IRAN: THE MUJAHEDIN

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Center
Iran: The Mujahedin
AAOV QrC,
Secret
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PA 81-10308
August 1981
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 National Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Iran: The Mujahedin
Information available as of 30 July 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
Near East South Asia Division, OPA,
The author of this paper is I of the
Office of Political Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
This paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South
Asia and the Directorate of Operations
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Mujahedin Strongholds
Caspian U. S. S. R.
Iraq- Saudi Arabia
Neutral Zone
Tabriz N Sea
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Rasht ? ,tahijan J- \
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yr _ Mashhad
~.llazvin Amol \ abol
Ka j ? TEhfan
!Hamadan
Malayeer
orulerd?Arak
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fliyadh
Towns shown in Iran are strongholds. - Abu Dhabiy
Underlining indicates hometowns of L"
Mujahedin leaders, several of whom are
from Tahriz United
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Iran: The Mujahedin 25X1
Key Judgments The Islamic leftist Mujahedin-e Khalq (People's Crusaders) emerged in
mid-1981 as the leading opponent of the Khomeini regime. They have won
increasing support from Iranians of all opinions who are dissatisfied with
the fundamentalist vision of an Islamic republic. The Mujahedin are not
now strong enough to seize power unilaterally, but their use of terrorist tac-
tics demonstrates the fundamentalists' weaknesses and helps create a sense
of chaos. The group, however, appears to have been hurt-at least
temporarily-by the regime's repression. In late July its leader fled into
exile in France with former President Bani-Sadr.
The Mujahedin include approximately 10,000 well-armed and highly
disciplined cadre and has shown it can bring out crowds of over 100,000
people for demonstrations in Tehran. Its blend of reformist Islam and new-
left concepts strikes a sympathetic emotional chord, particularly among
Iranian youth, who make up a majority of the population. Groups
advocating its ideology are likely to be prominent on the Iranian political
scene regardless of the fate of the Mujahedin.
The Mujahedin probably hope to gain a prominent role in local power
centers throughout Iran so that if central control continues to deteriorate,
they will be included in a broad anticlerical alliance able to succeed the
Khomeini regime. In that event, the Mujahedin's popularity should allow
their leaders to influence the shape of the next government.
Although the Mujahedin played an important role in the battles that
brought Khomeini to power, the fundamentalists consistently have sought
to exclude them. Since mid-1980 Mujahedin leaders have responded by
gradually increasing pressure against the fundamentalists, and in May
1981 they launched a major terrorist campaign against the regime.
The Mujahedin are xenophobic. Anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism
provide cornerstones for their policies. Their publications frequently and
consistently express hostility toward the United States and the corrupting
influence of Western culture in Iran. The Mujahedin have had sporadic
contacts with the Soviets in Tehran and elsewhere. They are not openly
pro-Soviet but rarely criticize the USSR. If in power, the group's leaders
would probably sympathize with most Soviet positions and might call on
Moscow for aid to prevent the return of Western influence to Iran. On
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some issues, however, the Mujahedin seem more inclined toward a
stubborn independence directed against all industrialized nations. The
Palestine Liberation Organization has provided training, supplies, and
information since the early 1960s and has acted as an intermediary in
dealings with the USSR.
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Iran: The Mujahedin
During the Revolution
The Mujahedin, the Islamic leftist group which has
become the leading opponent of the Khomeini regime,
played a significant role in the unrest that toppled the
monarchy.' Mujahedin members were well armed.
They published prolifically, spreading an ideology
especially attractive to the youth who were pillars of
the anti-Shah movement. They recruited actively at
the universities and were influential in the lower
schools and factories.
The Mujahedin were unable to stage large demonstra-
tions by themselves. They were weakened by faction-
alism and had relatively few disciplined followers.
Leaders concentrated instead on preparing for the
political struggle after the fall of the Shah. The
Mujahedin did help organize and direct demonstra-
tors and, along with various other groups, carried out
small-scale attacks on Americans and officials of the
Shah.
The Mujahedin played a key role in early February
1979 during the mutiny at Tehran barracks which led
to the collapse of the Bakhtiar government. After
beating off government counterattacks, the Mujahe-
din and others raided prisons, police stations, armor-
ies, and other military bases in Tehran, released
imprisoned comrades, and seized weapons throughout
Iran before Khomeini and his colleagues could orga-
nize a new government. Mujahedin members may
have been involved in the short-lived seizure of the US
Embassy in February 1979 that was dispersed by
progovernment irregular forces.
Under the Khomeini Regime
The Mujahedin have never accepted the Khomeini
regime as an adequate Islamic government. When
Khomeini took power, the Mujahedin called for con-
tinued revolution, but said they would work for
change within the legal framework of the new regime.
Mujahedin publications emphasized their unique role
as an urban guerrilla force that promised to enter
candidates for the highest offices under the new
political system.
