatyar)
Islamic Party (Khalil)
Islamic League of Afghanistan
Alliance of Islamic Freedom Fighters of
Afghanistan
16 September 1981
Islamic Party (Hekmatyar)
Islamic Party (Khalis)
Islamic League of Afghanistan
Revolutionary Islamic Movement
Afghan National Liberation Front
National Islamic Front
The Outlook for Insurgent Unity
In the near term the prospects for unity among the
disparate elements of the insurgency are not good.
Among the Peshawar exile groups-despite their peri-
odic alliances-the trend seems to be toward more
factionalism both between parties and among the
leaders of individual groups. In the various party
headquarters in Peshawar there is increasing strife as
the party leaders fend off the power moves of their
subordinates. Without the occasional intervention of
the Pakistani Government, the situation would be
considerably worse.
Some tribal groups in the field have been able to pool
their military efforts under the auspices of regional
organizations, but such cooperation rarely extends
across ethnic lines. Non-Pushtun tribes still harbor a
deep-seated enmity against their- Pushtun neighbors-
historically the dominant ethnic group in Afghani-
stan-and are unwilling to return to the pre-Commu-
nist status quo. Additionally, these regional groups
might succeed in organizing the insurgency in a given
area, but in so doing they would solidify ethnic and
regional differences and in some areas become de
facto governments unlikely to surrender their author-
ity to a broad national resistance movement or to any
non-Communist government in Kabul.
Former King Zahir Shah, who may have the best
chance of uniting the various tribal and political
elements of the resistance, has so far shown little
inclination to attempt this. Furthermore, such an
action would draw extreme opposition not only from
fundamentalists but from many others in the resist-
ance unwilling to lessen their own authority.
The situation would change if one insurgent leader or
group were to secure a disproportionate share of
foreign assistance in obtaining weapons. In Afghan
tribal society the power and prestige of a leader is still
a matter of patronage and of the exercise of reciprocal
rights and obligations between "feudal lord" and
"vassal." The leader of a Peshawar political party
who could demonstrate a consistent ability to supply
his men in the field with enough weapons and ammu-
nition to continue the fight against the Communists
would assume greater stature in the eyes of insur-
gents. Other groups would lose support if they too
were not able to obtain such aid.
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The Pakistani Government provided a practical dem-
onstration of this principle when it decided to recog-
nize only six major insurgent groups in Peshawar.
Literally dozens of other would-be insurgent groups,
lacking the official blessing and materiel support of
Islamabad, disappeared overnight.
In the Afghan countryside, tribal groups and insur-
gent commanders would quickly acquire renewed
respect for and confidence in a party leader who could
provide significant military support for their efforts in
the field. Afghan tribesmen who know and care little
about abstract political or ideological concepts would
respect and follow a strong leader with powerful
backing. Such a leader may be able to draw together
enough support to form a national liberation move-
ment.
Post-Soviet Government?
Should the resistance somehow come to power in
Kabul, the resulting government would be weak.
Afghan governments historically have had full control
only in the major cities and nearby rural areas. In
most of the country, government authority has been
tolerated only so long as there was no serious interfer-
ence with local affairs. In the past few years, central
authority has been virtually nonexistent in much of
the country, leaving local leaders in complete control.
It seems unlikely that these leaders will give up their
new power easily, and any future government may
have even less authority outside Kabul than its pre-
Communist predecessors
The government also would probably be divided.
Infighting in any coalition government would make
the formulation of coherent policy difficult and would
probably lead to attempts by the various groups to
eliminate their rivals. Frequent coups, purges, and
assassinations would be likely, a situation Afghani-
stan's neighbors-including the USSR-would be
greatly tempted to exploit, whatever agreement they
had reached about noninterference
A government representing only one faction of the
insurgency might be no better. If it made a serious
effort to implement its policies, it would meet resist-
ance from both its ideological rivals and regional
groups opposed to any extension of central authority.
Perhaps the best the Afghans could hope for would be
a government headed by a member of the royal family
and administered by experienced and well-known
politicians from the monarchy and Daoud's republic.
The leaders of such a government might have enough
tribal and political status to survive, but only if they
succeeded in avoiding serious offense to any of the
contending groups in Afghanistan.
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Appendix: Afghan Dissident Groups
Peshawar-Based Political Parties
Fundamentalists
Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party). The oldest, best orga-
nized, most dedicated and efficient of the Peshawar-
based political parties, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's
Hizbi Islami is the only group that resembles the
ruthlessly dedicated cadre usually associated with
guerrilla movements. The organization began in 1969
as a student group at Kabul University, founded by
Gulbuddin to oppose King Zahir Shah, and after his
fall, President Mohammad Daoud.
