THAILAND: CHALLENGES TO POLITICAL STABILITY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Publication Date: November 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Thailand: Challenges to
Political Stability
Secret
Secret
EA 81-10021
November 1981
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Thailand: Challenges to
Political Stability
Information available as of 30 September 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
r was prepared by
Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
25
25
This paper has been coordinated with the National
Intelligence Officer for East Asia and within the
offices of the National Foreign Assessment Centel
Secret
EA 81-10021
November 198/
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Thailand: Challenges to
Political Stability
Key Judgments Although the likelihood of radical change is remote, each element of
Thailand's tripartite leadership-the Army, the monarchy, and the civilian
bureaucracy-faces major challenges in the coming decade that threaten
to dilute traditionally high levels of authority and prestige.
The politically preeminent Thai Arm , long marked by clique rivalry
I uis beginning to develop factions with 25X
ideological bents. At the same time, a small but growing number of officers
seem willing to press the Army leadership to reduce its heavy involvement
in politics and devote more effort to making the armed forces highly
professional. This group is likely to grow. The serious external threat posed
by Vietnam has strengthened the appeal of this group within the officer
ranks. Most Thai military leaders also recognize that even a minor defeat
at the hands of the Vietnamese would damage the Army's political
legitimacy in the eyes of many Thai.
The current monarch's great popularity and personal qualities enable him
to play a key role in moderating national crises. The lack of an equally ca-
pable successor, however, suggests that the power of the monarchy and its
stabilizing influence will decline with succession. Moreover, the independ-
ence of the Palace from the military is likely to decrease, and the Army's
political power will probably grow despite the wishes of certain junior
officers that the military remain aloof from politics.
Over the next decade the Thai civilian bureaucracy must begin to resolve
several emerging economic problems. Inadequate food production and the
growing scarcity of land will become serious by the 1990s and could cause
unprecedented dislocation to the peasant culture. The deep political
passivity that this culture fosters among the rural population is the bedrock
upon which all Thai regimes rest. Disruption of this foundation would
ultimately-in the 1990s or beyond destabilize the Thai political system.
iii Secret
EA 81-10021
November 1981
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Political Stability
Thailand: Challenges to
Thailand's internal stability is based on the preemi-
nent power, ideological cohesiveness, and flexibility of
the ruling elite and on the political passivity of the
majority of Thai. This paper examines these founda-
tions and the challenges they face. It then assesses the
prospects for continued stability in the 1980s and
provides a checklist of indicators of potential threats
to the political status quo
politicians, have been the most powerful political
group since the early 1950s. The Army's political
voice, the result of a series of successful coups, is
enhanced by the control it has established and main-
tained in financial, administrative, and educational
arenas. During much of the period since the 1932
coup, Army officers have occupied a number of high
government positions, including that of Prime Minis-
ter. Until recently, they were strongly represented on
the boards of large state and private corporations and
Small, Powerful, and Cohesive
Leadership Class
The military, the monarchy, and the civilian bureauc-
racy have exercised joint leadership of Thailand for
nearly a century, effectively blocking the development
of competing political institutions. Generally conserv-
ative, their hierarchical structure conforms to Thai
cultural mores, and their practices help sustain com-
monly held Thai values rooted in tradition, national-
ism, and the free enterprise system (see table 1).[
The Military. The Thai armed forces have been the
dominant political institution since the overthrow of
the absolute monarchy in a bloodless coup in 1932.
Political power and authority flow almost exclusively
from government, and the Thai military, with its clear
hierarchical organization, discipline, and coercive re-
sources, is effective in dealing with civilian political
opposition. Equally important, the military has the
will for forceful intervention in pursuit of its personal,
institutional, and national goals. In contrast, the
civilian institutions-including all political parties,
special interest groups, and labor organizations-have
generally been weak in discipline, organization, and
leadership.'
