LIBYA: THE DOMESTIC CHALLENGE TO QADHAFI

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roved For Rel
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Assessment
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4128000200330001-2
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Libya:
The Domestic Challenge
to Qadhafi
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Libya:
The Domestic Challenge
to Qadhafi
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Information available as of 12 June 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was prepared by
Office of Political Analys
1 -1
is. Comments and
Chief, Near East South Asia Division, OPA, on
This paper was coordinated with the Offices of
Central Reference, Economic Research, Strategic
Research, and Geographic and Societal Research, the
Directorate of Operations, and the National
Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia.
Top Secret
PA 81-10229C
I-- I
July 1981
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Libya:
The Domestic Challenge
to Qadhafil
Key Judgments Widespread and growing disaffection with the Qadhafi regime in Libya
makes it almost certain that Qadhafi will ultimately be removed from power
by means of assassination or coup, probably engineered by the military.
Predicting the timing, however, is almost impossible. Qadhafi could remain
in power for a considerable period
Unhappiness is no longer confined to the middle and upper classes. Members
of the lower classes, too, have been affected by compulsory military service,
heavy casualties in Uganda and Chad, utterances and practices that offend
traditional Muslim mores, purges and executions for political and economic
"crimes," confiscation of savings, and murders of dissidents abroad. The
military, in particular, objects to the creation of revolutionary committees
within the officer corps-which has destroyed discipline-and to casualties
incurred in pursuit of Qadhafi's foreign adventures.
We have evidence pointing to a string of attempts against Qadhafi by
individuals and groups within the military in recent years. Fragmentary
information indicates that groups continue to plot but tells us little about
their extent or composition. Potential plotters cannot help but be disco r-
aged by the regime's success in neutralizing coup attempts in advance
Civilian discontent has shown itself in occasional reports of demonstrations,
circulated pamphlets, and unspecified unrest, perhaps even violence directed
against Libyan officials. Cyrenaica, especially in its chief town, Banghazi,
has been the scene of numerous disturbances. Student dissent peaked last
fall when students, including females, were forcibly drafted for service in
Chad. Farmers have resisted regime attempts at reform. There have been
arrests within the Berber community and among followers of one dissident
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A number of exile groups have organized in opposition to the Qadhafi
regime, but they tend to lack local assets and to dissipate much of their
energies in intergroup squabbling.
There are a number of key factors working in the regime's favor, however:
the political passivity of the Libyan people; soaring oil revenues and the
social programs they pay for; Qadhafi.'s extensive precautions for his per-
sonal safety; and his successful reliance on fellow tribesmen as spies and
informers. In the last two years the regime has begun a systematic policy of
intimidation-political purges and murders of exiles-that must give pause
to potential plotters
Qadhafi will most likely exit the scene-in time-as the result of a military
coup, perhaps with the participation of disaffected regime figures and
leading exiles. A successor regime will probably involve a collegial leader-
ship at first, masking a jockeying for power behind the scenes that will
ultimately yield a single leader. Any successor, however, will probably
reduce or eliminate Qadhafi's support for world terrorism, pursuit of a
nuclear capability, and use of oil to intimidate the West. The Soviet
connection would probably be maintained to ensure continued access to
weapons and parts, but there might be a significant distancing between
Tripoli and Moscow; even an outright breach cannot be ruled out
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Libya:
The Domestic Challen2e
to Qadhafi
Causes of Discontent
Libya's Mu'ammar Qadhafi-who at the moment
holds no official position but is nevertheless sole ruler
of the country-has seen popular acceptance of his
revolutionary regime erode dangerously in the past few
years. Qadhafi was never a friend to the upper class,
which had thrived under the monarchy, or to the
middle class-the landowners and merchants who be-
came the immediate targets of Qadhafi's reforms. He
quickly endeared himself to the lower classes, however,
as he set about transforming Libya into a semisocialist
state. Staple foods were subsidized. Education was
provided at no cost to the young, including thousands
studying at US and European universities. Medical
clinics were established throughout the country. An
ambitious housing program was undertaken. These
changes were made possible by the leap in oil profits
that began after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The re-
forms profoundly altered a country that before the
discovery of oil in 1959 was one of the poorest in the
world and seemed to solidify Qadhafi's popularity
But Qadhafi has not been content with modest re-
forms. Strongly influenced by Nasir, Qadhafi at first
remained in his shadow, modeling his revolution on
Nasir's. Soon, however, Qadhafi's self-image broad-
ened. With the publication of the three volumes of The
Green Book, Qadhafi arrogated to himself the stature
of Muhammad, uttering "the truth" in the tones of a
prophet and even "correcting" flaws in the Koran. This
posture has shocked Libya's devout Muslims and their
religious leaders-to say nothing of antagonizing
Libya's conservative Arab neighbors, Saudi Arabia
and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. A domestic
reaction to Qadhafi on religious grounds has, however,
been slow in developing because Libya-unlike Iran-
does not have strong, independent religious leaders.