At 36, younger than most other exile leaders, Gulbud-
din is ambitious and opportunistic. An impressive
orator who fits the conventional image of a stern
Islamic traditionalist, he has in the past refused to
deal with other groups because his own preeminence
within the insurgent movement might be diminished.
Under pressure from religious leaders and perhaps
seeing personal advantages in unity, he joined an
alliance with four of the other main exile groups in
August 1981. He remains convinced that the others
will eventually acknowledge his leadership.
Gulbuddin is uncompromising in his opposition to the
pro-Soviet regime of Babrak Karmal, and if he came
to power in Afghanistan, he would almost certainly
remain staunchly anti-Soviet.
He has, however, also been critical of the United
States and other Western countries, probably to avoid
strings he believes would accompany any help, to
emphasize his independence to the Afghan people,
and because he doubts Washington's willingness to
continue support for an extended period. Recently his
representatives have been more friendly to US offi-
cials and have indicated a desire for "friendly ties"
with the United States.
He strongly opposes any role for the royal family in
either the insurgency or any future Afghan Govern-
ment. His plans for a post-Soviet Afghanistan include
the establishment of an Islamic theocracy and the
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader
of the Islamic Party
outlawing of education for women. His supporters
insist, at least in dealing with Westerners, that a
Khomeini-like "dictatorship of mullahs" is neither
possible nor contemplated by Gulbuddin, and they
profess horror at the excesses of Islamic fundamental-
ism in Iran.
Hizbi Islami claims to have 27 autonomous provincial
organizations in Afghanistan and support from an
equal number of offices in Pakistan-24 in Peshawar
and three in Quetta. The central organization is
divided into functional committees dealing with sub-
jects such as politics, military operations, culture,
education, and refugees. These committees meet regu-
larly, work hard, and appear to be productive.
Gulbuddin's propaganda apparatus is undoubtedly the
most professional that the exiles have. Its press re-
leases are published in the Pakistani press more
frequently than those of other groups, and it has had
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Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan
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considerable success convincing Western newsmen
that Gulbuddin is the most important of the insurgent
leaders. The cultural committee puts out a wide range
of relatively slick publications aimed at a number of
different audiences, including Pakistanis, Arabs, Ira-
nians, and Russians.
Other indications of the organization's effectiveness
are a pool of articulate and well-prepared spokesmen,
an effective medical program, a zealous recruiting
program in the refugee camps, and-in contrast to
most exile groups-tight security and a smoothly
functioning central headquarters.
It is difficult to gauge Hizbi Islami strength and
military accomplishments, but the organization ap-
pears to have its greatest strength in Paktia and
Nangarhar Provinces, where it maintains arms caches
and field headquarters. Some of the best trained and
equipped insurgent bands in this area are under its
control. In other parts of the country, Hizbi Islami's
activities appear to be limited to collecting donations
and spreading Gulbuddin's party line. Gulbuddin's
image throughout Afghanistan has been enhanced by
Afghan Government propaganda, which tends to por-
tray him as the most dangerous of the "rebel bandit"
leaders.
Hizbi Islami's relations with other insurgent groups in
both Peshawar and Afghanistan have been poor.
Gulbuddin's self-serving public relations efforts, his
favored position with the Pakistani Government,
strong-arm recruiting in refugee camps, and his re-
fusal to cooperate with other organizations have cre-
ated extreme resentment among Afghans in Pakistan.
Within Afghanistan his men have earned a reputation
for intimidation and taking supplies without payment.
Reports of armed clashes resulting from Hizbi Islami
efforts to eliminate rival insurgent leaders and to
claim exclusive "turf" are growing. In addition Gul-
buddin's rivals in the resistance are trying to convince
the people that he is actually a leftist-a claim that
has some basis in the beliefs he professed when he was
a student.
In August 1981 rumors circulated about personality
and policy differences within the party's leadership.
Tension between the hot-tempered Gulbuddin and his
deputy Qazi Mohammad Amin appears to be simmer-
ing. Qualified observers describe the smoothly run-
ning party offices as disrupted by the maneuvering for
power of the two men.
Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party-Khalis Faction).
Mohammad Younus Khalis' Hizbi Islami broke away
from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's group in the spring of
1979 in protest over Gulbuddin's temporary merger
with Burhanuddin Rabanni's Islamic League. Khalis
probably believed that the moderately fundamentalist
Rabanni would compromise the Islamic Party's reli-
gious purity. Khalis's small but effective fighting
force of about 800 men concentrates more on waging
holy war in the hills of Afghanistan than on political
maneuvering in Peshawar.
committee.
