CONVERTING OF SOVIET ECONOMY TO WARTIME STATUS EXAMINED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01468R000100110004-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press
24 Aug 84) pp 3-11
[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, MSU S. Kurkotkin, deputy minister of
defense and chief of the rear services of the USSR Armed Forces: "Converting
the National Economy From Peacetime to Wartime Status During the Years of the
Great Patriotic War"]
[Text] Converting the national economy from a peacetime to wartime status
(mobilizing the economy) consists, as is known, in reorganizing all the eco-
nomic sectors and appropriate state institutions in the nation for organizing
mass production of weapons, military equipment, ammunition, uniforms, supplies
and other materiel for the all-round support of the Armed Forces, the activi-
ties of the state and the population in the course of the war.
The mobilizing of the Soviet economy started fully only with the outbreak of
the Great Patriotic War. However, during the prewar years, the Soviet people,
under the leadership of the Communist Party, successfully carried out the tasks
of increasing the nation's military-economic potential, broadening military
production, preparing the economy for a military reorganization and increasing
Its survivability.
The Communist Party and the Soviet government saw the approaching threat of war
and took proper measures to strengthen the state's defense capability.
During the years of the first five-year plans, the Communist Party, in consist-
ently following the instructions of V. I. Lenin that a war must be prepared
for "over a long period of time, seriously, starting from an economic upswing
in the nation"1 did. everything to more rapidly surmount its technical and eco-
nomic backwardness inherited from Tsarist Russia. The industrialization of the
country, the collectivization of agriculture and the cultural revolution played
an enormous role in strengthening the Soviet state's economic and defense might.
As a result of the measures taken, Soviet national income over the period from
1928 through 1940 increased by more than 5-fold,.electric power production rose
by 9.7-fold, coal mining by 4.7-fold, steel casting by more than 4-fold, oil
output by 2.7-fold, while machine products increased by 20-fold.2
A characteristic feature in Soviet economic development during the prewar years
was that military production developed at a higher pace than industry as a
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whole. Thus, while during the years of the Second Five-Year Plan, all indus-
trial product increased by 2.2-fold, defense products rose by 3.9-fold. The
average annual production of airplanes and tanks in 1935-1937'rose by over 4-
fold in comparison with 1930-1931, for artillery pieces it was 2.6-fold and for
rifles by almost 2.3-fold.3
In line with the greater immediate threat of attack by Nazi Germany on the
Soviet Union, measures were taken to increase the state food reserves and major
strategic materials. Just from January 123-9-through January 1,941, the state
reserves and mobilization supplies were increased by 5-fold for iron, 2-fold 1
for rolled product, more than 2-fold for copper and 2.2-fold for zinc.' The
Politburo of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Com-
mittee at this time adopted a number of decrees to broaden military production,
including: "On the Production of T-34 Tanks in 1940," "On the Reconstruction
of Existing Aircraft Plants and the Construction of New Ones" and others.
Time was of the essence. In the West the flames of World War II had already
broken out. Their glow was approaching the frontiers of the USSR. The nation,
in straining every muscle, strengthened its economic and defense might. In
just 3z dears of the Third Five-Year Plan, 3,000 new large industrial enter-
prises were built, including: metallurgical and copper smelting, oil refiner-!,
ies and automotive plants as well as pulp-paper combines and building materials
plants. Tank, aviation and artillery plants as well as plants producing ammuni-
tion went into operation.5
In creating the industrial potential, the necessity of the rational placement'
and military-economic dispersement of national economic capacity was taken into
account. Industry was brought closer to the raw material and fuel sources {
located largely in the Eastern regions of the USSR. During the years of the
Third Five-Year Plan, the basic emphasis was put on establishing military-
industry facilities in the Volga, the Urals and Siberia.
Of major importance for increasing the viability of the economy was the dupli--
cating of unique enterprises located in the European USSR in the East of the
nation. Thus, ferroalloy plants, aluminum-magnesium enterprises and so forth',
were built in Kuznetsk (now Novokuznetsk) and in the Urals.
Due to the comprehensive program for improving military-economic potential, bx
the summer of 1941, the industrial enterprises of the Urals, the Volga, Westein
and Eastern Siberia as well as Central Asia and the Far East were producing
18.5 percent of the military product but for the basic types this figure sur-1
passed 34 percent.6 In building new plants, production envisaged the possibil-
ity of rapidly converting them to turning out military products. Many enter-]
prises received mobilization plans.
As a result of the successful fulfillment of the plans of the prewar five-yeat
plans, the economic and defense might of the nation increased immeasurably.
The Soviet Union emerged in first place in Europe and second in the world for
the volume of machine building products, for tractor production, oil produc-
tion, for the volume of railroad shipments, and second place in Europe for thl
production of electric power, steel, iron and aluminum. The nation establish d
it own aviation, tank and artillery industries. The defense industry develop d
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particularly intensely during the 3 prewar years with the production level in
this sector rising by more than 4-fold.
However, it was impossible to fully carry out the complex military-economic
tasks confronting the nation from the threat of the initiating of a war by the
Nazi bloc against the world's first socialist state. History had left too
little time for the Soviet people to prepare to repel aggression. Nevertheless,
the measures undertaken by the Communist Party and the Soviet government to
strengthen national defense might made it possible to significantly shorten the
time,for switching the nation's economy to a war footing.
The treacherous attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR forced the Soviet people to
shift from peaceful labor to waging a holy war to defend their motherland.
During its very first days the Communist Party worked out a program for mobil-
izing all the forces to defeat the Nazi invaders. It was based upon the im-
mortal ideas of V. I. Lenin on the defense of the socialist fatherland. The
party was guided by the leader's instructions that once things had reached the
point of a war, everything should be subordinate to the war and the slightest
hesitation on this score cannot be tolerated. For this reason, as during the
years of the Civil War, Lenin's slogan "Everything for the Front, Everything
for Victory!" became the determinant in organizing the entire Soviet economy.
