SUDAN: INCREASING PRESSURES ON THE NIMEIRI REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200360001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
4128000200360001-9
Secret
Sudan:
Increasing Pressures on
pproved For Relea&~3F C
the Nimeiri Regime
Secret
PA 81-10264
July 1981
COPY 250
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
Secret
Summary
Sudan:
Increasing Pressures on
the Nimeiri Regime
The next three months-when daily temperatures in Khartoum will reach
well above 100 degrees and the antiquated electric power grid will be pushed
to its limit-could witness a serious challenge to the government of Presi-
dent Gaafar Nimeiri. The hot weather will coincide with the Islamic fasting
month of Ramadan when tempers fray. Necessities will be missing from
many shops as a result of foreign exchange shortages. New taxes, imposed to
comply with International Monetary Fund demands, and inflation will
further erode the standard of living of many urban Sudanese. The country is
already witnessing increased labor unrest, and public protests are a distinct
possibility.
President Nimeiri has survived several serious challenges to his 12-year rule.
The support of the army has enabled him to withstand three major coup
attempts, the most recent in July 1976 when an effort led by the Ansar
Islamic sect and supported by Libya narrowly failed. In August 1979
widespread demonstrations over commodity shortages took place in Khar-
toum, and in August 1980 a weeklong power blackout caused public
confidence in the government to reach a new low.
As with many other Arab and African regimes, Nimeiri's political survival
will depend to a large degree on his ability to maintain the loyalty of the
army. We have no indication that any significant group within the military
is prepared to move against the regime. There is, moreover, no figure on the
political scene who is acceptable to all major opposition groups.
Consequently we believe that, barring a recurrence of serious health prob-
lems, Nimeiri probably will remain in power over the next year. Over the
next two to three years, however, if the country's economic situation
worsens, opposition to the government will intensify and elements in the
military will be increasingly tempted to depose Nimeiri and his associates.
The principal author of this memorandum isl Office of Political Analysis.
The economic section was contributed by of the Office of Economic
Research. The memorandum was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for
Africa, the Directorate of Operations, and the Office of Strategic Research. Information
available as of 26 June 1981 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be addressed to the Chief Near East South Asia Division, OPA, telephone
Secret
PA 81-10264
July 1981
25
25
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
Sudan: Regions
Saudi
Arabia
Northern
Z ,\ sea
Eastern
National t
Capital /
KHARTOU 1 Eritrea ~v
Sudan astr 1` ...~ cn
SouYthe?
Boundary representation is
not neeessarify authoritative.
Kinanah
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
Secret
Sudan:
Increasing Pressur
the Nimeiri Regim
Sudan's significance to the United States has increased markedly since the
mid-1970s. Major factors in this development have been the establishment
of a Soviet presence in Ethiopia and President Nimeiri's endorsement of the
Camp David Accords in 1978 when other Arab leaders condemned Egyp-
tian President Sadat's peace policy. More recently, Nimeiri's efforts to force
the Libyans out of Chad, his campaign to rally support for Egypt among
moderate Arab states, and his offer to make military facilities available to
the United States if Sudan is threatened by another country have caused
Sudan to assume even greater importance for the United States.
Sudan's moderate foreign policy is to a large extent a product of Nimeiri's
perception of the threats to his continued rule. Since an abortive Com-
munist-led attempt to depose him in 1971, he has come to believe that the
Soviets are determined to remove Sadat and himself as a first step toward
dominating the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.
Nimeiri's survivability-he has ruled since May 1969-appears to be due in
large part to the absence of a broad, unified opposition to his rule. He
exercises almost all real political power although he has taken a number of
steps to increase public participation in government, most notably the
creation of the Sudanese Socialist Union-the nation's sole legal political
organization. His pursuit of national reconciliation with his conservative
opponents and governmental decentralization appear popular with most
Sudanese. Moreover, his unpretentious approach to government has led
many Sudanese to prefer him to more controversial opposition figures.
Health problems, which caused him to curtail his activities last year have
been alleviated, and he has resumed his role as an activist leaden 25
In each of the past several years the threat to the Nimeiri regime has
increased as summer has approached. Temperatures are high, and rain
compounds communication, transportation, and supply problems. Rama-
dan, the Islamic month of fasting when tempers fray, now falls during the
hottest time of the year. High inflation, increasing labor unrest, rising
unhappiness with the central government in the south and west, and a strong
likelihood of major power failures could combine to produce serious public
disorders 25
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
Gloomy Economic Political stability in Sudan, especially over the longer run, depends to a
Prospects considerable degree on the ability of the government to reverse the nation's
economic decline. As of early 1981 Sudan's economic outlook was grim. An
overall government deficit of more than $1 billion is predicted for the fiscal
year ending 30 June 1981. A current account deficit of $836 million is also
projected for the same period. Inflation, which had receded somewhat last
year, is expected to rise again, perhaps reaching the 40-percent level of 1979
and early 1980.