Senior Royal Thai Army (RTA) officers, usually
backed by other branches of the armed forces and
supported by a wide coalition of businessmen and
' The Thai national police force is the military's principal political
rival. For approximately a decade (1947-57), there was acute rivalry
between military and police cliques. In the early 1950s, for
example, the major conduit for US military aid to Thailand was the
police, which built up a paramilitary force with tanks, planes, and
artillery. As a result of clique rivalry, however, senior Thai Army
officers were able to take direct control of the police until 1975.
headed many state-controlled corporations
The prominence of military leadership also reflects
the dearth of experienced, well-known, or respected
civilian politicians. This is partly due to the long
periods of authoritarian military rule, which discour-
aged meaningful civilian political participation and
robbed most emerging politicians of the necessary
political and administrative experience. Most senior
civilian career officials do not appear to resent the
dominance of military men in executive positions
The power of the military has been heightened by the
political apathy of the general public and the wide-25X1
spread view-particularly in the provinces outside the
Bangkok metropolitan area that the armed forces
have a right to lead the nation. Although the political-
ly active public is growing in size and influence,
especially in Bangkok, there is little likelihood of a
quicker pace in the democratization of the political
process. Indeed, many observers believe that the Thai
continue to desire strong, decisive martial leadership.
The military also gains legitimacy through its support
of the monarchy, which seldom challenges the RTA's
authority.)
Since that time, professional police officers have served as directors
general of police and controlled police activities. The police present-
ly have less coercive power than the Army, but the power they do
have and the corrections they can draw on -notably the King with
his longstanding patronage of ~he Border Patrol arouse
military rivalry and suspicion. 25
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"Traditional" Elite Estimated at less than 100 families;
senior military, royal family, some
royalists, but few national politi-
cians or bureaucrats. Slow growth
in size since 1932.
"New" Elite Large number senior military, plus
highest graded civil servants; ma-
jority of national politicians; some
powerful Sino-Thai businessmen;
few royalists. Development of group
dates from late 1800s; rapid expan-
sion over past decade.
Manipulates all lower political
groups.
Only portion of group in power at
one time; few ideological differ-
ences; enjoy great prestige and
status.
Extraordinary concentration of
wealth derived largely from expan-
sion of agriculture over 30 years.
Strong ties to "traditional" elite
cliques; controlled by top groups.
Tainted by corruption. Moderate to
low political influence. Public life
focuses on clique struggles for offi-
cial positions and associated eco-
nomic advantages.
"Political Public" Educated, articulate urban dwell- Thailand's middle class. Do not
ers. Provincial leaders well repre- have elite status. Traditionally pre-
sented. Small portion of total urban fer occupations in bureaucracy, but
population but, with growth of edu- commerce and industry increasing-
cational opportunities, has grown ly attractive. Majority complacent
steadily over past 30 years. about political system. Vulnerable
to deterioration of urban economy.
Able to make unified demands on
government, but overall political
influence is low.
Nonpolitical Urban Overwhelming majority of urban Little political interest; no political
Population dwellers. influence. Make few demands on
elite system. Hold low-payment
jobs. Small fraction in organized
labor.
? High education; university degree,
distinguished group; top members
have Western education.
? High degree of Westernization.
? Readily employed in government;
jobs provide status and prestige.
? Few collect great wealth.
? Vested interests in political and
economic systems.
? Conservative/pragmatic vs.
radical/speculative.
? Majority in Bangkok; little contact
with villagers; poor perception of
rural problems.
The Palace. Nationwide respect for the monarchy is personal prestige, has made the monarch the strongest
one of the principal factors for stability in Thailand unifying element in the Thai sociopolitical scene and
(see figure 1). The vast majority of Thai believe that enabled him to play a conciliatory role during national
the most effective leadership is a fusion of royal crises
legitimacy and military power that keeps the peace
and allows life to go on in an orderly manner. This
attitude, coupled with King Bhumibol Aduladej's
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One of the King's most important roles in national
politics has been to affirm-as a symbol of national
unity the ruling groups' periodic needs for legitima-
cy. In all successful coups and power shifts among the
Thai elite since 1950, the new rulers never failed to
ment projects
Figure 2. The Monarch in a favorite role: visiting
rural areas to oversee Palace-sponsored develop-
overriding concern appears to be that economic and
political change proceed at a moderate pace- an
outlook that often aligns him with conservative forces.
seek and obtain the King's sanction. Nearly all re- The Bureaucracy. The civil bureaucracy is inefficient-
gimes have taken advantage of the King's popularity ly organized, lacks coordination among its various
by trying to identify and associate the monarchy ministries, has no strong political constituency of its
closely with government policy. The King has promul- own, and traditionally subordinates itself to whatever
gated constitutions, appointed major state officials, regime is in power. Nevertheless, career officials have
and at times given tacit approval to policy and provided continuity to the government during the
programs. In recent years, the Royal Family has had frequent changes in constitutional and political order
a decisive hand in the selection of Prime Ministers in recent years. Despite political changes at the top
and has had considerable influence in several other and the frequent rotation of ministers, the apparatus
key areas including military promotions, economic of the public service has been preserved. The bureauc-
matters, the support of individual parliamentarians, racy has been particularly successful in providing
and probably foreign policy. administrative continuity at the provincial and local
Outside the political arena, the popular stature of the
monarchy among the Thai masses has grown greatly
since Bhumibol's 1950 coronation. Thai affection for
the King has been deliberately cultivated by him and
reflects his determination to be involved in shaping
rural Thailand's economic and social development.