The advantages of the planned socialist economic system made it possible to
quickly carry out a number of major measures to convert the nation's economy
from a peacetime to a wartime status, namely:
a) To initiate military production on an ever-increasing scale and provide the
front with the necessary amount of weapons and military equipment;
b) To shift the economic proportions in the interests of the greatest possible
increase in the production of military products, to strengthen the military
industry having shifted to it enterprises from other national economic sectors;
c) To reorganize the operation of tran.sport, the communications agencies and
equipment and strengthen the capacity of the railroads;
d) To mobilize the material and labor resources of agriculture to continuously
supply the Armed Forces and the population of the cities with food and industry
with raw materials;
e) To reallocate the human resources to ensure the mobilization requirements of
the Armed Forces and the operation of industry and the other economic sectors;
f) To change the activities of the scientific and experimental-design institu-
tions in the aim of meeting the needs of the Armed Forces and attaining
military-technical superiority over the enemy;
g) To utilize the financial system, trade and enterprises in the service sphere
in accord with the needs of the war;
h) To increase the centralization of economic management in the aim of concen-
trating resources to meet the needs of the war and so forth.
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The economy was mobilized in an organized manner, according to a specific plan.
Under those very difficult conditions for the country, precise and efficient
planning was of special importance. This was carried out considering the
changes in the national economic proportions brought about by the needs of the
front. This made it possible to successfully carry out the very complex tasks
of supplying the operational army with combat equipment, weapons and other
materiel. Thus, even on the second day of the war a mobilization put
into effect
economic hplan owas t approved ammunition, third wee
quarter of 1941, and in
19 re41fleacnted the questions of mobilizing
'Auuse e a economy military-economic fourt~iqu plan
rter which
and for 1942 for the regions of the
t~
oV6Tga, IiJrals, Western Siberia, Kaza-c.Eistan and-- Central Asfa
The military-economic plans played a major role in mobilizing the economy.
They became a major implement for converting our national economy to a wartime
footing and in mobilizing USSR production potential for defeating the enemy.
The grandiosness of the tasks confronting the nation demanded changes in the
forms and methods of leading and organizing economic management. For this
reason the entire burden of authority was concentrated in the hands of the
State Defense Committee [GKO] established on 30 June 1941. The GKO decrees and
decisions had the force of wartime laws for all the state, party, Komsomol and
public bodies as well as for all citizens. Later on the Operations Bureau of
the GKO was established and this supervised the routine activities of all the
people's commissariats. This made it possible to pool the efforts of the front
and the rear and more effectively utilize the resources for mobilizing the
economy. Particular attention was paid to the questions of producing combat
equipment, weapons, ammunition and fuel.
The situation during the first months of the war was exceptionally complex. Butt,
under these conditions socialist industry demonstrated its ability to rapidly
satisfy the arising demand. Entire sectors of the national economy were convert?
ed to a wartime status. The lants of heavy, transport and a$ricultural machine'
enterprise were to n produciing artillery pieces and mortar. The repair building were converted to tank production while the medium machine buildinshops o p ants and local industry and artisan cooperative enterprises were also
__.a
converted
and involved mmunitinion. For producing heavy example, during durin in the first Leningrad,
th to he pro ucplin plants were weapons
60 plants were producing regimental cannons, 15 were turning out medium machine
guns, 16 were producing mortars while 7 plants were producing submachine guns.
Some 116 enterprises were involved in the machining of shells and projectiles.
The Communist Party and the Soviet government undertook decisive measures aimed
at developing military production on an ever-increasing scale. Upon a decision
of the party Central Committee, just during the last 4 months of 1941, 8 tank
plants, 6 hull and 3 diesel tank plants were set up in the Volga and particular-'
ly in the Urals. The_People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy_ from 1 August
1941 promised to begin pro ucing armor de plate at the Kuznetsk
Plant. The people's commissariats of medium machine bui din and ferrous metal-'
lurgy were to immediately move the armor rolling mill from the Kirov to the j
Nizhniy Tagil Metallurgical Plant. The front needed airplanes, guns and mortars',
and ammunition just as much as tanks. At a price of enormous effort the workers!,
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of the rear during the second half of 1941 increased the production of artil-
lery pieces by almost 3-fold in comparison with the prewar 6 months, by 2.8-
fold for tanks and 1.6-fold for airplanes.8 Military production rose signifi-
cantly in the first half of 1942.
During the war years, the organization and starting up of the production of new
types of weapons were carried out several times faster than prior to the war.
Military production was widened by an unprecedented acceleration in its develop-
ment rate. Thus, while prior to the war it took 2 or 3 years to build a blast_
furnace, during the war it took 7-8 months.
As is known, in the prewar years, the nation had begun building a large number
of industrial enterprises. Under the conditions of the commenced war, a deci-
sion was taken to mothball the construction of certain enterprises and projects
while others would be completed rapidly. The light industry sectors were sig-
nificantly reorganized. Production was initiated widely of greatcoat cloth,
as well as cotton and wool fabrics for the Armed Forces.
As a consequence of the occupation of a number of regions in the USSR, the
national economy suffered enormous losses. Prior to the war, the territory
temporarily occupied by the enemy by November 1941 had around 40 percent of the
nation's population, it produced 63 percent of the coal, cast 68 percent of the
iron, 58 percent of the steel, 60 percent of the aluminum, it produced 38 per-
cent of the grain and had 41 percent of the total railroad length.9
From the very start of the war, the difficult task arose of shifting from the
frontline areas the major enterprises, workers, engineers and technicians.
Leadership over the implementing of these measures was entrusted to the Evacua-
tion Council established on 24 June 1941 (chairman N. M. Shvernik, deputies
A. N. Kosygin and M. G. Pervukhin).
Evacuation was carried out according to a precise plan. From July through
November 1941, some 1,523 industrial enterprises were relocated to the East
(667 to the Urals, 224 to Western Siberia, 78 to Eastern Siberia, 308 to
Central Asia and Kazakhstan and 226 to the Volga). As a total during the
second half of the year, according to incomplete data, the equipment of 2,593
industrial enterprises was moved from the threatened areas. The members of the
VKP(b) Central Committee and government S. A. Akopov, B. L. Vannikov, V. V.