Ironically, a principal cause of Sudan's economic crisis is the increased
development expenditures resulting from Arab and other financial assist-
ance in 1974-78. The wealthy Arab states began investing heavily in
Sudan-the only moderate Arab state with large amounts of unused arable
land-in order to lessen their dependence on Western food imports. Invest-
ment, however, fell short of requirements, while Sudan's limited absorptive
capacity slowed disbursements and delayed completion of projects. Sudan's
attempt to sustain the development drive through foreign borrowing created
a large debt burden. At the same time, an increase in the world price of
cereals and domestic economic policy tended to discourage the production of
cotton, the nation's largest foreign exchange earner and encourage the
production of wheat and sorghum. Export growth has failed to keep pace
with rising imports because of the decline in cotton production, increased
petroleum imports, and reduced foreign investment
The country's financial difficulties have forced it to scrap its six-year (1977-
83) development plan and to adopt in May 1979 a three-year economic
reform program under International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidelines. As a
condition for securing assistance from the IMF, the Sudanese have devalued
the pound, encouraged the production of cotton, agreed to defer new
development plans pending the completion of outstanding projects, and
agreed to tighten government expenditures. In late 1979 an agreement was
reached on rescheduling Sudan's debts to official creditors, and in Novem-
ber 1980 repayment agreements were reached with the majority of commer-
cial banks. Nevertheless, Sudan has fallen behind on making payments
under those agreements. Renegotiation of the agreement with official credi-
tors is tentatively scheduled for July.F I
The government consistently has had difficulty living up to IMF guidelines.
Revenue shortfalls and increases in expenditures for petroleum and sugar
subsidies in late 1980 led the IMF to delay payment of the second install-
ment of its aid due in February 1981. The effect of such action is com-
pounded by the decision of Saudi Arabia, a major financial supporter of the
Nimeiri government, to make its aid contingent on Khartoum's meeting
IMF requirements. In late February and early March 1981 the authorities
agreed under IMF pressure to increase government revenues by raising
f
25
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06T00412R000200360001-9
Secret
import and excise taxes on a number of goods, including petroleum but
excluding sugar. Failure to agree on additional price increases for next year
during recent IMF negotiations in Khartoum may impel the IMF to
withhold further aid to Sudan. Saudi aid and debt rescheduling would be
jeopardized if agreement with the IMF is not reached.)
Sudanese industry is depressed. It is handicapped by a lack of foreign
exchange for spare parts and equipment, an inadequate transportation
network, an erratic power system, and a shortage of skilled labor. The
government has attempted to limit the loss of skilled labor and management
personnel to the oil-rich countries by requiring that all private contracts for
work abroad be approved by the government, but the effectiveness of this
action is in doubt
Given the time required to reverse the decline in cotton production and the
probable continued high level of oil imports, it will be several years before
Sudan can get its affairs in order. The government's policy of borrowing
from the central bank to finance deficits is certain to keep inflation high.
Together with IMF-mandated reductions in subsidies, this could increase
pressure from public employees for higher wages. Although tough govern-
ment tactics broke a strike by railway workers in June, further labor unrest
is a distinct possibility
Positive developments, including oil discoveries by Chevron in southwestern
Sudan and exploration activities by other international oil companies as well
as the inauguration of the Kenana (Kinanah) sugar factory, will not have a
major impact on the economy for some years. Thus, until the mid-1980s the
government may be forced to choose between limiting expenditures and
risking labor unrest and possible public disorders or violating IMF or debt
rescheduling agreements and losing vital financial assistance
The Domestic The return from exile in September 1977 of Ansar leader Sadiq al-Mahdi
Opposition culminated a successful effort by Nimeiri to split the opposition National
Front, which had mounted coup attempts against the government in 1975
and 1976. Through his policy of national reconciliation, Nimeiri has per-
suaded the two major opposition groups-the Ansars and the Muslim
Brotherhood-to abandon efforts to overthrow his government. At the same
time he effectively neutralized those groups that openly oppose the govern-
ment-the National Unionist Party, the Baathists, and the Sudanese Com-
munist Party.)
