JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-01773R000300110108-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2007
• Sequence Number: 108
• Publication Date: October 27, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

OGC 8-1857
Executive RegiLAly
27 October 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR. Director of Central Inteuigence
THROUGH: Inspector General
Deputy Director (Support) 0SJ / V S t
SUBJECT: Joint congressional Committee for Foreign
Intelligence
for
1. This memorandum contains a i eencmm S Bch recommendation
approval of the Director of Central Intell g
is contained in paragraph 12.
question of a Jo Congressional Committee for Foreign
2. The 86th Con ress. While it was
Intelligence is certain to
defeated on the floor of the Senate in the 84th Congress, e88 there we
separate measures for a Joint Committee in the Executive Branch's position on a joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence Februa was established after National Security Council actionr onof Cent al 1, 1956,
with the President approving the report of the Di
Intelligence dated 6 January 1956. In substance, the approved recom-
mendations were that a Joint committee would ~e an u ~' cDresent
supplement to existing congressional revi4w_:...
mechanisms are a equate. In addition, it was concluded that a Joint
Committee would create jurisdictional problems due to the large number ce field of Government agencies with responsises in the
p rob emsnand hamper
such a Committee could raise substantial e Branch?
r..
the con uct o oreign re a ons y e ecut
3. While the Agency has the problem common to all Executive
agencies of establishing proper relations with the Congress in order to
there are four aspects of the
inform them and obtain necessary funds,
problem which are peculiar to the Agency.
ILLEGIB
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a. Security, CIA is the only agency where security applies
to sucl b c matters as personnel, budget, organization, and
expenditures. This tends to breed suspicion and distrust on the
/part of Congressmen who are not informed. The security problem,
therefore, is different in nature as well as degree from that of
other Executive agencies.
b. Finished Intelligence. The end product of the Agency is
finished intelligence for the policyrnakers in the Executive Branch.
Sound arguments can be made that such finished intelligence is the
exclusive proper of the President in view of his responsibility
for e conduct of foreign affairs. A serious question is raised
whe er the Congress his a legitimate interest in finished intelligence
except to determine whether a valuable return is received for the
funds appropriated. Since intelligence is only one factor in policy
decisions, providing Congress with finished intelligence alone could
well lead to serious political difficulties in which the Agency would
be caught in the middle between the Executive and Legislative
Bran es.
c. Jurisdiction. Most agencies can deal with the Congress
representing their entire functional responsibilities whereas CIA
is a focal point of the intelligence community comprised of
components of other de artments and agencieswhich have__ their
own rect responsibility to the Congress. A formidable
jurisdictional problem is thus presented and while it is one for
the Congress to resolve, it is pertinent to our consideration of
relations with the Congress.
d. Covert Operations. In addition to the intelligence mission,
the A" enc ge wi a conduct of covert operations. Such
operations are carried out in accordance with policy directives
from appropriate Executive elements. In possible congressional
review of such activities there would be involved policy decisions
for which CIA does not have responsibility.
4. We shall attempt to appraise the relative merits of IlzlQkRg CIA
ongressional relations under the existing system and under a Joint Committee
ystem utilizing the above four factors.
a. Security. Under the existing system, security of the
CIA subcommittees has been excellent, but it cannot be assumed
that a Joint Committee would be less secure and un er the Mansfield
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type resolution the membership would be comprised solely
of members of our subcommittees. (The staff problem will
be discussed later.) The establishment of a Joint Committee
might have some adverse affect on relations with forei~n EGIB
intelligence services, but probably this would be of sh It
duration as they could be brought to understand that fundamentally
nothing had- been changed.
b. Finished Intelligence. On the question of producing
finished-intelligence on demand from the Congress, there would
seemto be little difference in the fundamental problem between
our present su committee system and a Joint Committee. Our
present subcommittees have not raised this issue although they
could at any time. There is somewhat more likelihood that the
Joint Committee would immediately raise the issue but the issue
is the same under either system. In fact, a Joint Committee
might tend to preclude other committees such as Foreign Relations
from requesting the material which could happen under the present
system.