Vakhrushev, A. N. Kosygin, V. A. Malyshev, M. G. Pervukhin, I. F. Tevosyan,
D. F. Ustinov, A. I. Shakhurin and others were concerned with the questions of
relocating and reestablishing the enterprises arriving in the rear of the
nation.
Not only industrial enterprises were evacuated to the East. The kolkhozes and
sovkhozes in the eastern regions of the nation during the second half of 1941
received 2,393,300 head of livestock shifted from the frontline zone.10
The shifting of the productive forces from the frontline areas deep into the
rear made it possible to maintain a significant portion of national wealth and
use this in the interests of carrying out the main tasks of increasing military
production.
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The moving over thousands of kilometers of what essentially was an entire in-'
dustria:L nation caused enormous strain in transport operations. The volume of
operational shipments increased sharply. All of this necessitated a reorgania-
tion of transport operations and here a major element was to convert train tr f-
fic to a special military schedule called the "A" travel warrant. This en-
visaged the moving first of troop trains and freight involved with the strategic
deployment of the Armed Forces. Other measures were also carried out envisaged
by the mobilization plan. A special freight control system began to be em-
ployed in rail transport.
Due to the fact that transport was being evermore difficult tasks, its leader
ship had to be strengthened. In February 1942, under the GKO the Transport Com-
mittee was formed the membership of which included I. V. Stalin (chairman),
A. A. Andreyev (deputy), A. I. Mikoyan, I. V. Kovalev, A. V. Khrulev, Z. A.
Shashkov and others. With the aid of the Transport Committee, it was possible
to achieve a greater coordination in the planning and carrying out of ship-
ments and to coordinate the work of the means of transport. The GKO altered
the management structure of the railroads and strengthened the leadership of
the NKPS [People's Commissariat of Railroads]. On 25 March 1942, the USSR
Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Chief of the Main Directorate of Rear
Services of the Soviet Army, Gen A. V. Khrulev, became the head of the NKPS.
Under the fronts positions were established for representatives of the NKPS.
Responsible party workers and representatives of the NKPS were sent to acceler-
ate troop train traffic to many junctions through which the main flows of mil--
tary cargo were moving. Here also were the representatives of the chief of the
rear services of the Soviet Army.
Due to these measures and the unstinting work of the railroad workers, ship-
ments for the army and the national economy increased significantly. For juse
the 10 main lines, the volume of loading and unloading by the beginning of May
1942 had increased by 50 percent, car stoppages had declined noticeably and
railroad capacity had increased.11
Along with the measures taken to improve transport operations, the GKO and thy:
USSR government gave great importance to mobilizing the material and labor re+
sources in agriculture to continuously supply the Armed Forces with food and
industry with raw materials. In order to carry out this task, it was essenti l
to alter the procedure for distributing the food resources. The state channel-
ed the existing food primarily to supply the Red Army and the population of the
industrial centers. According to a decision of the Politburo of the VKP(b)
Central Committee, from July 1941, a rationing system began to be introduced.
The amounts were set depending upon the degree of importance of the work per-
formed for defense purposes as well as the nature of the job and working cond-.-
tions. ,
The most important conditions for solving the food problem were the rapid re-',
organization of agricultural production to a wartime footing and controlling
the placement of the production of grain and other agricultural products. In
the spring of 1942, the planted area of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the red
gions of the Center., Volga, Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Trans-
caucasia and the Far East increased by 3.7 million hectares in comparison with
1940.12
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The organizing of accelerated production and technical training became a major
task. In a short period of time an extensive network of minimum technical
knowledge circles had been established and the number of trade and railroad
schools increased. The Soviet women made an enormous contribution to strength-
ening defense might.
A major role was also played by Soviet scientists in solving the major prob-
lems of reorganizing the economy and setting up a smoothly operating military
economy. The situation at that time demanded a change as rapidly as possible
in the activities of the scientific and experimental-design institutions to
meet the needs of the Armed Forces and for achieving military-technical superi-
ority over the enemy. The scientists paid particular attention to improving
various types of weapons and combat equipment. Scientists were at work on de-
veloping new, more advanced types of aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces and
mortars. Their efforts resulted in efficient rocket weapons, while radar and
other types of combat equipment were developed.
During the first, most difficult months of the Great Patriotic War, when the
nation was deprived of many deposits of essential raw materials, the Soviet
scientists carried out enormous work to seek out new raw material sources in
the Eastern regions. The research contributed to the development of the pro-
ductive forces in the Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan. New deposits of ferrous
and nonferrous metal ores, coal and oil were developed.
The needs of the war were broad and diverse. It had a significant impact on
the functioning of the state's financial system, trade and the service sphere.
Suffice it to say that in the second half of 1941, allocations for military
purposes, in comparison with the first half of the year, had increased by 20.6
billion rubles and in 1942 they reached 108.4 billion rubles. The redistribu-
tion of foreign trade was also for the benefit of military production.
Thus, drawing on the advantages of the socialist national economic system, the
Communist Party and the Soviet government were able to rapidly mobilize all the
potential capabilities of the nation to carry out the primary task of rapidly
establishing a smoothly-operating military economy. The greater centraliza-
tion in national economic management made it possible to mobilize the material
and financial means as well as the human resources of the nation and channel
them into broadening military production and establishing a strong, organized
rear.
The entire range of measures carried out by the Communist Party and the Soviet
government to mobilize the economy could not help but tell on the time re-
quired to convert the national economy to a wartime status. By the heroic
efforts of the Soviet people, by mid-1942, the war-production capacity lost
during the first months of the war had been not only replaced but also signifi-
cantly surpassed. Thus, the output of military products in the Urals rose, in
1942 in comparison with 1940, by more than 5-fold, in Western Siberia by 27-
fold and the Volga area by 9-fold.14
For the sake of comparison, it might be pointed out that in Nazi Germany the
converting of the economy to a military footing lasted almost 6 years, from
1933 through 1939. The mobilizing of the economy in the nations of the
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Of great importance for compensating for losses in food production was the ex-
tensive use of additional sources including the subsidiary farms of industrial
enterprises and rear troop units and which were specialized chiefly in the
raising of potatoes and vegetables.