The members of the Ansar Muslim sect, who comprise approximately one-
fifth of Sudan's 18 million people, are no longer openly hostile to the regime,
but Sadiq al-Mahdi is frustrated by Nimeiri's refusal to give him an
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06T00412R000200360001-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06T00412R000200360001-9
Leader of the officers' group that seized control of Sudan in a coup in May 1969, Nimeiri still holds al-
most all real power. He assumed the presidency in 1971, but has indicated that he may resign when his
present term ends in 1983.
Abd al-Majid Khalil First Vice President since August 1979, Khalil appears to be Nimeiri's choice as heir apparent. A career
army officer, he is regarded as highly competent, but lacks Nimeiri's political skill in dealing with
Sudan's competing groups.
Leader of the Ansar Islamic sect and former prime minister (1966-67), al-Mahdi returned from exile in
1977. He has been unhappy over his lack of a significant voice in national policy, but he has not actively
opposed Nimeiri in recent years.
Leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Turabi, like Sadiq al-Mahdi, accepted Nimeiri's offer of
reconciliation in 1977. In 1979 he became Attorney General. He has pushed, thus far unsuccessfully, for
the adoption of Sharia law in Sudan.
Al-Tayyib played a major role in negotiating the reconciliation with Nimeiri's conservative opponents
and since 1978 has been director of the State Security Organization, primarily responsible for foreign
intelligence and internal security. Although he has sometimes been identified as a rival of Abd al-Majid
Khalil to succeed Nimeiri, al-Tayyib has no base in the military and has said that he would support
Khalil as president.
Al-Hindi, leader of the National Unionist Party, refined to accept Nimeiri's offer of reconciliation in
1977 and remains in exile in London, where he works actively against the regime. He no longer has the
support of the faction of the party identified with the Khatmiyyah Islamic sect and has little real influ-
ence inside Sudan, although he serves as a rallying point for exile groups opposed to Nimeiri.
important role and has withdrawn from direct participation in the govern-
ment. Reflecting the historic Ansar distrust of Egypt, Sadiq is at odds with
Nimeiri over the Sudanese leader's decision to align the country closely with
the Sadat government. Sadiq also believes that Nimeiri's decision to openly
oppose the Libyan presence in Chad invites retaliation with little positive
gain. He has also said that by offering military facilities to the United
States, Nimeiri has violated Sudan's longstanding nonalignment.
Despite the increasing hostility between Nimeiri and Qadhafi, Sadiq has
continued to visit Libya and probably also receives some financial support
from Qadhafi. Sadiq, however, claims to have warned Qadhafi against
interfering in Sudanese domestic affairs and reportedly has cautioned his
followers against joining Qadhafi's Islamic Legion. Sadiq's attempt to
portray himself as a leader of the loyal opposition and to restrain his
followers from openly challenging the regime robabl stems from a desire
to avoid a regime crackdown on his activities.
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
Secret
The Muslim Brotherhood has actively participated in the government, but
is almost certainly maneuvering to place itself in a favorable position if
Nimeiri is forced out. The most conservative of all organized Islamic groups
in Sudan, its primary base has been the faculty and student body at the
University of Khartoum. Despite its small membership-estimated at be-
tween 60,000 and 300,000 nationwide-the appeal of the Brotherhood's
militant brand of Islam and its willingness to use intimidation to achieve its
ends have made it a formidable political force. The Brotherhood operated as
a clandestine organization from 1969, when Nimeiri banned all political
parties, until 1977, when it accepted Nimeiri's offer of reconciliation.
Although its leader, Hasan al-Turabi, serves as Attorney General, Sudanese
security officials regard the organization as a threat to the regime and
closely monitor its activities.
The National Unionist Party, the most important of those groups actively
seeking to overthrow Nimeiri, reflects the views of the better educated and
more secular merchants, civil servants, and professionals who oppose the
conservative forces represented by the Ansars and the Muslim Brotherhood
and resent the dominant role of the army. In the past the party drew much of
its strength from the pro-Egyptian Khatmiyyah Islamic sect, the principal
rival of the Ansars. The party now appears to have broken into two factions.
The Khatmiyyah sect headed by the Mirghani family does not share the
leftist sentiments of Sharif al-Hindi. the resent leader of the National
Unionist Party.
