CHANGING SUBSTANCE AND NATURE OF INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR

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CHANGING SUBSTANCE AND NATURE OF INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR
,,,.~ C71l~l TT'f
R
-a1V
AL _LL1 nussjan No 11, Nou.&5 (signed to
[Article by Lt Gen A.I. Yevseyev, Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent:
"On Certain Trends in the Changing Substance and Nature of the Initial Peri-
od of a War (Based on the Experience of World Wars I and II)"; passages en-
closed in slantlines printed in boldface]
[Text] In the last two wars, the entry of the opposing sides into the war
and the conduct of military operations at the beginning of the war comprised
a specific period, which differed significantly in substance from subsequent
periods and had a number of unique features. The beginning of the war marked
a transition from peaceful, political forms of struggle to the use of force.
After that only the forms and methods of warfare changed. Along with the be-
ginning of military operations during that period, an entire system of politi-
cal, ideological, economic and actual military measures were carried out,
there was a readjustment in the perception of the people, and all forces
were mobilized for combatting the enemy. The warring parties attempted to
implement plans devised in peacetime and to employ means of warfare un-
known to the enemy and new methods of conducting combat operations. And
experience showed that the interweaving of numerous political, economic,
military and other factors made that period extremely complex. It was par-
ticularly complex in World War II, which involved many dozens of nations on
various continents and affected the vital interests of almost all of the
world's peoples.
Questions pertaining to the initial period of the war were discussed in a
number of works and articles by Soviet and foreign authors. (Footnote 1)
(Ye.A. Shilovskiy, "The Initial Period of the War" in VOYNA I REVOLUTSIYA,
October 1933; "Nachalnyy period voyny" [The Initial Period of the War],
under the general editorship of S.P. Iyanov, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974;
VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1959; Nos 8, 9, 1960. Problems per-
taining to the initial period have also been discussed in the works of V.A.
Melikov, A.M. Zayonchikovskiy and R.P. Eydeman, in the Works of Foch Kuhlman,
Ludendorff and a number of other military theoreticians.) The experience
acquired in this area is also highly important today for the continuing study
of a large group of problems.
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The initial period of a war, which came into being with the appearance of
large-scale armies requiring mobilization, assembling and deployment, sub-
sequently continued to change. The changes in its substance and its nature
were influenced by many factors. In our opinion, the employment of new types
of weapons and combat equipment by the warring parties and changing methods
of unleashing wars should be considered to be the main ones. Specific, fairly
stable trends took shape in the process of change.
The /trend of change in the substance of the initial period/ was manifested
most vividly in the past two world wars. This is graphically depicted in
Table 1.
The'table shows that the initial period of World War I mainly involved mobi-
lization, assembly and deployment of forces, and conversion of the economy from
peacetime to wartime footing. Until these measures were completed, combat
operations were conducted by relatively small groupings and with the limited
objectives of covering the strategic deployment of the armed forces for cc-
-ducting military operations in accordance with plans for the first operations,
and frustrating planned implementation of mobilization and deployment of
forces by the opposing side.
In order to forestall the enemy in preparing for active combat operations,,
however, in World War I, even before it was declared, the parties secretly'
placed part of their armed forces onto wartime status., made preparations fcr
general mobilization and deployed forces in regions adjacent to borders.
The combat characteristics of the weapons and military equipment were greatly
enhanced during the period between the wars, and the improved economic capa-
bilities of the developed nations created the situation for maintaining air
forces and formations of tank, motorized and other branches of troops in a
state of mobilizational readiness in peacetime, which could be used for a
surprise attack and the conduct of active combat operations from the begin-
ning of a war. It was primarily the military-political leadership of fascist
Germany which took advantage of this. When it prepared for its predacious!
wars, it planned and implemented most of the preparatory steps pertaining to
the conversion of the national economy onto a war footing and the concentr6-
tion and deployment of its armed forces prior to the war. This was done in
order to simultaneously commit to battle the main forces of its army and to
conduct extensive offensive operations from the very beginning in the interest
of achieving important strategic results. "An operation will only make sejnse,"
Hitler maintained, "if we totally defeat a state with a single thrust."