Regardless of the decline in agricultural production, the Soviet kolkhoz peas-
antry did everything possible and impossible not to remain in debt to the front.
Agriculture was able under unbelievebly difficult conditions to become a sound'
support for the front. Having mobilized the human and material resources, it
made full use of its material and technical base and maintained the required
food production level. At a price of unstinting effort, the rural workers prod
vided the army and the population with food products and industry with raw
materials.
Another difficult problem in mobilizing the economy was the reallocation of
human resources to meet the mobilization requirements of the Armed Forces and
the running of industry and the other economic sectors. With the outbreak of {
the war, millions of workers, ko:Lkhoz members, engineers and technicians joined
the ranks of the Army and Navy. A sharp reduction in the number of working-agel
population was also caused by the temporary occupation of a significant portiot
of Soviet: territory. For this reason the Central Committee of the Communist
Party and the Soviet government adopted a number of extraordinary measures to
make more effective use of the personnel in the national economy and to seek out
human reserves.
On 26 June 1.941, the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On the
Working Hours of Manual and White Collar Personnel in Wartime" was promulgated
The leaders of the enterprises were granted the right, with the permission of
the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] to set for employees compulsory
overtime lasting from 1 to 3 hours a day. Regular and supplementary leaves
were cancelled. This provided an opportunity to increase the load factor on
the production equipment by approximately one-third without increasing the
enterprise personnel.
For the correct and planned distribution and redistribution of labor resources
on 30 June 1941, under the Bureau of the USSR SNK, a committee was established,
for registering and allocating the labor force under the chairmanship of P. G.j
Moskatov who also headed the Main Directorate of Labor Resources. The republic
SNK, the kray and oblast executive committees were given the right to effective
ly maneuver manpower in the interests of increasing military production. a
From July 1941 through January 1942, the Committee for the Registration and
Allocation of the Labor Force was able to shift into the defense industry from'
local industry enterprises, from the service sphere, industrial cooperatives aid
the municipal economy and mobilize from the unemployed population some 120,8501
persons. Just in the second half of 1941, production received 500,000 house-
wives and 360,000 students of the 8th-10th grades. During this period, constric-
tion battalions and worker columns were actively organized. These were sent t4
coal mines, oil fields, power plants, to enterprises of ferrous and nonferrous{
metallurgy, to construction projects and railroad transport. The number of
persons in these formations reached 608,500 persons.13
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4 "Sovetskiy tyl v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [The Soviet Rear in the Great
Patriotic War], Moscow, Mysl', Book 1, 1974, p 9.
5 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...," Vol 12, p 154.
6 Ibid.
7 "Istoriya SSSR s drevneyskikh vremen do hashikh dney" [The History of the
USSR From Ancient Times to Today], Moscow, Nauka, Vol 10, 1973, p 76.
TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 81,
inv. 12076, file 5, sheet 3.
9 "Istoriya vtoroy mir.ovoy...," 1975, Vol 4, p 152.
10 Ibid., p 140.
11 Ibid., p 148.
12 "Velikaya pobeda sovetskogo naroda 1941-1945" [The Great Victory of the
Soviet People 1941-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1976, p 401.
13 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...," Vol 4, p 144.
14 N. Vozneseriskiy, "Voyannaya ekonomika SSSR v period Otechestvennoy voyny"
[The Soviet Military Economy During the Period of the Patriotic War], Moscow,
Gospolitizdat, 1948, p 77.
15 "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow,
Voyenizdat, Vol 5, 1978, p 343.
16 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...," Vol 5, p 48.
COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1984
10272
CSO: 1801/13
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anti-Hitler coalition, in particular the United States, was carried out in the
course of the war and continued around 2 years. Here the United States at
that time did not suffer any serious losses and its army was not engaged in
active combat operations.15
The well organized Soviet military production from mid-1942 provided the
troops with the necessary amount of equipment, weapons and other materiel.
During this year the Soviet Army received over 25,400 aircraft of all types,
around 24,500 tanks, 33,100 field guns (of a caliber of 76-mm and more), around
125,600 mortars and 127.4 million shells.16
This made it possible for the Soviet Supreme High Command to arm new military
formations and establish a reserve of combat equipment, weapons and ammuni-
tion. This ensured the increased size and combat might of the Armed Forces
and was a major prerequisite for a fundamental turning point in the course of
the war.
In having a developing industrial base in the East of the nation, the Communist
Party and the Soviet government established a rapidly growing, well organized
military economy. This was a qualitatively new stage in the development of the
Soviet economy making it possible to achieve a material and technical superiojr-
ity in the difficult economic struggle against Nazi Germany.
The successful reorganization of the socialist national economy and the shifti-
ing of a significant portion of the nation's productive forces to the East in
a short period of time were possible due to the unprecedented labor feat of the
Soviet people led by the Communist Party.
The rapid conversion of the nation's economy from a peacetime to a wartime
status showed that the socialist economic system was more mobile and maneuverf-
able, it was able more quickly to adapt, to respond more effectively to the
changing needs and utilize more effectively the material resources in the in-!
terests of meeting the needs of the front. The USSR was able with maximum
efficiency to utilize each ton of metal, fuel, each unit of machine tool equp-
ment.
The lessons of converting the nation's economy from a peacetime to a wartimel
status during the years of the last war provided numerous examples of effective,
rational decisions and of the highest state, production and labor discipline
showing the indisputable advantages of the socialist state's economy.
FOOTNOTES
1 V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 395.
2 KOMMUNIST, No 7, 1975, p 20.
3 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 193-
1945], Moscow, Voyenizdat, Vol 12, 1982, p 154.