Al-Hindi is in exile in London. He has received aid from both Libya and
Iraq, but since 1980 Libya has been al-Hindi's major backer. Having lost
much of his support inside Sudan, al-Hindi probably is not a major danger to
the regime. For the most part his activities consist of distributing
antigovernment pamphlets and cassettes to anti-Nimeiri groups outside
Sudan. In recent months he reportedly has focused his efforts on building
antiregime sentiment in the armed forces
The Sudanese Baath Party, with only a few hundred members, seeks a
secular Arab nationalist state and has in other Arab countries used violence
to achieve its ends.
More recently, however,
Sharif al-Hindi's identification with Libya would appear to preclude close
cooperation with the Iraqi-backed Baathists.
The Sudanese Communist Party was at one time the largest Communist
party in Africa. It has been seriously weakened by government repression
since the disorders in August 1979 in which the Communists played a
significant part. The party, nevertheless, has considerable assets in the labor
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
25
25
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
movement and among students. Although it can no longer mount a direct
challenge to the regime, it probably can still stimulate unrest.
The Southern Problem The north-south cleavage remains the most serious division in Sudanese
society. Relations between the two regions were relatively tranquil between
February 1972-when the Addis Ababa agreement that ended the 17-year
civil war was signed-and early 1980, but traditional southern distrust of
the north has intensified during the last year. Southerners have long believed
that they have not received their fair share of development funds. The
predominately black, non-Muslim southerners also have been concerned for
some time over efforts by northern Muslims to give Sharia law greater force.
The principal factors souring southern attitudes toward the north are an
unresolved regional border dispute and a decision to build a small refinery at
Kosti (Kusti) in the north, rather than at Bentiu in the south closer to the
newly discovered oilfields.
Southerners see the choice of Kosti as a deliberate northern effort to deprive
the south of its natural resources. Some southerners have threatened to use
force to prevent oil from being moved to Kosti. Arguments by northern
officials that Kosti is a better location for communications and processing
have not been persuasive. Although the central government and the Chevron
oil company have agreed to increase development investment in the south, to
provide training in the oil industry to southerners, and to improve the
distribution of oil products to the south and west, most southerners are
skeptical of these promises. The endorsement by High Executive Council
President Abel Alier (chief executive officer of the Southern Region) of the
decision to build at Kosti has also failed to win much support in the south
and may have damaged Alier's standing among southerners. Protests by
students and other groups against the Kosti decision are continuing.
North-south tensions also have been aggravated by a dispute over the Abyei
District in the southern part of Kordofan Region. The area was traditionally
a southern tribal grazing land before the agreement of 1972, and southern-
ers believe that the area should be returned to the south. Arab tribes who live
there, however, insist that it remain part of the Kordofan Region. Nimeiri
has been able to avoid open conflict by referring the matter to mediation,
which will enable both sides to present their views but is unlikely to resolve
the basic conflict over the area.
An increasing number of southerners have come to believe that their
fortunes will not improve so long as they are linked with the north-a view
that could lead to renewed conflict. The increased availability of weapons in
the south (many brought by refugees from Uganda), the possibility of
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06T00412R000200360001-9
Secret
renewed support from Uganda and Ethiopia for southern dissidents, and the
likelihood that Libya might be tempted to encourage southern secessionists
are also factors that could lead to fighting between the northern and
southern regions. Nimeiri's decision in early 1981 to permit southern leaders
to solicit aid and assistance directly from Arab Peninsula states may help
persuade southerners that Nimeiri is still concerned with their interests. The
memory of the many casualties suffered in the civil war also deters man
southerners from renewing the conflict.
External Threats Libyan leader Qadhafi's efforts to depose Nimeiri constitute the principal
external threat to the regime. In 1975 and 1976 Qadhafi backed Ansar
attempts to topple Nimeiri. Although relations improved somewhat in 1977
and early 1978, Nimeiri's endorsement of the Camp David Accords in
September 1978 led Qadhafi to renew financial support and military train-
ing to the followers of Sharif al-Hindi, the only major Sudanese opposition
figure to have refused Nimeiri's amnesty. Although the Libyan leader
withdrew his support for al-Hindi in 1979, apparently fearing involvement in
conflicts with both Egypt and Sudan, he restored it in 1980 and again began
training Sudanese dissidents in Sudanese border.
Relations between the two states deteriorated sharply after Libyan forces
entered Chad in October 1980. The Sudanese have taken the lead in African
diplomatic efforts to force Qadhafi to withdraw his troops. Sudanese of-
ficials believe, however, that force will be required to induce the Libyans to
withdraw. Consequently they have permitted the use of Sudanese territory
as a safe haven and supply base for forces loyal to Chadian dissident Hissein
Habre.