c. Jurisdiction. There are two sides to the question of
jurisdiction. On the one hand is the question of extent of
jurisdiction over intelligence matters which could be claimed
by the Joint Committee. The extent of asserted jurisdiction by
a Joint Committee over the intelligence activities of other agencies
which have responsibilities to other committees is a matter of
conjecture and concern. On the other hand there is the question
of how many committees properly can assert jurisdiction over the
Agency at the present time. For example, a subcommittee of
House Foreign Affairs on. State Department Organization and Foreign
Operations lists one of its responsibilities in the Legislative
Calendar as ". . . liaison with Central Intelligence Agency . . .. It
Also,legislation affecting CIA personnel might well be claimed by
the Post Office and Civil Service Committees, whereas a Joint
Committee could probably assert exclusive jurisdiction over the
Agency in all matters except appropriations. Generally we have
not been subject to any serious jurisdictional difficulties under
the present system but it is likely that a Joint Committee would
tend to cause jurisdictional questions to be raised.
d. Covert Operations. On the question of covert operations,
again there seems to be little basic difference in dealing with our-
s ubcommittees or with a Joint Committee. owever, the existence
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of a Joint Committee would tend to bring the issue into Locus.
So far the subcommittees have not seriously considered policies
under which CIA conducts its covert activities. A Joint Committee
t =~ could- most certa nl be expected to study such problems more
care ally and might well be critical of policies, instructions, or
particularly limitations put on by State or Defense. The problem
of such policy guidance is delicate enough without-having a third
party, particularly a congressional group, enter the debate. So,
on balance, the subcommittees' system may be preferable from
this point of view, although there is nothing to prevent the problem
from arising wi em also.
5. The present subcommittees have not moved actively to dispel
what seems to be a growing distrust and suspicion of the Agency within the
Congress. The Agency has not requested specific action by our sub-
committees in this regard. The level of lack of knowledge of the Agency,
its activities and its relations with Congress is illustrated by the fact that
certain senior Congressman on the Armed Services Committee were not
aware that there was a CIA subcommittee. The publicity attdBapon
the establishment of a Joint Committee would tend to lessen some of the
suspicions as would the reports which presumably would be forthcoming.
It is also likely that the Joint Committee would be of considerable assistance
in n guiding through the congressional mill the relatively few items of needed
legislation.
6. The most serious problem and the most difficult to assess
concerns the fundamental constitutional question of the relationship between
the President and the Congress, particularly with regal d to lie President 's
function in the conduct of f5retgn affairs. This point is discussed in more
detail in the DCI memorandum of 6 January 1956 to the NatiopEgurity
Council. A Joint Committee in all likelihood would tend to bring these
issues into sharper focus although it is imposst a approach
which would be taken by a Jotnt ommittee. However, it -is-t- ru ethat the
existing subcommittees could raise the same issues. Since they have not,
the cons itutional question remains a distinct negative factor in assessing
the desirability of a Joint Committee.
7. The membership on a Joint Committee raises many doubts.
The various measures proposing a Joint Committee have specified determi-
nation of membership in different ways. In some cases it is left open except
for the usual relationship between majority and minority parties, and in all
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likelihood seniority rules would apply. Under this arrangement there
would be increased dangers arising from the inflexible nature of selection.
In the present system, the selection of membership on subcommittees is
handled more informall y and there have been no serious problems. Under
the Mansfield type of resolution the membership includes only the members
of the existing CIA subcommittees so no additional membership problem
is raised. However, it does raise the question of responsibility to addi-
tional committees. The Mansfield type resolution does not eliminate
supervision of the Armed Services Committees but simply imposes the
(l Joint Committee on top of the existing system, thus increasing our burden.