The Mujahedin had significant assets for the political
competition. It had sympathizers in Bazargan's provi-
sional government, in some revolutionary committees,
and even in Khomeini's entourage. Bazargan may
have recommended the Mujahedin be given one or
two minor ministries, but if so, he was overruled by 25X1
the fundamentalists. The group's ideology was attrac-
tive to many segments of the population, particularly
the young. Its intimate links with Ayatollah Taleqani,
then Tehran's most prestigious cleric, made the Muja-
hedin attractive to the urban lower classes, the heart
of Khomeini's constituency
The fundamentalists clearly viewed the Mujahedin as
a threat and began to whittle away at its support. The
fundamentalists enlisted the most loyal armed Muja- 25X1
hedin units in Tehran into the first elements of the
Revolutionary Guard, which was designed to be the
armed mainstay of the new government.
the losses to the Revolutionary
Guard left the Mujahedin with about 3,000 commit-
ted cadre scattered throughout Iran. They could not
effectively manipulate their remaining sympathizers.
Much of the Mujahedin effort in the early months of
the new regime was, therefore, devoted to rebuilding
and strengthening their national organization.F
The fundamentalists used clashes during the summer
of 1979 as an excuse to expel the Mujahedin from
their Tehran headquarters. Masud Rajavi and other
Mujahedin leaders went into seclusion. Ayatollah
Taleqani's death in September 1979 further hurt the
group's efforts to gain acceptance
Despite these setbacks the Mujahedin entered avidly
into the national debate on the structure of the new
Islamic regime. The Mujahedin unsuccessfully sought
a freely elected constituent assembly to draft a consti-
tution.
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The Mujahedin made another attempt at political
participation when Mujahedin leader Rajavi ran for
the presidency in January 1980. He was forced to
withdraw when Khomeini ruled that only candidates
who had supported the constitution in the December
referendum-which the Mujahedin boycotted-were
eligible. Rajavi's withdrawal statement emphasized
the group's efforts to conform to election regulations
and reiterated the Mujahedin's intention to advance
its political aims within the new legal system.
In March and May, Rajavi and several other Mujahe-
din ran in Tehran for the Islamic Assembly. Musa
Khiabani, Rajavi's deputy, ran in Tabriz, and others
probably ran in the north, where the group was
strong. The Mujahedin demonstrated their broadened
appeal by running on their ticket several moderate
political figures-such as Ahmad Haj Seyyed Javadi,
who was elected from Qazvin
The Mujahedin was the only leftist group with enough
first-round votes to qualify candidates for the runoff.
Rajavi and Khiabani seemed assured of winning.
Rajavi's candidacy was endorsed by President Bani-
Sadr, who indicated he "might" be able to work with
the Mujahedin; former Prime Minister Bazargan, a
friend from the earliest days of the organization's
existence; and the Tudeh Party.
Between the two rounds the group announced its
members would disarm to prove they were not initiat-
ing the clashes with fundamentalists that had become
routine during campaign periods. The fundamental-
ists responded by again banning Mujahedin represent-
atives from the campuses. Only the daughter of the
late Ayatollah Taleqani was elected. The group's
protest-probably accurate-that the fundamental-
ists had altered vote totals to deny Rajavi and Khia-
bani a legitimate national platform came to naught.
Into Opposition
Rajavi hinted that the Mujahedin were considering
active opposition to the Khomeini regime. In the early
summer of 1980 the Mujahedin staged several rallies
in Tehran, drawing up to 150,000 people to hear
Rajavi promise to carry on the opposition to funda-
mentalist dominance.
During this period he or another Mujahedin spokes-
man apparently met daily with Khomeini in private,
but failed to convince the Ayatollah of the group's
legitimacy. On 25 June Khomeini issued a major blast
against the Mujahedin, claiming their activities would
derail the revolution and bring back "US domi-
nance."
Immediately after the speech, Mujahedin leaders
withdrew from sight to map a new political strategy.
Mujahedin offices were closed, editorials in the
group's newspaper, Mujahed, no longer addressed
significant issues, and the organization as a whole
went underground.
Mujahedin deliberations focused on the basic conflict
between their Islamic and revolutionary principles.
Continued acceptance of Khomeini as the ultimate
arbiter left the Mujahedin with little choice but to
disarm and blend into the fundamentalist crowd. In
contrast, loyalty to their revolutionary program re-
quired challenging the fundamentalist regime and,
ultimately, Khomeini himself.
The Mujahedin apparently decided to oppose Kho-
meini, but before their campaign took hold, Iraq
invaded and the Mujahedin again sought a legitimate
place in the new regime. Mujahedin units went to the
front immediately. They were tolerated by the funda-
mentalists only in the first hectic days of the war, and
most were soon expelled. The Mujahedin used the
opportunity to improve its image, reestablish contacts
in southwestern cities, and proselytize in the armed
forces.
By mid-November 1980 the Mujahedin were again
calling for "p:reparation of a general movement to
topple" the fundamentalists and were heavily involved
in the pro-Bani-Sadr demonstrations that were erupt-
ing across Iran because of fundamentalist efforts to
control the war effort. Mujahed also reappeared
regularly and resumed addressing significant political,
economic, and social issues.