Nor is there a revered, central Islamic institution, like
Cairo's Al-Azhar University, capable of taking the
lead in orchestrating opposition. Reforms such as the
inauguration of compulsory military service for
women, as well as men, have generated no organized
resistance, but the effect has been deeply disturbing to
Mu'ammar Qadha 1 I
the pious, and there have been scattered instances of
Qadhafi's doctrines are not the only problems causing
discontent among the lower classes, as well as within
the ranks of Qadhafi's more traditional opponents.
Compulsory military service is universally disliked-
particularly among high school and college students,
who have seen their schools and universities turned into
military barracks for half the year. Often representa-
tives of the regime will march into a classroom and
draft all the students on the spot. Qadhafi's foreign
adventures and the heavy casualty rate they have
brought are widely resented. We have no reliable in-
formation on Libyan losses in Chad, or on earlier losses
in Uganda. There is evidence that the rate is fairly
high, however, and that the effect of the losses has been
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compounded b the regime's clums attempts to cover
up their extent families are not
notified of a death until a government vehicle arrives to
deposit a sheep-for sacrifice-at the doorstep. Fam-
ilies are given no details, and the bodies are not re-
turned, depriving the survivors of the possibility of
conducting appropriate funeral rites
About two years ago Qadhafi embarked on an all-out
attempt to impose his revolutionary doctrines on Lib-
yan society. He may have been spurred by the success
of the Iranian revolution and a determination not to be
shown up by Iranian zealots who, he was convinced,
were modeling their revolution on his own. In early
1978 he published the second volume of The Green
Book-on economic theory-and began to put its
cloudy ideas into practice. In May he nationalized
every house not occupied by its owner; renters became
owners overnight. In September workers were urged to
take over their place of employment, and in December
the government nationalized all import industries. In
March 1979 Qadhafi announced that he was stepping
down from the office of President and dissolving the
Revolutionary Command Council, since all power was
now in the hands of the people. This enlarged Qad-
hafi's freedom of action, since it removed whatever
restraints the RCC had imposed. The death penalty
was announced for undefined "economic crimes" in
April 1979, although it was not immediately applied.
tionary committee members, and sentenced. Some,
after dramatic televised "confessions," were released;
others vanished. Between April 1980 and May 1981,
11 Libyan exiles were murdered-in Rome, Beirut,
London, Bonn, Athens, Milan, and Manchester; other
dissidents were seriously injured, including one exile's
two children and a student in the United States
Libya's newly repressive atmosphere is widely unpopu-
lar with all levels of Libyan society, including the lower
classes that had previously benefited from the Qadhafi
regime. Some have lost family members, friends, and
acquaintances. The regime has used the threat of force
against an individual or his family to persuade people
to cooperate. Those murdered abroad may not be
buried in Libya, depriving the families of the consola-
tion of Muslim rites. The result has been distrust, even
of one's own family, and revulsion. Revolutionary
committee members-most of them young men, many
drunk with power rather than ideological fervor-have
been encouraged to act like goon squads, breaking into
homes and smashing wine presses, stealing in the name
of revolutionary equality, literally getting away with
murder.)
On the economic front, too, the regime launched a last-
ditch attack against the vestiges of Libyan capitalism.