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JPRS-UMA-85-036
31 May 1985
Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 85 (signed to press 20
Dee 84) pp 30-36
[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Kurkotkin, USSR deputy minister of
defense, chief of rear services, USSR Armed Forces, under rubric "40th
Anniversary of the Great Victory": "The Outstanding Exploit of the Rear-
Services Workers"]
[Text] The years of the Great Patriotic War are receding farther and farther
into the past. But time cannot diminish the grandeur of the unprecedented
exploit of the Soviet nation that was carried out under the guidance of the
Communist Party. As is noted in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee,
entitled "The 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Nation in the
Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," the Victory achieved by the Soviet Union
completely revealed the advantages of socialism and its tremendous economic,
sociopolitical, and spiritual capabilities.
The course and outcome of the fiercest and bloodiest of wars that mankind had
even known reconfirmed the correctness of the Leninist instruction to the
effect that without an economic upsurge "one cannot even discuss any serious
increase in the defense capability" ([Lenin, V. I.], "Poln. sobr. soch."
[Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 168).
The material basis of the enemy's defeat during the years of the Great
Patriotic War was laid in the course of the prewar Soviet five-year plans. In
an unprecedently short period of time our country had overcome the technical
and economic backwardness that had been inherited from tsarist Russia.
The factor that became a very important link in the resolution of the tasks of
the most rapid increase in the country's economic might was its
industrialization. At the 14th party congress it was noted that
industrialization was the basis not only for the overall upsurge of the entire
national economy, but also the basis of the reinforcement of the country's
defense capacity. And it is not by accident that it was emphasized in the
directives for the lst Five-Year Plan, "Taking into consideration the
possibility of a military attack on the part of the capitalist countries on
the world's first proletarian country, it is necessary, when elaborating the,
five-year plan, to pay the maximum amount of attention to the most rapid
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development of those branches of the national economy in general and industry
in particular which will play the leading role in the job of guaranteeing the
country's defense and economic stability during wartime."
The Leninist party did everything necessary to assure that socialist
construction, under conditions of the hostile capitalist encirclement, was
reliably defended. Therefore the proper attention during the prewar years was
directed primarily at those branches of industry which had the most direct
influence upon the production of military output and upon the reinforcement off'
the country's military-economic potential. In the overall volume of
industrial production, the percentage of machine-building and metal processing
rose at the most rapid rates. Branches that received further development were
machine-tool-building, power and transport machine building, and the
electrical industry. Something that was especially important for defense
needs was the production of special and high-grade types of steel, which were
required for the tank, aviation, motor-vehicle, and other branches of
industry. Another circumstance that was of tremendous importance was the fact
that the Soviet Union had provided ferrous metallurgy with its own base for
the smelting of the ferroalloys that were needed for the production of
especially strong grades of steel.
The Communist Party and the Soviet government, in their economic policy
proceeded for the.need for the correct combination of the interests of
developing the national economy and the tasks of creating and improving the
country's military-economic potential. The aggravation of the international
situation and the buildup of the threat of attack upon our country during the
1930's forced the USSR to accelerate the development of the war industry. For
example, during the years of the 2nd Five-Year Plan, with an increase in the
total industrial output by a factor of 2.2, in the defense branches it
increased by a factor of 3.9. The average annual production of aircraft and
tanks in 1935-1937 quadrupled as compared with 1930-1931; artillery pieces
increased by a factor of 2.6; and rifles, by a factor of almost 2.3. The
party's course that was aimed at the accelerated development of the defense
industry was also typical of the 3rd Five-Year Plan. In the course of that
five-year plan the increase in the production of civilian output during the
three-year period was an average of 13.2 percent a year, and military output
39 percent a year.
The 18th party congress devoted the most serious attention to questions of
reinforcing the country's defense capability. At all levels of party and
state leadership, a considerable amount of work was carried out, which was
aimed at reinforcing the country's military-economic potential. According to
a decision of the party's Central Committee, the People's Commissariat of the
Defense Industry was subdivided into four independent people's commissariats,
which were headed by candidate members of the Central Committee. In 1939-1941
the VKP(b) Central Committee and the Soviet government enacted several decrees
dealing with questions of the development of the war industry. They included
"The Remodeling of Existing Aircraft Plants and the Construction of New 10nes0'
(September 1939), "The Production of T-34 Tanks in 1940," etc.
It was also at that time that our country created the T-34 and KV-1 tanks, the
YaK-1, MIG-1, LAGG-3, IL-2, and PE-2 aircraft, and the volley-fire rocket
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launcher that was given the frontline name of the "Katyusha." All these
things withstood their test well during the course of the war. Unfortunately,
by the beginning of the 1940's their production was only being to grow and the
share of these models of armament in the overall quantity was insignificant.
Together with the development of the defense industry, measures were taken to
increase the viability of the economy and to prepare the national economy for
reorganization on a military basis. In this regard a factor that was of truly
strategic importance was the party's course that was aimed at the creation of
a large-scale industrial base in the eastern part of the country. New
industrial regions sprang up there. The country's second coal and
metallurgical base was activated -- the Urals-Kuznetsk complex with such
industrial giants. as the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk combines.
The Karaganda Coal Basin grew rapidly. A major petroleum-drilling and
petroleum-refining industry -- the "second Baku" -- was being created between
the Volga and the Urals. And by the summer of 1941 the eastern parts of the
country accounted for almost one-fifth of all the war plants.
Heavy industry became the basis of the material-technical base for the
collectivization of agriculture -- one of the most important sources of the
country's economic might. By the beginning of 1941 the kolkhozes and
sovkhozes had in operation as many as 684,000 tractors (in 15-horsepower
terms), 182,000 grain combines, and 228,000 trucks. Thanks to the kolkhoz
system it was possible to organize during the difficult wartime period the
providing of the army and the population with food supplies and the providing
of industry with raw materials.
At the 18th Party Conference that was held in February 1941 the questions of
the further development of industrial production were in the center of
attention. Decisions enacted by that conference provided for the more
complete development of the branches of the national economy that were
decisive for the country's defense, and the creation of the necessary state
reserves and mobilization reserves.