Test of Strength
The Mujahedin became steadily more aggressive in
challenging the Khomeini regime. Supporters in Ta-
briz and Mashhad, and presumably elsewhere, began
stockpiling weapons in January 1981 and planning for
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attacks on fundamentalist forces. They were also
active in Tehran, staging a large rally protesting the
release of the US hostages. The Mujahedin apparent-
ly intensified recruiting in hopes that they could play
the deciding role in the power struggle between Bani-
Sadr and the clerics
The Mujahedin took the offensive in early March
when, at an antifundamentalist rally in Tehran, its
members fought fundamentalist hecklers. Mujahedin
sympathizers turned out in record numbers in the
days immediately after the rally to distribute propa-
ganda in Tehran. Other units seized key locations in
Lahijan on the Caspian coast and announced the
formation of a "government" based on Mujahedin
programs. After two days the Mujahedin withdrew to
the hills
In the next several weeks fundamentalist and Muja-
hedin clashes increased in intensity and frequency.
The Mujahedin effort reached a peak on 27 April
when an estimated 100,000 well-organized sympa-
thizers marched through Tehran. The demonstration
had been organized without access to any of the major
media outlets and announced only in Mujahedin
publications and by word of mouth. Simultaneous
Mujahedin demonstrations took place throughout
The rally and the abrupt drop in incidents throughout
Iran involving Mujahedin seemed to demonstrate the
group's ability to orchestrate antiregime activity on a
broad scale. The official fundamentalist newspaper
labeled the events of late April the "most ominous and
organized conspiracy ... since the revolution." Some
leading fundamentalists called for a cautious re-
sponse, fearing the Mujahedin would initiate a series
of protests like those that had been so effective against
the Shah. Hardliners, however, demanded an immedi-
ate confrontation with armed opposition groups.
Rajavi issued a statement evoking themes of official
cruelty and corruption that had been used effectively
against the Shah and labeling the Mujahedin, for the
first time, "an important opponent of the regime."
The Mujahedin statements demanded:
? Freedom of political activity for all groups.
? Autonomy for all ethnic minorities.
? Abrogation of all agreements with imperialist
countries.
? "Just" actions by the government "that benefit all
the people."
The fundamentalists' ouster of Bani-Sadr prompted
the Mujahedin to accelerate their antiregime cam-
paign. The group's leaders were probably eager to
rally the opposition before the fundamentalists could
ready a strike against the left.
The Mujahedin almost certainly was responsible for
the bombing of Islamic Republican Party (IRP) head-
quarters on 28 June.
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Khomeini regime claims that a young Mujahedin M
member employed at the headquarters actually placed 25X1
the bomb. In the wake of Bani-Sadr's dismissal and
the IRP bombing, the regime launched a campaign of
repression that apparently has taken its toll. Although
the Mujahedin have maintained their terrorist pres-
sure against the regime, Rajavi fled into exile with
Bani-Sadr in late July, and his initial comments
suggest he intends a long stay outside Iran.
Structure M
Most of the Mujahedin in the prerevolutionary period 25X1
were from west-central Iran, although over half of the
group's founders were from Tehran or farther north.
Several Mujahedin leaders have been Azarbayjanis-
its deputy head, Khiabani, for example, is from
Tabriz-and the group has always been strong in the
heavily Azarbayjani-populated north. Many Mujahe-
din have been children of pious bazaar merchants,
clerics, and other members of the traditional middle
class. Almost all have been drawn from the young
intelligentsia and are Shias; few have been female or
of working class origin. A disproportionate number
have been physical science students at Tehran colleges 25X1
and universities, some of whom used their expertise to
build communications equipment and explosive de-
vices as well as to produce ammunition. Many were
further politicized after being drafted into the armed
forces.
After a Marxist faction split off in 1975, the Mujahe-
din developed a tightly knit, well-educated cadre in
the major cities. Still appealing to the better educat-
ed, it developed strength in the educational system-
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drawing strong commitments even from teenagers-
among professionals, and apparently among younger
clerics. Outside urban centers, Mujahedin member-
ship remained more traditionally Islamic, less educat-
ed, and more likely to be drawn from workers and
farmers
The Mujahedin draw potential cadre from their pool
of Islamic sympathizers. Promising candidates are
moved gradually into more sophisticated ideological
groups as they become more politicized.
The Mujahedin is headed by an "organizational
staff" with 20 members. The group's leader, Masud
Rajavi, is the chief ideologue. His deputy is Musa
Khiabani, who may also be the military commander.
Also at the top are Rajavi's wife, Ashraf Rabiei, and
Abbas Dava.ri. The staff has three advisers: Khalil
Rezai (father of three well-known Mujahedin mar-
tyrs), Modir Shanechi, and Taher Ahmadzadeh. The
staff is divided into several committees: labor, social,
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Mujahed is published in Tehran, other large Iranian
towns, and in Western Europe. Estimates of its
circulation run up to 200,000 copies. Rajavi, Khia-
imprisoned together for anti-Shah activities. Until his
death, Ayatollah Taleqani served as the principal
bridge between the Mujahedin and the fundamental-
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bani, Davari, and Mehdi Abrishamchi have been
prominently featured in Mujahed.
Supporters
The group's avowedly Islamic orientation has given it
a broader recruiting base than its leftist rivals. The
Mujahedin probably has around 10,000 committed,
fully trained cadre throughout Iran. It has many
thousands of other members and sympathizers
throughout the country
The Mujahedin competes effectively by using reli-
gious symbols and offering the prospect of an appar-
ently familiar, idealized future. The group emphasizes
close contact with the people in contrast to its leftist
rivals. In the early years, for example, many Mujahe-
din lived at home rather than in "safe houses.'F_
The group has been able to draw on support that
crosses class lines from Iranians dissatisfied with the
pace and direction of the fundamentalist-dominated
Islamic revolution. The group is very active in the
schools at all levels. It regularly uses students-often
female-to distribute propaganda
The Mujahedin has used several means to broaden its
appeal. Its detailed labor and peasant programs have
been widely publicized, and members have been sent
to the factories and countryside to practice what they
preach.