Libya intensified its attacks on the Nimeiri regime after Sudan restored full
diplomatic relations with Egypt in March 1981 and invited Sadat to attend
the 25 May revolution celebration in Khartoum. A public statement by
Nimeiri in late March calling for Qadhafi's removal resulted in a stepped-up
Libyan effort to bring down the Sudanese leader. The Sudanese believe that
there is little likelihood of a direct attack across the Chadian frontier by
Libyan forces, but are deeply concerned that Qadhafi will support cross-
border operations by groups of Sudanese dissidents. Sudan broke diplomatic
relations with Libya in late June, charging Tripoli with responsibility for a
bombing at the Chadian Embassy in Khartoum.)
Other radical Arab states also are critical of Nimeiri for his close relation-
ship with Sadat and his support of the Camp David Accords, and in some
cases have aided antiregime elements. In 1979 while Sharif al-Hindi was
temporarily out of favor with Qadhafi, the Iraqis provided him with assist-
ance. They may still be aiding other anti-Nimeiri groups, especially the
7 Secret
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06T00412R000200360001-9
Sudanese Baathists, despite a gradual improvement in Sudanese-Iraqi rela-
O
Following a rocket attack on the Sudanese Embassy in Beirut in May 1981,
Nimeiri downgraded relations with Syria, charging that President Assad
had come under the influence of Qadhafi. Nimeiri also accused Arafat and
the PLO of responsibility for the attack and called on the Palestinians to
choose a new leader. The Sudanese for some time had suspected the PLO of
planning antiregime terrorist operations. In February 1981 Sudan expelled
the four PLO representatives in Khartoum, although Sudanese officials
stated that the action was aimed at the individu 'nvolved and did not
constitute a severance of relations with the PLOI
1976 coup attempt can be utilized by Nimeiri opponents.
As the threat from Libya has intensified, Nimeiri has succeeded in improv-
ing relations with Ethiopia, reducing the chances that Sudan will be faced
with hostile neighbors on opposite borders at the same time. It is now less
likely that the several hundred Ansars who took refuge in Ethiopia after the
that the Eritreans are prepared to settle for less than full independence.
The Sudanese Government is concerned over the security threat posed by
the almost 300,000 Eritrean refugees in Sudan. It is seeking to persuade the
three major Eritrean groups to present: a common negotiating front to the
Ethiopians. The Sudanese attempt to broker a political solution to the
Eritrean conflict, however, has been unsuccessful. There is no evidence that
the Ethiopians are prepared to grant the Eritreans meaningful autonomy or
urged other governments to do the same.
security situation could invite Soviet, Cuban, or renewed Libyan involve-
ment. Consequently Sudan has begun to cooperate with other regional
states, especially Kenya and Zaire, to strengthen the Obote government.
The Sudanese have also disarmed anti:-Obote forces in the border area and
The Sudanese are also concerned over the threat to security presented by the
nearly 100,000 Ugandan refugees in southern Sudan. Although Nimeiri had
been critical of Ugandan President Milton Obote and the Tanzanian role in
his election, he has come to see the Ugandan leader as preferable to any of
the likely alternatives, and he is afraid that a continuing deterioration of the
The USSR, which has seen its position in Sudan deteriorate markedly since
the short-lived coup led by the Sudanese Communist Party in 1971, would
prefer to see the Nimeiri regime replaced by a more radical government.
Although we cannot confirm Sudanese suspicions that the USSR was
directly involved in the Libyan-backed effort to depose Nimeiri in 1976 or in
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06T00412R000200360001-9
0
25
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TO0412 8000200360001-9
Secret
the current training of Sudanese dissidents, the Soviets are not displeased by
Libyan efforts to topple Nimeiri. Since 1978 the Soviets have made several
efforts to improve relations with Sudan, but have been rebuffed on each
occasion. Nimeiri has been consistently critical of Soviet activities in the
region and has condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
The Military: The Sudanese armed forces constitute Nimeiri's principal power base. The
Key To Survival army helped Nimeiri come to power in May 1969, and it proved loyal to him
during the conflict with the Ansars in 1970, despite the fact that many
members of the armed forces were nominally members of the sect. It was
army support that enabled Nimeiri to regain power following the abortive
Communist-led coup in July 1971 2
As with many other Arab and African regimes, Nimeiri's continued survival
depends on the willingness of the army to put down serious public disorders.