The King's main vehicle for involvement has been
personal contact with the peasants through sponsor-
ship of numerous economic, agricultural, and social
projects (see figure 2). In this way, he has conveyed
the impression of devotion to public service, made the
monarchy appear accessible to its subjects, and fos-
tered a strong bond with the common citizen. His
level. This has allowed the civil service to develop
considerable experience and expertise, giving it a
virtual monopoly on governmental competence
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The bureaucracy influences the formulation and im- 25X1
plementation of government policies. Upper level civil
servants set standards for program development, help
determine policy, and provide considerable general
guidance to the Thai regimes. Development programs
are almost always conceptualized in the bureaucracy
because the few organized, independent interest, pro-
fessional, and academic groups have little government
influence.
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The bureaucracy's expansion over the past several
decades has acted as a social safety valve, absorbing
the educated Thai and giving them a vested interest in
the elite system. It has thus reduced antielite pressure
by the most articulate social groups.
Widespread Political Passivity
The political passivity of the overwhelming majority
of the population is one of the most salient features of
Thai society. This passivity is based on cultural,
historical, and socioeconomic factors that include the
peasants' relative prosperity and economic independ-
ence, traditional lack of interest in governmental
affairs, and fear of challenging the elites' power to
govern.
Peasants make up about 80 percent of the population
and are the foundation of the social structure. Al-
though large numbers of rural Thai remain very poor
and wide areas have not greatly benefited from
Thailand's economic progress over the past few dec-
ades, most Thai live a relatively secure, stable, and
economically tenable life in which the government
plays only a small part. Moreover, the Thai popula-
tion traditionally has made few demands on the
government-even the local government. Rural Thai
expect and desire modernization but do not believe
that some catastrophic event-such as a revolution-
is required to produce the necessary changes
The Thai masses have never insisted that the leader-
ship be democratized or that the structure of society
be transformed. Thai culture itself is an obstacle to
making strong and coordinated demands on the gov-
ernment. Many cultural values, attitudes, and pat-
terns of action appear to work against the develop-
ment of a widespread and effective democratic
political process (see table 2).
Challenges to the Thai Elite System
The military, the Palace, and the bureaucracy each
face unprecedented challenges and pressures that
could increase in severity by the 1990s:
? The military must reduce divisiveness in its ranks
and cope with demands for greater professionalism
arising from the Vietnamese threat in Kampuchea.
Cultural Factors Contributing to Rural Stability in
Thailand
Thailand has no history of village-based political organizations and
processes. Although modern communications have spread political
messages from urban areas in recent years, the bulk of the country's
population remains conservative.
Tradition of individualism
Throughout Thai culture there is a strong sense of individualism,
which permits the Thai to enter and sustain relationships on a quid
pro quo basis and to break these ties whenever they feel such action is
in their self interest. This tradition inhibits the formation of parties
and other interest groups.
Buddhism
Approximately 95 percent of the Thai population is Buddhist. Thai
Buddhism tends to discourage the Thai from engaging in social or
political organizations. The religion stresses freedom from entangle-
ments with society.
Social Order
Respect for the social hierarchy is highly valued in Thai culture, and
students are taught to maintain the major institutions of the country,
particularly the monarchy.
Popular political parties
Thailand lacks an effective competitive political party system and
does not possess a single mass party with roots in rural areas. The
typical Thai villager considers politics and government beyond his
responsibility.
Youthful population
The youthfulness of the population may impede the development of
political consciousness. Approximately 80 percent of Thai are under
40 years of age; nearly 40 percent are less than 15 years old. Politics,
at least in the rural areas, is considered an activity for the older
members of Thai society.
? The monarchy must deal with the problems of its
future role as an influential political institution and
of succession by heirs who appear much less capable
than the current King.
? The most potentially difficult challenges to the
bureaucracy, as well as to other members of the
Thai elite, are complex rural demographic and
development-related problems, some of which are
new to Thailand.