Considerable success during the prewar years was achieved in the national
economy, occupational instruction, and the indoctrination of the Soviet
citizens in the spirit of utter devotion to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism,
love for our socialist Motherland, and the spirit of the inviolable friendship
of the peoples of our country. The Communist Party showed constant concern
for the reinforcement of the moral-political unity of Soviet society.
The German fascist aggression disrupted the fulfillment of the creative plans
of the Land of the Soviets. It proved to be impossible to carry out everything
that had been planned. We were also given too little time by history to
prepare our country to repel the aggression. But that which we succeeded in
doing was an important contribution to increasing the industrial and defensive
might of the Soviet state and to the buildup of the production of weapons and
combat technology in the course of the war.
The treacherous attack by fascist Germany upon the Soviet Union immediately
necessitated the reorganization of the party ranks, the operation of the state
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agencies and public organizations on a military basis, and the mobilization of
the country's resources for the production of military technology. Therefore
the total power was concentrated in a single agency that united the efforts of
the front and the rear. That agency was the State Defense Committee (GK4),
which was formed on 30 June 1941 on the basis of a joint decision by the
VKP(b) Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the
Council of People's Commissars.
Based upon Leninist theory concerning the defense of the socialist Motherland
the Communist Party developed a clear-cut program for combatting the
aggressor. The basic documents that set forth the specific paths for
defeating the fascist usurpers were the 22 June Declaration of the Soviet
Government, and the 29 June 1941 directive of the SNK [Council of People'.
Commissars] and the VPK(b) Central Committee to the party and Soviet
organizations in the oblasts along the front. The party and the Soviet
nation, in the extraordinary circumstances of that time, applied tremendous
efforts that were aimed at reinforcing our army, putting the economy onto a
military basis as rapidly as possible, and converting the country into A
single military camp.
As early as the first day of the war, a Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet stipulated such economic measures as the introduction of labor
conscription and the regulation of the operating time of industrial
enterprises and of institutions. A ration-card system was introduced for thi
purpose of regulating personal consumption.
The mortal danger that hung over the country did not shake by even one iota
the party's conviction of victory. The party consolidated its ranks even more
closely for the purpose of executing a-truly historic task. The Soviet Union
was opposed not only by an aggressor army that was armed to the teeth, but
also by the economy of the fascist Reich, an economy that had been mobilized
to the maximum extent. Hitlerite Germany surpassed the USSR with regard tp
the size of the machine-tool pool by a factor of 2.5; number of specialists in
machine-building, by a factor of almost 1.5; and for coal production, by 4,
factor of 2.5. Germany produced much more coal, magnesium, electric power!,,
locomotives, and motor vehicles. In addition, Hitler's Reich was making the
maximum use of the industrial potential and natural resources of its alliep
and the countries that it had occupied.
The first months of the armed struggle against the Hitlerite usurpers were
extremely complicated ones for us. As a consequence of the fact that the
enemy had occupied a number of rayons, the national economy of the USSR
suffered tremendous losses. Prior to the war, the Soviet territory that was
temporarily seized by the end of 1941 had had approximately 40 percent of the
population, had produced 63 percent of the coal, 68 percent.. of the cast iron,
and 58 ;percent of the steel, had more than 40 percent of the total length or
the railroads, and produced 38 percent of the grain.
From the very first days of the war the Communist Party and the Soviet
government were confronted by a task of unusual complexity -- the task of
converting the country's national economy to a military basis within the
shortest possible periods of time. That necessitated. the immediate and
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fundamental change in the branch structure of the national economy, the
organization of military production, the assimilation of new technological
processes, etc. The things that the front needed first of all were aircraft,
tanks, ammunition, and other materiel without which it would have been
impossible to conduct military actions.
The complicated situation in the first months of the year and the need to make
time-responsive decisions were among the factors influencing the increase in
the role of current planning. For example, by 23 June a mobilization plan for
the production of ammunition was put into effect, and a week later an overall
national-economic mobilization plan for the third quarter of 1941 was
approved.
However, because of the extremely unfavorable conditions it was necessary to
shut down the principal military-industrial base urgently and to evacuate it
from the rayons that were threatened with seizure by the enemy, moving it deep
into the country. Therefore, for purposes of the prompt providing of the
needs of the front, on 4 July 1941 the State Defense Committee gave a
commission headed by USSR Gosplan Chairman N. A. Voznesenskiy the assignment
of developing a military-economic plan for guaranteeing the country's defense,
having in mind the use of the resources and enterprises on the Volga, in West
Siberia, and in the Urals, as well the resources and enterprises to be
transferred to those areas on an evacution basis.
On 16 August the VKP(b) Central Committee and the Council of People's
Commissars approved a military-economic plan that was a program for the
creation of a well-coordinated military economy that was capable of
guaranteeing the attainment of victory. The plan provided for a comprehensive
program of measures, which program included the evacution of enterprises in
the military people's commissariats to the eastern parts of the country; the
expansion of the production of arms, ammunition, aircraft, tanks, and ships;
and the development of heavy industry and rail transportation.
It was only a planned socialist economy that could have been able to use in a
purposeful manner all the resources in the interests of the war. Entire
branches of the national, economy were changed over and put on a military
basis. The plants in heavy, transport, and agricultural machine-building
began producing artillery pieces and mortars. The production of arms and
ammunition was organized at the repair and overhaul shops of plants, and at
enterprises of local industry and cooperative trades. The work that was
carried out was complicated and responsible. But the fulfillment of the plan
required time. Meanwhile a considerable number of industrial enterprise
proved to be dismantled or were preparing to move to the east. The evacuation
occupies a special place among the stupendous tasks that were resolved by the
nation under the guidance of the party. It was an operation that could
probably be compared with the largest battles in the Great Patriotic War.
The execution of that completely unprecedented task was made the
responsibility of a specially created Evacuation Council, to which N. M.
Shvernik was assigned as chairman, and A. N. Kosygin and M. G. Pervukhin as
deputies. Carrying out the overall guidance of the evacuation, the Politburo
of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR Council of People's Commissars
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adopted on 27 June 1941 the decree entitled "The Procedure for Removing and,
Transferring Contingents of People and Valuable Property." That decree)
mentioned the need to give the preference to the military enterprises when,
transferring the plants. From July through November 1941 alone, 1523 plants!
and factories were transferred to the east. The total number of industrial]
enterprises, according to incomplete data, which were transferred from the,
threatened rayons was 2593.