(Footnote 1) ("'Sovershenno sekretno! Tolko dlya komandovaniy !': Dokume}nty
i materialy"("Top Secret! Only For Command!": Documents and Materials],
Moscow, Nauka, 1967, p 143)
Soviet military thought during that period, although proceeding from the as-
sumption that war between such states as Germany and the USSR would begin
without advanced declaration with operations by large groupings of troops
accepted the possibility that the initial period would develop in approxi-
mately.the same manner as in World War I. It was assumed that the main
forces would go into action after border engagements and after the strategic
deployment of the armed forces of the parties had been completed. It was;
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therefore believed that the initial period would include mobilization, border
engagements for covering the concentration and deployment of troops, the de-
ployment of the main forces under the plan for the war and their occupation
of the forming-up position for conducting the first decisive operations.
(Footnote 1) ("Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. 1939-1945" [World War II, 1939-1945],
under the general editorship of S.P. Platonov, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1958,
p 170 In this case fascist Germany would be operating under the same condi-
tions as the Soviet Union.
World War II was begun and conducted entirely differently than World War I,
however. The aggressor's capability for unexpected and concentrated employ-
ment of such types of weapons and branches of troops as the aviation and tanks,
as well as large motorized formations, permitted him to simultaneously destroy
troops and extremely important installations to a relatively great depth.
This drastically altered the conditions for the strategic deployment of armed
forces by the nations subjected to attack and the nature of their operations,
and consequently, also the substance of the initial period.
From the very beginning of its aggression, fascist Germany carried out exten-
sive offensive operations with powerful groupings of troops created in advance
and deployed in secret. The immediate objective was to route the first
echelon of the opposing side's armed forces, to frustrate the deployment of
its main forces and set the stage for a victorious conclusion of the war.
As a result, the states which were subjected to a surprise attack were forced,
as a rule, to conduct difficult offensive battles with forces of the first
strategic echelon during that period. The mobilization, concentration and
deployment of forces of the second strategic echelon and the reserve continued
under cover of those battles.
In its most general form, the initial period of World War II was therefore a
specific segment of time during which the belligerents conducted the first
(offensive and defensive) operations with groupings of armed forces deployed
by the time the war began for purposes of achieving immediate strategic ob-
jectives or creating advantageous conditions for subsequent military opera-
tions. The side subjected to a surprise attack also carried out overt mobi-
lization and internal measures to convert the nation to a wartime footing.
And so, the general trend in the change occurring in the substance of the
initial period during the two past world wars was that active military opera-
tions conducted for purposes of achieving crucial strategic objectives began
to dominate during that period. The aggressor conducted preparatory measures,
including the mobilization and deployment of forces for conducting the first
operations, during the period preceeding the war.
The objectives assigned the armed forces during the initial period differed
from those of World War I, and the quantity of personnel and equipment allo-
cated for achieving them increased. The aggressor typically attempted to
apply the entire power of its armed forces during the first strike, in order
to disorganize command and control, to defeat..the enemy's main groupings of
forces, his aviation and navy., to stun him and deprive him of the possibility
of resisting and taking retaliatory steps. In the war against France in 1940,
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for example, 136 of 148 divisions mobilized by fascist Germany were concen-
trated for the initial thrust. This was more than 90 percent of all the
Wehrmacht's ground forces. (Footnote 1) ("Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya,"
Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1980, Vol 8, p 328) The German fascist command used 190
divisions, around 4,300 tanks, 47,200 guns and mortars, and 4,980 aircraft
(more than'83 percent of the ground forces and 62 percent of the aviation)
for the surprise attack on the USSR. (Footnote 2) (Ibid., Vol 2, p 55)
The moment at which the main forces were committed to battle in World War II
was moved decisively closer to Its beginning as a result.
The changing substance of the initial period of a war is a trend which con-
tinues today. A war against the USSR and other socialist commonwealth nations[,
should imperialism's aggressive forces succeed in unleashing one, will be a
crucial armed conflict between the two opposite systems, capitalism and so-
cialism. The objective of a future war by the USA against the USSR is de-
scribed with absolute clarity in Directive No -59 signed by former U.S.
President J. Carter-in 1980: the destruction of socialism as a social and
political. system. The main concept behind the strategy of "direct confron-
tation" is the unlimited employment of strategic offensive forces in the
first strike.