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Divisiveness in the Army. The events leading to the
"April Fool's Day" coup attempt in 1981, and reports
on its aftermath, indicate that divisiveness within the
military-particularly the Army has been growing
for some time. Up to the early 1970s, the dominance
and power of the Army were enhanced by the homo-
geneity of aspirations and outlook of its members.
Although the RTA has long been separated into
cliques, the issues dividing them were typically per-
sonality centered rather than ideological. There now
appear to be serious divisions over domestic political
policy and the proper national role of the armed
forces. These divisions threaten the military's future
as a political power, its cohesiveness on national
policies, and its ability to defend Thailand's sovereign-
ty. F_ I
A major split appears to exist between the senior and
junior military levels, which has produced consider-
able tension and frustration within the ranks. There is
little hard information on the issues and characteris-
tics that separate the groupsi
The junior officers criticize the commitment of their
seniors to the status quo. The junior officers have been
widely exposed to advanced political systems and to
the revolution in military technology. This has height-
ened their awareness of Thailand's need for economic,
political, and technical advancement. Because they
are called upon to perform civilian roles basic to
advanced societies, the more politically conscious
officers are further educated to the need for substan-
The Vietnamese Threat. The unification of Vietnam
under Communist rule and the occupation of Laos
and Kampuchea by regular North Vietnamese troops
Characteristics and Attitudes
of Senior and Junior
Thai Officers
Senior Military
Members of the political elite; participants in several coups.
Insiders who rear) rewards of office, nrestice_ and wealth
25X
intermarried with leading ing families; members of corporate
boards.
Opposed to radical change; some lead ultraconservative
pressure groups.
Participants in high-level military rivalries, which are a key
source of political tension in the Thai Government.
Cohesion traditionally weak because members have never
perceived outside group threat.
Stationed in Bangkok, divorced from problems of moderniza-
tion of rural Thailand.
Junior Military
Skeptical of historical role of RTA in politics; question future
relationship of civilian and military elements in the Thai
political system.
Critical of senior military's lack of competence.
Often identify closely with the leadership of other emerging
nations.
Received extensive training in the United States in programs
that have brought great change to the structure and purpose
of Thai armed forces.
More professionally qualified than their superiors.
Frustrated over "bottlenecked" promotions caused by senior
military extensions past mandatory retirement age.
Share a sense of embarrassment over poor fighting quality of
a number of RTA elements; blame senior officers' preoccupa-
tion with politics.
Stationed in rural areas, appreciate problems emerging there.
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of training. The military has produced highly quali-
fied officers, but the preoccupation of its upper eche- 25
lons with politics rather than with military efficiency
has created an armed forces structure ill prepared to
resist an external foe. 25
realize the worst Thai fears. The RTA's competence A serious defeat by the Vietnamese along the Thai-
to defend the nation against an external attack has Kampuchea border-for example, the destruction of a
never been tested and now is bein questioned in Thai regiment-would badly shake the legitimacy of
military as well as civilian circles. the RTA with civilian politicians and the more edu-
cated public. The urban population would be particu-
The Thai armed forces have made major improve- larly critical of the military. Many residents of Bang-
ments in the past decade but still suffer many short- kok believe that the April Fool's Day coup showed
comings, particularly in organization and some areas that the armed forces have serious weaknesses and
that the military should leave the political arena and
strive to become more professional
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A major catastrophe such as an invasion and occu-
pation of parts of Thailand would create an almost
irresistible demand for increased professionalism and
would probably lead to demands for a more highly
authoritarian system that ranked national security
above economic and political development. Prior to
the recent coup attempt, the Young Turks and the
Democratic Officers, two of the most important junior
officer factions at the time, had similiar views on the
role of the military.
Key leaders of the Young Turks
currently are discredited because of their coup at-
tempt, but the issues and positions they espoused-
some of which were borrowed from the Democratic
Officers remain popular. The shadowy Democratic
Officers faction remains intact.
The Succession Issue. Since his coronation in 1950,
King Bhumibol's actions clearly indicate his determi-
nation to use his considerable political influence,
thereby abandoning the monarchy's traditional aloof-
ness from politics. His successful injection of the
Palace into the political world may have led the
Kingdom to expect too much of the monarchy, setting
a standard that could prove unsustainable by succes-
sors
Because of the lack of a qualified successor, the
sudden death or incapacitation of the King during the
next few years would almost certainly substantially
lessen the influence and prestige of the monarchy. At
a minimum, there would be a temporary power
vacuum at the Palace because none of the heirs-one
son and two daughters-has the experience and stat-
ure necessary to play an effective conciliatory role in
the inevitable national crisis (see figure 3). A contin-
ued failure of the monarchy to function effectively
would lead to a decline in nationwide respect and
ultimatel to a eakening of the Palace's unifying
capacity
Queen Sirikit is unlikely to fill a power vacuum
created by the King's death. In contrast to the King,
she has no strong power base of her own in the Army,
even though she actively supports some generals.