The Mujahedin says it has "no strong organization"
among the ethnic minorities. Mujahedin ideology
supports ethnic autonomy and Sunni-Shia equality,
but contains hints of disdain for Sunnis. Cooperation
between the Mujahedin and the dissident ethnic
groups seems to have increased in 1981. Some reports
allege an alliance between the group and the Kurdish
Democratic Party, the major dissident force in the far
northwest and the strongest ethnic dissident group.
The Mujahedin is also active among the Baluch in the
southeast.
Mujahedin leaders have had close ties with several
prominent clerics. These links were begun or en-
hanced when Mujahedin leaders and the clerics were
ists around Khomeini.
Ayatollah Ali Tehrani-exiled to Mashhad by the
Khomeini regime in early 1980-remains a prominent
Mujahedin supporter. Tehrani, who was the instructor
of a popular Islamic modernist, Ali Shariati, has been
an outspoken critic of the Khomeini regime over the
past 18 months, and Mashhad has become a center of
opposition to the fundamentalists.
Other clerics, such as Azarbayjani spiritual leader
Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari, who are unenthu-
siastic about Khomeini's brand of fundamentalism,
have mixed feelings about the Mujahedin. While they
approve of its determined opposition to the Khomeini
regime, the Mujahedin's Marxist leanings and its
advocacy of violent dissent strongly limit the more 25X1
moderate clerics' willingness to offer supportF_~ 25X1
Relations With Other Leftists
The Mujahedin have periodically cooperated with the
Fedayeen-a Marxist guerrilla group that has no
Islamic allegiances-but have rejected overtures from
the pro-Soviet Communist Tudeh Party.
The Mujahedin and Fedayeen have been both attract-
ed to and repelled by each other since they emerged in
the 1960s. Before the revolution they had similar
tactics, foreign contacts, and immediate goals-to
bring down the Shah in favor of a radically revolu-
tionized society. Although ideological differences kept
their relations cool, the Mujahedin obtained guerrilla
training from the Fedayeen and later provided them
with funds and weapons.
At times supporters of the Mujahedin and Fedayeen
have been reported to move between the groups
comparatively freely. It is likely, however, that much
of the Mujahedin leaders' organizational effort has
been directed toward preventing losses while attract-
ing and retaining the loyalty of incoming sympathiz-
ers from rival groups.
Throughout 1979 the Fedayeen tried to convince the
Mujahedin to join in an opposition front. At the time
the Fedayeen was the stronger of the two groups,
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hedin leaders.
During the presidential and legislative elections,
Fedayeen leaders urged their sympathizers to vote for
Mujahedin candidates. At the same time, Fedayeen
organs published extensive critiques of Mujahedin
platforms. Over the past 18 months the balance of
power between the two groups has tilted in favor of
the Mujahedin, and little has been heard from the
Fedayeen about cooperative activity
The Mujahedin and Tudeh are not close. Probably at
Moscow's behest Tudeh tried to woo the Mujahedin
and then turned against them when its efforts were
unsuccessful. Tudeh supported Mujahedin candidates
in 1980 and sought Mujahedin adherence to a Tudeh-
led leftist front. During the second round of the 1980
legislative election, Tudeh characterized Rajavi as
representing a "true part of the revolutionary forces"
whose presence in the Assembly would "help unite
revolutionary forces and boost Iranian independence
and freedom."
Mujahedin leaders and committed cadre read widely
in international revolutionary literature and identify
with the goals of most revolutionary groups, Islamic
or not. With the exception of the Palestinians and
Algerians, however, this interest has not translated
into continuing ties
The Mujahedin's closest relations are with the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization. Mujahedin publications
often carry articles on Palestinian issues and state-
ments of support for Palestinian initiatives.
Ties to the PILO were an outgrowth of the Mujahe-
din's early need for guerrilla training and an external
source of arms and supplies. They also grew out of the
Mujahedin's deeply rooted hatred of Israel and re-
sentment of "'Zionist imperialist interference" in Iran
under the Shah. Contacts date back to the mid-1960s
when three of the nine founders of the group and
several recruits went to Jordan for PLO training and
aid in setting up arms supply networks
The relationship cooled in early 1979 when the funda-
mentalists around Khomeini turned against the Muja-
hedin. It was probably rekindled, however, as PLO
leader Arafat became disillusioned with the Khomeini
External Ties
Mujahedin's mixture of radical Islamic, Iranian na-
tionalist, and revolutionary Third World views sug-
gests that a detailed statement of their foreign policy
approach would include:
? Support for the Palestinians on most regional issues.
? Backing for the USSR and its allies on some global
matters, particularly those that allow a clear stand
against "US imperialism."
? Stubborn independence, like that of the Khomeini
regime, on other questions such as Third World
opposition to the industrialized nations.