Younus Khalis, 60 years old, is admired by men of
almost all political parties and is the closest thing in
the Afghan insurgency to being the traditional tribal
role model-the warrior-poet. A fiercely traditional
leader who believes that the Koran is the only consti-
tution Afghanistan needs, Khalis in his early days was
an editor of religious magazines and later a teacher of
Islamic thought in Kabul. He was eventually forced to
flee to Pakistan in 1974 after the publication of a
book that was critical of former President Moham-
mad Daoud. He subsequently joined the original
Hizbi Islami and became a member of its advisory
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Mohammad Younus Khalis,
leader of the Islamic Party-
Khalis Faction
Khalis's influence is strongest in his home province of
Nangarhar and to a certain extent in the adjoining
province of Paktia, where his forces are commanded
by the renowned fighter, Jalaluddin Hakani, who
serves as Khalis's second-in-command at Peshawar.
Khalis's headquarters in Peshawar has long suffered
from disorganization, lack of professionalism, and an
inability to master the political aspects of the insur-
gency. Recently, however, Khalis reportedly tightened
up his organization considerably and extended the
geographical scope of his operations. His group has
smuggled more arms across the border than any
other
Jamiat-i-Islami-Afghanistan (Islamic League of Af-
ghanistan). Professor Burhanuddin Rabanni's Jamiat-
i-Islami is second only to Gulbuddin's Hizbi Islami in
its adherence to fundamentalist rhetoric and political
philosophy. The two groups share a desire to establish
rule based on the Koran and the traditional precepts
of Islamic law, although Rabanni would not oppose
the return to power of the monarchy.
Burhanuddin Rabanni, leader
of the Islamic League of
Afghanistan
Rabanni, a former professor of Islamic law and
theology at Kabul University, began his political
activism while working on his doctorate in Islamic
philosophy at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. While in
Cairo in 1968, he helped establish a clandestine
organization to oppose the rule of King Zahir Shah.
After returning to Kabul, he worked to expand the
new organization through active recruitment and was
finally elected secretary general of the group in 1972.
Rabanni fled to Pakistan in 1974, when President
Mohammad Daoud ordered his arrest for antigovern-
ment activity. There Rabbani founded the Jamiat in
July 1978.
Rabanni's group, mainly non-Pushtun in composition,
is probably strongest in his native province of Badakh-
shan. It has limited contacts in Tajik and Uzbek areas
and some support among the Shia tribesmen of the
Hazarajat region in central Afghanistan. The organi-
zation's military strength is thin even in these areas,
and many insurgent bands who acknowledge
Rabanni's leadership rarely receive either guidance or
support from him
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Rabanni's group, like Gulbuddin's, is organized into
committees. But the Jamiat's committees are much
less effective. Jamiat's "public relations" committee,
recognizing the need for media exposure, regularly
releases articles and photographs to the local and
international press.
Rabanni receives substantial outside backing from the
Jamiat-i-Islami-Pakistan as well as from Arab Gulf
states and Iranian sources. Rabanni has recently
spent considerable time improving his strained rela-
tions with the Khomeini regime and soliciting aid
from sympathetic Arab sources.
In July 1981 the Jamiat suffered significant internal
upheaval when the number-two man, Ahmad Shah
Ahmadzai, withdrew from the party along with a
number of others. The move seems to have been
motivated by personality conflicts, not ideological
differences. The Jamiat does not seem to have been
seriously hurt organizationally and reportedly has
even benefited from defections from Gulbuddin's
Islamic Party.
Harakat-i-Ingilab-i-Islami (Revolutionary Islamic
Movement). Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi's
party, basically fundamentalist in ideology, began as
an attempt to bring Gulbuddin's Hizbi Islami and
Rabanni's Jamiat together in one organization and
under one neutral leader. The coalition fell apart
within a month. Nabi subsequently formed his own
political party, the Harakat.
The Harakat has been less specific about its ideology
than other groups, and it appears to have only a
rudimentary political structure. In the past, however,
Nabi has been more willing to cooperate with secular
groups than with other fundamentalist leaders. The
support of large numbers of fighters throughout
Afghanistan which Nabi claims seems to be based on
the rural population's perception of him as a staunch
protector of Afghan tradition and religious belief,
rather than actual control of military operations
Nabi, from the Khowst area in Paktia Province, was a
member of the Afghan parliament and later went into
voluntary exile during the regime of President Daoud.
Maulvi Mohammad Nabi
Mohammadi, leader of the
Revolutionary Islamic
Movement
Nabi is thought by many to carry the extremely
prestigious blessings of the mullah of the Shor Bazaar
as the chosen standard bearer for the holy war against
the infidel.
In early 1981 Nabi dealt his party a severe blow by
briefly aligning himself with two moderate party
leaders, Ahmad Gailani and Sibghatullah Mojadedi,
precipitating a showdown with the extreme funda-
mentalist wing of his party led by Mansoor Nasrullah.