Figure 3. Thailand's Royal Family. Princess
Maha Chakri Sirindhorn is at far left, behind her
younger sister. The Crown Prine and his wife are
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Peasant Economic Problems. The relatively prosper-
traditional passivity of the rural population are likely
to erode over the next decade. In particular, Thai
ble land, will be strained to meet domestic food
increase such credit. For example, the Government's
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives,
which was created in 1966 to improve credit availabil-
ity, has benefited only a handful of farmers, and the
private banks continue to give priority to their urban
customers. Most farmers have little contact with
formal lending agencies and prefer to obtain relatively
small loans through family members- often at little
or no interest-or through local money lenders or land
speculators.
1 million rural
families are tenants and 500,000 are landless. Ap-
Over the next 10 years, the Thai population is expect-
ed to increase by approximately 15 million people to
more than 55 million. Under existing farming meth-
ods, arable land is inadequate to meet the needs of the
projected population. Ideally the Thai need 2.5 rai 2
per capita. With a population growth of 3.2 percent
annually, cultivated land will decrease to 1.2 rais per
person in 1990, compared with 2.2 rais in 1970 and
3.0 rais in 1960. Hence, the yield per unit of land
must be increased to meet future food demand and to
create enough jobs to absorb the 30-percent increase
in the labor force projected by the end of the 1980s.
Prospects for greatly increasing Thai agricultural
productivity during this period are dim, given the
difficulties and costs of extending irrigation, promot-
ing the use of fertilizer, and increasing access to low-
cost credit. Effective irrigation systems cover less than
one-fourth of Thailand's total rice land. Consequent-
ly, the new high-yielding rice strains that require
fraction of cultivable land. Double-cropping of rice is
relatively well-off farmers can afford the high price of
fertilizers
Achievement of increased productivity and greater
work opportunities for farmers will, at a minimum,
require more government-generated credit, but Bang-
kok has taken only limited and inefficient steps to
proximately I million families are attempting to settle
in jungle areas that are probably ill suited for sus-
tained intensive farming. With an average rural
household consisting of 5.5 individuals, more than 13
million persons may be affected by the shortage of
Some modest land reform bills have been drafted, but
no adequately funded, effective program has been put
into practice. The Agricultural Land Reform Act of
1975, for example, was designed to distribute state
land and private holdings in excess of eight hectares to
landless laborers, tenants, and small holders in order
to provide each family with a plot of four hectares.
Under this act the government distributed 40,000
hectares to over 10,000 farm families, less than 0.2
percent of Thailand's nearl 6 million farm families.
Another modest land reform bill currently being
debated would require the government to purchase
land for redistribution
Thailand Through the 1980s
Although system-threatening political instability does
not seem likely in the 1980s, some realignment in the
traditional Thai power balance is almost certain.
None of the potential gainers, however, appears
equipped to deal with the country's gradually evolving
economic problems. As a result, serious popular dis-
content could arise in the following decade
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A shift in favor of the military would be most rapid
should King Bhumibol die. The King's prestige would
not transfer either to Prince Vachiralongkorn, whose
close relationship with the RTA almost certainly
would place him under some measure of military
base to influence the military.
Even should the King survive the decade, the military
will play a strong role in shaping policy and determin-
ing the principal changes in the direction Thailand
takes. The present problems of factionalism are likely
to shift away from personalities and narrow partisan-
ship toward ideology and issues as younger officers
are promoted. Even these differences could dissipate
in time, since the issues separating the current junior
officers seem to be less great than those separating the
junior officers and their present superiors. The persist-
ent threat from Hanoi will also mute ideological
differences and strengthen the commonality of pur-
pose within the military
Although the military could easily strengthen its
position, some of the new generation of officers appear
to be less interested in political involvement than their
seniors. The younger men seem primarily concerned
of the military's limitations in running what is an
increasingly complex economy.