Mujahedin may have received aid from Libya, Iraq,
and Syria during the Shah's rule, but recent Mujahe-
din propaganda indicates that it views such states as
"stooges" of the United States
with radical Islamic student organizations in the
United States and Western Europe.
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demonstrations at Iranian installations in support of
their colleagues in Iran and actively circulate Muja-
hedin publications among expatriate Iranians and
leftist sympathizers.
Attitude Toward the Soviets
Little information is available concerning Mujahedin
attitudes toward the USSR. An extensive survey of
Mujahedin texts published over several years has
revealed only one mention of the USSR, in early
1980, when the Mujahedin criticized-mildly-the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They were under
pressure from other leftist Iranian groups to join in
condemning Moscow, but the Mujahedin statement
reduced the Soviet action to a secondary concern. The
Mujahedin stated their opposition to "Soviet military
presence on Afghan soil" and called for its "rapid
departure." They then reasoned, however, that any
move that thwarts imperialism should be supported.
The Mujahedin statement concluded that the invasion
should be seen primarily as an obstacle to US inter-
ests in South Asia. The Mujahedin criticized Tehran's
support of the Afghan rebels, who, the group said,
help US, not Islamic, interests
Isolated comments on revolutionary tactics suggest
that the group might appeal to Moscow for "sup-
port"-diplomatic pressure and various types of eco-
nomic and military aid-to prevent a resurgence of
The current Soviet position, expressed on
National Voice of Iran programing beamed into Iran,
opposes the Mujahedin leaders because of their oppo-
sition to the Khomeini regime, but has sought to
Attitude Toward the United States
The Mujahedin's view of the United States is unre-
mittingly hostile. The group's publications frequently
and consistently label the US and Western culture as
the source of the problems of Iran and the Third
World. The Mujahedin focus their attacks on the
United States and those countries Washington would
be most likely to use to approach Iran.
The Mujahedin claim they have compelled the Kho-
meini regime to resist the impulses of some Western-
ized members to reestablish relations with the West.
The group urged the Khomeini regime not to release
the US hostages without first holding spy trials and
criticized the financial arrangements associated with
the hostage release.
A series of articles published in Mujahed in early
1981 by a militant who has since become openly pro- 25X1
Mujahedin asserts that the militants who seized the
US Embassy would have held out only a few days if
they and the regime had not been compelled to stay
longer by the emotions stirred in the Iranian people,
especially by the Mujahedin's anti-American propa-
ganda
Mujahedin statements and slogan
those staged by their rivals
after the seizure evoked themes like those of other
Iranian radical groups. Their demonstrations outside
the Embassy were not significantly different from
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Domestic Policies 25X1
The Mujahedin base their domestic policy on the
belief that the least that can be expected from an
Islamic government is the elimination of all vestiges of
Western-especially US-influence.2 They add that
an acceptable government would also be opposed to
' Annex C provides a review of the ideological underpinnings of
Mujahedin policies
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dictatorship and would be anti reaction ary-issues on
which they fault the Khomeini regime. The Mujahe-
din program is not far distant from that of the
fundamentalists who have tried to undercut the left by
co-opting large parts of its platform.
Detailed outlines of Mujahedin proposals have ap-
peared in several of their publications and in the
presidential platform of Mujahedin leader Rajavi.
The group advocates:
? Providing a popular voice in all aspects of national
life through "a truly democratic power structure"
based on control by democratically elected people's
councils in all sectors of society. Trade unions must
be political as well as professional. The National
Assembly is the most senior council.
? Creating an informed public opinion through open
communications from the government.
? Nationalizing all "exploitative investments," espe-
cially those used to send abroad capital generated in
Iran, and ending the role of "foreign colonial banks"
in Iran.
? Asserting the people's right to use Iran's re-
sources-especially oil-to better their lives and
spread the revolution. "Imperialist-linked" agree-
ments of all kinds would be nullified.
? Promoting small and medium industries, especially
those outside urban areas, through diversion of
capital expenditures from large industry. This
would prevent the reemergence of "class profit" and
"exploitative capitalism." The Mujahedin would
also remove government restrictions on the bazaar.
? Abrogating all agreements not in the interests of the
workers and formulating new laws favoring worker
interests. These laws should provide housing, educa-
tion, employment, and health care to the lower
classes. The Mujahedin say that workers should
share in profits in proportion to any increase in the
total profit of their individual employer.
? Diverting financial and technical resources to agri-
culture to end dependence by foreign suppliers and
create a balance between agriculture and industry
necessary for solid economic growth. Debts owed by
peasants and villages would be canceled and lands
restored. Migration to the cities would be discour-
aged by providing needed services in rural areas.
? Guaranteeing "complete" freedom of speech for the
media, political and religious groups, and individ-
uals. Promoting equality between Sunnis and Shias
and all other monotheistic groups, as well as
between men and women.
? According cultural and political freedom "within
the framework of national unity" to the ethnic
minorities, especially the Kurds.
? Fostering law and order and "resolving class strug-
gles as peacefully as possible.'
Special attention is given to the structure of an
Islamic defense force-the people's army. Mujahedin
theorists argue that there is no place for a professional
army equipped with sophisticated weapons in a "just
and humane" Islamic society because it would "grow
at the expense of other economic and social sectors."