8. Some of the above problems are further emphasized by the
.~ fact that a Joint Committee would have its own staff. Presently the staffs
Sz, working with the subcommittees have as much as they can han in the
way of work for other defense activities and ten to eav _CIA alone. A
staff for a Joint Committee, however, even if it were one man, would
have but a small portion of its time taken up with the few legislative
problems this Agency has. There is little doubt that the staff's time
would, therefore, be devoted to informing itself on intelligence activities
and inquiring into substantive matters. The staff in turn would promote
the interest of Committee members, and we could expect a far more
active give and take than exists between the Agency and the subcommittees.
This would be time consuming and the probable detriments would probably
tend to outweigh the benefits, as the increased security exposure and the
tendency of the Joint Committee to interfere would probably have more
e feet than any support we might wish the Committee t (lend. However,
the problem of the staff is not insoluble and the selection thereof could
probably be worked out by mutual agreement between the Chairman and
the Director. The staff problem is additionally unique in that to do their
job properly they would gain access to the most sensitive of clandestine
activities on an across-the-board basis, whereas even within the Agency
these activities are compartmented and very few people in the Agency have
full access. The normal turnover of staff people possessing such broad
\ knowledge of Agency activities adds to the security problem.
"y~Ca n4 h
9. Aside from the Agency's view on a Joint Committee, we must
consider the position of the Executive Branch as a whole as expressed
by the approved National Security Council action recommending against
a Joint Committee. It is believed that certain people in the White House
and the Bureau of the Budget are strongly against the Joint Committee
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ncept as inevita y leading to invasion of the prerogatives of the Executive
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Branch by the Congress. There have been some indications that active
efforts may have to be undertaken in this regard with respect to the
Joint Committees on Atomic Energy and Internal Revenue Taxation.
We have also heard strong expressions of opinion against the Joint
Committees by various embers of Congress. Certainly Senator
Salton-s , as an eexample, was strong in his belief when he was
prompted to say "a Joint Committee would wreck CIA. " Any consid-
eration by the Agency of actions outside of the Agency on the question
of a Joint Committee must consider these opinions.
10. Certain of the advantages claimed for a Joint Committee
could be accotnplt-s a under our existing subcommittee system-.- - A
more careful review of Agency activities can be accomplished by. our
LLES
present subcommittees. whereas in the past there has not been
thorough review on an annual basis. Some of the members of our sub-
committees have- conceded, that possibly they have not lived up t ttheir
response t es in this respect. A review o Agency activities (not
simply a briefing- on world affairs) accompanied by a statement or
report issued to the membership of the Congress as a whole that a
review has been conducted would go a long way to alleviate some of
the pressures and meeting the stated objectives of a Joint Committee.
Other possible action would be more frequent briefing of the key staff
;members of the subcommittees. Such a procedure could, in part,
answer Chairman Cannon's outstanding request on the Agency for some
\method of briefing the staff and, in turn, the subcommittee.
11. Most of the problem areas which we have discussed raise
the same fundamental issues whether there is a Joint Committee or
whether the existing subcommittee system remains -- the difference
being that a Joint Committee system would be more likely tolLzt401phe
issues thus giving the problem greater emphasis. Although some
advantages no doubt would accrue from a Joint Committee system, it is
However, it is believed that the establishment of a Joint Committee would
not be disastrous for the Agency. Certainly it would create some new
problems particularly as the result of the permanent staff but in all
probability we could resolve most of the difficulties.
12. Therefore, the Agency should take affirmative action to
alleviate the ressures for a Joint Committee by working m ely
with the existing subcommittees and urging em tot a pove actions
on our behalf. In view of the established position of the Executive Branch
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 and the opinions of congressional leaders ~dee ~iect action to forestall a
committees, the A enc shoal nses to queries as to the CIA
Joint Committ ee. As in the pas respo should b that the matter is
position on a Joint Committee generally
one for the Congress to decide. In certain special situations the
response could include a discussion ~ sf ~dy be placed before the
addition, I would recommend that
president's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence for their
comments.
esrislative Counsel
WC -
-PGI
The recommendation in paragraph 12 is approv
i
17 NOV 1958
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