It nationalized small shops, leading to chronic short-
ages of foods and other necessities, then turned its
attention to individual savings accounts. Declaring as
its aim the elimination of "hoarded wealth," it seized
control of all citizens' money above a maximum of
1,000 dinars (about $3,380) per family. So radical was
the move that its effects extended well down the eco-
nomic ladder, again chipping away at the regime's
The year 1980 saw a qualitative change in Qadhafi's
style of rule. Until that time his attempt to impose a
new social and economic order, while hard on those
who had previously been well off, was tempered by
moderation. But in 1980 Qadhafi seemed to lose all
sense of restraint. In a lecture in May on his revolution-
ary doctrines at Fatih University, Qadhafi declared
that "the physical liquidation of counterrevolutionary
forces everywhere is the last stage in a revolutionary
struggle." He thus elevated to the status of doctrine
what he had already begun to practice: arrests, show
trials, executions of economic "criminals" and political
opponents at home, and the murder of dissidents
abroad. The "revolutionary committees"-which had
been created in 1977 but had maintained a relatively
low profile-moved to the fore as agents of the re-
gime's repression. Thousands were denounced,
rounded up, tried before courts composed of revolu-
traditional support
The army-especially the officer corps-has particu-
lar reasons for disillusionment with the regime. It has
borne the brunt of Qadhafi's determination to inject
Libyan power into places like Uganda and Chad,
which the population considers irrelevant to the coun-
try's interests. The regime's decision to introduce revo-
lutionary committees into the ranks of the armed
forces meant that junior officers, even enlisted men,
were often elevated over the heads of their superiors-
a situation that destroyed military discipline and
eroded morale. On the other hand, Libya's success in
Chad has probably had a positive effect on the mili-
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tary's support for the regime-at least so far. But the
military must find duty in Chad onerous at best. The
Chadians have started to harass Libyan troops, and if
Chadian rebel leader Habre is successful in mounting
a guerrilla campaign against the occupying Libyans,
stretched thin over difficult terrain, the resulting death
toll could quickly change the military's mood.
Areas of Vulnerability Within the Leadership
Qadhafi's Libya is, rhetoric aside, a state ruled by one
man. Immediately following his successful coup in
September 1969 Qadhafi, who did most of the coup
planning, called himself merely the first of 12 members
of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council, but the
other members of the group were handpicked by him.
It quickly became apparent that the civilian Council of
Ministers had no real power. Over the years, seven
members of the original RCC have fallen by the way-
side. At the moment only four-besides Qadhafi-
have any political role: Abd al-Salam Jallud, fre-
quently referred to as Qadhafi's second in command
(he holds no official position); Mustafa Kharubi,
thought to be head of both general and military intel-
ligence, although there is one report that he has lost
these posts; Khuwaylidi al-Humaydi, leader of the
people's militia; and Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir, com-
mander in chief of the armed forces
For all their long association with Qadhafi and their
retention of positions of seeming importance, the ac-
tual power exercised by these men is unclear
A key
uncertainty involves the amount of power exercised by
Jallud. He is usually regarded as Qadhafi's deputy-
and thus Qadhafi's most likely successorF_
The positions of Kharubi and Humaydi and their
attitudes toward Qadhafi are only slightly less puz-
zling. There is a fair amount of evidence that the two
have disagreed with a number of Qadhafi's policies at
different times over the years, and that Qadhafi has
come to question their loyalty-although apparently
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Khuwaylidi al-Humayd4
apparently obsequious; he never questions or opposes
Qadhafi's policies and takes Qadhafi's side in
intraleadership disputes.
Abu Bakr Yunis is the only one of Qadhafi's former
RCC colleagues who still seems to be unreservedly
loyal. Yunis, one of the few blacks to have made good
in a race-conscious country, is the only figure in the
leadership besides Qadhafi who has a powerful tribal
power base (the Yunis tribe is in Fezzan, near the
Chadian border)-a fact that may explain his long
tenure, since he is some-
what ineffectual. His attitude toward Qadhafi is
Most accounts agree that regardless of their current 2
status, the four remaining RCC members have lost
ground in recent years to a group of young,
uneducated, and unpolished (some barely literate) fire-
brands and sycophants from Bedouin tribes-many of
them Qadhafi's fellow Qadhafa tribesmen-who feed
Qadhafi's ego, tell him what he wants to hear, and
encourage his drive to impose his ideology on the
country, particularly through the use of "revolutionary
violence." Several of these figures, such as Sayyid
Qadhaf al-Dam, a cousin and fellow tribesman,
Sayyid's brother Ahmad, and Qadhafi's cousin Hassan
Ashkal, are very powerful. They tend to move from
position to position, often taking on security or intel-
ligence functions or carrying out special missions for
Qadhafi. They seem to be fanatically loyal to their
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Qadhafi, the ones he trusts and turns to for advice.