The army would tend to serve its own interests or
those of the upper and middle classes, as well as
foreigners, rather than "the people." Citizens would
not support such an armed force, and it would,
therefore, rely on its sophisticated weapons and the
imperialists who sell and service them
Rajavi's platform called for a "20-million-strong peo-
ple's militia to protect the nation against imperialist
attack." Other Mujahedin texts describe the force in
more detail and blur the distinction between militia
and regular army:
? The army would serve the national interest, particu-
larly that of the lower classes, and not serve as "a
link in a chain of imperialist alliances." It would not
participate in an "unjust or antirevolutionary war,"
but would help revolutionary movements such as the
Palestinians.
? Foreign advisers would have a limited role; advisers
from imperialist nations would be banned.
? "Barbaric" differences between officers and men
would not exist. Lower ranks would be free to
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criticize, and decisions would be made by consulta-
tion. "Blind" obedience would be eliminated be-
cause the men would understand the policies of an
Islamic government.
? Military service would not be compulsory, and
promotion would be based on piety, not seniority.
(Ability does not seem to be a factor for the
Mujahedin.)
Prospects
The Mujahedin are the leading element in the diffuse
opposition to the Khomeini regime. The regime's
repression has so far discouraged a coalescence
around the Mujahedin. Through apparently indis-
criminate arrests and executions, fundamentalist ef-
forts have had some success in breaking down Muja-
hedin security. Over the longer term, however, the
Mujahedin's continuing resistance is likely to win
them additional sympathy and support.
The Mujahedin have several advantages, including
their members' ability to strike and then retreat
underground; their popular ideology; secure financing;
urban guerrilla skills; and penetrations of fundamen-
talist institutions.
The Mujahedin cannot assume power unilaterally in
Iran nor can they hold Tehran. The group probably
hopes to play a leading role in local power centers and
in building a national coalition that can oust the
fundamentalists and ensure that the Mujahedin will
play a prominent role in any successor regime
The Mujahedin blend of reformist Islam and new left
concepts strikes a sympathetic chord among Iranians.
The Mujahedin group or others advocating a similar
ideology, are likely to remain a force in Iranian
politics regardless of their immediate fortunes
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Appendix A
1963
Shah represses opposition; Khomeini exiled to Iraq.
1965
Mujahedin organization formed by militant anti-Shah
youth.
1967
Shah's coronation.
1969
First Mujahedin go to Lebanon for training by
Palestinians.
1971
Mujahedin begin terrorist strikes; many arrested and
executed.
1973
Mujahedin kill US military advisers.
1975
Mujahedin organization splits; Mujahedin kill US
military adviser.
Iran-Iraq border treaty signed.
1976
Mujahedin kill US civilians assigned to defense proj-
ects; suffer large losses in government's antiterrorist
campaign .
1978
Anti-Shah movement gains strength; Khomeini leaves
Iraq for France; martial law declared; Mujahedin
active in anti-Shah struggle; leaders released from
prison under Shah's amnesties.
January 1979
Shah leaves Iran.
February 1979
Mujahedin help rout Iranian military; Bakhtiar re-
gime collapses; Khomeini returns to Iran; Mujahedin
possibly involved in first seizure of US Embassy.
November 1979
US Embassy seized a second time.
December 1979
New constitution approved.
January 1980
Mujahedin leader Rajavi ordered out of presidential
race by Khomeini; Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr elected
president.
March-May 1980
Fundamentalists dominate two-round Assembly
elections.
Summer 1980
Mujahedin leaders go underground; reassess tactics.
August 1980
Mohammad Ali Rajai named prime minister.
September 1980
Iraq invades western Iran.
November 1980
Arrest warrants issued by Revolutionary Court for
Mujahedin leaders.
January 1981
US hostages released.
April 1981
Mujahedin stage largest demonstration in Tehran in
almost a year.
May 1981
Mujahedin openly challenge the Khomeini regime.
June 1981
Khomeini dismisses Bani-Sadr; bomb probably set by
Mujahedin kills fundamentalist leaders.
July 1981
Rajavi accompanies Bani-Sadr into exile in France.
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Appendix B
The Mujahedin Before the Revolution
The founders of the Mujahedin were disaffected
young members of the Liberation Movement of Iran.
The Movement grew out of intellectual groups op-
posed to the Shah during the 1950s. It advocated the
use of peaceful means to create a new regime that
combined a constitutional monarchy with West Euro-
pean-style socialism. Movement leaders hoped to
reconcile religious and secular opposition groups with
a program based on Shia ideals, modern Iranian
cultural values, and 20th century political and eco-
nomic theories.
The Shah's repression of opposition demonstrations in
1963 alienated militant young Movement members,
many of whom were probably also irritated by the
personal rivalries among older Movement leaders.
Some longstanding relationships' with Movement
leaders persisted, however, such as those between the
Mujahedin and the late Ayatollah Taleqani and
Mehdi Bazargan, who later became Khomeini's first
Prime Minister
The original Mujahedin leaders were profoundly in-
fluenced by the religious fanaticism of fundamentalist
Iranian clerics and the anti-Shah terrorist groups they
supported. They were also impressed by the Marxist-
Leninist theories and vocabulary popularized by revo-
lutionary literature.
The young militants-led by nine recent Tehran
University graduates-formed a secret discussion
group that eventually became a separate organization
called the Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (The
Organization of Crusaders of the Iranian People). Its
basic principles were:
? Islam is a dynamic and revolutionary religion that
can be reinterpreted through Marxist dialectics.