These professionally oriented individuals may be more
willing to see greater power evolve into the bureaucra-
cy's hands, but they are a minority and will not be
strong enough to initiate such a major change in Thai
leadership patterns. Moreover, the senior officers can
meet many of the demands for a more professional-
capable military without any meaningful decrease in
political activity. As a consequence, the Thai military
is likely to become technically more professional in
some limited areas, but with no decrease in its overall
political influence.
The bureaucracy itself is not in the best position to
cope with Thailand's problems even if a strengthened
military were able to enforce consensus on develop-
ment goals. The pattern of frequent transfers of power
seven prime ministers over the past seven years has
the energetic members in the bureaucracy. Despite
the technical abilities and positive intentions of many
of its members, the present bureaucracy lacks the
appreciation of rural problems that an earlier genera-
tion of government officials had. The bureaucracy's
growing elitist character has produced a commitment
to maintaining the status quo that could undermine
the government's ability to solve long-range economic
problems capable of sparking rural unrest in the
1990s
The threshold for such unrest and its likely form are
difficult to predict. It is probable, however, that the
threshold itself will be less important than the pres-
ence in the rural areas of an organizing force or
nucleus that can articulate the farmers' problems and
make unified demands on the government for them.
Thailand's large and growing numbers of university-
educated students are capable of becoming this nucle-
us. In the 1973-76 liberal period of government, a
relatively small group of determined university stu-
dent leaders organized precedent-setting farmers' fed-
erations and forced the central government to at least
acknowledge many of the farmers' genuine economic
grievances at that time. Although students today are
poorly organized and the government closely monitors
their activities, many Thai leaders-including the
King-consider them to be potentially the most trou-
blesome element in Thai society
Indicators of Changes in the Thai Elite Structure
The most important set of indicators of stability
threatening changes in the Thai elite structure con-
cern the armed forces. The following would indicate
either a basic weakening in the armed forces' ability
to provide strong and unified leadership or a decline in
their legitimacy:
? A growing split between officers over the issue of
the military's heavy involvement in politics.
? Increasing numbers of professional soldiers who
express doubts about their ability to run the
country.
? Greater sentiment among professional soldiers that
coups are not an appropriate means of changing
governments.
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? Deep dissatisfaction among junior officers that,
despite external threats, senior officers continue to
be concerned with narrow political interests and to
ignore the country's need for improved defense and
greater professionalism within the military.
There is considerable speculation on how smoothly the
country would operate in the absence of an effective
monarch. Several indicators might point toward a
diminished role for the throne as a stabilizing force in
national crises:
? Elements of the Thai elite openly speculating on the
shortcomings of the monarchy.
? Growing rumors that the monarchy should be "neu-
tralized," captured, or held incommunicado during
future coups.
? Open criticism or discussion of Prince Vachira-
longkorn's relationship with the RTA.1
Now, as prior to the 1932 revolution, the general
population is largely politically apathetic. The grow-
ing number of educated Thai, however, could lead to
increased demands for part of the spoils as did
foreign-educated Thai students who started the 1932
revolution. A major symptom to look for over the next
decade would be a change in the avenues of entrance
into the elite. Some indicators of this might be:
? Increasing barriers preventing intellectuals from
becoming members of the ruling class.
? Growing numbers of well-trained individuals who
have less access to the ruling class through patron-
age and are unwilling to settle for semielite status.
? Formation of a "counterelite" by frustrated intellec-
Traditional values and attitudes account for much of
the stability that has marked rural Thailand. Thus,
value changes-perhaps economic in origin -could
indicate an erosion of the passivity of the rural
population, which in turn could threaten the system.
By their nature, such changes would be extremely 25
difficult to monitor particularly by foreigners. Mon-
itoring attitude changes would be only slightly less
difficult for the Thai civilian bureaucrats, who are not
attuned to the rural social scene. The following would
indicate a basic change in rural Thai society that
might lead to a challenge to the current system:
? Agriculture, particularly rice cultivation, is no long-
er considered worthwhile and noble.
? Increased rural interest in commerce and a taste for
urban life.
? Decreased emphasis on self-reliance, personal digni-
ty, and economic independence.
? A reduced sense of discipline.
? A perception of decline in well-being in the rural
areas.
? Loss of faith in the current elite system's ability to
preserve the well-being in rural areas.
? A growing number of organized rural rou s that
make demands on local government. 25
tuals, as did the 1932 plotters.
 Secret Approved For Release 2007/05/07: CIA-RDP03TO2547R000100240001-5
Secret