Areas of Vulnerability Within the Military
There is considerable evidence that unhappiness with
the Qadhafi regime has been mounting within the
ranks of the military, but little information on the
existence of active plotting groups
We can be fairly certain of
widespread dissatisfaction within the ranks of the mili-
tary, but it does not necessarily follow that disaffected
officers are prepared to act-particularly in view of the
fate that has overtaken so many of their fellows in-
volved in antiregime activity over the years. The fact
that Qadhafi has faced-and surmounted-repeated
coup and assassination attempts, most of them mili-
tary, tends to make the existence of current plotting
groups more plausible, but does not augur well for their
chances.
Early in 1979 Qadhafi compounded his problems with
the military by committing some 2,000 men-many
from the people's militia-to the ill-fated campaign in
Uganda. At this point he seems to have realized that
steps had to be taken to deal with mounting military
discontent. He convened a three-day meeting of Free
Officers ' in April 1979, at which he catalogued the
"triumphs" of Libyan policy that could be credited to
the Army and simultaneously announced that revolu-
tionary committees were to be organized within the
officer corps, obviously as a control mechanism.
' The Free Officers are the group of young officers who, under
Qadhafi's leadership, carried out the coup in September 1969. Those
who emerged as leaders, and who subsequently became members of
the 12-man Revolutionary Command Council, were, with only two
exceptions, part of the 1963 graduating class of the Military Acad-
emy, and the total number of Free Officers-many of whom played
ri h r l role, if any. in the actual coup-probably exceeds 100.
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There is some possibility that the success of Qadhafi's
move into Chad has alleviated the situation within the
military to some extent by giving it a successful cam-
paign. The long history of failed coup attempts and
subsequent executions, moreover, has no doubt
discouraged potential dissidents, as has the current
repressive atmosphere: purges at home, murders
abroad, and Qadhafi's heavy reliance on spies and
informers. At the same time, casualties in Chad have
reportedly been high, and few Libyans see any national
stake in Chad or have any interest in a merger. There is
considerable evidence of significant disaffection in the
armed forces;
to act against the regime
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Civilian Dissent
There is no evidence of current plotting by civilian
groups within Libya. There are, however, indications
of widespread unhappiness on the part of key groups:
religious conservatives; students; entrepreneurs and
other members of the middle class; and professionals.
There are fragmentary accounts of demonstrations,
circulated pamphlets, and unspecified unrest, perhaps
including protest attacks on regime officials, but Libya
is now a closed society and few details have come to
light.
Several generalizations, however, can be made. Qad-
hafi's power base is in the western part of the country.
He draws his strength from his own tribe and those
around his birthplace, the Tripolitanian city of Surt,
and from the tribes near Sabha in Fezzan-the place
where he attended school. 2
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 Cyrenaica-that portion of Libya closest to the Egyp- Mosque after an imam spoke out in criticism of Qad-
tian border-has traditionally been antagonistic to the hafi.
Qadhafi regime. Banghazi (in Cyrenaica) has been the
scene of numerous disturbances over the years. In 1972
a "Libyan Liberation Movement" in Banghazi was
active in distributing tracts and painting slogans hos-
tile to the regime. In April 1979, an assassination
attempt was slated to take place in either Banghazi or
Tobruk and was uncovqred when bombs hidden in a
rivate home exploded.
In March 1980 violent clashes were reported to have
taken place between members of the Tobruk revolu-
tionary committee and local citizens; at least in the
beginning they involved members of the Kashat tribe
seeking revenge for the rough public interrogation of a
fellow tribesman who was also a prominent local busi-
nessman. Several people were killed. An assassination
attempt against Qadhafi took place in Banghazi in
May 1980
Student dissent predates the regime's involvement in
Chad, but until the fall of 1980 does not seem to have
amounted to much. the
circulation of antiregime pamphlets and the boycott of
a lecture by Qadhafi's deputy Jallud at Tripoli's Al-
Fatih University. A subsequent incident involved the
defacement of a large portrait of Qadhafi with red
paint at the same university. The regime has kept close
watch on Gar Yunis University in Banghazi since an
April 1976 student uprising there; Qadhafi himself has
appeared at Gar Yunis to lecture the faculty on the
need to exhibit sufficient revolutionary fervor, and
student union elections have been rigged. November
1980 saw a number of serious incidents at Al-Fatih
that grew out of demonstrations protesting conscrip-
tion for military service in Chad; we have few details,
but troops seem to have been called out to impose
order, and some deaths were reported
Unrest in conservative religious circles surfaces only
rarely. In November 1980, however, Libyan police
reportedly arrested 50 worshippers at Tripoli's Idris
Libyan Berber community.)