The tremendous amount of organizational work carried out by the party,
committees and the trade-union and Komsomol organizations, and the truly
heroic labor of the workers, kolkhoz members, and intellectuals yielded their
fruit. By the middle of 1942 it was possible to activate 1200 of thel
evacuated plants and factories.
Thanks to the selflessness of the working class, many of the evacuated
enterprises began producing military technology within a month or a month and
a half after arrival at the new location. There was a shortage of working
hands. It was at that time, in answer to a summons issued by the Communist
Party, that housewives, teenagers, and retirees took up positions at the
machine tools. Many of them were able, within very brief periods of time, to
master related specialties and to become experts in their field.
And so, by only one year after the beginning of the war, the reorganization of
the economy on a military basis was successfully carried out, and by the end
of 1942 the process of creating a well-organized military economy was
completed.
A special role in the development of military production belonged to the
Urals. With regard to the production of steel, rolled metal, and aluminum
the Urals occupied first place in the country during the war years. The Urals
produced 60 percent of the medium tanks and 100 percent of the heavy ones
Every other artillery shell that was shot at the enemy was made out of Urals
steel.
By the joint efforts of scientists, production specialists, and all those whc
worked untiringly for the sake of achieving victory over the enemy, by the
second half of 1942 and the beginning of 1943 the necessary military-economic
conditions were created for achieving a major breaking point in the war}
Those conditions became possible thanks to the quantitative and qualitative
growth of the Soviet rear area. The front and the rear squeezed together into
a single crushing fist and there was no force that could oppose that
indissoluble unity. That is why the more perspicacious Hitlerite generals and
economists concluded after Stalingrad and Kursk that the German economy had
already won the fight.
But the war continued. And during the year of the major breakthrough, our
country's economy was facing new tasks. That was linked with the fact that b
that time the possibility of increasing production by means of th
redistribution of the math the fact that by that time the possibility o
increasing production by means of the redistribution of the material and labor'
resources was basically exhausted. The qualitative factors began to take or
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greater and greater importance: the increase in labor productivity as a result
of improving the technological processes and the organization of production.
By May 1942, in response to an appeal issued by the party, a completely
unprecedented All-Union Socialist Competition under the motto "Everything for
the front, everything for victory!" was broadly extended throughout all the
branches of the national. economy. The movement of the 200-percenters, 300-
percenters, and even thousand-percenters -- that is, those who had
overfulfilled their. norms by a factor of 2, 3, or 10 -- was broadening. The
competition encompassed thousands of industrial enterprises and played a
tremendous role in increasing the labor productivity.
An important condition for the successful resolution of the military-economic
tasks was the intensification of the party leadership of the economy. The
basic branches of the military economy were headed by members or candidate
members of the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee. Experienced party
and economic workers headed the people's commissariats of industry: D. F.
Ustinov, armament; A. I. Shakhurin, aviation industry; P. I. Parshin, mortar
industry; and B. A. Vannikov, ammunition. Thousands of Communists were sent
to very important enterprises in heavy industry. Whereas by the beginning of
1943 there were 920,400 Communists working in the leading branches of the USSR
national economy, by the end of the year there were 1,114,200. The
reinforcement of the party organizations and the concentration of the party
forces in the decisive sectors of the military economy tremendously
contributed to improving the work of Soviet industry.
At the beginning of 1943 the party's Central Committee began concentrating the
Communists' efforts at the elimination of the bottlenecks in the economy and
at the fulfillment of an extensive program for the development of heavy
industry. Decisive steps were taken to eliminate the lag in the fuel,
metallurgical, and power industry. During a one-year period the capital
investments in those branches doubled as compared with the previous period.
But what was the effect that the success in the creation and improvement of a
well-organized military economy had upon equipping the Red Army and upon the
course of combat actions? First, the increase in military production made it
possible to restore the considerable losses of combat technology that had been
incurred at the beginning of the war and served as a solid basis for carrying
out a major turning point in the war. Secondly, that success made it possible
also to achieve a qualitative superiority over the enemy with regard to very
important types of armament. The troops received the latest tanks, which got
the upper hand over the Panthers and Tigers that had been advertised in every
way by fascist propaganda; aircraft that enabled our pilots to win supremacy
in the air; as well as excellent small arms and different kinds of ammunition.
Whereas Soviet industry in 1942-1944 had a monthly production of more than
2000 tanks, it was not until May 1944 that Germany's industry reached its
maximum -- 1450 units.
In the work of providing all kinds of support to the front there were no
secondary sectors. All the links in the economy were important. It would
have been impossible, for example, to overestimate the contribution that was
made to the attainment of victory by the workers in agriculture. The
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conditions under which they worked were the most complicated ones.
Agriculture transferred to the front its tractors and trucks and a
considerable number of horses. As a result of the temporary occupation of
part of our territory by the enemy, there was a sharp reduction in the areas
that were planted to crops. The entire brunt of the rural labor fell onto the
shoulders of the women, the old men, and children. Having replaced the men
who had gone to the front, they worked unceasingly in the name of bringing the
victory closer. Summing up the results of 1943, the party's Central Committee
remarked that under the difficult wartime conditions the kolkhozes and
sovkhozes had coped during the year that had elapsed with the agricultural
operations and had guaranteed without any serious interruptions the supplying
of the Red Army with food supplies and industry with raw materials.
The initiative shown by the workers in collecting funds for the Soviet Army
deserves the most profound gratitude. The funds that were received just from
the workers, kolkhoz members, and intellectuals were used to build 2500
aircraft, 30,000 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery pieces], 20
submarines and gunboats, and a large amount of other armament.