Nasrullah and his followers were ejected from the
Harakat after they attempted to remove Nabi from
his party leadership
The Pakistani Government was finally forced to inter-
vene and bring back a semblance of unity to the
Harakat, with Nabi remaining as titular head of the
party and Nasrullah brought back into the fold. The
administrative efficacy of the Peshawar headquarters
has been shattered, however, by the party's internal
squabbling. Within Afghanistan the quarrel is re-
flected in partisan divisions between Harakat's fight-
ers and a slow melting away of support to other
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parties. Seriously diminished in strength, Nabi's party
may face further challenges as other fundamentalist
leaders maneuver to undercut Nabi's position.
Moderates
Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami (National Islamic Front). If
impeccable Islamic credentials were the true mark of
a powerful and effective insurgent leader, then Pir
Syed Ahmad Gailani and his party would be a
credible force in the insurgency. Gailani, 48 years old,
is a descendant of Afghanistan's principal "saintly"
family and traces his ancestry back to the Prophet
Mohammad. He thus commands a considerable reli-
gious following from Sufi Muslims throughout
Afghanistan.
Gailani, a well-educated, well-dressed, well-traveled,
extremely Westernized gentleman, is considered too
ineffectual and too tainted by Western liberal ideas to
count for much with the only constituency that mat-
ters in the insurgency-the fighting tribesmen. Fur-
thermore, Mahaz officials are widely regarded in
fundamentalist circles as effete intellectuals who har-
bor dangerous ideas about social reform and modern-
ization. Reportedly the Mahaz is supporting two
socialist/leftist groups, Sama and Afghan Mellat. His
Western attitudes, however, have made Gailani ap-
pear much more attractive to many Westerners than
Pir Syed Ahmad Gailani,
leader of the National
Islamic Front
submit themselves to its nominal leadership, is that it
serves as a conduit for externally supplied arms.
other exile leaders.
Gailani's scheme for a post-Communist Afghanistan
includes the separation of church and state and a
parliamentary form of government with the possible
participation of the king as a figurehead. He also sees
an Afghanistan led by intellectuals instead of reli-
gious figures and a constitution guaranteeing a multi-
party system and a mixed economy with opportunity
for eventual industrialization. Gailani's foreign policy
would consist of nonalignment-friendly relations
with the USSR, but a decided "tilt" toward the
United States
The Mahaz maintains no permanent guerrilla forces
in Afghanistan, although it occasionally sends raiding
parties across the border and a few insurgent groups
look primarily to Gailani for support. Its principal
usefulness, and the reason many insurgent tribesmen
Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan (Afghan Nation-
al Liberation Front)) Pir Sibghatullah Mojadedi, like
Gailani, is a member of a prominent Islamic family,
claiming direct descent from Umar, the second Caliph
of Islam. Family members have held important gov-
ernment posts and had considerable wealth, and the
Hazrat of Shor Bazaar, one of the most prestigious
and influential religious leaders in Afghanistan, is
always a member of the family. Although Mojadedi
may be the senior surviving member of his family-
many have been jailed or executed by the Afghan
Government--he has not claimed to be the current
Hazrat.
Both the family's religious prestige and-at least in
the Kabul area-its past political and economic
prominence give Mojadedi some potential for a sig-
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Pir Sibghatullah MoJadedi,
leader of the Afghan
National Liberation Front
Mojadedi is a scholar by profession, specializing in
Koranic studies and Islamic politics. Although an
open-minded moderate on most Islamic issues, he
objects strongly to Western dress for women and the
consumption of alcohol. A widely traveled man,
Mojadedi speaks excellent English.
Marxists-Socialists
Shola-i-Javaid (Eternal Flame)-Afghan Maoist
Party. This party, long opposed to the pro-Soviet
Communists, is generally more Maoist than the pres-
ent Chinese leadership-one faction of the party still
supports the Gang of Four. It claims the loyalty of
only a few insurgent bands, however, and receives no
appreciable support from Beijing. In August 1981 the
party was decimated when the Karmal regime arrest-
ed up to a 1,000 of its members after a countrywide
nificant following in Afghanistan. His organization,
however, appears to be the least important militarily
of the main exile groups. His spokesmen in Peshawar
make the usual grandiose claims of major victories,
but these claims are at best exaggerations and some-
times take credit for the work of other insurgent
The organization is primarily a family operation, with
MoJadedi relying principally on his sons to carry out
administrative and policy functions.
Mojadedi maintains ties with Saudi Arabia, Libya,
and Kuwait, where he often goes in search of financial
aid. His feelings toward the West are generally
friendly
Opposed to the strict Islamic fundamentalism of
Gulbuddin, Khalis, and others, Mojadedi's vision of a
post-Communist Afghanistan consists of an Islamic
republic under the aegis of a restored monarchy.