Libya's Bedouin tribes are generally thought to sup-
port the regime, but there are occasional hints of
trouble from this quarter. In January 1981 some Lib-
yan Berbers were apparently discovered in possession
of revolutionary pamphlets obtained from Algerian
Berbers, touching off a campaign of arrests within the
Another disaffected group occasionally heard from are
the farmers in the "green belt"-the coastal strip in
northwestern Libya that contains most of Libya's ag-
ricultural land. Qadhafi has long intended to imple-
ment a land reform limiting landholdings to no less
than five and. no more than 10 hectares-an arrange-
ment that would dispossess many farmers with hold-
ings less than five hectares. The regime backed down
from an attempt to carry out these reforms in 1978.
Another attempt in the fall of 1979 led to such opposi-
tion that both the people's and the revolutionary
committees in Zawiyah refused to carry out the redis-
tribution. Violence ultimately broke out, much of it
caused by an armed group calling itself the "black
cats," which committed a series of robberies and
beatings in and near Zawiyah; one of the first victims
was the head of the town's revolutionary committee.
The regime again suspended the land reform, but there
were reports in early 1981 that it planned to renew the
attempt.)
The entrepreneurial and professional classes-hardest
hit by the regime's reforms-seem to have remained
quiescent, probably out of a feeling of helplessness.
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Qadhafi's more recent actions may be pushing the
Libyan people to the limits of their tolerance. In Feb-
ruary 1980 a prominent lawyer was arrested in the
early phase of the regime's extensive "anticorruption"
purge and died in custody. Some 5,000 people chanting
antigovernment slogans attended his funeral, prompt-
ing the regime to call out the police with orders to
shoot. Forty of the mourners were later arrested; anti-
Qadhafi slogans were painted on walls around Tripoli,
and a portrait of Qadhafi in a central square was
smeared with black paint.
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Strengths of the Regime
Despite evidence of mounting discontent with the Qa-
dhafi government in all levels of Libyan society, a
number of factors work in the regime's favor. The
Libyan people traditionally are politically passive. The
country's soaring oil revenues go far to cushion dis-
affection; per capita income is now about $10,000 a
year-one of the world's highest. Such programs as
food subsidies, housing projects, and provision of medi-
cal care build support
It is possible that some potential dissidents are de-
flected by the regime's incessant protestations that,
under Qadhafi, Libya alone has realized "true democ-
racy," since it has abolished representative govern-
ment-considered to be a distortion of democracy-
and established direct rule by the masses (hence the
coined name for this type of government,
"jamahiriya"-republic of the masses). The govern-
ment has created a system of popular committees and
general people's congresses that may foster the illusion
of democracy in the eyes of some. Special attempts
have been made to recruit women and members of the
Berber minority into the structure. Trade and profes-
sional unions are integrated into the popular commit-
tees, although trade unions are outlawed as unnec-
essary; in theory, workers have taken over the places of
business that employ them. These devices give very few
Libyans a sense of control over their destinies, but they
serve as a distraction
In the past two years, however, the regime has resorted
increasingly to government by intimidation-a tech-
nique that raises the level of discontent, but clearly
discourages people from acting. The atmosphere
within the country has grown increasingly repressive.
With revolutionary committees encouraged to de-
nounce neighbors and coworkers for lack of revolution-
ary zeal, with the "confessions" of allegedly corrupt
businessmen and officials featured on nightly televi-
sion, with the confiscation of private savings accounts,
businesses, and homes, and reports of dissidents mur-
relatives and fellow tribesmen, on whose loyalty he can
depend. He early adopted the practice of appointing
tribal supporters to sensitive positions, both military
and civilian; they also function as informers on col-
leagues or underlings showing signs of discontent. The
military comes in for special attention. Officers are
frequently rotated to prevent their developing a body of
loyal followers, and revolutionary committees have
been installed throughout the officer corps. The system
seems to have paid off
nightly and to employ East German bodyguards
is said to sleep in a mobile van that shifts location
Qadhafi, alerted by repeated assassination attempts,
takes extensive precautions for his personal safety. He
Qadhafi has.always been careful to guard against a
repeat of the coup that brought. him to power in 1969.