Or take, for example, the activity of the transportation specialists. The
successful resolution of the tasks confronting them became possible thanks to
the maximum concentration of their efforts and means in the decisive sectors
of the transportation management, the centralization of the administration of
the branch, and the strenuous, and frequently risky, labor performed by the
railroad workers, motor-road workers, and river-transportation workers. When
carrying out all the operations, transportation uninterruptedly carried out
operational and operational-supply shipments, and carried the wounded back to
the rear. Rail transportation alone carried more than 19 million cars with
military freight.
Something that was exceptionally important in the political, economic, and
social sense was the restoration of the destroyed economy during the course of
the war. Thanks to the titanic work performed by the party, the government
and the entire nation, the restoration proceeded at rapid rates. For example,,
whereas in 1943 the liberated rayons produced industrial output valued at 2.71
billion rubles, in 1944 they already produced 3.1 times more industrial
output. By 1945, 7500 industrial enterprises were restored in the liberated
rayons.
An important role in guaranteeing the Victory was also played by the Rear of
the USSR Armed Forces. That was influenced by the fact that, as the military
production expanded, there was also an increased complexity in the tasks of
delivering promptly everything that was needed to the formations, units, and
ships.
A considerable influence upon the construction of the Rear of the Armed Forces
was exerted by the increasingly complicated military-strategic tasks. For
example, the seizure of the strategic initiative, the increase in the depth
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and rates of the operations, and their duration dictated the need to increase
the number of railroad, motor-transport, and road-management troops.
The basis of supporting the operations and other combat actions was material
supply. With regard to its overall volume of production and expenditure,
during the war years it constituted more than 10 million tons of ammunition,
16.4 million tons of fuel, 40 million tons of food supplies and fodder, and a
large quantity of uniform articles.
During each period of the war, the operation of the rear had its
peculiarities. But one thing is indisputable. Not a single operation, not a
single combat engagement, would have been successful without the prompt
providing of the troops with armament, ammunition, rations, and fuel.
Take, for example, the supplying of the troops with fuel. The fuel reserves
during the period of the defensive Moscow engagement on the Western Front
provided for 35-40 days of operation of the armored-tank and motor-transport
technology and the 10-12 day needs of aviation. With the changeover of the
troops to the counteroffensive, the fuel expenditure increased by 40-50
percent.
In the Battle of Stalingrad 149,000 tons of fuel were, expended; and in the
Kursk engagement, 204,000 tons. And this entire tremendous quantity had to
received from the enterprises, promptly brought to the fuel depots, stored,
and then delivered to the field of combat.
A tremendous contribution to the attainment of Victory was made by the
military medics. They returned to active duty more than 72 percent of the
wounded and 90.6 percent of the sick.
During the wartime years the Rear of the Armed Forces also executed other
important tasks. To meet the needs of aviation, more than 6000.airfields were
equipped, and hundreds of thousands of individual pieces of various kinds of
armament, combat technology, etc. were repaired.
In the course of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet rear received the richest
experience in providing economic support to an armed struggle that was
completely unprecedented with regard to its scope or ferocity, and experience
in mobilizing all the material and spiritual forces of the. nation for the
defeat of the usurper. That experience continues to this day to be of
tremendous, theoretical and practical importance for reinforcing the military-
economic might of our country and of all the countries in: the socialist
community.
As was emphasized in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee entitled "The
40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Nation. in the Great Patriotic
War of 1941-1945," a great exploit was performed during the war years by the
workers in the rear services. The workers, kolkhoz members, scientists,
engineers, and designers, by their selfless labor, won an unprecedented battle
for metal and grain and for the creation of powerful Soviet weapons.
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The economic victory of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War was i
complete accord with natural law. It was influenced by the most advance
socialist state and social system, by the advantages that were brilliantly
used during the war years by the Communist Party. It was precisely the party
armed with advanced Marxist-Leninist theory, that mobilized the Soviet nation
for the attainment of Victory.
The advantages of our economy are based on the fact that the enterprises
transportation, communication, natural resources, and material means are owned
by the nation. Unprecedented opportunities, as compared with the capitalist
countries, were opened up by the planned. socialist economy. That wa
precisely the factor that helped our country to use more effectively every to
of metal and coal, and every piece of machine-tool equipment. The Communist
Party was able to guarantee a higher concentration of industry than that o
the enemy, and was able in a planned and flexible manner to concentrate the
country's forces and means on the resolution of the chief tasks.
Falsifiers of history in the West are striving with all their-might to
exaggerate the role that was played by the shipments of arms and ammunition td
the Soviet Union from the United States and England. Actuality refutes the
conjectures of the imperialistic historians and politicians. The Allied
shipped to us only 2 percent of the antiaircraft pieces, 13 percent of the
aircraft, and 7 percent of the tanks. It is completely obvious that the
Soviet Union destroyed the fascists by using Soviet-produced weapons.
Almost 40 years have passed since the victorious May 1945. During the decades
that have elapsed, the USSR has achieved tremendous success in all spheres or
social life. An important stage in the further reinforcement of our
Motherland's might is the final year of the 11th Five-Year Plan. The State
Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1985, which was
approved by the 2nd Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, hasl
set down new prospects for improving mature socialism. That plan stipulates
the resolution of the key questions in the development of the economy, thef
raising of the national standard of living, and the guaranteeing of our
country's defense capability.
The economic and scientific-technical potential of the USSR represents a very
reliable factor in deterring the imperialistic aggression. "The party'
Central Committee and the Soviet government," K. U. Chernenko has stated
"understand their very great responsibility to the nation. June 1941 will not
be repeatedl Any aggressor will receive immediate retribution.. Let everyone
know that -- both our friends, and those who are not our friends."
The Land of the Soviets has never striven for, and is not striving now for*
the attainment of military superiority over anyone. But the Soviet Union will
not allow the disturbance of the military balance that has developed. The$
present-day level of production, science, and technology in the USSR makes it
possible to create -- if this should be. required in response to a military
challenge issued by imperialism -- any types of arms and to supply them in the
necessary quantity to the army and navy, and to maintain our Armed Forces
constantly in a high state of combat readiness.
COPYRIGHT:. "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sit".,; 1985..
5075
CSO:; 1801/155
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