Soviet military. doctrine is a defensive one.. This means. that the USSR will
never be the first to employ nuclear weapons or military .force. In the face
of the real threat on the part of the imperialists, however, the Soviet Armed
Forces are constantly prepared for retaliatory actions: a resolute rebuff
for any aggressor and if necessary, an all-destroying strike.
All of this provides reason to assume that unlike past world wars, the
main substance of .the initial period in the contemporary situation may in-
volve nuclear strikes or strikes with conventional weapons by the belliger-
ents and the conduct of active military operations from the very beginning
with strategic groupings of forces deployed in peacetime for achieving the
main objectives of the war. The mobilization and deployment of the armed
forces in the.theaters of military operations and the conversion of the eco-
nomy to a wartime footing may be completed at the same time.
World Wars I and I.I demonstrated with absolute clarity a stable /trend.,of
growing importance forachieving, the objective 'of the initial period of. concen-
trated employment of new. weaponry/. During World War'I, the states in both
coalitions were already intensively readying new. types of weapons (aircraft,'
dirigibles, submarines, flame-throwers and chemical agents), with the sur-
prise employment of which it was planned to stun.the enemy and create good
conditions for conducting subsequent combat operations. V.I..Lenin pointed
out this trend. The German bourgeoisie, he wrote, "selected the time for
the war most convenient from its standpoint, utilizing.its latest improve-
ments in military. equipment and anticipating new weapons already planned and
decided upon by Russia and. France." (Footnote 2) (V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr
soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 26, p 16) 'As the destructive power
and range of the weapons and the mobility of the troops increased, the possi-
bilities for achieving.increasingly more important. strategic results during,'
operations of the initial. period also increased. Fascist Germany attempted
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to utilize the factor again at the beginning of World War II. It had a
powerful base of materiel and attempted to put into force its superiority
in technical means of conducting warfare. The surprise and large-scale
employment of those-weapons permitted the German fascist command to achieve
significant results within a short period of time. In the war against Poland,
for example, massive strikes by German aircraft against airfields, road junc-
tions and troops concentration sites made it possible to rapidly gain air
superiority, frustrated the mobilization and strategic deployment, and dis-
organized control of the nation and its armed forces. The Wehrmacht's
superiority in mobility and maneuverability made it possible to rapidly
penetrate the Polish Army's defense and split its front into pieces, to en-
circle and eliminate the main groupings of forces.
At the beginning of the Great Patriotic.War, as a result of the concentrated
employment of aircraft, tanks and motorized formations, the German fascist
army succeeded in destroying the Soviet Forces' strategic defensive front,
moving-deep into their rear area, preventing reserves moved up from the depth
from concentrating and from occupying their designated lines, frustrating or
weakening counterthrusts and in many cases, encircling large groupings of
troops or cutting them off from the main forces. (Footnote 1) ("Istoriya
vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-19451, Vol 4,
p 489)
The employment of modern weapons can have an immeasurably greater effect upon
the achievement of the objectives for the initial period of a future war.
And. we must not forget the fact that during the entire period since the war,
the USA has been making a desperate. effort to gain technical military
superiority over the USSR. It has created an enormous arsenal of the latest
weapons for implementing its aggressive schemes. Imperialist circles in the
USA and their allies in NATO plan to use these latest weapons to inflict a
"disarming" strike upon the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations, to
deprive them of the possibility of taking retaliatory action, and to achieve
their own objectives within a short period of time.
A /trend of growing influence of the results of the initial period upon the
subsequent course of combat operations/ was extremely clearly manifested.
It took shape during World War I. Although the military operations conducted
during its initial period had limited objectives, they created favorable con-
ditions for deploying groupings of armed forces and beginning the first opera-
tions.. During World War II, this trend underwent.further development. As a
result of the large-scale use of new types of weapons and military equipment,
as well as decisive methods of conducting combat operations, the German fascist
army succeeded in capturing enormous territories during the initial period and
defeating large groupings of armed forces, thereby creating favorable condi-
tions for the subsequent armed conflict. Furthermore, in those case in which
a nation subjected to aggression was inadequately prepared militarily and
economically and occupied little territory, it suffered total defeat during
the initial period (Poland, Holland and Denmark).