He tends to associate with and rely for advice on
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dered abroad, few Libyans will be inclined to stick
their necks out. Some members of the military have
probably met to plot, but many of the most discon-
tented and willing to act have already been arrested
and executed-with dampening effect on their col-
leagues
military has produced most of the coup and assassina-
tion attempts against Qadhafi over the last 11 years,
and it has the ability to take over key posts and solidify
the position of a new regime. Several scenarios involv-
ing the military are possible. A plot could be in
progress now and touched off with little warning.
Alternatively, the current success in Chad may have
neutralized some dissidence within the military, and a
move might come only after the situation in Chad has
deteriorated-perhaps when Habre's guerrilla group
gains momentum and is responsible for mounting Lib-
The Libyan exile movement was for a time thrown into
disarray by the government-arranged murders of
prominent dissidents that took place between April and
November 1980, totaling 11 dead and three wounded.
A new incident in Rome airport in February 1981
seemed to signal the start of a fresh campaign. Fear of
assassination disrupted exile meetings and caused
some dissidents to move from Europe to Egypt or
Morocco. It is nevertheless doubtful that the exile
movement ever posed a significant threat to Qadhafi.
Only assets in Libya-if any-are in a position to
threaten the regime, and a disruption of exile
politicking is of little consequence. Qadhafi's main
motive was presumably intimidation-a demonstra-
tion that no quarter is beyond his reach. In this he was
successful, and the lesson was probably also effective
domestically
Outlook
Qadhafi will almost certainly be removed from power
by means of assassination or coup; the main questions
are when and by whom. Predicting a date is almost
impossible. We are certain that disaffection in Libya
has laid the groundwork for action against the regime,
but we lack information about any particular plotting
group or groups with assets and a specific plan. The
fact that we do not have the information does not mean
that such a group does not exist, or that plotting may
not have reached an advanced stage; an unknown
group probably has a better chance of success. Qad-
hafi's ouster will probably come sooner rather than
later-perhaps in the neighborhood of a year or two-
but this prediction is little more than a hunch. Qad-
hafi's intelligence and security services are able and
still loyal to the regime; previous plotters have been
inept. Qadhafi's tenure could be a long one.1
yan casualties
Other figures within the Libyan regime could move
against Qadhafi in certain circumstances. A consensus
that Qadhafi has finally gone too far could develop,
particularly if Qadhafi is bogged down in Chad and
suffers a humiliating defeat, or if he embarks on a
policy that others regard as potentially disastrous for
Libya-shutting down Libyan oil production entirely,
for example, as a means of putting pressure on the
United States. A move by regime figures could func-
tion like a palace coup and be over before the mili-
tary-loyal to Qadhafi or not-has a chance to act1
Finally, assassination is a possibility. It probably would
occur in connection with one of the above scenarios;
most conspirators reason that Qadhafi is dangerous as
long as he lives. The assassination could, however, be
carried out by a lone gunman acting out of a variety of
motives-concern for the future of his country, re-
venge for a relative lost in Chad-and prepared to give
his life in the attempt. Qadhafi, who at one time won
popularity by mingling with average citizens on an
informal basis, now appears in public only rarely-
probably out of fear. But no leader can seal himself off
completely, and a simple assassination would in many
ways be the easiest scheme to engineer
Each of the above scenarios has different implications
in terms of a successor to Qadhafi. The possibility that
Qadhafi will rule for decades and die a natural death,
having groomed a successor, cannot be wholly elimi-
nated; but such an event would take place so far in the
future-Qadhafi is 39-that speculation is worthless.
Succession because of natural death in the short term,
for whatever reason, would closely resemble succession
because of assassination by an individual acting alone.
There would be considerable initial confusion, since no
The answer to "who?" is also elusive. The odds are that
Qadhafi will be removed by elements of the military,
very possibly in cooperation with members of the re-
gime who have military ties-most likely Humaydi,
the militia leader, or intelligence chief Kharubi. The
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dissident group would be poised to act. Oddly enough,
one immediate outcome might be business as usual,
while jockeying for power continued behind the scenes.
Since Qadhafi holds no official position, there is no
immediate need to name a successor. Muhammad al-
Zarruq Rajah, named General Secretary of the Gen-
eral People's Congress in January 1981, is technically
chief of state and could exercise the powers of that
office, perhaps in conjunction with Jallud, who cus-
tomarily stands in for Qadhafi. The backstage struggle
for power would, however, be intense. Regime figures
would try to consolidate their position, and the military
might be tempted to step in. This scenario yields the
most unpredictable outcome
A military coup would probably result in some sort of
collegial rule, patterned after the Revolutionary Com-
mand Council established by Qadhafi after his own
seizure of power. As in the RCC's case, it would
undoubtedly serve as a facade for behind-the-scenes
maneuvering, which would ultimately lead to the
emergence of one or at most two leading figures.