(Mojadedi is distantly related by marriage to the royal
family.
roundup.
Suzamane Azadelbarche Mardo Me Afghanistan
[SAMA] (The Organization for the Liberation of
Afghanistan). Probably the most effective nationalist
political group after the six major Peshawar-based
parties, SAMA has reportedly carried out numerous
sabotage and assassination operations within the city
of Kabul and is also said to be active in the neighbor-
ing province of Parvan to the north.
A party with a disciplined cadre, SAMA is an
offshoot of the pro-Beijing Marxist party, Shola-i-
Javaid. SAMA, however, does not appear to have
maintained its Chinese connections.
SAMA's leader is Abdul Qayyuum, a self-proclaimed 25X6
"independent Marxist" who took over after the "dis-
appearance" of its founder, Agha Majid. Majid is
presumed to have been murdered at Pul-i-Charki
Prison by the Afghan secret police.
important factor in the resistance.
Afghan Mellat (Afghan Nation). Afghan Mellat, led
by Rahim Pushtunyar, is descended from the Afghan
Social Democratic Party, a progressive socialist, ul-
tranationalist, pro-Pushtunistan party that managed
to win a few local elections in Kabul during the reign
of King Zahir Shah. Largely a collection of intellectu-
als, Mellat is most effective in Kabul and has a few
isolated bands fighting occasionally in Nangarhar and
Paktiar provinces. In no place, however, is it an
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In Peshawar the group is seen as basically socialist
with a commitment to the establishment of democrat-
ic institutions, separation of church and state, and the
complete reform of Afghan "feudalism."
Tribal-Based Regional Organizations, Proroyalist
Groups, Religious Leaders
Shora-i-Itifaq Islami (United Council of Islamic
Revolution)
The Hazara tribes of central Afghanistan were the
first to unite into a regional grouping to defend their
homeland from government and Soviet incursions.
The Shora is a "cooperation" of 31 separate Hazara
groups under the elected leadership of Syed Ali
Behishti. The organization serves as the governing
body of the Hazarajat with two vice chairmen and a
secretariat subordinate to the chairman of the United
Council (Behishti). The council is directed by 42
representatives from various districts who form an
executive committee. The committee handles its af-
fairs through five departments-law, public relations,
military affairs, finance, and friendship affairs.
Not particularly well-armed, the Hazaras have not
received any aid from the Peshawar parties, although
they have been able to buy arms from them on a few
occasions. Iran has provided the Hazaras with rela-
tively small quantities of weapons, including Ameri-
can M-1 semiautomatic rifles and West German G-3
automatic rifles. The Iranians reportedly have also
provided a few military advisers to teach the
Hazaras-with whom the Iranians share the Shia
brand of Islam-weapons handling and basic tactics.
It is unlikely that the Khomeini regime, beset with
numerous problems of its own, is providing a signifi-
cant amount of aid.
Regardless of their supply problems, the Hazaras
have turned their mountain strongholds into a virtual-
ly autonomous region with Kabul in control of only
about a half dozen isolated garrisons. The fact that
very few refugees in either Pakistan or Iran are
Hazaras testifies to their success
The Hazaras are also conducting nighttime raids into
Kabul with a force called the "Kalibdad Freedom
Fighters Corps," said to have 3,000 fighters based as
close as 30 kilometers outside Kabul
The Hazara resistance to some extent may be an
independence movement. The Hazaras resent their
second-class status in a country in which all govern-
ments-including the present one-are dominated by
Pushtuns. According to one Hazara leader, when the
Soviets are driven out, the "real war" between the
Pushtuns and. Hazaras will begin.
The Panjsheris
The Tajiks of the strategic Panjsher River valley have
organized themselves into a self-reliant and formida-
ble thorn in the side of the main Soviet supply line,
playing havoc with military convoys on the main
highway from Kabul northward to the USSR and
posing a potential threat to Bagrani, one of the main
Soviet airbases. As a result the Soviets periodically
have sent powerful columns up the valley to eradicate
resistance. None have penetrated farther than the end
of the motora.ble road-about 30 kilometers-and
some suffered heavy casualties. The Soviets reported-
ly at one point even tried to block the narrow entrance
to the valley with a wall
The valley, now an autonomous entity in the hands of
its people, runs its own public services, including a bus
line. The Panjsheris have not been hindered by the
lack of outside support.
Konar-Nuristan Organization
The leader of this tribal-regional group, Dr. Syed
Shamsuddin Majrooh, served as Minister of Justice
during 1963-65 and briefly as Deputy Prime Minister
in 1965. In spite of his governmental experience,
Majrooh has become an outspoken advocate of the
primacy of tribalism over political leadership as a
driving force for the resistance movement. He believes
that only a coalescence of tribal and regional groups
within Afghanistan can forge a true national consen-
sus.