? Armed struggle is the only effective tactic in the
struggle against imperialism.
? Other Iranian opposition movements have failed
because they lacked an effective Marxist structure.
The Mujahedin organization slowly expanded, almost
entirely in urban areas-Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, and
Tabriz, which were among the hometowns of its
founders
For the first five years its leaders concentrated on
developing their ideology and creating the ground-
work for armed opposition. In the late 1960s the
Mujahedin helped set up a public hall in Tehran to
broaden the reach of their ideas. Conservative clerics
in Qom were outraged at the revisionist Islam taught
at the hall, but the more modern clerics from the
Tehran divinity school were willing to speak there.
SAVAK investigated the hall, but apparently con-
cluded that it represented a welcome irritant to the
traditional clergy, not a threat to the Shah's regime.
In 1973, after the security service made the connec-
tion between Mujahedin terrorist activity and oper-
ation of the hall, it was closed.
The hall provided a forum for Dr. Ali Shariati, the
young prophet of Iranian socialism. The group's re-
cruitment effort was helped significantly by its associ-
ation with Shariati, whose pamphlets and taped talks
were enormously popular among Iranian students. F-
Mujahedin concepts were close to, but not identical
with, Shariati's. Shariati preached the creation of the
classless society planned by the Prophet Mohammed
as well as the duty of all Muslims to fight "world
imperialism, international Zionism, colonialism, ex-
ploitation, oppression, class inequality, cartels, mul-
tinational corporations, racism, cultural imperialism,
clerics who advocate subservience, and the blind
worship of the West." Shariati held that an Islamic
jurist (Imam) would be the leader of an Islamic
society, while the Mujahedin maintained that such a
regime should be controlled by the "aware masses."
Shariati also included the clergy as an oppressor class
along with landlords and capitalists, while the
Mujahedin omitted them.
The Mujahedin began terrorist operations in Iran in
mid-1971 with efforts to disrupt the Shah's celebra-
tion of the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian
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monarchy. The group's plans went desperately awry.
A captured Mujahedin member gave information
under torture that led to the arrest of about 70 of his
comrades. A SAVAK penetration at about the same
time led to the imprisonment, death, or execution of
many other members, including all the Mujahedin
A brother of one of the nine founding members then
took over the group. Rajavi and Khiabani also became
influential in this period, according to their Mujahe-
din biographies, although both were imprisoned by
the end of the year. When the second Mujahedin
leader was killed in 1974, the group fell largely under
the control of three young militants whose disagree-
ments over the importance of Marxism in their
ideology eventually split the Mujahedin
The group's new leaders-most of whom were later
eliminated by Iranian security forces-began to pub-
lish an underground newspaper, Jangal, in the early
1970s. The Mujahedin benefited from an order issued
by Ayatollah Khomeini, then in exile in Iraq, that
called on faithful Muslims to support the Mujahedin.
Khomeini relayed to the Mujahedin and other opposi-
tion guerrilla groups money from pious Shias. The
Mujahedin also received funds from wealthy bazaari
relatives of some of the members
By late 1973 Mujahedin leaders had developed a
deeper interest in Marxist theory and were reading
extensively in Asian and Latin American revolution-
ary writings and early Soviet publications. In mid-
1974 they began sending agitators to Iranian shops
and factories. Some of the group's leaders began to
talk openly of the necessity of incorporating Marxist
theory into Mujahedin ideology.
Factionalism
A Marxist faction-mainly in Tehran-broke away
in 1975 and murdered several leaders of the Islamic
faction, which retained the allegiance of the Mujahe-
din's provincial units. The Marxists claimed that
Islam appealed mainly to the middle class while
Marxism was the "salvation" of the working class.
Mujahedin documents indicate the split was partly
engineered by SAVAK agents who had been ordered
to create dissension within the group's leadership.
Both factions covered up the split until after the Shah
fell "to preserve the unity of the people." Leaders
knew the vast. majority of their sympathizers were not
disciplined and might bolt to rival organizations.
After the revolution, the Marxist faction adopted the
name Sazeman-e Paykar Bara-ye Azadi-e Tabaqeh-e
Kargar (Fighting Organization for Liberating the
Working Class), or commonly, Paykar. Its principal
leader is Ali Reza Sepassi-Yadanian. The group's
major organ is a weekly newspaper, Paykar. It is
largely devoted to articles opposing "US imperial-
Paykar ideology rejects the Mujahedin concept of the
importance of human will in social development and
claims it is sollely a matter of materialist determinism.
It emphasizes urban. activism designed to mobilize the
urban proletariat and tactical alliances with other
opposition groups to strengthen the left. It advocates a
people's democracy in Iran and supports the demands
for autonomy of Iran's ethnic minorities, among
whom it became active. Paykar sees the Mujahedin as
bourgeois and liberal. In the view of the Mujahedin,
Paykar is opportunistic and not deeply committed to
the "welfare of the masses."
Paykar leaders considered a merger with the
independent Marxist Fedayeen, but soon broke off
talks because of irreconcilable ideological differences.
Paykar publications have denounced the Fedayeen's
refusal to criticize "Soviet imperialism" as well as its
refusal to end contacts with "dubious entities" such as
Tudeh.