Even when the belligerents on both sides had considerable forces and equipment
but one of them-forestalled the other in deployment and execution of the strike,
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the outcome of operations during the initial period placed the nation sub-
jected'to the surprise attack into an extremely difficult position and had
a significant effect upon the. subsequent course of the armed conflict.
The unfavorable outcome of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War,
for example, continued for a long time to have a negative effect upon the
course of military operations and made it necessary for the Soviet people
and their Armed Forces to apply enormous efforts to halt the enemy and
alter the course of the struggle to their benefit.
In the Pacific theater, the American aviation on the Hawaiian and Philippine
Islands was destroyed, and England's aviation and navy in Malaya suffered
great damage as a result of strikes by the Japanese fleet and aviation in
orhoniheld athefinitinitiative
December of 1941. The swift advance ofthealJapanese,
absolutely, frustrated all attempts by the
important strategic lines. And despite the great economic and military
capabilities of the USA and.England, the results of the initial period.af-
fected the subsequent course of military. operations for a long time.
The constant development of weapons provides the basis for assuming that
the results of the initial period in a future war can have a considerably
greater affect upon the course and the outcome of.military operations than ',
in the past.
Stockpiles of nuclear ammunition, and various delivery systems created in the
USA and other NATO nations are perfectly adequate for rapidly destroying or
damaging many times over all of the important targets to the entire depth Of
the nation subjected to attack. The strategic weapons presently possessed!,
by the United States, for example, can lift more than 12,000 units of nuclear am-
munition at a single launching (takeoff). The U.S. Government plans to in-
crease its strategic first-strike capability to 20,000 nuclear charges by
1990. (Footnote 1) ("Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [Whence Comes the Threat
to Peace], 3rd edition, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1984, pp 17, 31) Their total
power exceeds hundreds of times over the power of all explosives.and ammun.-
tion used by the warring states of the world during World War II. Plans
worked out by the U.S. and. NATO command set the mission of destroying bothl,
nuclear and conventional weapons of the Soviet Union, its military-economip
facilities, railroad junctions, control agencies and posts, and destroying!
the main groupings of the armed forces. The USA, Defense Secretary C..Wineberger.
has stated, must acquire "the capability for delivering a nuclear strike
against the Soviet Union which threatens the existence of the society itself."
(Footnote 2) (PRAVDA, 3 July 1985) Objectively, the employment of the qu,ali-
tatively new-weapons in a future war will create the conditions necessary for
achieving during its initial period, results which can in no way be compared
with the results of the initial period of past wars. The importance of this
period lies in the fact that the very first massive nuclear strikes can to an
enormous degree predetermine the entire subsequent course of the war and re-
sult in losses in therear.area and in the forces, which can place the people
and the nation into an exceptionally difficult situation. (Footnote 3)
("XII syezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Stenograficheskiy
otchet" [The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Steno-
graphic Record], Vol II, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1962, p 112) Because of this
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the initial period of a future nuclear-missile war could be the main and de-
cisive period, which will greatly predetermine the subsequent development of
the armed conflict and in certain situations, the outcome of the war. Even
if the war begins with the employment of conventional weapons, which have
great destructive power and considerable range, airmobile formations and
powerful armored equipment, the initial period may have an enormous influence
upon the subsequent course of military operations.
A /trend of increasing spacial scope for military operations/ during the ini-
tial period was clearly revealed during the two world wars. During the ini-
tial period of World War I, unlike previous wars, German forces occupied the
territory of.neutral Luxemburg and captured the Belgium fortress of Liege in
the West European theater.
During the initial period of World War II combat operations developed simul-
taneously over vast areas and enveloped areas deep in the rear-of the bellig-
erents. In the war against Poland, for example, they were conducted on a
front of 700 kilometers and. to a depth of 350-400 kilometers. The average
daily rate of. advance by the German fascist forces was 20-24 kilometers.
During the initial period of the Great Patriotic War the armed conflict de-
veloped on a front of more than 3,000 kilometers. By mid-July striking
groups of the Wehrmacht on the western sector had advanced to a depth of
400-600 kilometers, moving at an average daily rate of 20-30 kilometers. On
certain days the enemy's tank groupings advanced 40 to 60 kilometers.
The fact that the opposing sides can use modern strategic nuclear weapons,
particularly missiles with unlimited range and capable of striking at tar-
gets located anywhere on the planet, assures immeasurable expansion of the
borders of an armed struggle, which may embrace all of the world's continents
from the very.beginning and become intercontinental.