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There is very little real cooperation between the
Nuristanis and the Pushtuns of the Konar Valley,
traditional tribal enemies. The tribal confederation is
more a theoretical formulation in the mind of
Majrooh than a political or military reality. He,
however, has the support of the well-respected insur-
gent field commander, Anwar Amin. The Nuristani
resistance, like that of the Hazaras, is to some degree
a reaction to Pushtun domination
Durrani Pushtun Tribes
Azizullah Wasifi, Minister of Agriculture under
Daoud, heads a coalition of Durrani Pushtun tribes in
southwestern Afghanistan from Farah Province to the
Pakistani border east of the Qandahar. The group
appears to be proroyalist. (The Afghan royal family
comes from one of the Durrani tribes.) The collective
military forces of the group are under the command of
Ismatullah Achikzai, a former major in the Afghan
Army. Achikzai reportedly operates three training
and resupply camps in Pakistan. The degree to which
he controls the resistance in this area is unclear; many
insurgent bands do not recognize his authority.
Central Tribal Confederation
This loose union of central Afghan tribes encompasses
the areas of Qonduz, Samangan, Bamian, Ghazni,
Lowgar, and Kabul Provinces. The central headquar-
ters is in Khawaat, Chaki Vardak district. As with
other tribal coalitions, a major reason for uniting
regionally is frustration with the political maneuver-
ing and intrigues of the Peshawar political parties.F_
Islamic Union of Northern Afghan Provinces
This newly formed organization of Uzbeks living in
the northern provinces appears to be very successful in
raiding military convoys coming into Afghanistan
from the Soviet Union. Numbering about 800 men,
the group has received some aid in the form of four
12.7-mm DSHK antiaircraft guns from Rabanni's
Jamiat.
Afridi Tribe
The Afridi tribe, long known for its warlike exploits
against governmental authority in the area of the
Khyber Pass, has now joined the fray under the
leadership of Anwar Afridi, grandson of the famous
tribal leader, Ajab Khan. The tribe's political sympa-
thies are proroyalist
Quetta-Qandahar Group (National Islamic Union)
Led by Sardar Mohammad Akram, who is said to be
related to the royal family, this group is headquar-
tered in Quetta, Baluchistan. It conducts insurgent
operations in Qandahar and Helmand Provinces.
Sazman-i-Jihad-i-Akbar-i-Islami (Organization for
the Great Islamic War)-Baluch Tribe
This organization, headed by Dost Vakeel Gorgaij
Baluch, is intended primarily to draw attention and
support to this ethnic minority in southwestern
Afghanistan. The Baluch, residing in Qandahar,
Helmand, Nimruz, and Farah Provinces, are weak
militarily because of their small numbers, lack of
supplies, and the open country in which they operate.
They could, however, because of their kinship ties
with Pakistani and Iranian Baluch communities, be-
come vital conduits for external assistance to insur-
gents in western Afghanistan.
Afghanistan Islamic National Revolution
This group is headed by Fazle Rahman Hussanini,
called Pir Muqtadar Sahib by the faithful, an ac-
knowledged Afghan religious leader. The Pir claims a
following of a million fighters, mostly Pushtuns from
Paktia Province and Pakistan's Waziristan agencies.
The group receives no arms from the Peshawar groups
but depends entirely on captured weapons. There is
nothing to confirm the size of the Pir's group or to
show that it constitutes a cohesive organization. Also,
as a political/ military leader the Pir leaves much to
be desired.
Unity Ulema-Organization of Afghan Mullahs
This group of Afghan religious leaders is applying
considerable pressure for an alliance between the six
major Peshawar political parties. Although we know
very little about the group's membership or organiza-
tion, it was the primary force behind the alliance
formed in August 1981 of five of the six major
Peshawar groups. The exclusion of the moderate
Gailani party may mean that the group is controlled
by the fundamentalists and designed to cut out those
having any connections with the regimes of King
Zahir Shah or Mohammad Daoud
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Dr. Mohammad Yusuf's Group
For some time a proroyalist faction has coalesced in
Hamburg, West Germany around Dr. Mohammad
Yusuf, who was Prime Minister during the period of
1963-65. Yusuf, a well-known and respected figure,
and other intellectuals have attempted to lure King
Zahir Shah and other members of the royal family
out of exile in Italy and into participation in a
government-in-exile. Under this plan the King would
assume the role of President with Yusuf as Prime
Minister and Prince Abdul Wali, the King's son-in-
law, serving as Minister of Defense. The proposed
organization is seen as a rallying point capable of
drawing together the regional/tribal confederations
and producing a viable government of national con-
sensus. King Zahir Shah, the only man who could
realize the plan, has so far declined to leave his refuge
in Rome or lend his name to the enterprise.