Terrorism
Targets of Mujahedin terrorist attacks after their
abortive maiden effort in 1971 included US military
advisers killed in 1973 and 1975, US civilians asso-
ciated with defense projects killed in 1976, and
Iranian security officials. The group was also respon-
sible for the bombings of air and oil company offices
in Iran. These attacks were well executed and were
designed to attract increased attention to the anti-
Shah opposition, frighten US residents, and make
SAVAK appear vulnerable.
By early 1976 Mujahedin and Paykar losses in such
operations had become severe enough to compel a
reconsideration of tactics. Both decided to concentrate
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on recruiting new members. The Mujahedin focused
on students, while Paykar targeted workers.
Soon after the split in 1975, Masud Rajavi-then
imprisoned for anti-Shah activities-was accepted as
the Mujahedin's leader and chief ideologue. This
faction retained its full commitment to armed
struggle, but Paykar became critical of what it
claimed was an excessive reliance on such activity.
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Appendix C
The Ideology of the Mujahedin
"After years of extensive study of Islamic history and
Shia ideology, our organization has reached the firm
conclusion that Islam, especially Shiism, will play a
major role in inspiring the masses to join the revolu-
tion. Shiism has both a revolutionary message and a
special place in our hearts." Mujahedin text
"A man is a true Muslim only if he is a revolution-
ary. A Muslim is either a revolutionary or not a true
Muslim. In the whole of the Qoran, there is not a
single Muslim who was not a revolutionary. " Muja-
hedin text
Mujahedin ideology is a major source of the group's
wide popularity in Iran. It has been crafted with care
and is applied with consistency to domestic and
foreign issues-often in great detail. It reinterprets
the Qoran and several classic Shia theological texts
using concepts from a wide range of international
revolutionary literature. The Mujahedin present their
program and the theories behind it as a dynamic
response to the problems of modern Iran and a model
for international revolutionary groups.
? Total opposition to "US imperialism," which is the
principal enemy of revolutionaries. All events occur-
ring in Iran advance or impede this confrontation.
? Political, economic, and social power must be used
in the service of ideology. If "practical consider-
ations" take precedence over ideology, progress
cannot be made toward the ideal Islamic society.
Other recurring themes are the superiority of collec-
tive interests over those of individuals, the primacy of
Iranian models over those originating abroad, and the
necessity of remolding the attitudes and behavior of
the people to remove the effects of corrupting
influences.
These basic ideas can be traced through the several
major theoretical documents produced by the Muja-
hedin. One of the most influential is a detailed
reinterpretation of early Islamic history. Its basic
premise is that the ideal Islamic society is monotheis-
tic and classless and strives for the common good.
Within such a society citizens share in the benefits of
their work to the extent of their needs, but no one is
allowed to profit from the labor of others.
According to the Mujahedin, such a society existed
under the Prophet Mohammed, but was corrupted by
the feudal landowning class and the capitalist mer-
chant class. The text strongly emphasizes the necessi-
ty of armed struggle and flexible tactics in changing
circumstances to reestablish the ideal society.
Another major work focuses on the necessary triumph
of the oppressed over the oppressor and emphasizes
that it does not occur independently of man's will.
This concept underlies what is probably the basic
disagreement between the Mujahedin and the funda-
mentalists. The Mujahedin believe that the Qoran is
the source of truths on which the ideal government is
based and that it is open to interpretation by the
"aware masses" (such as Mujahedin cadre) who are
the most suitable citizens to govern wisely. The
fundamentalists hold that the basis of Islamic govern-
ment is the truth expressed in Islamic law and that
only persons with specialized knowledge of the law
(clerics) can lead an ideal government.
In their analysis of 20th century Iran, Mujahedin
theorists argue that the 1905 revolution transformed
Iran from a feudal society into a bourgeois system
heavily dependent on Western capitalism and under
the domination of imperialism-especially US imperi-
alism. They believe that by the late 1960s, cultural,
economic, political, and military imperialism threat-
ened the very existence of Iran. The Mujahedin say
that the Pahlavi regime had little support outside the
Westernized middle and upper classes and ruled by
terror and propaganda. Mujahedin texts call for
"heroic acts of violence"-such as their own terrorist
attacks-to awaken the people and begin the breakup
of oppressive societies.
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In the Iranian context, the fundamentalists are guilty
of "pragmatism," believing that their end (the Islamic
Republic) justifies temporary use of unacceptable
means. They have corrupted their ideological princi-
ples. The Mujahedin's rivals-the other leftists such
as Paykar and Tudeh-are "opportunists" who openly
disregard principle in guiding their activities.
The Mujahedin strongly endorsed the leadership of
Ayatollah Khomeini over the "unified masses" that
toppled the Shah, but they argue that he has not
provided the necessary force to prevent the fundamen-
talists' corruption of the principles of the 1978 revolu-
tion which will allow imperialism to reassert itself in
Iran. In the Mujahedin view, the fundamentalists
turned away from Khomeini's emphasis on the will of
the people at the beginning of the new regime. They
have allowed their "pragmatic" fear of the return of
imperialist influence and their "opportunistic" fear of
losing control of the revolution both to restrict the
choices and information open to the people and to
oppress them.
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