Today, it is apparent that a different approach must be taken to the assess-
ment of the time factor. The drastically increased. range and speed of action
of modern. weapons makes it possible to rapidly destroy targets at various
depths. This is graphically depicted in Table 2.
Table 2. Approximate Data on Missile Flight Times
PaccTORHHe Ao o6r,eKra I 20001 4000
(1) nopa>KeHHA, KM
BpeMA nonera paKeTW, MUM 1 6-81 15-17
(2)
Key:
1. Distance to target, km
2. Missile flight time, min
6000 1 8000 1 10 000
30 1 33 1 35
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Since the new weapons make it possible to achieve the immediate strategic
objectives far more rapidly than was the case in World War II, it is most
likely that the initial period of a future war may also be briefer.
Consequently, the initial period of a future war will differ substantially
from the initial periods of past wars with.respect to scale of military
operations. And this applies not just to a nuclear war. The new concept of!:
the AirLand operation adopted by the Pentagon as part of the "direct confronr
tation" strategy, calls for the surprise launching of military operations,
the infliction of maximum destruction upon the enemy with the latest weapons',
and determined operations into the depth by ground forces, air and naval
forces, which simultaneously envelop all of the nation's territory.
The warring sides always attempted to use the element of surprise as one of
the most important factors for achieving the assigned objective. /The trend)
toward the achievement of surprise in an attack by the aggressor was particu-
larly vividly manifested in World War II/. The military-political leadership
of fascist Germany and militaristic Japan used all possible means for achie\-
ing this: the press, radio, diplomatic channels, false documents, etc.
Dissemination of false information was practiced on a large scale. Prior to
an. attack the aggressor would attempt to create a psychological climate in
his nation and the region as a whole, which would permit him to '.'justify" his
treachery. German fascism and Japanese militarism made extensive use of de-
liberate lies, blackmail and the intimidation of other nations with non-
existent danger for this purpose.
The difference in the degree of readiness of the armed forces on the opposi$~g
sides predetermined to a significant degree the aggressor's success and the11
unsuccessful outcome of the initial period for nations subjected to a surprise
attack. Hitlerite Germany's treacherous surprise attack on the Soviet Unioi,
for example, placed forces of the western border military districts into ex-
tremely difficult situations for conducting their initial operations. Because
of the incomplete preparedness of the formations, they were committed to
battle piecemeal and without essential fire and air support. The mobilization,
concentration and operational deployment. of the troops were carried out aft~er
combat operations had already begun, under air strikes and sometimes, under
attack by enemy groupings. All of this was one of the most important reasons
why events developed disadvantageously for us at the beginning of the war.,
In addition to this, it should be pointed out that the more the element of
surprise came into play, the more effort and time were required of the nation
subjected to aggression for stabilizing the. front and altering the strategic
situation in.its favor.
In their preparations for a new war against the socialist nations, the aggres-
sive imperialist states continue to count mainly on a surprise attack. Fu ther-
more, the possibility of carrying out a so-called preventive strike, which,is
essentially an anticipatory attack, should the military-political leadership
of the USA unleash a war, has been elevated to the rank of state policy.
"The treacherous, predacious invasion of another's territory without a declara-
tion of war," Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade S.L. Sokolov, candidate]
member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and Minister of Defense
of the USSR, states, "has become a sort of norm for the imperialist aggressors."
(Footnote 1) (KOMMUNIST, No 6, 1985, p 68)
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The organizational development and the technical equipment of the armed
forces of the USA and its NATO allies are being carried out, and various
methods are being worked out for unleashing and conducting a war in the
spirit of these aggressive designs. Large groupings capable of conducting
active offensive operations for achieving the objectives of the initial
operations without additional reinforcements have already been created near
the borders of the socialist commonwealth nations. Strategic first-strike
weapons are being developed at an accelerated pace, which can be placed into
action immediately at the proper signal. Agencies and posts for troop con-
trol and command have been set up in the theaters of military operations, and
a global communications system has been established. The USA with its enor-
mous nuclear capability stubbornly resists accepting a commitment not to be
the first to employ nuclear weapons.