Loya Jirgah (Grand Assembly)
During times of crisis in the history of the Afghan
people, the Loya Jirgah has been convened. Originally
an assembly of tribal leaders, it fills roughly the same
role in Afghanistan that a constitutional convention
does in the United States. The last one that met in
Afghanistan ratified the constitution presented by
President Daoud and formally elected him President.
Convened again in the early summer of 1980, the
Loya Jirgah carried some promise of bringing togeth-
er the disparate elements of the insurgency, both
political and tribal. It soon became clear, however,
that the fundamentalists, especially Gulbuddin Hek-
matyar's Islamic Party, would not tolerate a challenge
to their privileged position in the insurgent movement.
The lack of support from the fundamentalists and the
inability to weld the moderates and the regional/
tribal groups into a working union ensured that the
Loya Jirgah would slowly fade into dissolution. There
are occasional reports that either the Jirgah will
reconvene or a new Jirgah will be held.
Qaum-i-Itihad (Tribal Union)
This is nothing more than a catchall phrase expressing
the intense frustration of the indigenous Afghan
insurgent leadership with the inability or unwilling-
ness of the Peshawar political parties to provide
significant assistance to the fighters in the field.
Although an expression of the popular will, this effort
is doomed without the support of a powerful patron,
such as the king.
Several individuals and groups connected with the
Afghan insurgency operate between legitimacy and
fraud. Some appear to be well-meaning people who
lack the resources and support to contribute effective-
ly to the resistance; others limit themselves to propa-
ganda in Western countries and do not claim a role in
the insurgency. But some are simply confidence men.
Sadudin Schpoon and Bahauddin Majrooh
Both professors, Schpoon and Majrooh (son of Dr.
Syed Shamsuddin Majrooh of the Kunar-Nuristan
Organization.) are well-known Afghan intellectuals
and articulate spokesmen for the insurgent cause both
in the media and on occasion in the halls of the US
Congress. They identify most closely with the political
philosophy of Ahmad Gailani, although Schpoon has
ties with Younus Khalis, and Majrooh has some links
with Mojadedi. Reportedly they have formed an
organization called AGEL (an acronym derived from
its Pushtun name), which enlists expatriate "adven-
turers" to train recruits in guerrilla tactics and the use
of weapons. Nothing much should be expected from
this particular effort.
Alliance of Former Afghan Generals (Group Still
Unnamed)
the following
exiled Afghan generals are prepared to form a new
Afghan resistance group:
? Alam Omar Olomi, former Deputy Chief of Staff
and commander of forces in Paktia Province, is a
leader of the Mohammad tribe in Helmand
Province.
? Abdul Kariim Mustaghni, former Chief of Staff
and Defense Minister, purports to have influence in
Vardak Province.
? Mohammad Arif, a former Army general, has
followers in Paktia Province.
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? Abdul Salam Malkyar, former Deputy Chief of
Staff, has followers in Ghazni Province.
? Qamruddeen Nassri, former commander of the 7th
Division stationed in Kabul, claims to have influ-
ence in Lowgar and Laghman Provinces as well as
around Jalalabad.
? Mohammad Hussein Abassi, former chief of per-
sonnel affairs of the Ministry of Defense, has
influence among the Hazara tribes.
? Mohammad Akram, former commander of forces in
Nahrin Province, has a number of followers in
Baghlan Province, including the area around the
Chinese border.
The group claims to be opposed to the corruption and
ineffectiveness of the six major Peshawar political
parties and to have no connection with royalist fac-
tions. The group's claims to widespread tribal influ-
ence within Afghanistan are suspect, however, be-
cause most of the generals have been absent from
tribal areas so long that ties with tribesmen have
eroded. Furthermore, many tribesmen are deeply
suspicious of professional military men
Col. Mohammad Zarif Qader
Living in Frankfurt, West Germany, former Col.
Mohammad Zarif Qader represents himself as the
chief of the major Peshawar insurgent groups, with a
strength of 3 million followers and 100,000 fighters.
There is nothing to substantiate the Colonel's grandi-
ose claims.
Itihad-i-Mujahiddin-i-Islami Afghanistan (Union of
Islamic Freedom Fighters of Afghanistan)
The Itihad is a Hazara insurgent group founded in
Quetta two years ago and led by Haji Rasul. The
group's representatives complain about the Pakistani
Government's aid to the Pushtun-dominated political
parties in Peshawar to the exclusion of non-Pushtuns
like the Hazaras. The group also claims that it
receives no aid from Iran and is opposed to the
Khomeini brand of Islamic fundamentalism.