In October 1964 the government of Ibrahim Abbud fell when the army
refused to suppress massive street demonstrations. In August 1979, on the
other hand, the police and the army rallied behind the government to put
down Communist-orchestrated disorders that lasted some 10 days.C
Morale in the military, possibly the major factor in its willingness to support
the regime, appears to be directly related to pay and the ability of the
government to provide the armed services with modern arms and equipment.
he 2,'
acquisition of considerable amounts of new equipment in the spring of 1981
will probably have a positive effect on morale throughout the armed services.
The continued inability of the government to improve overall economic
conditions, however, could cause dissatisfaction to spread. 2
Since the Ansar-led, Libyan-supported coup attempt in 1976, when some
officers joined the rebels and only a few off-duty enlisted men reported to
their units, the regime has made a concentrated effort to ensure military
loyalty. Because an estimated 60 percent of the enlisted ranks came from
western Sudan, the homeland of most Ansars, recruitment of northerners
and easterners has been emphasized. This policy, however, has left the
military understrength-probably less than 60,000 as opposed to an au-
thorized strength of 71,000-because civilian pay is higher in the northern
and eastern regions of the country.
The primary responsibility for maintaining security within the armed forces
belongs to the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). Its personnel are
stationed with every unit down to and including battalion level and in some
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06T00412R000200360001-9
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06T00412R000200360001-9
cases smaller isolated units.I
Intensive efforts are also made to ensure the loyalty of personnel assigned to
those units responsible for maintaining order in the Khartoum area-the
Republican Guard, two companies of the airborne brigade stationed at
Khartoum North, and a group of eight infantry companies stationed at
Khartoum South. Periodic arrests and court-martials of dissidents are used
to deter others from engaging in antiregime activity
The regime's efforts to keep dissatisfaction in the armed forces to a mini-
mum appear to have been largely successful. There probably is isolated
opposition to the government within the military, but it does not appear to be
a serious threat to Nimeiri. If the regime were threatened, internally or
externally, the army would defend it. Over time, however, the loyalty of the
military could be eroded by a perceived lack of career opportunities or the
government's inability to deal with the nation's economic problems.
President Nimeiri has been in office for more than 12 years, considerably
longer than any other leader since the country achieved independence in
1956. The prospects for his remaining in power over the next year appear
good, provided his health remains satisfactory. Despite-some reports of
unhappiness in the armed forces, there are no indications that any group in
the military is preparing to move against the regime. We believe that the
army is probably willing and able to put down most public disorders that
might occur. An extended, widespread public uprising, however, could
severely test the military's loyalty to the government. Although we cannot
predict such an uprising, it is possible that one could occur spontaneously
given the extent of public dissatisfaction.
If Nimeiri died or left office for health reasons, First Vice President Abd al-
Majid Khalil would succeed him temporarily. Khalil, who appears to have
the support of the military, probably would win the presidential elections if
they were held, as constitutionally required, within 60 days. If Nimeiri
chooses not to seek reelection at the end of his present term which expires in
1983, the Sudan Socialist Union would select the next president. In this
case, Khalil who has the support of Nimeiri, would appear to be the front-
runner.
Under Khalil, or a government in which he had the strongest voice,
Sudanese national policies probably would change very little. Sudan prob-
ably would maintain its pro-Western and pro-Egyptian foreign policy.
25
25
25
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9
Secret
Khalil, who lacks Nimeiri's ability to deal with the disparate Sudanese
political and tribal groups, probably would be inclined to treat domestic
critics of the regime more harshly than Nimeiri. This approach could end
the uneasy truce between the government and its conservative opponents
created by Nimeiri's national reconciliation campaign
In the event that Nimeiri and his supporters were deposed in a coup,
elements of the armed forces almost certainly would be involved and
probably would dominate a successor regime. If military officers sympa-
thetic to more conservative elements in Sudanese society, especially the
Ansars and the Muslim Brotherhood, were to control a successor govern-
ment, the new regime's foreign policy would shift from the present pro-
Western stance toward a more nonaligned position. Such a government
would abandon its close identification with Egypt in favor of closer ties with
the conservative Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. Sudanese-US rela-
tions would be less close, but the new government probably would continue
to seek military and economic support from the West.
In the unlikely-but not impossible-event that officers sympathetic to the
goals of Libya and/or other radical Arab states were to control a successor
government, US interests in the region would be very seriously damaged and
Sudanese relations with the USSR and its allies could be expected to
improve dramatically
 Secret
Approved For Release 2007/06105: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200360001-9