Various types of exercises and large-scale maneuvers by groupings of NATO's
armed forces are regularly conducted near the borders of the Warsaw Pact
nations in a situation approaching actual combat to the maximum. possible de-
gree. Each year 300,000-350,000 soldiers and offiers, up to 15,000 units of
tracked equipment, more than 2,000 combat aircraft and 300-500 ships take
part in them annually. (Footnote 1) (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 16 January 1985)
Different versions of general and "limited" wars against the socialist nations
are openly practiced. in these exercises. Large mobilizational activities and
strategic troop movements., and joint operations involving conventional, nuclear
and chemical weapons are planned and rehearsed.
The "Global Shield" exercises have been regularly conducted of late, which
are unprecedented with respect to scale and the composition of the forces
involved and which practice variations for conducting.a strategic nuclear
war against the Soviet Union. Intercontinental ballistic missiles.are
launched, and massive flights are made toward the USSR by strategic aircraft
during these exercises. (Footnote 2) ("Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru," p 68)
This has made it more and more difficult to distinguish these exercises and
maneuvers from the real initiation of aggression. They therefore make it far
easier to carry out secret preparations for a war against the USSR and to
achieve a surprise attack.. Along with the material preparations, unceasing
massive "psychological attacks" continue as in' the past to be carried out
against the socialist social system and Marxist-Leninist ideology.. Entire
streams of lies and slander sweep onto the socialist nations.
The possibility of a surprise attack by an aggressor employing all the avail-
able power of its armed forces has brought forth the requirement that the
army and navy be maintained in a constant state of readiness to repel aggres-
sion and inflict powerful retaliatory strikes upon the enemy.
And so, the experience of the past two world wars makes it possible to con-
clude that the substance and the nature of the initial-period have changed
and that its influence upon the subsequent course of the war has increased.
The scope of military operations has grown immeasurably. The surprise fac-
tor has assumed a greater and greater role. The likelihood of the employ-
ment of qualitatively new types of weapons with enormous destructive power
and the changes which have occurred in methods of conducting military operations
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provide the basis for assuming.that the trends noted will retain their sig-
nificance also in a future war.
The World War II experience made it perfectly apparent that the initial period
had come to involve mainly extremely intensive combat operations to seize the
initiative and achieve the most important strategic objectives. The change',
in the procedure for entering a war was brought about by qualitative changes
in the entire system for preparing a nation for war, particularly in the
sequence and the time involved in accomplishing the strategic deployment of
the armed forces. It became imperative to take the main steps to prepare
for frustrating aggression when an actual threat of attack arose. It became
particularly Important to reduce the amount of time required to accomplish
them to the maximum possible degree.
The initial period of the Great Patriotic War demonstrated once again that it
is necessary to vigilantly monitor the intrigues of the aggressive imperialist
states and to always know the status of their armed forces and the possible
nature of their activities. The more serious becomes the threat of the surl-
prise unleashing of a war by an aggressor, the greater must be the combat
readiness of the army and navy and the more stable must be the system of
leadership of the armed forces and of the nation as a whole. The repelling
of a surprise attack, the successful development of military operations ano
the subsequent course of a war depend to a crucial degree upon the capability
of the armed forces during the very first minutes of the war to make deter-t
mined and effective use of their combat strength, to employ the weapons at!,
their disposal and immediately carry out the missions assigned to them.
Because of the increased role of new types of weapons and combat equipment '', in
the achievement of the objectives for the initial period, it has become par-
ticularly important to maintain the technical equipment of the troops and
naval. forces at a high level. The lessons from the past war teach us that,
in order for the armed forces not to be caught unawares, they must always
have the most modern types of weapons and combat equipment, which incorporate
the latest scientific achievements and which are not inferior to analogous,
weapons systems of the armies of likely enemies with respect to tactical and
technical characteristics.
The fact that questions pertaining to the initial period had not been ade--
quately worked out theoretically prior to the war had a certain negative
effect upon the course of military operations at the beginning of the Great
Patriotic War. It is extremely important for military science to thoroughly
study in peacetime all of.the most important problems pertaining to prepara-
tions for and the conduct of the armed struggle during the initial period.,
It is highly important to study the initial periods of the past world wars'
and those of local. wars and conflicts unleashed by the imperialist states.',
COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1985.
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