This Hazara group appears to be of little importance
when compared to the much larger and effective
Shora-i-Itifaq led by Syed Ali Behishti
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Group Ethnic
Composition
Areas of
Major
Strength
Comparative
Military
Strength
Political
Orientation
Hizbi Islami (Islamic Predominantly
Party-Hekmatyar) Pushtun
Paktia, Nangar-
bar
Strong in limited
area
Extreme funda-
mentalist, anti-
monarchist, theo-
cratic
Hizbi Islami (Islamic
Party-Khalis)
Predominantly
Pushtun
Nangarhar, Pak-
tia
Strong in limited
area
Theocratic
Jamiat-i-Islami (Is-
lamic League of Af-
ghanistan)
Mainly non-
Pushtun
Badakhshan with
limited contacts
in Tajik and Uz-
bek areas
Thin
Not opposed to
return of king
Harakat-i-Igilab
(Revolutionary Is-
lamic Movement)
Mainly Pushtun
Thinly spread
Thin
Willing to
cooperate with
secular groups
Mahaz-i-Milli (Na-
tional Islamic Front)
Mainly Pushtun
NA
NA
Believes in secu-
larizecl, Western-
oriented
democratic insti-
tutions
Jabha-i-Najat-i-
Milli (Afghan Na-
tional Liberation
Front)
Mainly Pushtun
NA
NA
Islamic Republic,
under restored
monarchy
Shola-i-Jauaid (Eter-
nal Flame)
Various
Thinly spread
NA
Maoist, opposed
to pro-Soviet
Communists
SAMA
Various
Kabul
Effective terrorist Originally pro-
infrastructure Chinese Marxist,
within Kabul now more apoliti-
cal
Religious Foreign
Orientation Support
Extreme Islamic Libya, Iran, Mus-
fundamentalist lim Brotherhood
Extreme Islamic Undetermined
fundamentalist
Moderate funda- Arab Gulf states,
mentalist Iranian sources
Basically funda- Undetermined
mentalist
Conservative Is- Undetermined
lamic
Conservative Is- Saudi Arabia, Lib-
lamic ya, Kuwait
Secular No appreciable
support from
Beijing
Secular NA
Socialist, nation- Secular Undetermined
alist, reformist
Shora-i-Itifaq Hazara Bamian, Ghowr, Moderate Primarily con- Shiite, but basi- Iran
(United Council of Oruzgun cerned with local cally secular
Islamic Revolution) affairs, antiexile,
anti-Pushtun
Panjsheris Tajik Panjsher River Strong in limited Concerned with Basically secular NA
Valley area local affairs
Konar-Nuristan Pushtuns of Konar Valley, Thin Antiexile, pro- Basically secular NA
Organization Konar Valley, Nuristan tribal union
Nuristanis
gan, Bamian,
Ghazni, Lowgar,
Kabul
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Group
Ethnic
Composition
Areas of
Major
Strength
Comparative
Military
Strength
Political
Orientation
Religious
Orientation
Foreign
Support
Islamic Union of
Northern Afghan
Provinces
Uzbek
Northern prov-
inces
Strong in limited
area
Locally oriented
group
Secular
NA
Afridi Tribe
Pushtun
Area of Khyber
Pass
Moderate
Proroyalist
Secular
NA
Quetta-Qandahar
Group (National Is-
lamic Union)
Pushtun
Qandahar, Hel-
mand
Thin
Proroyalist
Secular
Undetermined
Organization for the
Great Islamic War
Baluch
Qandahar, Hel-
mand, Nimruz,
Farah
NA
Pro-Baluchi Na-
tionalist
Secular
Some from Paki-
stani and Iranian
Baluch
Afghanistan Islamic
National Revolution
Pushtun
Paktia and Paki-
stan's Waziristan
Agencies
NA
Undetermined
Religiously in-
spired
NA
Unity Ulema
Various
Peshawar based,
no strength in
field
Nonmilitary
Prounity
Composed of Af-
ghan religious
leaders
Undetermined
Dr. Mohammad
Yusuf
Various
No strength in
Afghanistan
Nonmilitary
Proroyalist
Secular
Undetermined
Qaum-i-Itihad (Tri-
bal Union)
Various
Nonmilitary
Nonmilitary
Antiexile move-
ment
Secular
NA
Schpoon and Maj-
rooh (Ace[,)
Undetermined
Undetermined
NA
Prowestern, Lib-
eral
Secular
Undetermined
Alliance of Afghan
Generals
Various
NA
NA
Antiexile
Secular
Undetermined
Colonel Mohammad
(Zarif Qadar)
Undetermined
NA
NA
Undetermined
Secular
NA
Union of Islamic
Hazara
Undetermined
NA
Antiexile,
Shiite, but mostly No aid from Iran
Freedom Fighters of
Anti-Pushtun
secular
Afghanistan
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