Humaydi or Kharubi could end up on top. If the
military acts in connection with leading exiles or subse-
quently invites them to return-a logical step toward
winning general acceptance of the new regime-sev-
eral of these men could be given posts. Most likely
candidates would be Dr. Muhammad al-Magaryaf,
the religious conservative who has recently assumed
considerable prominence in the exile movement; for-
mer Foreign Minister Abd al-Munim al-Huni, long
involved in exile activities; and Umar Muhayshi, for-
mer member of the Revolutionary Command Council
and leader of an abortive coup in 1975
If figures within the Libyan regime move against Qad-
hafi, a collegial situation is also likely to result in the
near term. The cast of characters would be different
from the above and would include the people surround-
ing Qadhafi now. As in the case of a natural succes-
sion, Jallud would have an edge, since he tends to stand
in for Qadhafi on public occasions and has more stat-
ure in the eyes of the general public. Armed forces
commander Abu Bakr Yunis, though considered closer
to Qadhafi than anyone outside his circle of relatives,
would as a black have difficulty winning general
acceptance. The tribesmen and relatives on whom Qa-
dhafi has increasingly relied-men like Qadhaf al-
Dam and Hassan Ashkal-are heavily implicated in
the regime's most unsavory policies and would be hard
put to win support. Men with access to military power,
however-H[umaydi, Kharubi, and Yunis-could
come out on top after a period of maneuvering]
Virtually any of these scenarios would result in consid-
erable improvement in terms of the threat posed by
Libya to US interests. No one other than Qadhafi is
likely to pursue his Green Book ideology with any kind
of conviction.. Efforts to project Libyan influence and
protect Libyan interests in the Middle East and Africa
would continue, but Libyan support for subversion
virtually worldwide and indiscriminate training of
subversive groups in terrorism and sabotage would
cease. Qadhafi's successors are unlikely to be as single-
minded in their pursuit of a nuclear capability for
Libya and are less likely than Qadhafi to use oil as a
political weapon a ainst the West particularly the
United States
There could be, however, significant variations in the.
attitudes of possible successors toward the Soviet
Union, as opposed to the West, and in their willingness
to move closer to the moderate Arab camp. In general,
any successor group cooperating closely with the exile
movement, particularly one giving leading exiles posi-
tions in a post-Qadhafi government, would tend to be
somewhat pro-Western and willing to work with such
supporters of the United States as Saudi Arabia and
EgYptl
A coalition drawn from the ranks of the military would
probably adopt a nonaligned policy, putting Libya's
national interests first and steering a course some-
where between identification with the East or the
West. It would probably be far more suspicious than
the Qadhafi regime of close cooperation with the So-
viet Union, but would not move to jeopardize access to
Soviet weapons. There could be exceptions to this
generalization. Some groups within the military are
known to be strongly anti-Soviet, despite-or perhaps
because of-training in the Soviet Union or Bloc coun-
tries and the presence of Soviet advisers in Libya. Such
a group could adopt an anti-Soviet line-leading to the
possibility that the Soviets will react by marshaling
whatever assets they possess in Libya in an attempt to
bring to power someone on whom they can rely. We
have no information on who such a pro-Soviet can-
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Too Secret
25
didate might be or the kind of support the Soviets can
muster, but any unsettled situation-inevitable after a
coup-would give them room to maneuver
If the succession is natural or the current regime moves
against Qadhafi, there would be a tendency to em-
phasize continuity with Qadhafi's policies as a way of
stabilizing the country. Moreover, few of Qadhafi's
lieutenants utter their thoughts freely-a principal
reason for their survival. It is therefore not possible to
predict where one or a group of these men will take a
post-Qadhafi regime. Most, however, are known to
have at least some differences with Qadhafi and to
oppose his excesses. Should the successor be Jallud, the
likeliest outcome under these two scenarios, the regime
would probably pursue a pragmatic rather than an
ideological line. Jallud, who received some military
training in the United States, is not driven by Qad-
hafi's philosophical preoccupations. He would prob-
ably continue many of Qadhafi's socialist policies, but
in modified form. He would be likely to remain close to
the Soviet Union, but without Qadhafi's strong dis-
trust, even hatred, of the West
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Ton Secret
Top Secret
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